

INDIA IN PARLIAMENT & ABROAD

INDIA IN PARLIAMENT AND ABROAD 1919-20.

Being a Record of Proceedings on Indian Affairs in
both Houses of the British Parliament, and a
Symposium of all about India & Indians
in the Dominions, America
and Abroad.

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FOREWORD

The following pages relating to Parliamentary Proceedings on Indian Affairs and matters affecting India and Indians in the Dominions and elsewhere constitute a section of the Indian Annual Register for 1921, and are now issued in a separate volume for the convenience of those who are interested in this matter alone and cannot go in for the parent volume. The series "India in Parliament and Abroad," issued by us annually, purports to present to the Indian Public in convenient book-form matters vitally affecting Indian interest which otherwise remain almost a sealed book to us. For, the full proceedings of Parliament and of the Imperial and other Conferences, where Indian matters of momentous importance are discussed and decided upon, are available in this country only in the form of meagre summary Press Telegrams, and, in the absence of a cheap and handy compilation of these proceedings, the general run of educated Indians fails to maintain that abiding interest in these matters as they would like to do. We hope, however, that this publication will meet the desideratum.

PUBLISHER

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Indians in South Africa

The South African Asiatic Commission of Enquiry

The Commission of Enquiry, regarding the grievances of Indians in South Africa promised by the authorities by the middle of 1919, was eventually set up early in 1920 with the Hon. J. H. Lange, K.C., Judge, Kimberley, as Chairman and Lieutenant Colonel Wylie, K.C., of Durban and Mr. E. Roth, solicitor, of Pretoria as members. Sir Benjamin Robertson, the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, was deputed by Government of India in January 1920 to place the India Government's case before the Commission. [For antecedent matters, see the Register 1920, Part II, pp. 342—52.]

The Commission began its sittings to take evidence from April 1920, at Durban.

On April 30, Mr. H. H. Kemp, Assistant Town Clerk of Durban, stated that he was absolutely opposed to Asiatics as traders and district settlers in this country, for social and economic reasons as also on grounds of colour or race. His only remedy for the thorny question was the complete repatriation of all Indians, clock, stock and barrel with expropriation of their property, subject to reasonable compensation. The question in South Africa was a national one.

Mr. Leon Renaud, advocate, Durban, said that the Indians had played a very important part in the making of Natal and Coast Sugar Industry, as well as in the railway development on the coast. The Indian had done much in the way of production.

Colonel Frieid Addison, retired Sugar planter, said that the Indian was much more regular and reliable than the native. He had never been able to do more than barely pay expenses until he introduced the Indian. It would practically spell ruination for the sugar industry if they were to part with the Indians.

Mr. W. Doull presented a statement on behalf of the Durban Committee of the South African National Indian Congress. The following proposals were submitted:—(1) Standard wages to all labourers, irrespective of race or colour, and subsequent improvement in conditions of life; (2) Legislation providing for a minimum standard of wages to shop assistants and all other ranks of labour on an equitable basis. (3) Amendment of the licensing laws on the lines of the Transvaal Ordinance, No. 9 of 1912, and providing

that licence can be refused only on the specified grounds contained in that Ordinance, with the following amendments thereto :—

(a) Three convictions within, say, the last two years on any criminal charge other than that of contravening a trading law or by-law ; (b) that the words “in the opinion of the Council” be deleted, and the reason why the applicant is not deemed desirable to be stated by the authority refusing the licence. (4) That there be a right to appeal to the Court in all licensing matters, whether the application is for a new licence or for a transfer or removal or renewal. (5) That the laws affecting land and licences be made applicable to the whole of Natal, which includes the Northern Districts of Natal and Zululand.

The principal evidence given to the Commission on May 1 was that by a deputation of farmers appointed by the Natal Agricultural Union at a Conference held at Pietermaritzburg in April. The Union represented the general body of Natal farmers. The deputation presented the following resolution embodying the views of the Natal Farmers, and unanimously passed.

“This Conference records its considered opinion that the Asiatic problem presents a serious menace to the Union of South Africa and recommends that :—

(a) While recognising that the existing tenure of land by Asiatics should not be interfered with, no further acquisition of land by purchase, lease, or other means, by Asiatics, should be allowed.

(b) No new licences shall under any circumstances be issued to Asiatics.

(c) No transfer of any existing licences to any Asiatic shall be permitted, but at the expiry of any licence held by an Asiatic by death of the holder, reasonable compensation for land and trading stocks shall be paid.

(d) That the Government shall legislate on most drastic lines against the holding by any European or other person of a licence on behalf of any Asiatic.

(e) At such future date as shall be fixed by legislation, all Asiatic licences now held by companies shall expire, and compensation shall be paid to such holders.

(f) The urgency of this matter calls for immediate settlement by legislation.

Colonial-born Indians

A deputation of Colonial-born Indians consisting of Messrs. J. M. Francis, A. Christopher, V. S. C. Pather, L. Panday and J. Hoover presented to the Commission a statement of their views, Mr.

Christopher acting as the spokesman. The statement emphasised the right of the Colonial-born Indians to live in the country of their birth, for which many of them had fought in East Africa and other theatres during the Great War.

On Monday, May 3, Mr. A. J. S. Maritz, Magistrate at Stanger, the centre of a large Indian district on the sugar-growing North Coast, spoke most highly of the Indian. He considered that the only solution of the difficulty was to educate the Indians up to the European standard.

Final Evidence

Evidence was then taken by the Commission in the Cape Province, Transvaal, and Natal. Although there was no representative of India on the Commission, Indian interests were very closely watched throughout by Sir Benjamin Robertson, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces. Able counsel have been employed by the Asiatics in all these Provinces visited by the Commission, and their case was ably sustained by both Indian and European evidence. Everywhere the Asiatic organisation seemed to be very effective, and superior to that of their European opponents. The Commission did not sit in the Orange Free State, where Indians form but a negligible number.

Pietermaritzburg Sitings

The Commission sat in the Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg, the Natal capital, from Tuesday May 4, until the end of the week.

Lieut.-Col. A. T. G. Wales was the first witness. He said he had known the Indian for over sixty years. He was brought up among them, and had indeed been nursed by them. He thought that the present rights of the Indians should be retained, but there should be no extension. Indians had been useful agriculturally, industrially, and generally. Every inducement should be put in the way of Indians desirous of returning to India, but there should be no compulsion.

Major W. Comrie, M. P. C., appeared on behalf of the Richmond Agricultural Society. He submitted that the Indian influence in Natal was a very dangerous one, and the prospects exceedingly serious. He pointed out that Indians were exempt from military service, whereas Europeans from 18 to 60 years of age could be called out for military service when needed, as had happened in the Natal Native Rebellion of 1906.

Lieut.-Col. Fawcus, also representing the Richmond Agricultural Society, stated that he considered it to be a manifest injustice to the Native that Indians brought into South Africa should be given rights above those of the natives. The Indian had not a good

influence on the native in South Africa. Every Indian should be encouraged to go out of the country, and those who stayed should be placed in locations. The Asiatic was not a desirable farmer. He considered segregation to be quite feasible, as there was plenty of land. The rate at which Indians were increasing was such as gave the Europeans no chance. Indians were increasing at the rate of 56 per 1,000 per annum; the natives at the rate of 28 per 1,000, and the Europeans at the rate of 14. He suggested that the Indians be put into segregation areas pending their return to India. There was far more room for Indians in India than there was in Natal, and he suggested that a man be given £100 to return to India and his wife £50. He stated that there was a widespread movement in India to have Europeans repatriated. He did not blame anyone; but there should be a similar movement in South Africa to get the Indian away. Australia, Canada and New Zealand would not have Indians. Then why should Natal?

Mr. J. Hunt Holley, farmer of Sandymount, said that he had been farming all his life in Natal. The Indian had anything but a good influence, and he would like to see him out of the country. The Indian store was a centre for immorality: he had often passed Indian stores, and noticed a number of Kafir women round about. His own reason satisfied him that there was no reason for doubting that immorality did exist in the Indian stores.

Mr. P. W. Stride, Town Treasurer of the City of Pietermaritzburg, presented resolutions of the City Council proposing the division of the City into three racial areas, namely, (1) Europeans or coloured persons (St. Helenas), (2) Asiatics, (3) Natives, where no other persons may acquire, own or occupy land or buildings. The Council also submitted that trading should be restricted to the areas set apart for the respective races. Mr. Stride stated that the Asiatic population of the City had increased from 188·7 by 360·5 per cent. The European increase for the same period had been one-third of that.

The final municipal resolution submitted by Mr. Stride read:—
“The existence of Asiatic stores and business in Upper Church Street, the principal thoroughfare of the city has been unfavourably commented on for the past thirty years. These places are a blot on the City, and a perpetual eyesore, and should be eliminated.”

The Natal Legislation 1908

The remainder of the evidence taken by the Commission at Pietermaritzburg brought forward little new with the exception of the statement put in by Mr. Selke as to the Natal legislation of 1908 affecting Asiatics.

The Natal Parliament passed two Bills in 1908 affecting Asiatic traders. Both were passed with a support that bore witness to the fact that Parliament had the electorate fully at its back. One was passed unanimously through both Houses prohibiting the issue of new licences to Asiatics after December 1, 1908. The second Bill prohibited the holding of present trading licences after December 31, 1918, by Asiatics. This was carried through Parliament in both Houses, by majorities of two to one. Both Bills were reserved, and disallowed by the Crown, owing presumably, to the demur of the Indian Government.

Further evidence at Dundee, in northern Natal, was taken, and this closed the investigating labours of the Commission.

The Report of the Commission

The Government of India received a copy of the interim report, dated May 12, 1920, submitted by the Asiatic Enquiry Commission to the Governor-General of South Africa. The report is as follows :—

“During the course of our enquiries, evidence has been laid before us which tends to show that there is at present, owing to the shortage of rice and other causes, considerable number of Indians who with their families would be prepared to return to India if the opportunity were afforded to them. We have also had evidence from an influential Calcutta merchant at present on a visit to the Union, who until recently was the Chairman of the Central Employment and Labour Board under the Government of India, that at the present time, owing to industrial development, the labour supply in India is insufficient to meet the demand and that good wages are being paid.

“The evidence on these points is confirmed by Sir Benjamin Robertson and Mr. G. L. Corbett, the official representatives of the Indian Government. We, therefore, strongly recommended to your Excellency that prompt steps be taken to provide the necessary shipping facilities and to appoint an official well-acquainted with Indian minds and methods to act in a sympathetic manner and lay before the Indians the advantages of immediately returning to India.

Militating Circumstances

“Two main circumstances have hitherto militated against the return of Indians, viz, (1) the excessively long time they are kept at the Durban depot awaiting shipment, during which they spend their available money in subsistence and are consequently driven to re-entering employment to enable them to provide for their families and themselves, and (3) the fact that they are not allowed

to take with them to India their earnings in the shape of gold and their jewellery.

"We, therefore, recommend that immediate steps be taken

(a) to appoint an official not connected with the Protector's Department to organise the return of such Indians as are prepared to go,

(b) to provide frequent shipping facilities at short intervals,

(c) to relax restrictions on the export of gold in so far as necessary in order to allow returning Indians to take their legitimate savings and jewellery with them to India,

(d) to make provision where necessary for enabling Indians and their families to reach their homes after arrival in India.

"Evidence was given before the Commission that at a meeting held at Durban during March last of Indians employed by the South African Railways, 80 per cent. of those present expressed their wish to return to India if assisted thereto. We consider that if action were taken by the Government in furtherance of this desire on the part of their own employees it would become widely known amongst the Indians wishing to return to India and have good results. We feel, too, that advantage should be taken of the presence of Sir Benjamin Robertson and Mr. Corbett, in whom the Indian community have the utmost confidence and whose influence is consequently great, to obtain their assistance and advice regarding the scheme which we have recommended."

Ministerial Statement

In the House of Assembly, Cape Town, on Friday, July 9, the Asiatic question came under discussion in the Committee of Supply on the Interior Vote on the Estimates.

Mr. Van Hees (Christiana) asked for a declaration of Government policy on the Asiatic question. The agitation against Asiatics was, he said, particularly strong in the Transvaal. Segregation, he contended, would not solve the problem. The objection to the Asiatic was based on his low standard of living. The European could not compete with the Asiatics, and the latter demoralised his neighbours in the Transvaal. It was felt that the only method to deal with the Asiatics was repatriation.

The Minister of the Interior (Sir Thomas Watt) said he could only repeat what had been previously stated when the Government was asked what it intended to do towards carrying out the recommendations of the Asiatic Commission. That was that the Government was encouraging Asiatics to go back to their own country (An Hon. Member: minus their gold ?) Free passages, proceeded

Sir Thomas, were granted to Asiatics willing to leave the Union, and the embargo on the export of gold had been raised so as to enable them to take with them savings up to £25 each. This included the total value of the gold they had, whether in ornaments or not ; but it did not include small personal adornments. The law was the same as that applied to Europeans. He was informed that £25 was a fair average of the value of gold, Asiatics used to take home with them prior to the premium on gold. Of course, if a man were caught trying to smuggle gold out of the country, it was seized and confiscated. It was not a question of whether the law was a moral one or not. There the law was, and, while it remained in force, it must be carried out impartially in the case of Asiatics as well as Europeans.

The Minister, continuing, said that an officer had been appointed to supervise the repatriation of Asiatics, and arrangements had been made to obviate the necessity of a long stay in the depots at Durban which there used to be in the past before a vessel could be obtained. Asiatics had become tired of waiting at Durban, and had abandoned their plan of leaving the country. The Minister assured the House that newcomers were rigidly excluded. The few Asiatics now admitted into the Union were either those entitled to return, or wives and families of Asiatics already in the Union.

Referring to segregation, the Minister said that the word "segregation" had not been mentioned, but the whole matter had been referred to the Commission and segregation was a question the Commission was bound to consider. It would be quite improper for him (the Minister) to say what the Government's policy was in the matter before the Commission had reported. But it was quite erroneous to say that the Asiatic population had been increasing in the Transvaal. He predicted on the contrary that the Commission would find that it had decreased.

Finger Prints

The Union Minister of the interior (Sir Thomas Watt) replying to an Indian deputation on the subject of the taking of finger-prints of Indians made the following statement:—Government have decided that where Indians travel inter-provincially in the Union, thumb prints should not be taken in cases in which they are able to read and write either of the official languages of the Union, and their bonafides are otherwise established to the satisfaction of immigration officers.

Indians in British East Africa

Early in January 1920 the Rev. C. F. Andrews, who had gone on a mission of enquiry of the Indian grievances in British East Africa, cabled to India the full draft of the proposed Ordinance menacing the civic rights of the Indian settlers in East Africa. The following is the text —

“Firstly, the bill may be cited as the removal of undesirables Ordinance 1919.

“Secondly, any person within the East African Protectorate not being a native who from information officially received is deemed by the Governor in Council undesirable may be ordered by the Governor to remove himself from the Protectorate before the date prescribed in such order.

“Thirdly any person contravening such order shall be liable on conviction to a fine up to Rs. 1500 or to imprisonment of either description not exceeding six months or both together. Such conviction shall not affect the Government’s power to issue further order under the preceding section against same person.”

The Legislative Council in which this draft ordinance was proposed to be passed was to meet in January 19th. This Ordinance entirely lacks the safeguards against political misuse. The volume of evidence in the Economic Commissions report contains no valid substantiation of Indian moral depravity. The proposed Ordinance left every Indian at the mercy of the executive subservient to interested European agitator against Indians. The unscrupulous nature of the agitation is manifest from the utterly false charges flung about the moral depravity against the Indian settler. The Indians claimed the right of priority to the ordinary natural right to live on terms of equality with every other kind of settler in East Africa.

The following Note by Mr. Andrews on the position of Indians in East Africa was published about this time in India.

[See also *Register 1920, Part II, p. 310.*]

When I reached Mombasa at the end of November, 1919, a copy of the Final Report Part of the Economic Commission of the East Africa Protectorate was put into my hands. It was printed with the Royal Arms prominently displayed on its title page and on its outside cover. In its opening paragraphs it contained two

warrants issued by His Majesty's Ministers, the Heads of Government in March, 1917.

On reading through this Report, I found that it had held its sessions during a period of twenty-two months, and that the evidence had been regarded as of such an important nature that it had all been taken on oath. The Chairman of the Commission was a leading member of the Executive Government of the Protectorate.

This East Africa Economic Commission, thus officially appointed by His Majesty's Ministers, was instituted in direct relation to the Conference of the Allied Nations at Paris, held during the War. It followed throughout the three main headings of that War Conference, dealing with

- (1) Measures for the War period.
- (2) Transitory measures of reconstruction.
- (3) Permanent measures.

It is under the third heading 'permanent measures' that the conclusions of the Commission on the Indian Question are given. If one may judge from a very careful reading of the whole report, not once but many times over, the clear impression is left that these conclusions on the Indian Question were regarded by the Commissioners themselves as by far the most important and convincing part of the whole subject. They are stated at the end of Chapter VII. The heading of the chapter is 'General Native Policy'. The whole problem of the Native Policy of the Protectorate is made to depend upon this one final judgment and verdict:—the exclusion of the Indians.

The pages dealing with the Indian Question read as follows:—

The Economic Commission's Report.

"We have left to the end what is perhaps the factor which more directly than any other affects the welfare of the Native, that is, the influence of the Asiatic.

"It is hoped that the frank discussion of this subject will not cause offence, but it is one which calls for plain speaking.

"It must be borne in mind that any criticism of the Indians which it may be necessary to make refer specifically to those in this Protectorate. These are mostly drawn from the lowest type of artizan coolie and "banya" or small shop-keeping classes, and include few representatives of the more responsible elements of the population of India.

"Further, such criticisms, like most generalisations, are subject to exceptions. There are some Indians in the country who have proved themselves reliable members of society, and of whom we should be sorry to use disparaging terms. Exceptions, however, have little bearing upon the main argument.

"Before the advent of the Imperial B. E. A. Company, Indians were established on the coast, where they seized the opportunity afforded them by the abolition of slavery, to oust by loan and foreclosure the ancient Arab trade and civilisation of which Zanzibar was the centre. But except for occasional incursions by half-caste Baluchis, the interior was untouched by Indian influence till British control was effected. The introduction of the coolies employed on the construction of the Uganda Railway was the first connection of Indians with the interior. The employment of Indian labour for this work was due, it is believed, purely to considerations of convenience, and here it is instructive to note that not only did the capital cost of the Indian-built Railway work out excessively high, more than double the sum for which a reputable firm of British contractors had offered to execute the task with African labour, but that the working costs per train-mile of the Uganda Railway are higher than those of the railways of the South African Union, though the percentage of white men employed on the latter is more than twenty times as great.

"It may be permitted to question whether the authorities of the time realised the immense Imperial significance, for good or evil, of their action in promoting contact between the Natives of East Africa and the decadent civilisation of India. The inevitable effect of the intervention of an intermediate race between European and African is that that race absorbs most of the occasions of personal contact with the African. Hence such intimate influences as the African of this country is at present receiving are mainly imported to him by the Asiatic, and are predominantly Indian rather than British.

"East Africa is in a somewhat different position from any other countries of Africa in respect of this problem.

"The self-governing States of the Union, together with the Rhodesias, control Indian immigration, with a view to ultimate exclusion. In Natal, Indian labour was at one time introduced, but its introduction was subsequently agreed to have been a mistake, and drastic steps have been taken to limit and localise its effects.

"In the African Protectorates under the Colonial Office, immigration is not prohibited, with the result that in East Africa the immigrants have not been confined to the trading class, but have included coolies, clerks, artisans and mechanics. German East Africa was for long protected from this invasion, but latterly, for political reasons, considerable encouragement was given to Indians there.

"It is the distinguishing peculiarity of this country that here the Indian plays the parts of the clerk, artisan, carpenter, mechanic,

etc., functions which the African is capable with training of performing, and does elsewhere perform, satisfactorily. The presence of the Indians, organised as they are to keep the African out of every position which an Indian could fill, deprives the African of all incentives to ambition and opportunities of advancement.

"It may be admitted that the Indian has played and still plays a useful part in opening up trade, stimulating the wants of the natives and inducing them to part with their products for purposes of export. For this service he is entitled to credit, but the essential point is that the same service might, with due encouragement, have been performed by the Native peoples.

"In every direction, the sphere of the Indian in this country is not complementary but competitive with those of the European and African. Even in the minor spheres the European, if the Indian would submit to the civic, moral and commercial obligations current in European Society, has nothing to fear from Indian competition, the contrary theory, which formerly found in local governing circles, having been completely exploded by the history of the past thirteen years. But with the African, the case is different. He is not strong enough anywhere to stand against the competition of the more crafty race. So long as that race is organised to keep him in servitude, by shouldering him out of all the posts which lie in the path of his advancement, he must be content to remain a mere hewer of wood and drawer of water.

"There are, therefore, strong economic reasons against the free admission of certain classes of Indians into the country.

"There are unfortunately other reasons of even greater weight against all Indian immigration into this, or indeed any part of Africa.

Physically the Indian is not a wholesome influence because of his incurable repugnance to sanitation and hygiene. In this respect the African is more civilised than the Indian, being naturally cleanly in his ways; but he is prone to follow the example of those around him. Plague, though said to be "endemic" in the country, has certainly been imported, if not originally, then on later occasions, from Bombay, and Indian quarters are almost invariably the foci of each successive outbreak. The same may be said of all dirt-born diseases. The Indian is everywhere the despair of the sanitarian; here he is a menace not only to himself, but especially to the natives of the country.

"The moral depravity of the Indians is equally damaging to the African, who in his natural state is at least innocent of the worst vices of the East. The Indian is the inciter to crime as well as vice, since it is the opportunity afforded by the ever ready Indian

receiver which makes thieving easy. If the Indians were eliminated, the number of offences against property, now high, would be reduced to manageable proportions.

"The Empire is faced with a serious dilemma which cannot be evaded. The choice lies between the vital interest of the African and the ambition of India. The presence of the Indian in this country is quite obviously inimical to the moral and physical welfare and the economic advancement of the natives. The matter is one of the highest Imperial importance, and we regard it as imperative that the Empire should definitely decide, and that without delay whether the welfare of the African is to be subordinated in his own country to political considerations and the pretensions of the more restless elements of India. Upon the decision as to East Africa, the future of the whole continent will largely depend, for if Indians are to be allowed to stream in at any one entrance in unlimited numbers, it will scarcely be possible to localise them indefinitely in any particular territory.

"Our own view of this question is that there can be no excuse for meeting out to the African treatment to which India herself would never submit.

On purely economic grounds, we submit that the admission of the Indian was a cardinal error of policy. It involved the economic stagnation of the African throughout a large tract of Africa, and the consequent retardation of progress for the sake of what promised to be at best but a temporary convenience. In our view, the error ought gradually, but without unnecessary delay, to be rectified, by similar means to those by which the same error is being rectified in Natal.

"The Railway and other Government Departments should as quickly as possible replace Indian employees by Europeans in the higher grades and Africans in the lower. Further, Asiatics who are allowed to remain in this country should be obliged to conform to the same sanitary standards as Europeans as a condition of their residence here. It will probably be found that this will result in a great reduction in their numbers.

"The Imperial principle which is to control the migration within the Empire of different peoples has been finally laid down by the Imperial Conference in July last in the following terms:—

"It is an inherent function of the Governments of the several communities of the British Commonwealth, including India, that each should enjoy complete control over the composition of its own population, by means of restriction on immigration from any other communities."

"It is therefore essential that a decision of policy in reference to East Africa should be come to without further delay and that such decision shall be based upon the principle of self-determination, and shall consider only the interests of the indigenous native and Arab population and of the race responsible for their control.

"It is our firm conviction that the justification of occupation of this country lies in our ability to adapt the native to our own civilisation.

"If we further complicate this task by continuing to expose the African to the antagonistic influence of the Asiatic, as distinct from European philosophy, we shall be guilty of a breach of trust."

A further chapter of the Economic Commission Report, dealing with the 'Political Future of Middle Africa' was drafted and discussed at several meetings, and up to the last session it had been the intention of the Commission to publish it in the main body of the Report, as Chapter XVII. But during the last session it was decided to omit it from the main Report—possibly because it had the appearance of going slightly beyond the terms of reference. One of the Commissioners, however,—named E. Powyss Coob Esq., of Molo,—attaching great weight to this question, as one which (to quote his own words) "towers above all others and casts its shadow across the whole economic future," has himself published this chapter in a Note under his own name. He has been allowed by the Chairman and members of the Commission to take this somewhat unusual course, and the Chapter is thus fully quoted, as an Appendix, at the end of the Report itself. It reads as follows:—

Political Future of Middle Africa.

"The East Africa Protectorate is an artificially defined territory without natural frontiers (except on its seaboard). It constitutes one of the group of territories under the British Crown comprising (in addition to British East Africa) Uganda, the conquered territory of German East Africa, Nyasaland, and the Rhodesias. The territories of this group, which in this chapter will be referred to as Middle Africa, are to very large extent homogeneous in character, forming together one predominantly agricultural domain of boundless richness and fertility. Middle Africa, is, in fact, one of the world's great unopened storehouses.

"The acquisition of the conquered territory, which formerly split Middle Africa into two sections, has now made practicable the consolidation of the countries composing into one federated Dominion.

"Federation is required as a preliminary to standardising policies on several of the main questions which confront all the terri-

tories of the group. Hitherto each has gone its own way, with the result that there has been no community of counsel and purpose. East Africa and Uganda have, in apparently analogous, if not indetical, circumstances, arrived at and carried into execution widely divergent conclusions on such important questions as native tenure of land, and native policy generally. Had they arrived at identical, it could only have been by accident. Such a state of affairs appears to us indefensible. The wastefulness, and where the interests of subject races are concerned, the harmfulness of it hardly call for demonstration.

"The following are among the matters in respect of which federation would lead to greatly increased efficiency of public services in all the territories affected :—

"Defence : finance : customs : policing : communications : immigration : native policy : education : and scientific and industrial research. This appears to us so obvious that we refrain from enlarging on any of these matters except the first two.

"A consolidated Middle Africa would constitute in British hands a permanent strategical barrier to any possible scheme for dominating Africa by means of a Middle Africa scheme of aggression such as Germany had in contemplation. It would be the bulwark of Africa against militarism. Few will be so optimistic as to imagine that no such bulwork can be required when the present war is ended : but it will not be afforded to the full extent possible by a number of detached protectorates.

"The strategical advantages attending unification of control and administration of the various territories of Middle Africa would be of inestimable value in the event of Great Britain again being involved in warfare there. The defensive strength of such a combination should be sufficient to render any hostile designs futile.

"The advantages of federation in the sphere of finance would be of scarcely less importance. A Dominion approximately equal in area to the sister Dominion of South Africa, and certainly not inferior to it in natural resources, would be able to command support for the financing of large scale railway and other projects necessary for development, where a number of minor states, incapable of acting in concert, would be unable to find accommodation.

"Apart from such material advantages, the union of the British territories of Middle Africa would powerfully promote the spreading of the British ideal, which we are convinced is what the best interests of the people of Africa demand.

"We therefore recommend that the countries specified should unite in forming the Dominion of Middle Africa, each however retaining intact such local autonomy as it now possesses ; and that a

Governor-General be appointed for the Dominion, who should be assisted and advised by a Federal Council, consisting of the Lieutenant-Governors and popular representatives of its component units. We have assumed the readiness of each of the units to attach themselves to this rather than to any contiguous federation.

"It will be noted that the conquered territory known as German East Africa is an integral and essential portion of the proposed Dominion. The scheme above outlined, therefore, conflicts with the scheme recently propounded in the London press for making over the conquered territory to India for colonisation. The latter scheme necessitates driving a wedge between the northern and southern and parts of the Middle Africa Dominion, and is therefore strategically objectionable in the last degree. If further argument is necessary, it may be suggested that on military and sanitary grounds alike, the occupation of any part of Africa by Indians without European support and guidance would be a dangerous experiment.

"Besides, we regard it as highly important that advantage should be taken of the opportunity offered to reunite and consolidate native peoples such as the Cost Arabs and Swahilis, and the Masni tribe, which have hitherto been divided into sections disjoined from each other, much to their mutual disadvantage, by purely artificial frontiers.

"But we have already stated in Chapter VII what we submit are final reasons against the betrayal to the Asiatic of any section of the African peoples the responsibility for whose destinies has fallen into our hands. Short of the retrocession of the territory in question to Germany, we can conceive of no transaction more immoral, or more certain ultimately to recoil in ruin upon our own heads, than to buy off Indian discontent at the expense of the native of Africa. Such generosity at the cost of others, and those our own dependents, would be neither honourable nor politic.

"If India requires an outlet, there are vast empty spaces in Asia a waiting developmen to which it might now be practicable for her to apply her energies without the certainty of such evil results as must attend the exploitation of the African by the Asiatic".

When we come to examine the evidence on which such drastic conclusions are based, the result is altogether disappointing. No Indian member was invited to sit on the Commission itself, although some of the largest business transaction in the country have been carried out by Indian merchants, and for a number of years the opening up of the trade with the interior was almost entirely in their hands. What is stranger still to notice is the fact, that not a single Indian Association appears to have been invited to send its representatives to give evidence. I have made enquiries about this,

and it appears that, when such an important Commission was appointed (which would affect vitally Indian interests) and the request for Indian representation was refused, there was a natural disinclination to come forward individually to offer evidence. This seems to me to have been quite reasonable and dignified. I cannot find any hint whatever that the Commission itself took any steps to remedy or alleviate this initial injustice to the Indian Community. I use the word 'injustice,' here advisedly; for the Supreme Government of the Protectorate must have clearly known that the Indian Question would be dealt with in a manner which would affect their whole future; and to refuse the perfectly reasonable request for representation, in those circumstances, appears to me fundamentally unjust.

The disappointment is scarcely less when we turn to the European evidence which was tendered on oath. The Commission itself, in its own Report, states that 'the influence of the Asiatic' is 'perhaps the factor which more directly than any other affects the welfare of the Native.' Again it is stated, 'The matter is one of high Imperial importance . . . Upon the decision of East Africa the future of the whole Continent will largely depend'. Yet on turning to the index on the very large and thick volume of evidence, we find only nine references to the subject.

(1) The first is a reference to sanitation by Mr. H. Ryle Shaw : "In Natal where the Indian population is larger than the European, and where there is constant intercourse with India, the Port possesses a large quarantine ground for Asiatics. In this Protectorate the necessity for such accommodation is much greater".

(2) The second reference is to Indian labour by the Hon. C. W. Hobley:—

"The next point upon which I would venture to lay stress is the more intelligent use of the Native population. I would like to abolish the idea that if skilled work has to be done an Asiatic must be engaged. We should as soon as possible commence to train a considerable number of native youth to do the necessary artisan work. The training should be on English lines, not Indian: the pupils should be taught to work standing at a bench, not squatting on the ground. The Indian system of two men to a hand-saw and two men to a plane should be consistently discouraged. I have no bias against the skilled Indian forman or artisan, but it is noticeable that the quality during recent years has deteriorated although the rate of wages has increased. It has also been asserted that the employment of large quantities of Asiatic labour results in a steady leakage of money from this country to India."

(3) The third reference is by the same witness :—"If the Indian immigrant were a great introducer of new capital into this country it would balance the loss (*i e.* on imports) to some extent, but, as far as my information goes, this is not the case. Hardly any land owned by Asiatics in East Africa is being actively developed or worked. In Uganda, I believe, there are few coffee planters engaged in wholesale or retail trade financed to a great extent by the banks."

4. The next reference is that of Mr. A. K. Constine, Merchant and Motor Car Hirer :—

"The native trade is in the hands of the Indians. Europeans would not have little "durkas" in the native villages like the Indians. Wherever trade was large enough the European could beat the Indian. Natives might be trained to take the place of Indians, but these durkas must deal with the Indian wholesaler in Mombasa. The Indian wholesaler bought from the European firm on credit. Some of the biggest firms in this country trade entirely on credit. He thought this was sound business."

(5) The fifth reference is that of Mr. R. W. Playfair, Manager, National Bank of India, Nairobi :—

"Indian profits generally remained in the country. Indians were mostly working on credit. Their profits went in increased stock and purchase of land. An Indian to start with needed little money. The big Indian financed the small man."

(9) The next reference is that of H. H. Heatley Esq., Farmer, Naudi ;—

"He was not keen on natives learning to read and write, through perhaps it would be advantageous in some cases..... He did not favour natives learning English. He thought that, wherever possible, Goan and Indian clerical labour, artisans, etc., should be replaced by white men, British taking preference, both in Government Offices and Railway."

(7) The seventh reference is that of Colonel W. K. Notely, Commissioner of Police :—

"Checks on Indian immigration were stringent. A man had to prove himself able to earn his own living, or else give a bond for the cost of his passage. A European without employment had to give deposit of £25 if required by the Immigration Office or give a bond. There was also power to deport undersiables within twelve months of landing. There was no influx of poor Indians going on. Last year (1917) and the year before (1916) Indian emigration exceeded immigration."

(8) The eighth reference is that of E. Battiscombe Esquire, Conservator of Forests :—

"One of the great difficulties to contend with at present is the absence of literate native employees: the only medium of communication between the European and the raw native is the Asiatic clerk or skilled Indian artisan. This class demand very high wages which are in many instances out of all proportion to the duties demanded of them and of the class of work they turned out. Many of the more respected natives could be trained as Assistant Foresters and they would be far more satisfactory than the Asiatic both for acquiring an intimate knowledge of what is going on in and around the forests, for becoming acquainted with the various species of trees and as "go between" between the European and the Native."

(9) The last reference is that of the same witness :—

"Of first importance in the training of the natives in any trade or profession is the entire elimination of the Asiatic element. If the native is to be taught, the teaching should be conducted on European lines, *e.g.* take the case of carpentry. If a native is taught by an Indian carpenter it is highly probable that he will adopt Indian methods, never learn to finish off any piece of work properly and moreover never succeed in making himself more useful than the average Indian. It is the same with other professions : the average Indian artisan in this country cannot be said to excel in his art which appears to be more a matter of tradition than training : and it is unreasonable to expect the African to become more proficient than the Indian if he merely has these traditions instilled into him."

These are the only references to Asiatics, in the whole body of evidence, which have been regarded worthy of indexing ; and I have quoted them *in extenso*. The evidence, such as it is, appears to me extraordinarily little, both in quality and quantity, for such immense conclusion to be made to depend upon it. As it stands, also, it by no means points in one direction only. The Manager of the National Bank of India, which is the oldest established in the country, and accepted as the Government Bank, declares pointedly that Indian profits generally remain in the country and go to the increase of stock and purchase of land. The Commissioner of Police reports that already checks on Indian immigration are stringent and that for two years past more Indians have gone out of the country than have entered it. Even those, like Mr. Battiscombe, Conservator of Forests, who wish to replace the Indian by the African, acknowledge at the same time that the number of Africans, who have had any training of education, is infinitesimal.

If the case against the Indians were to be decided on the evidence alone, I do not think that any learned Judge on any bench

would give a verdict such as the Commissioners have given. One is driven to the conclusion that they have made up their minds, not so much on the evidence set before them, as in accordance with their own private inclinations. I am not myself acquainted with the workings of such Commissioners, and therefore cannot say whether such action is technically in order. To me, as an amateur on the subject, it seems essentially unfair. Not only was no Indian evidence taken, not only no Indian representative allowed to sit on the Commission, but even when the very scanty European evidence was wavering and undecided and, in one case at least, contradictory, even then the Commissioners (who took oaths from the witnesses in a judicial manner) summed up against the Indian Community on practically every point and condemned them to ultimate exclusion.

It is clear, when comparing actual dates, that December 1918, and January 1919, were the two months in which the Indian Question reached a very critical stage in East Africa. The Economic Commission was at that time bringing its numerous sessions to an end and it was already looking forward to framing the main outlines of its Report. The Armistice had just been concluded with the Central Powers, and the greatest excitement had been aroused, in European minds, by Sir Theodore Morrison's ill-advised proposal, that the conquered territory of German East Africa should be made into a special reserve for Indian colonisation. I was in India at the time that this suggestion was made, and I can bear witness that the leaders of Indian public opinion, either ignored it altogether, or else discountenanced it. Mr. M. K. Gandhi, whose judgment on such a subject would naturally carry the greatest weight, both with the Indian Government and with the Indian people, condemned the proposal from the very beginning and others more or less fell into line. Even in British East Africa, I have discovered on inquiry that it was only the name and reputation of Sir Theodore Morrison and his personal influence during his visit, which induced Indian residents to take up the suggestion. How artificial it all was may be easily seen by the half-hearted way in which it was ultimately canvassed. A deputation, which was sent to India on this and other matters, soon found it best to drop this question out altogether; and the Congress meeting held in Nairobi, in November last, (*See Register 1920, p. 320 Part II.*) did little more than pass a formal resolution which had no life behind it.

European residence in East Africa is so far aloof from things Indian, that it was impossible for all that I have related to be accurately known. During the months that followed the Armis-

tice, new boundaries were being marked out on the map of the world every day with bewildering rapidity. It seemed not impossible, in December 1918, that the Home Government might decide at once, under the sanction of the great Four at Versailles, the fate of the conquered German territory, without any consultation.

This, among other matters, appears to me to account for the very great activity of the European Associations in British East Africa on the Indian Question, so soon after the termination of the War. It was a time of intense excitement, a feverish period of strain and tension and exhaustion, the very worst time for calm constructive statesmanship. I cannot help reading into the Economic Commission Report itself, where it touches the Indian Question, the same excited racial feeling. That, at least, is the genuine impression left on me as I have studied them, coming fresh from the outside. And I would add, quite frankly, that I have felt the very atmosphere of this Protectorate, while I have been living here, both among Indians and Europeans alike, to be abnormal and the outlook on life to be distorted. There was an immediate relief, when I passed from East Africa to Uganda.

I have felt that this long explanation has been necessary before quoting the Convention Resolutions because I am coming more and more to believe that they do not represent the final opinion of my own fellow countrymen, (Englishmen) but rather the inflamed opinion of a period of excitement immediately after the War.

It is important to notice that five of the Economic Commissioners took a leading part in the Convention of Associations held at Nairobi in January, 1919, about which this chapter is written. They are signatories both to the Economic Commission Report on March 21st, 1919, and also to the Draft Resolutions, circulated on December 21st, 1918, on behalf of the Convention. Thus they were actively participating in two different committees dealing with the Indian Question at the same time, the one official in character and the other non-official.

I have made careful enquiries about the Convention of Associations, as to how far it truly represents the united non-official European opinion, in accordance with its name: "The Whiteman's Parliament"; the assurance has been given me, that its representation is very wide indeed. What follows may be taken therefore as representing a very high percentage of European opinion in East Africa.

The leading members of the Convention published first of all certain draft resolutions, to which I have already referred. These draft resolutions appear to have been very fully discussed and can-

vassed at the different meetings of the numerous European Associations during the weeks that followed their circulation. Then, at last during the January Sessions of the Convention, 1919 which met at Nairobi, the Indian question came first on the agenda paper and the following revised resolutions were unanimously accepted and carried :—

(For these Resolutions, See Register 1920, Part II p. 307-8, et Seq.)

The Guiana Deputation.

Shortly after the receipt of the cable mentioned on page 313, M. Gandhi enquired of the Government of India the true position of Indian affairs in East Africa, and to this Sir George Barnes, on behalf of Government, replied as follows :—

21 January 1920.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

In your letter of the 13th instant you ask me to give you some information regarding the difficulties which are arising in East Africa. The information which we have so far received is far from complete, but I will tell you what we know and what we are doing.

2. In my answer to a question put by Sir Dinshaw Wacha at the meeting of the Legislative Council on the 19th September last. I told him how the position then stood. You will remember that a deputation of Indians from East Africa headed by Mr. Alibhai came to Delhi last March. I was then away on leave, but I understand that Sir Thomas Holland, who received the deputation in my absence was impressed by the fairness and moderation with which they stated their grievances. Their memorial was forwarded to the Secretary of State with a despatch in which the Government of India urged there was no justification in a Crown Colony or Protectorate for assigning to British Indians a status in any way inferior to that of any other class of His Majesty's subjects. We further urged not only that the more galling disabilities of Indians in East Africa should be removed, but also that their claims to a share in the Government of the country should be sympathetically considered.

3. We have now heard from the Secretary of State that he has pressed these views on the Colonial office, and that Lord Milner on his return from Egypt will discuss the general question of the position of Indians in East Africa with the Governor, Major General Sir E. Northby, who is now in England.

4. Meanwhile a new situation has arisen from the publication of the Report of the East Africa Economic Commission and the proposed Ordinance for the removal of undesirables. We have not yet received a copy of the report, and we know no more about the proposed Ordinance than what has appeared in the press. On the 15th inst. I received a visit from the Hon'ble Mr. Phoke, one of the Indian Members of the East Africa Legislative Council who is now on a visit to this country, and he told me that he had heard

nothing about this Ordinance when he left Nairobi on the 17th December 1919.

5. As Colonel Amery said in his reply to a question put by Mr. Bennet in the House of Commons on the 22nd December last, the Economic Commission's report must not be regarded as expressing the views of the Government of East Africa or of the Imperial Government. The proposed Ordinance too, if it has been correctly reported, is not ostensibly directed against Indians and it is not possible to question the right of any Government to remove undesirables from the country over which it exercises jurisdiction. At the same time, I can assure you that the Government of India are fully alive to the general tendency of events in East Africa. His Excellency the Viceroy has already telegraphed to the Secretary of State asking for full information. He has also urged that the Indian case should be fully represented at the forthcoming discussion between Lord Milner and General Northby in London and that no action detrimental to Indian interests in East Africa should be taken meanwhile.

Yours Sincerely,
(Sd.) G. S. Barnes.

The Deputation mentioned in this letter was the British Guiana Colonisation Deputation which was received by a Committee of the Indian Legislative Council on Feb 6th 1920. The Deputation put forward a scheme of free emigration with state assistance and asked the Govt. of India to place their British Guiana Colonisation Scheme to a Committee of the Legislative Council of India consisting of elected Indian Members.

On February 4th 1920, in the Imperial Legislative Council, Mr. S. N. Banerjea (now *Sir*) moved for a committee to receive the deputation and examine the proposed scheme of colonization.

The Committee thus formed commenced its sitting on Feb. 6th, when the Hon. Dr. J. J. Nunan, Attorney-General of British Guiana, and Mr. J. A. Luckhoo, a barrister and an Indian resident of that Colony, were present to lay their scheme for British Guiana and give evidence in regard thereto. The Committee consisted of the Hon. Messrs. Banerjea, Sarma, Chanda, Sinha, Sastri, Crumis, Sir D. Wacha and Marjoribanks. Mr. Banerjea was elected president. The credentials of the deputies were first examined and then—

Dr. Nunan, in opening the case, said that he represented the agricultural and commercial society of British Guiana. He did not come here in his official capacity. The Legislative Council of British Guiana unanimously accepted his scheme of colonisation and in fact the whole Colony had supported it. Mr. Luckhoo was

the only Indian representative in the British Guiana Legislative Council and was sent to it by 60 Labour votes. The scheme of colonisation which he wished to propose and the deputation to put forward, was both authorized by the local Legislature and the Executive and supported by public opinion. As regards the position of the Indian in the Colony there were 1,800 out of a total population of 150,000 Indians who get franchise and the rest were represented by an official member. The reason was that Indians never worried themselves about politics and were until recently only looking to their economics. Only now were they waking up to political privileges of which they were not cognisant before.

The status of Indians in Guiana was the first question enquired into and examined by Mr. Banerjee. The deputation said that there was absolutely no distinction between one race and another. Indians enjoyed the same civic rights as Portuguese, Chinese, European or any other race. They all had that equal status ever since 1838, when they began to immigrate into that Colony. Equal status was part of the unwritten law and it had been maintained ever since. There was of course no statutory guarantee now to preserve this equality but the Colonial Office would see that in effect Indians had the same franchise for elections to municipalities, Legislative Councils, and other public bodies as any other race or people. Socially also there was no distinction whatever and Europeans and Indians were pulling together. The caste system no doubt prevailed but there was great unity between Hindus and Mahomedans.

In reply to Mr. Crum, Dr. Nunan said that a declaratory act could be passed in British Guiana in half an hour guaranteeing equality of status of Indians. The indenture system had been abolished to a great extent and when he started for India there were only 600 cases of indenture. This number must have diminished by now.

Mr. Sarma referred to the voting strength of each race inhabiting the Colony and asked if it was true that the European Community can never carry anything of a racial character in Council except with the assistance of Negroes and Chinese as against Indians, and that if an Indian asserts and puts himself forward as a voter there is every chance of holding his own.

Mr. Luckhoo.—That is my view.

Continuing, witness said that 75 per cent. of cultivated lands was owned by Indians and Europeans held only two per cent. This did not include the sugarcane area, 39,000 acres of which were held by Indians. This fact showed that the non-European population had as much interest in that sugarcane industry as the European. These 39,000 acres were now being cultivated chiefly by uninden-

tured labour. The unindentured Indian kept a larger area than the indentured, even in case of sugarcane districts. Local syndicates and companies did not employ indentured labour. It was only those companies that were registered in England and that had shareholders in England that employed indenture labour in the Colony. Factories did not employ indentured labour. It was sugar planters who employed it.

Mr. Sarma.—How has the abolition of the indenture system affected the sugar planters?

Dr. Nunan.—The whole Colony has felt the pinch of the abolition of indentured labour but sugar planters have felt it most.

Q. What is the capital sunk in sugar factories and plantations?

A. Ten million sterling. Of these ten million more than half is British-owned and the rest by indigenous people. The State owns the land.

Mr. Sarma next asked about the health of the Colony and the deputation replied that the coast was perfectly healthy but not for manual labour. On the whole it was a healthy Colony and had a relaxing climate. Compulsory education was in force inland and nearly all boys who would have to go to school under statute were at school.

Q. You say in your memorandum that the object of Government is to make this an Indian Colony. It means that practically the whole of Government will pass to the Indians and that you are prepared to face that situation?

Dr. Nunan.—At the same time we look forward to the continuance of the present friendly relations.

Mr. Sarma—You don't expect that there would be any swinging of the pendulum back when once Indians go into power and have a working majority.

Dr. Nunan.—No, I don't expect it. We are prepared for it and we don't see any reason to be afraid of it.

Asked by Mr. Chanda on the Indian strength in the public services, Mr. Luckhoo said that in the very highest grade there were none and frankly told the Committee that at present there was none qualified for it but Indians had risen to almost senior positions.

Replying to Mr. Sinha, Dr. Nunan said that so far there had not been an Indian in the Executive Council. The present Legislature consisted of 22, of whom fourteen were elected and seven nominated, besides the Governor.

Mr. Sinha—Your Legislature does not control the Executive.

Dr. Nunan—No, but it can hang up the executive. (Laughter).

Mr. Sinha—I wish we could do it here. (Renewed laughter).

Dr. Nunan gave an instance in which the legislature by indirect pressure once enforced their will on the Executive. Continuing he said that in a case of dispute between the Legislature and Executive the matter would go to the Secretary of State who would generally favour the view of the Legislature and ask the Executive to follow.

Q. Do you think that for a long time to come Indians will continue to be in a position of a numerically large but rather uninfluential community?

A. It is the most influential community because they are very industrious and thrifty. They have not used political power so far because they have not bothered about it.

Q. Supposing we agree to your scheme would your Government accept an arrangement that after a year's trial or after a reasonable time the Government of India would send a deputation to investigate the matter and see how the scheme had worked.

A. O, yes, and we are also agreeable to the other safeguard, that is permanent residence in the colony on behalf of the Government of India of person or persons to watch the interests of emigrants.

Q. Is it the case that Indians there demand more wages and better state of living?

A. That is not so, although I know that people will not be satisfied with anything.

Q. There is a suspicion here in India that Indians who are already in colonies are somewhat opposed to your scheme and that you are trying to bring an abiding force against them and make their conditions hard.

A. Indians in British Guiana unanimously supported a resolution welcoming our scheme of colonization if well organised. I therefore deny that there is any ground for apprehension.

Further asked by Mr. Sastri, Dr. Nunan said if Indians emigrated the younger part of their population would not suffer for want of educational facilities. They were taught in their own vernaculars. The caste system was being rigidly kept up and there was no necessity of overstepping it in a precipitate manner. Their proposal was to import families and they did not want to take anybody unless they could provide him with a wife.

The Colonization Scheme

The following is a summary outline of the scheme of emigration put forward by the British Guiana Deputation.

Recent changes in the Imperial policy as regards preference and urgent demand for foodstuffs all over the world made it incumbent upon them to set aside £100,000 to be offered as an inducement to the emigrants. The Colony had arranged for regular passenger and cargo line of steamers between Indian Ports and the British Guiana. For the first three years not more than 5,000 adults a year would be given free passages. On arriving in British Guiana, they could, if desirous of working land of their own, obtain land, either agricultural or pastoral, on easy terms in small or large holdings. If the settlers preferred employment, the Guiana Government guaranteed the local rates of pay which, for the piece-work on sugar estates on a seven hour day, amounted to Rs. 3 for males, and females at light work about half of that. He would also be provided with house accommodation. The cost of living was under 40 per cent of the ordinary, and the male wage-earner could have at least a rupee a day. Wages would be controlled by the official Arbitration Boards to prevent variations unfair to the wage-earner. Reward grants of five acres of the coast or river land, specially protected by an embankment from floods, prepared for irrigation, drainage and cultivation, would be given to families after three years' agricultural work in the Colony. The Indian Government has been asked to appoint its own official at the cost of the Colony to watch the interests of the settlers. The deputation welcomed Mr. Gandhi's suggestion that, after a certain period, an independent report shall be made by popular leader at the Colony's expense. The deputation also suggested the constitution of a Committee consisting of an Indian Government official, a nominee of the unofficial section of the Indian Legislative Council and Mr. C. F. Andrews to report on the working of the scheme. At the request of the Indian Government's supervising officer, any individual or family would be repatriated free of charge at any time, while if such a request emanated from an individual or a family, the Guianese Government would pay half the estimated cost of the repatriation at the end of 3 years residence, three fourths of the cost at the end of five years, and free of charge at the end of 7 years. The repatriation would not affect any land or other rights fully acquired. Cheap return tickets would be provided to those wishing to return on family reasons. This would secure a regular commercial intercourse between the two countries. A limited

number of professional men, such as doctors, engineers, clerks, schoolmasters, *etc.*, would be given passages either free or at very low rates. One priest or minister of religion for each religious group would be taken free on each voyage. Guarantees of continuance of the existing privileges could be furnished by the Colony and the Colonial Office, stating that their definite policy was the continuance of political and commercial equality of all races. If necessary, a declaratory ordinance could be passed in Guiana, recording the actual position but one legislature could not bind another in regard to this matter.

Before proceeding to examine the scheme, the President, Mr. Bannerji, read out the following cablegram received from the Under-Secretary to the Colonial Office to Dr. Nunan: "Your telegram, 3rd January. The message from the Government, dated 28th December, states the Indian Government has been notified that the existing indentures of last emigrants will be cancelled." The deputation said that they were perfectly certain that there had been an immediate and unconditional cancellation of the indentures for the purpose of creating a favourable atmosphere, and that this cancellation was independent of the scheme they were putting forward.

Dealing with the scheme, Mr. Bannerji asked: One of the papers commenting on our work makes the suggestion: What is the guarantee that you can give, so that the rights and privileges that now exist will not be taken away at some future time?

A:—If we are false to our work, we can dodge any guarantee. An ordinance will be passed declaring that all people are equal before law in the British Guiana, whether they come from outside or not.

Q:—That is only to a limited extent, because another legislature might set it aside. The Colonial Office should give to the Indian Government an undertaking that the policy which has been going to for years will not be departed from.

A :—That I am prepared to ask the Colonial Office to do.

Q :—Will your legislature make a declaration to that effect ?

A :—Yes. On behalf of our Government I undertake now to get a declaration passed immediately.

The Committee was also informed that at present the Colony was short of medical practitioners, and that if some doctors went from this country, they could easily make £1,000 a year, at present doctors there make even more money. Clerks were also required, and an ordinary clerk in a commercial concern could earn from Rs. 60 to Rs. 120 per mensem. There were large irrigation and drainage scheme which required engineers. A first class engineer could

make £1,000 a year. There was room also for Indian Lawyers who could earn between three to five hundred pounds annually. English was the court language and there were qualified interpreters in courts. An unskilled labourer got 7 annas, whereas a skilled labourer got Rs. 2. Wages had gone up since 1917, and the indentured labourers had been getting more than the unindentured ones. The condition of the Indian population in the Colony was as good as it was in India, and as a moral safeguard, the deputation suggested that each group of emigrants should bring their priests. Temples and mosques could be built for purposes of worship, and the State was not going to interfere with their religion.

Mr. Crum asked if at any time, say, after 10 or 15 years a deputation that would go from India decide that the condition of the emigrants is not satisfactory and that you have not kept up to your present promise, are you prepared to repatriate them?

A:—We are prepared to repatriate any people if that is the recommendation from one of the three members of the Commission such as we have suggested in our scheme. In Guiana, they said, the coinage was of English silver and based on English Gold basis. They were not affected by the depreciation in English Pound to the same extent as they were in England. There was ample opening for medical men. The deputation was not sure if the Indian University medical qualification was a bar. If so, they undertook to get it removed.

Mr. Sarma referred to the decrease of population, bad, water-logged conditions of several places, and wanted explanation for a statement that the health of the Colony was better than in India.

The deputation replied that the decrease of population was due not to death rate which compared favourably with other Colonies, but to the fact that there had been a large number of emigrations from the British Guiana to the Dutch Guiana for higher wages that were obtainable in Surinam and Trinidad and at the time of the Panama Canal construction. The death rate was lower than what prevailed in India, and there was no cholera, plague or small-pox as here. If thousand families were to go now to the British Guiana, there was house accommodation ready for them, and they would not take any family if they could not provide ready made accommodation. An average man could earn a dollar, that is, just above Rs. 2. The deputation was not in favour of fixing a minimum wage, because it was not in the interests of the wage-earners themselves. They had only seven hour labour in the British Guiana. There was nothing like that in the world, not even among the Bolsheviks. (laughter.)

Mr. Chanda elicited the information that an agricultural labourer had not to work in jungles or forests, and that the land was

already cleared for him to cultivate. The moment a minimum wage was fixed for these in the Colony, the colonisation system was doomed.

Mr. Sinha got from the deputies the promise of submitting to-morrow a written draft of the Declaratory Ordinance regarding the establishment of equality of race in the Colony, and to Mr. Marjoribanks they said the present Asiatic immigration Ordinance would be so amended as to include this and other guarantees.

Mr. Crum asked: Are you prepared to sign, on behalf of your Government, a note of the proceedings, or, at any rate, those points in regard to which you are in a position to give guarantee?

A:—Yes. Our Government will agree to any other points which we might decide.

On the Committee reassembling on 10th February, Mr. Surendra Nath Banerjee, placed a copy of the correspondence which passed between Mr. Polak, Honorary Secretary, Indian Overseas Association, London, and the Secretary of State for Colonies.

Correspondence Between Mr. Polak and the Colonial Secretary.

Mr. Polak stated that the East Indian Association of Georgetown (British Guiana), which body the Indian delegates of the Deputation claimed to represent, had expressed strong dissent from the objects of the proposed scheme which they characterised as being not one for colonisation but for labour. Mr. Polak hoped that nothing would be done until the East Indian Association and other similar bodies were given full opportunities of presenting their views and until educational and sanitary improvements that were officially regarded as urgently needed in the Colony had been carried out by the Colonial administration.

It appeared that the East Indian Association at a meeting resolved that the pamphlets issued by the Deputation while in England were unauthorised and misleading, and that their scheme was unworkable and detrimental to the incoming caste Indians.

The Secretary of State for Colonies, in reply, assured Mr. Polak that the interests of all sections of the community would be carefully weighed in connection with the scheme.

Dr. Nunan explained that Mr. Luckhoo, who was the President of the East Indian Association, has, before leaving Guiana, addressed the Association on the scheme which they unanimously approved. A couple of members had a personal feeling and one of them was spending time and energy over this.

Draft of Declaratory Ordinance.

The deputation then presented the draft of the Declaratory Ordinance which they had resolved to see passed in their Legislature

establishing and making clear equal rights for all races. The draft *inter alia* states that all ordinances purporting to confer any franchise, vote, appointing or nominating power, or any right to be elected, appointed or nominated to any office or honour or emolument under Political Condition Ordinance, Local Government Board Ordinance, Education Ordinance or under any other Ordinance shall be deemed to apply equally to every British subject of every race or origin, and that any Ordinance purporting to confer upon the British subjects any right for trade, commerce, land-holding, land transfer, lease or mortgage of movable or immovable property or any right of association, or purporting to regulate the exercise thereof, shall be deemed to apply to all British subjects resident within the Colony.

Searching Questions by Members.

The members of the Committee subjected the deputation to severe cross-examination on the immediate prospects of those who would go to the Colony, especially as regards housing, wages, land for cultivation, repatriation, sanitation and education. It was assured that emigrants would, on landing, be given cottage and lands and advance of money for cultivation of the first crop or until they were well set up.

Sir Dinshaw wanted a detailed prospectus to be prepared by the deputationists showing the necessities that might be supplied to the emigrants.

Dr. Nunan :—Do you think that a prospectus could be prepared with the varying conditions of a thousand miles of the country.

Sir Dinshaw :—Then better not invite labourers.

Dr. Nunan.—I shall work up one.

Mr. Sarma.—Do you take any special interest to protect Indian interests?

Dr. Nunan.—We have got Arbitration Board and there is the Protector of Colonies.

Sir Dinshaw.—The Protector of Colonies or mere protector of the colony than protector of Indians?

Dr. Nunan.—That has never been the case in the British Guiana and that would never be.

Sir Dinshaw :—Have you not got indogenous population, neighbouring population, whom you could employ for labour? Why do you come so many miles to India?

Dr. Nunan :—We have considered all these things. American Indians there are who are a timid set and fit only for boat work.

Sir Dinshaw :—Possibly their labour is too dear and therefore you can't make money.

Dr. Nunan :—We are a wealthy Colony and we offer the current wages there. We offer the same privileges to the people at home.

Sir Dinshaw :—We will wait and see.

Guarantees.

After further discussion, the following guarantees were put forward and signed by Dr. Nunan, on behalf of the Deputation :

(a) By a declaration by the Legislative Assembly that the present civil status involves equality of all British subjects in the Colony, politically and commercially, and an assurance by the Government of the Colony and by the Colonial Office that the maintenance of such status is a settled policy.

(b) Guarantees as regards wages, housing, sanitation, repatriation, inspection by Indian Government Officers and representatives deputed by the Indian leaders, repatriation in the event of any change in the status, and finally the number of men not to exceed the number of women.

Report of the

British Guiana & Fizi Colonisation Committee

This Committee of the Imperial Council (p. 328) was also authorised to meet a similar deputation from Fizi. The Report which was shortly after submitted was published for information by the Govt. of India on 7th May 1920. The following is the full text :—

We, the Committee appointed with reference to the Resolution of the Legislative Council on the 4th February 1920,

- (a) to examine the scheme of colonisation which the deputation from British Guiana desire to put forward and to report thereon and make recommendations to the Government of India,
 - (b) to meet the deputation from Fiji and to examine any proposals which they may put forward and to report thereon and make recommendations to the Government of India, and
 - (c) to examine the credentials of the deputations,
- have the honour to submit the following report.

2. The British Guiana deputation consisted of Dr. J. J. Nunan, L. L. D., and Mr. Luckhoo, Barrister-at-Law. The members of the Fiji deputation were His Lordship the Bishop of Polynesia and Mr. R. S. D. Rankine.

We find that Dr. Nunan and Mr. Luckhoo are accredited to the Government of India by the Secretary of State for India on

behalf of a representative deputation from British Guiana headed by the Governor of that Colony, which deputation was received by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and was introduced by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Secretary of State for India. The object of the deputation was to present the needs of the Colony both for the maintenance of present industries and for their extension and to show the advantages which this colony affords to immigrants from other countries. The scheme of colonisation proposed in respect of Indian immigrants is contained in Appendix A. to this Report. This paper was handed to the Committee by Dr. Nunan.

3. As regards Fiji, we find that Mr. Rankine is an officer of the Government of Fiji sent by that Government and that his Lordship the Bishop of Polynesia has been selected by the Government of Fiji, at the request of the planting community of that colony, to visit India and ascertain whether a system of immigration of Indians into Fiji cannot be devised that would satisfy both the Government and public opinion in India. The proposals put forward for Fiji as handed to the Committee are in Appendix B to this Report.

4. Before dealing with the details of these schemes, the Committee would in the first place record their opinion that no scheme of immigration of Indians to either of these colonies should be approved unless it is certain that the position of the immigrants in their new homes will in all respect be equal to that of any other class of His Majesty's subjects resident there. Upon this point, therefore, the Committee questioned the deputations at some considerable length. So far as British Guiana is concerned, the deputation assured the Committee that East Indian immigrants had now equal rights with all other classes of British subjects in the colony which was under a liberal constitution giving the people large powers of self-government. The deputation went further and undertook to declare this equality in rights by legislative ordinance and to secure its continuance by obtaining an announcement of the Colonial Office that the maintenance of such status was a settled policy. A draft of the proposed ordinance has been handed to the Committee by Dr. Nunan and is appended to this Report, Appendix C.

5. In the case of Fiji, the terms of Government appear to be less liberal than in Guiana. The guarantees, therefore, that the Fiji Government can give regarding equality of the political rights are more limited in scope. The Fiji Deputation, however, assured us

- (1) that Indians in Fiji are at present entitled to engage in professions, and trade and commerce, and to acquire property, on the same conditions as other residents, including

Europeans, and that the Government of Fiji will undertake that these rights will not be altered in any way to the detriment of Indians as compared with other residents :—

- (2) that the Government of Fiji will further undertake that the existing municipal rights enjoyed by Indians will not be altered, except in so far as municipal rights of other residents may be altered in the same direction ; and that the political rights now being extended to Indians to elect two Indian representatives to the Legislative Council of Fiji will not be withdrawn.

6. While welcoming these assurances, the experience of the past in other colonies compels the Committee to recommend further investigation of this aspect of the matter. It is possible that while political and economic condition render the grant of equal political rights to Indians practicable and expedient at present, there may be (the Committee do not say there are) forces at work calculated to change this happy state of things, which forces may not be easily recognizable save by investigation and enquiries on the spot in British Guiana and Fiji respectively.

7. Coming now to the schemes themselves, the Committee consider, subject to qualification expressed below, that the terms proposed are in themselves fair and reasonable. The Committee however, feels that the effect of the scheme on the Indian immigrant will depend more on factors that can only be gauged on the spot rather than on written provisions of rules and laws. The Committee will endeavour to explain the difficulty it has in the matter by examples :—

1. The most satisfactory feature of both schemes is the provision of land for settlement. But, for this part of scheme to be real and not illusory, the land proposed to be granted must be of such quality and situation that a new Indian settler would not find beyond his power to cultivate it successfully and maintain himself and family thereon. It seems to the Committee impossible to form an opinion on this part of the scheme without local enquiry.
2. Wages are said to be much above the cost of living but as it is not practicable to enforce the payment of wages irrespective of the works done, the Committee think that local enquiries into the tasks expected of a worker, the wages paid therefor and the cost of living, by persons conversant with the capabilities and needs of Indian agriculturists could alone elucidate whether the prospects of immigrants are really so good as they appear to be

on paper. This appears to the Committee to be more particularly necessary in the case of the Fizi.

3. Health conditions in both colonies are reported to be good ; and the Committee sees no reason to doubt this in the case of Fizi. In the case of British Guiana, notwithstanding the favourable (in comparison with India) death rate, the Committee understands the East Indian population has been practically stationary. It is possible that this state of things is due to re-emigration or repatriation, or is explainable on other grounds than bad death and birth rates. But the Committee feel that it would be well to have the matter investigated on the spot.

8. For the reasons set forth in the above paragraphs the Committee resolves to submit its conclusions in the form of the two following resolutions which have been passed by the members unanimously.

Resolutions.

I

“This Committee having heard Dr. Nunan and Mr. Luckhoo is inclined to take a favourable view of the Scheme of Colonisation presented by them in view of guarantees and safeguards which they are prepared to provide by legislation and otherwise, but before recommending definite acceptance of it, would advise the appointment of a deputation of three competent persons to proceed to British Guiana, investigate the conditions on the spot and report to the Government of India.

II

This Committee recommends :—

1. (a) that the Government of Fiji be asked to give guarantees similar to those which the British Guiana deputation declared that their Government was prepared to give :
 - (b) that, if the Government of Fiji do give these guarantees the Government of India should send a deputation similarly constituted to test the scheme generally and specially as to the question of the adequacy of wages, and
- II—subject to the above guarantees being given and to a satisfactory report being made by the deputation, this Committee would recommend a favourable consideration being given to the colonisation scheme by the Government of India.

[(Signed)

Members of the Committee (see p. 328)]

Note by the Hon. Mr. Chanda

It seems to me that the British Guiana Deputation was on a somewhat better footing than the Fiji one, as regards binding their respective Governments. Political conditions in British Guiana are also more favourable than in Fiji as regards Indians, but the climate of British Guiana is not very attractive and the wages in Fiji are decidedly inadequate as the recent riots indicate. Land scheme seems to be a secondary consideration—in Fiji at any rate—real object is to obtain labour immediately.

I am not very anxious to give much encouragement to any emigration on a large scale on other grounds also.

However, I agree that definite guarantees being given, matter should be investigated by a deputation which we recommend before any definite recommendation be made.

(Sd.) KAMINI K. CHANDA.

Note by the Hon. Mr. Sarma

1. I shall add a few lines by way of explanation. The two deputations have the moral support of the Governments concerned behind them and the British Guiana Deputation has a large body of colonial opinion in its support, but I do not think that either of them has any authority to bind its Government.

2. It was not clear to me that the wages in British Guiana were adequate and at the present rate of exchange the wages in Fiji appears to be inadequate. The wages promised to be guaranteed were not very definite. As regards housing, I believe the existing arrangement and the arrangements promised meet the requirements of those who may engage themselves to work on plantations. Free labourers may be afforded facilities, but it did not seem to be clear that any definite pledges were given.

3. Guarantees mentioned in the note should be given before any deputation is sent. The deputations were anxious about the importation of labour to work on plantations and the scheme proper appeared to be a matter of secondary importance at the present moment. There seems to be no clearly planned arrangement already made for land colonisation. I am not in favour of encouraging emigration unless it be for immediate land colonisation, but the possibilities are so great that if the necessary guarantees are given, deputations should be sent to investigate the problems on the spot.

(Sd.) B. N. SARMA.

The Deputation to the Viceroy.

23rd July 1920.

A deputation of the Indian residents of British East Africa, waited upon the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, along with Sir G. Barnes, the Commerce Member, Government of India, on July 23rd at the Viceregal Lodge. The deputation consisted of the hon. Mr. Abdul Rasul, Mr. Visram, Member, Legislative Council, East Africa, Mr. Husainbhoy Abdulabhoy Lalji, merchant and a member of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, Mr. Beharilal Narayana, merchant, Zanzibar, Mr. Muhammed Saleh Kassim, rice merchant, Zanzibar, Mr. Karabhai Teja, rice merchant, Mombassa and Mr. Nanubai Desai, merchant, Kisumu, East Africa.

The Representations

The representations made by the deputation covered the whole ground of Indian grievances in British East Africa. The first point related to Sir Benjamin Robertson's visit to Tanganyika and British East Africa, and the deputation expressed regret that Sir Benjamin would consult only the local administrations and would have Indian residents unheard.

His Excellency explained that the deputation was under a misapprehension. It was true that Sir Benjamin Robertson's visit was informal, but this would not mean that he would not discuss the situation with Indians and take all possible measures to appreciate and understand their views. In order that there might be no misunderstanding on the point, the Viceroy undertook to send a telegram to Sir Benjamin Robertson in the sense. The deputation then asked what action would be taken on Sir Benjamin Robertson's report when received, and His Excellency reminded them on his declaration in the Indian Legislative Council on July 30th last. He had stated that the position of the Government of India was and always would be that there was no justification, in a Crown Colony or protectorate, for assigning to British Indians a status in any way inferior to that of any other class of His Majesty's subjects. His Excellency stated that he adhered to this declaration and that he would continue to press this view on His Majesty's Government. At the same time he expressed the hope that Indians would co-operate with him by putting forward this case in a manner which was likely to win general acceptance. He pointed out to the deputation that it was a matter of great importance that in presenting their case they should avoid all overt statements and exaggeration. He suggested they should concentrate on the main issues and should avoid arousing anta-

gonism and resentment by putting forward exaggerated claims. The deputation then referred to the present currency policy in British East Africa and to the harm done to Indian trade with the Colony by the present position of exchange. They stated that owing to exchange it was difficult for Indian merchants in British East Africa to place firm orders with Indian mills at rupee rates, and they also referred to the fact that Italian merchants trading in Italian sphere of influence in Abyssinia had the benefit of special preference given in that territory to goods made in Italy and they suggested that it would be beneficial if Indian merchants were placed in a similar position in British East Africa. In reply, His Excellency pointed out that currency policy in British East Africa was an internal matter of great complexity, and he doubted whether the Government of India would be justified in interfering in a domestic problem of this kind. He emphasised, moreover, that the policy affected both Indians and Europeans and that it did not imply any racial discrimination. Similarly the question of tariff preference to Indian imports into British East Africa raised a very large issue and did not not specifically affect the question which he was there to discuss, namely that of disabilities of Indians in British East Africa. The next point raised was in connection with the recent territorial division of British East Africa into Kenia Colony and Kenia Protectorate. His Excellency stated that the Government of India was still without information as to the exact meaning of this change, but he promised to make enquiries in the matter. The deputation then asked that an Indian Trade Commissioner might be appointed in British East Africa. His Excellency assured the deputation that the Government of India had already considered that proposal and were in correspondence with the Secretary of State on the subject. He added that if a Trade Commissioner were appointed it must be clearly understood that his duties would be purely of a commercial nature. The deputation then referred to the power vested in the hands of the administrator of Tanganyika Territory to deport undesirables, and they suggested that these powers might make it possible for the administrator to deport Indians without trial. His Excellency stated that the Government of India had no copy of the ordinance referred to, and he asked the deputation to send a copy to Sir George Barnes in order that it might be examined by the Government of India. At the same time he pointed out that Tanganyika Territory was still an occupied enemy country and was under quasi-military law and he saw no *prima facie* reason to suppose that the ordinance should be regarded as being directed against Indians. He read out to the deputation a portion of the draft mandate for Tanganyika Territory which, it was

proposed, Great Britain should receive from the League of Nations. If this mandate were ratified, it would entirely safeguard the rights of Indians.

Municipal Disabilities

The disabilities of Indians in municipal matters were then discussed. The deputation complained that the constitution of Nairobi Municipal Council had recently been changed. Formerly, the Municipal Councils contained 5 European elected members, 4 nominated officials, 2 elected Indian members and one Goanese elected member. The deputation stated that the number of elected Europeans had now been raised from 5 to 9 and that nominated officials had been eliminated from the Council. The deputation object to this change, because formerly they had been able to count on 4 nominated officials to safeguard the interests of Indians. They considered it unfair that Europeans should have such a disproportionate representation on the Council in comparison with Indians. The Indians paid considerably greater share of the total municipal revenue from taxation than Europeans, and moreover they outnumbered Europeans by 3 to 1. They stated that the new constitution of the Municipal Council had aroused great resentment among Indian population in Nairobi, and that in order to give concrete expression to this resentment Indians had refused either to offer themselves for election to the Council or to accept nomination. His Excellency agreed that there was great force in what the deputation said on this point, and hoped that their grievances in this matter would be redressed.

The deputation also referred to the question of political franchise, and they complained that an ordinance had already been passed in the local Legislative Council which did not adequately meet the claims of Indian residents in the matter of franchise. His Excellency agreed that this matter was vital. It was covered, however, by the declaration of January 30th last in the Imperial Legislative Council.

In conclusion, His Excellency reminded the deputation that the decision in matters of this kind lay with His Majesty's Government and on with the Government of India. The Government of India were in sympathy with many of the demands of Indians resident in British East Africa. They had already made representations to His Majesty's Government on the subject and they would continue to do so. At the same time he repeated his appeal to the deputation that Indians should not make the task of the Government of India more difficult. He again advised them to concentrate on the main issues, to state their case with studied moderation and to avoid making exaggerated claims and demands which would tend to alienate sympathy and weaken what was otherwise a strong case.

Govt. of India

Despatch on Indians in E. Africa

21st October 1921.

A mass meeting of East Africa Indians was held at Nairobi (British E. Africa) on the 22nd August to consider the announcement of Lord Milner's decisions. A resolution was passed, protesting against assigning an inferior status to the British Indians in the East African Territories (a) by not granting them due and effective representation on the Legislative and Municipal Councils, (b) by insisting upon the application of the principle of segregation of races, and (c) by putting restrictions on the ownership of land by them.

On these issues the Government of India write :—

We are convinced that the only reliable safeguard for Indian interests is adequate representation in the Legislative Council. At the same time, we desire to reiterate our opinion that there should be a common electoral roll and a common franchise on a reasonable property basis *plus* an educational test, without racial discrimination, for all British subjects. We believe that this is the true solution of the East African problem. We fear that separate representation for different communities will perpetuate and intensify racial antagonism. On the other hand, a common electorate, whereby a member of one community, would represent the constituents of another community, would tend to moderate and compose racial differences. In the other way we believe the diverse races in East Africa will become a united people. We recognise that practical objections will be urged against such a solution. In the first place, the Legislative Council Ordinance of 1919 conferred adult suffrage on the European population, and it may be admitted at once that the Indian community is not ripe for adult suffrage. On the other hand, the adoption of a common franchise on the basis which we have suggested, would mean a narrower franchise for the European community than that which they now enjoy. It is not within our province to question whether it was wise at once to confer adult suffrage on the shifting European population of a new country like the Kenya Colony. It is probable, at any rate, that the great majority would satisfy the property and educational qualifications which we would suggest. We recognise that it would not be possible to disfranchise any one who already has the vote, but for the future we would urge that there should be a common qualification for everyone of whatever race who is admitted to the electoral roll. The composition of the Legislative

Council is admittedly experimental, and we would submit with respect that its revision should not be prejudiced by the Ordinance of 1919; which was passed without a consideration of our views, and, indeed, without our knowledge. Secondly, it may be objected that as the Indians in East Africa are more numerous than the Europeans and are likely to increase more rapidly, a common electorate would mean that the Indian members would dominate the Legislative Council, and that this would be incompatible with the responsibilities of the British Government for the welfare of the colony as a whole and of the native population in particular. The objection is admittedly not immediate, for it is stated in paragraph (3) of the Despatch of the 21st May that there is only a very small number of the Indian community who can be regarded as qualified to exercise the franchise. Hence if the qualification for a common franchise is properly defined, it follows that the number of Indian voters will be far less than the number of of European voters. In future it is the rule that, with better educational facilities and increase of wealth, the Indian voters might outnumber the Europeans. But the Indian voters would still, it is believed, to a large extent, be concentrated in the urban constituencies. The country districts would continue to return European members. Finally, it is common cause that the interests of the native population require that the official majority should remain. The fear of Indian domination is, we submit, unfounded. In paragraph (4) of the Despatch of the 21st May, Lord Milner directs that the same arrangements should be made for the elective representation of Indians on the Municipal Council. We understand that the Nairobi Municipal Council, which is the most important in the Colony now, consists of one nominated official and twelve elected Europeans and that it is proposed to add three elected Indians. We have no exact figures to show the relative positions of the different communities, but we are informed that the population and the incidence of municipal taxation are roughly as follows: Europeans—population, 2,000—municipal taxation Rs. 70,000; Indians—population, 5,000—municipal taxation Rs. 1,20,000; Africans—population, 12,000—Rs. 10,000 Government grant-municipal taxation Rs. 50,000. Here, again, we would urge most strongly that Indian interests should be adequately represented. In the Municipal Councils there is not even the safeguard of an official majority. And it is believed that the insanitary conditions in which Indians are frequently living are due in part at any rate to the neglect of the Municipal authorities. Here again we would press for roll and common franchise. The ward system of election would secure adequate representation for each community, and an increase

in the number of official members, which, the interests of the large native population would appear to require, would be a safeguard against the predominance of any single community.

Segregation of Races.

In paragraph (7) of the Despatch of the 21st May Lord Milner has directed that the principal of race segregation should be adhered to in the residential areas of townships and whenever practicable in commercial areas also. We noted with satisfaction Lord Milner's assurance to Lord Islington's deputation that, in any decision which might come to, he would certainly not be actuated, either by racial prejudice, to allow the consideration of trade jealousy to prevail, and we observe that there is no intention to discriminate against Indians or to sacrifice Indian to European interests. It appears from Lord Milner's speech in the House of Lords, on the 14th July, that the policy of race segregation emanates from Professor W. J. Simpson, whose principles are enunciated in paragraph (16) of his report on sanitary matters in the East Africa Protectorate, Uganda and Zanzibar. Professor Simpson's object is sanitary. Lord Milner is also influenced by social reasons. To quote, again, his speech of the 14th July: "My own conviction is that, in the interests of social peace, the residence of different races in different areas, I am speaking now of the populous city areas, is desirable, and so far from stimulating it is calculating to mitigate hostility and ill-feeling." Nevertheless, Lord Milner's decision is bitterly resented not only by Indians in East Africa, but by educated opinion, throughout India. The reason for this resentment requires careful consideration. We will first consider segregation in commercial areas. The first objection is that it is irrational. If the end in view is to prevent intermingling in the same quarters of town and trade centres of races with different customs and habits, the nationality of a business firm would appear to be less important than the nationality of its employees and customers. It seems irrational, for instance, that a European and an Indian firm, which are alike dealing mainly with European customers and are alike employing Indian clerks and assistants, should be made to trade in different quarters, or again sanitation and social convenience do not appear to require that a European firm, with a large native retail trade, should carry on its business in the European quarter. The distinction would break down altogether in the case of companies. Secondly, from the strictly commercial point of view it is inconvenient that firms, doing the same class of business, should be separated by an artificial barrier. In the Uganda Protectorate, which is less affected by racial prejudice, the recently appointed Develop-

ment Commission, in paragraph 209 of their report, stated that they would be strongly opposed to any segregation in the business areas. And we are informed that the Uganda Chamber of Commerce has expressed similar views. Again, in Mombasa, the most important commercial town in East Africa, which is free from the racial bitterness of the Uplands, we understand that European opinion generally favour a joint business area. Thirdly, it is feared that the condition of segregation, which Lord Milner postulates, namely, that Indians should be fairly dealt with in the selection of sites, will not be fulfilled, and it must be admitted that the plans of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu facing the pages 24, 45 and 59 of Professor Simpson's report, are sufficient cause for anxiety. In Nairobi, Professor Simpson proposed that the whole of the present business quarter between the Railway Station and the river should be reserved for Europeans. Indians were to be relegated to the other side of the river. In Mombasa, again, the whole of the area adjoining the harbour of Kilindini was to be the European business area. Indians were to be kept on the other side of the Island. And in Kisumu, where practically the whole of the trade is in the hands of Indians, one short street was allotted for the Indian bazar, while an extensive block was to be laid out as European business quarters. Fourthly, it is objected that segregation in commercial areas is impracticable. In Nairobi, a considerable part of the land, which Professor Simpson included in the European commercial area, is already occupied by Indians who it is recognised, cannot be expropriated. We are indebted to Sir Edward Northey for the plan attached to this Despatch showing the lay-out which is now proposed. The comparison with the map facing page 24 of Professor Simpson's report will show that his recommendations have been substantially modified. We gratefully acknowledge the liberal spirit in which Sir Edward Northey has interpreted Lord Milner's orders. At the same time, it is apparent that his proposals, which are based on practical considerations, are not consistent with Professor Simpson's theories. The European and Asiatic areas are now separated only by the width of a street and the Indian bazar, which in Professor Simpson's opinion is the centre of infection, remains where it is running out like promontory into the European area. Moreover, a large number of plots in the revised European area, and more especially in the important Government road, are still occupied by Indians, whom it is not intended to disturb. In fact, it would appear that commercial segregation in Nairobi is now practically narrowed down to the question whether Indians shall be allowed to bid for certain unoccupied plots in the best business streets in

which Indians are already established, but which it is now desired to reserve for European occupation. If then the object in view is sanitation and social convenience, we submit that the criterion should be the class of business and not nationality. We suggest that there should be a joint commercial area regulated by strict sanitary and building laws, which would ensure that only business of good class, whatever may be their nationality, should be established in the best streets, and that the business of the inferior class whatever may be their nationality, should be confined to less important streets. Further, it has frequently been noticed that the practice "of living in" leads to insanitary habits and overcrowding, and we would suggest that "living in" should be prohibited, at any rate, in the best streets. In other words, to use the phrase, which we understand, is current in Nairobi, there should be a joint "lock-up"

Residential Areas.

We have next to consider the question of segregation in residential areas. It is admitted that the Indians in East Africa naturally prefer to live together in their own quarter, and have no desire to live in the European residential area. They have only asked that they should be allowed to acquire suitable residential sites, which hitherto have generally been denied to them. The only exceptions are the few Indians who have been brought up to live in European style, and it is understood that the Government of the Colony would desire to enforce the policy of segregation rigidly in such cases. The Indian objection to residential segregation is primarily a question of principle. It is felt not only by Indians in East Africa, but also throughout India that compulsory segregation implies a racial stigma. In theory, it may be that there is no question of racial discrimination against Indians. It is unfortunate, however, that the policy of segregation, as advocated by Europeans in East Africa, is animated by the racial feeling, which marred the Economic Commission's Report. And it is not easy for Indians to appreciate that the reasons, for which Lord Milner has accepted this policy, are wholly different. Nor is it a matter of mere sentiment. They fear that in practice the policy of segregation will be administered in a spirit of racialism rather than of even-handed justice. In his speech of the 14th July Lord Milner said the condition, on which he was prepared to defend segregation, was that there should be fair treatment of both races, in the matter of sites. "I mean to say," he added "that you should not give all the best sites to Europeans and cram the Indians into inferior localities. This, however, they consider,

is precisely what has happened in the past, when the principle of segregation was not formally recognised. And they see no reason to expect that the formal recognition of the principle will better their condition. These fears do not appear to us to be groundless. In the projected plans of Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu in Professor Simpson's report, the areas demarcated for European and Asiatic residence respectively, apart from any question of convenience are wholly disproportionate to the numbers of the two communities. And it is understood that in the case of residential areas, no substantial modification of Professor Simpson's proposals is intended. It seems to us, indeed, almost inevitable that compulsory segregation will mean that the best sites will be allotted to the race which is politically most powerful. Further, it can be taken as almost certain that the race which controls the Municipal Council will spend an unfair proportion of the revenue of the municipality on its own quarter, and will neglect the areas occupied by other races. The practical effect of compulsory segregation on the race, which is politically weaker, can be seen in the Asiatic ghettos in the Transvaal. We deeply regret that Lord Milner should now have considered it advisable to adopt the principle of race segregation. It seems to us to be a reversal of the principle, for which His Majesty's Government have always contended in the parallel case of South Africa. We may, perhaps, be permitted to quote the words, in which the late Mr. Alfred Lyttelton in his Despatch, dated the 20th July, 1904, rejected the proposals which the Governor of the Transvaal had submitted for the segregation of Indians in the Transvaal. We believe that sanitation and social convenience could be adequately secured by mutual consent, by the strict enforcement of sanitary and building laws and by a just administration of municipal revenues. In this way the end, which Lord Milner has in view to promote social comfort, a social convenience and social peace, might be attained. But legislation on racial lines, so far from mitigating, will stimulate hostility and ill-feeling. It will, we fear, gratuitously provoke a consequence in this country and throughout the Empire.

Restrictions on Ownership of Land

We will consider first the restriction on the ownership of land in townships. In paragraph (8) of the Despatch of the 21st May, Lord Milner says that it seems necessarily to follow from the adoption, of the principle of race segregation, that as a general rule, no transfer of land, either by way of ownership or mortgage between Europeans and Asiatics, should be allowed and similarly when township plots are put up to auction, Europeans should not be allowed to bid for plots in the Asiatic quarter, or Asiatics to

bid for plots in the European quarters. It may be added that the restriction would close a legitimate field for investment both to Indians and to Europeans, and in the case of sales of new plots would be likely to prevent the State also from obtaining the full market price for Crown lands. It is understood that Indians already own many plots in the areas now occupied by Europeans and *vice versa*. It would appear to us to be inequitable to restrict the right of transfer of plots already alienated and unnecessary to impose any such restriction in the sale of new plots which may be alienated hereafter. There remains the restriction on the acquisition by Indians of agricultural land in the Uplands. It is suggested in paragraph (6) of the Despatch of the 21st May that this merely reaffirms Lord Elgin's decision contained in his Despatch of the 19th March 1908, that, as a matter of administrative convenience, grants of land in the Upland area should not be made to Indians. We understand, however, that practically no land, which is now capable of development, remains to be alienated in the Uplands. In the course of his address to the Convention of Associations at Nairobi on the 9th August last, His Excellency the Governor is reported in the *East African Standard* of the 14th August to have said: "By the time this whole settlement scheme (the soldier settlement scheme) had been readjusted in the firms which had not turned out to be what it was hoped they would be, and were replaced by something better, there should not be a farm left worth having." It would thus appear that there is now practically no land left to which Lord Elgin's decision could be applied. It is understood, however, that the restriction has now been extended so as to prohibit the transfer of land to Indians. We would point out that this goes far beyond Lord Elgin's decision and it is incompatible with his own pronouncement that it is not consonant with the views of his Majesty's Government to impose legal restrictions on any particular section of the community in regard to the acquisition of land. Lord Milner has justified the exclusion of Indians from the Uplands, on the ground that Europeans were by nature physically excluded from other areas. Hence, if the limited area, which is suitable for European settlement were thrown open to the competition of Asiatic there would be, taking the Colony as a whole a virtual discrimination in favour of Asiatic as against European settlement. He cannot, therefore, regard the Indian claim to be admitted to the Uplands as just or reasonable. It has been argued with force that there are vast areas in the Empire suitable for European settlement, from which Indians are excluded, either by law or climatic conditions, and that it is, therefore, unjust that Indians should be prohibited

from acquiring agricultural land in a colony which has been, to a considerable extent, developed by Indian enterprise. Apart from this, however, it is not clear that the admission of Indians to the Uplands would be a virtual discrimination against Europeans. First, it is necessary to determine what exactly is meant by the Uplands. This term is defined in the Despatch of the 17th July, 1906, in which the Colonial Secretary approved of the principle that the land outside municipal limits, roughly lying between Kiu and Fort Ternan, should be granted only to European settlers. It might be inferred from the Despatch of the 1st May and from Lord Milner's speech of the 14th July that the European settlers were confined to a comparatively small area, while Indians enjoyed a monopoly elsewhere. But a reference to the map appended to this Despatch, for which we are again indebted to Sir Edward Northey, will show that by far the larger part of the area coloured red, which is the alienated land or land surveyed for alienation, lies between Kiu and Fort Ternan. Further, almost the whole of the alienated land outside these limits, that is in the lowlands, which *ex-hypothesi* are unsuitable for European settlement has been alienated to Europeans. The total area alienated to European or available for alienation is given as 11,859 square miles. The total area held by Indians, we are informed, is only 32 square miles, out of which 21 square miles have been purchased from Europeans, and only 11 square miles have been obtained from the Government. In addition the Indians hold a small area of agricultural land in the coastal belt, but here, again, we understand the Europeans own large plantations. The attitude of the Government, towards the acquisition by Indians of agricultural lands, even in the lowlands, can be judged from the case which has been brought to our notice. We submit that it is not easy to reconcile the land policy of the East African Government with Lord Milner's assurance that it has been the avowed principle and is the definite intention of the British authorities to mete out even-handed justice between the different races inhabiting those territories. In the circumstances which we have set forth, we are unable to agree that the Indian claim to be allowed to acquire agricultural land anywhere in the Colony is neither just nor reasonable. We do not consider that the proposal in the latter part of paragraph (6) of the Despatch of the 21st May is adequate compensation for the exclusion of Indians from the Uplands, and we hold most strongly that there is no justification for the extension of Lord Elgin's decision so as to prohibit the transfer of land to Indians which, in our view, is incompatible with his own pronouncement. We would add that it is the opinion of Sir Benjamin Robertson that climatic disabilities in the Colony, as a whole, tend to operate against the Indian rather

than against the European settler. The European, who works on the plantation system with native labour, can and does cultivate the Lowlands. The European planter is no more excluded by climatic consideration from the Lowland than he is excluded from other tropical countries. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the Indian farmer would prosper in the cold climate of the Upland. We understand that this opinion is supported by experience in Natal. The acquisition of agricultural land by Indians in Natal is not restricted. There are many wealthy Indians, and there are more than 1,000 Indians of the agricultural class. There is a keen demand for land in the coast belt, which has not been satisfied. But very few farms have been acquired by Indians in the Uplands and the evidence before the recent Commission was that where Indians have attempted to farm in the upland, they have generally failed. If, then, as Lord Milner suggests, the issue in Kenya Colony is merely a question of climate, we would urge that it be left for the climate to decide. The Despatch of the 21st May purports to deal only with the various questions affecting the Indian community in British East Africa. We are informed, however, by Sir Benjamin Robertson that under the order of the Colonial Office, Lord Milner's decisions were announced simultaneously in Nairobi and Entebbe and understood to apply *mutatis mutandis* to the Uganda Protectorate. We were not previously aware that the position of the Indians in Uganda was even under the consideration of the Colonial Office. Moreover, from the information before us, it would appear that the East African decisions are generally inapplicable to the conditions in Uganda. In the first place, we understand that in Uganda there is no Legislative Council, nor any elected Municipal Council. On the contrary, in the important Uganda province, the native Lukiko already enjoy a substantial measure of autonomy, and it is likely that a similar form of native Government will eventually be established in the other province. Secondly, as has already been stated, the Uganda Development Commission, in Paragraph (209) of their report, have rejected the principle of segregation in business area as impracticable. Thirdly, the Development Commission in the same paragraph of their report, which was signed by two Asiatic members, accepted generally the principle of separate residential areas for different races, and it would appear that if no order had been issued, this question would have been settled amicably by mutual consent. Fourthly, as already stated, the Development Commission, in paragraph 212 of their report, have rejected restriction on the acquisition of land in townships as neither justifiable nor necessary. Finally, there is no "upland" in Uganda. In short, the racial issue would seem to have been raised unnecessarily.

in Uganda. We are informed by Sir Benjamin Robertson that the relations of the Indian community in Uganda with the Government and with unofficial Europeans have always been cordial, and this is borne out by the friendly spirit of the report of the Development Commission on which all classes were represented. We may be permitted to quote paragraph 3 of their report in contrast to the racial bitterness which animated the report of the East African Economic Commission :

"The country owes much to the Indian trader, and we consider that a broad policy of toleration should be adopted towards him. He has shown energy and enterprise and has assisted in the opening up of the more remote districts. He is also of value as an agriculturist, and his activities in this direction might well be encouraged."

It seems to us regrettable that Uganda should have been drawn into the East African controversy. As things now stand the Indians in Uganda fear that disabilities to which they have not hitherto been subjected will now be imposed upon them. It will relieve anxiety if they are assured as early as possible that this is not the intention of His Majesty's Government.

Conclusion.

To conclude, we are unable to accept Lord Milner's decision as a final settlement. It is our duty to impress on you that public opinion throughout India regards the case of the Indians in East Africa as a test of the position of India in the British Empire. At the Imperial Conference of 1918, for the sake of Imperial unity, we accepted the reciprocity resolution which practically excludes Indians from the Self-Governing Dominions. We cannot agree to iniquity of treatment in a Crown Colony, more especially in a Colony in which India has always had a peculiar interest. We have shown in this Despatch that whatever may be the intention of Lord Milner's decision, there is, in practice, an unfair discrimination against Indians in East Africa. If further proof is needed, we may point out to the fact that in Tanganyika territory, where Indians are protected by the Government of the League of Nations, Lord Milner's decisions cannot be applied. It seems to us to be an impossible position that British Indians in a British Colony should be subjected to disabilities to which they cannot be subjected in an adjoining mandated territory. It has been suggested that a Royal Commission should be appointed to consider the whole question of the administration of the East African Territories, and it appears from his reply to Lord Islington's deputation on the 19th April, that Lord Milner himself is not averse to the proposal. We would urge the appointment of such a Commission at the conclusion of the Indian

question in the terms of reference. In no other way we believe will it be possible to assemble the facts on which a just decision can be based. We would also urge that the Government of India should be represented on the Commission. We cannot admit that we are not directly concerned. To quote once more Lord Milner's reply to Lord Islington's Deputation, "we will cease to be an Empire if any portion of the Empire is entirely relieved from the responsibility for what happens in another." The Government of India cannot and will not disclaim responsibility for the welfare of the Indians who are settled in East Africa.

The Sec. of State's Reply.

To this the Secretary of State for India replied by cable, dated India Office, the 24th December, 1920 :

East Africa. Your despatch of October 21st. I need hardly say that I am fully alive to the importance of the question, and as responsible here for the protection of Indian interests, I have urged upon his Majesty's Government the strength of the case which you have so cogently presented. I have not answered your despatch, merely because matter is still before His Majesty's Government, and I wish Your Excellency's Government to be assured that your despatch has reinforced the case which I was already urging.

(Note)

The Islington deputation of 19th April mentioned above was the deputation headed by Lord Islington and comprising Sir J. D. Rees, Sir M. Bhowmegree, Sir Krishna Gupta, Messrs Ormsby Gore, Bennett, and Col. Wedgwood, together with members of the East African Indian Delegation which waited on Mr. Montagu and Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, and made representations urging equality of treatment for Indians in East Africa and the removal of existing disabilities and asked for a commission of enquiry. The proceedings were, however, *private*. Mr. Jeevanji, head of the Indian Delegation, afterwards regretted that he consented to the deputation being received privately. He said that if he knew beforehand that such would be the case he would have refused to go. Publicity was never given to the affairs of East Africa. The result of the deputation was that the Colonial Office took the matter coldly and apathetically. The following memorandum was then published.

Memorandum

To the Secretary of State

By the Indian Overseas Association

The following petition submitted to the Secretary of State for India by the Indian Overseas Association and Indian Delegates from and on behalf of Indians in British East Africa covers the whole field of the infamous wrongs that are being perpetrated there against the Indian settlers.

Introductory.

In the year 1920 it might seem a work of supererogation to insist upon the fact of the ancient association of India with the Eastern Territories of the African Continent. The local administration of the British East Africa Protectorate and His Majesty's Government should be fully aware of all the facts relating to that association, but that they are in danger of being forgotten is clear from Part I of the final Report of the Economic Commission issued last year by the Government of the East Africa Protectorate. (See p. 920.) That Commission was appointed by the Governor of the Protectorate and was presided over by a high officer of the Administration. The Report was signed by him in common with the other members of the Commission. In Chapter 2 a historical survey of East Africa is given. It is incredible that the signatories of this Report were ignorant of India's historic connection with these territories, yet the astonishing fact remains that this chapter contains not a single reference to India or her people, and the only conclusion that can properly be come to by a perusal of this chapter, together with Chapter 7, is that the omission of any such reference was deliberate. It will be necessary at a later stage to revert to the allegations contained in Chapter 7.

Historical.

Indian trade connection with Zanzibar and the East African Territories is almost pre-historic. It is, at any rate, upwards of three centuries old and it is notorious that since the middle of last century, from the time of Lord Canning, British Indians and the Government of India have taken a very active part in extending British influence in East Africa. It was admitted before the Sanderson Committee in 1910, by Sir John Kirk, with probably an unequalled knowledge

of the protectorate, that "but for the Indians we (the British) should not be there now. It was entirely through being in possession of the influence of these Indian merchants that we were enabled to build up the influence that eventually resulted in our position." One of the main grounds stated for granting the Royal Charter to the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888 by Queen Victoria was that it was calculated to be advantageous to the "commercial and other interests" of the British Indians, and that "the possession by a British Company of the East Coast line" would protect British Indian subjects from being compelled to reside and trade under the Government and protection of Alien Powers". In the early days of the conquest and pacification of the Protectorate, Indian soldiers bore a very honourable part, and the history of events in Natal at the outbreak of the Boer War was repeated when, in the beginning of the late World War, the timely help given by India in men, money, and material to East Africa saved the country from complete destruction and its occupation by the German forces. The earliest transport facilities in the protectorate were provided by Indian contractors and labour. The main factor in opening up the interior of the country was the construction of the Uganda railway, entirely by Indian labour and subordinate staff, under the most trying conditions and with considerable loss of life. Since then very large numbers of Indian traders, merchants, agriculturists, artisans and labourers have migrated to the country at the express invitation of the local Government, and relying on justice and equal treatment under British rule. This enterprising, loyal, simple-living, and law abiding Indian population has rendered invaluable service to the country in its industrial and commercial development, and has introduced into and invested in it very large sums of money in the erection of large numbers of substantial and permanent buildings, comprising several streets and Bazzars entirely owned by Indians, in the chief towns of the Protectorate and also in Uganda. In his book "My African Journey" (a journey undertaken by him as Under Secretary of State for the Colonies) the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, at present the Secretary of State for War, wrote: "It is the Indian trader, who, penetrating and maintaining himself in all sorts of places to which no white man could go, or in which no white man could earn a living, has, more than anyone else, developed the early beginnings of trade, and opened up the first slender means of communication."

The Present Position

By far the greater proportion of the clerical and mechanical staff on the Uganda railway and its workshops consists of Indians,

and large numbers of Indian clerks are employed in the Government offices and commercial houses. The erection of buildings throughout the country is carried on by Indian contractors and artisans, and about 80 per cent, of the trade and commerce of the Protectorate is carried on by Indians. The present European population of the Protectorate is said to be approximately six thousand, and includes a considerable proportion of officials, military, and missionaries. In 1911 slightly more than one-half of the European population was actually engaged in the development of the country. The proportion to-day so engaged is believed to be not very much greater. The present Indian population of the Protectorate is certainly not less than 25 thousand, and it is estimated that it is between 30 and 35 thousand.

It is thus clear that, apart from the pioneer character of Indian enterprise in East Africa, the Indian population of the Protectorate is considerably greater than the European. Its invested capital is far greater, its hold upon the trade and commerce of the Protectorate is four-fifths of the whole, and it pays a very much larger proportion of the taxation of the country than does the European population. No impartial observer could fail to come to the conclusion that in all essentials, including those of climate, the Protectorate is, in fact, apart from the native population, an Indian and not a European colony. Indeed, Indian law is, and was, as a matter of course, administered in East Africa. So distinguished and disinterested a traveller as Dr. P. Chalmers Mitchell, in a dispatch appearing in the *Times* of 16th March, 1920, says: "The retail trade is almost wholly in the hands of the Greeks as far as the Sudan, and to the South, of the Indians. Indian and Japanese products are ousting British. . . . The goods are adapted for local European and native requirements. . . ., Indians are rapidly gaining control of the ivory, hides, and other markets. There are branches of Indian banks in every centre." Dr. Mitchell, being a stranger, could not have known that Indian trade existed in the protectorate generations before any British goods were introduced.

European and Indian Relations

In spite, however, of their prior claims to consideration at the hands of the authorities, due to their pioneer work in the carrying of the products of modern civilisation to the barbarous and semi-barbarous people of the country, and the vital and trading risks incidental thereto, and notwithstanding their numerical preponderance and the immensely superior proportion of the private Indian capital invested in the country, the Indian settlers did not adopt a dog-in-the-manger policy. They did not demand preferential treat-

ment. They did not demand European exclusion, nor did they agitate for the imposition of disabilities upon such Europeans as were already settled or might be allowed to settle in the Protectorate. On the contrary, they were not afraid of competition, and welcomed and were willing to co-operate on a basis of equality with all new comers whether Indian or European. Some prominent members of the Indian Community even went out of their ways to recommend the country for European settlement as well as Indian. In the early days of the British administration of the Protectorate, the relations between the Indian community and the Administration were of a very friendly character. The Foreign Office, which at that time controlled the Administration, fully recognised the invaluable and indispensable services rendered by India and the Indian settlers. Shortly after the Boer War, a number of malcontent Dutch settlers from South Africa, dissatisfied with the conditions in the neighbouring German Territory, migrated to the Protectorate, and eventually settled in the area known as 'the Highlands'. These settlers brought with them the bitter South African racial prejudice directed against coloured people, and together with other white settlers, with experience of conditions in South Africa and other self-governing portions of His Majesty's Dominions, but entirely ignorant of Indian traditions and customs and of the earlier history of the Protectorate, commenced an agitation against the Indian settlers with the object eventually of reducing them to the same position of inferiority as has been the unhappy fate of their countrymen in South Africa. At first these efforts met with no success, to the great chagrin of the white settlers who pressed for the transfer and the control of the Administration from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. His Majesty's Indian subjects in East Africa date their principal troubles from the beginning of Colonial Office administration in East Africa. Without endeavouring to determine how far the Colonial Office was responsible for the change, they nevertheless believe that a deliberate attempt was made at that time to alter the whole character of the administration—which before then had been equitable and even-handed to all sections of the community but which thereafter under the growing influence of the South Africa immigrants or other settlers having similar experience in European controlled British Colonies, so as to give advantages and preferential treatment, to the white settlers under the pretext that the Protectorate should come more and more under European influences in the interests of the native population. In August 1907, the Land Board of the Protectorate recommended that Government land in certain specified areas should not be allotted to Indians, but should be

reserved for European settlement. In transmitting the resolution to the then Secretary of State, Lord Egin, the commissioner of Lands reminded him that but for India the railway would never have been constructed, that most of the trading wealth of the country was in the hands of the Indians were British finally, that Indians were British subjects. Unfortunately, as had happened some months earlier in the case of Indians in South Africa, His Lordship did not give to these powerful considerations the importance that they merited. In a dispatch to the Governor, dated 18th March 1908, Lord Elgin said "With regard to the granting of land to Indians, it is not consonant with the views of His Majesty's Government to impose legal restrictions on any section of the Indian community, but, as a matter of administrative convenience grants should not be made to Indians in the upland areas." It is submitted in the first place, that the rights and the well being of His Majesty's Indian subjects ought never, in a territory such as British East Africa, to have been subordinated to mere "administrative convenience", but, that, it is common knowledge that no question of "administrative convenience" was at issue at that time. The European settlers wish to reserve the whole of the uplands area, as one of the healthiest and best parts of the Protectorate for themselves. Not that they wished themselves to develop the country. They relied and still rely entirely upon native labour for the purpose; but they wished to live a life apart from and out of contact with the Indian community, and to reserve for themselves the most favourably situated areas, access to which has been made possible only by Indian enterprise and labour. The departure from principle on the flimsy grounds advanced by His Majesty's Government was disastrous, and from that time the Indian position has gradually gone from bad to worse. And whereas, in contrast with the reservation of the upland area for exclusive White settlement, it was generally understood that the lowlands were to be reserved for Indian settlement, it is significant and characteristic of the unfairness of the White settlers that they are to-day engaged in an endeavour to secure the assent of the Colonial Office to an encroachment upon the Lowland areas.

When the War broke out, the Indian Community was specially requested and loyally consented to abstain from controversial agitation. Their consent was obtained on the understanding that such abstention was to be reciprocal. Unfortunately, neither the Government nor the European settlers abided by the agreement. Racial differentiations of an administrative, and of a legislative character have followed fast, until to-day the situation is such as to agitate the people of India, who are asking with the utmost anxiety whether the tragic history of the Indian population of South

Africa, for which, to a very large extent, they hold his Majesty's Government responsible, is to be repeated in East Africa, with far less possibility of justification, and where the Administration is not, as in South Africa, that of a self-governing Dominion enjoying Responsible Government, but of a Protectorate directly controlled by His Majesty's Government, who must bear the full responsibility for all the consequences of the adoption and continuance of the present racial policy which they have initiated or permitted.

The Economic Commission

A reference was made above to Chapter 7 of the Report of the Economic Commission. The Commission appointed by the local Government did not include a single Indian representative, and by way of protest no Indian evidence was tendered, and practically no evidence bearing upon the Indian situation was produced before the Commission. Yet in that Chapter the Commission, without supporting testimony of any kind, delivered an attack upon the commercial methods and the private morality of the Indian Community, of such a character as it is impossible for any self-respecting and high spirited people for one moment to tolerate. These allegations of a most offensive type have been made with the very clear object of creating an atmosphere of prejudice against the Indian section of the population. European and Christian civilisation has been deliberately invoked and contrasted with Eastern and non-Christian civilisation to the detriment of the latter and in the alleged interests of the native population, and recommendations have been made that the Protectorate should be treated, together with adjacent territories, as a quasi Dominion, and that power should be handed over to the small oligarchy of white settlers, whose views need no elucidation in the light of the declaration on the Indian question of the Convention of Associations of East Africa (the most important non-official body of European in the country, which is often known as "The White Man's Parliament") that their aim was to change the whole character of the country and its population by the stoppage of Indian immigration and the gradual elimination of the Indian population. The Indian Community has felt that such a campaign, undertaken ostensibly on behalf of the native population by the white settlers, is hypocritical in the extreme. Those who are best acquainted with local conditions and who can read between the lines of the proceedings of the Convention of Associations and the Report of the Economic Commission, are under no illusion as to the altruism of the motives of the European settlers.

The present agitation is reminiscent of similar campaigns conducted at various times in different parts of South Africa preli-

minary to the introduction of anti-Asiatic legislation imposing further disabilities upon the resident Indian population. The Indian community in East Africa has bitterly resented the imputations that have been made against it, and it challenges impartial investigation. It desires at this stage to make no counter charges, but it is content to quote the opinion of the authorised representatives of the Native people themselves. Mr. C. F. Andrews, who was specially deputed by the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association of Bombay to investigate the situation in East Africa recently, made a special point of meeting the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice of Uganda, two Ministers of the Native Parliament. This is what Sir Apollo Kagwa, Prime Minister, and Mr. Staisles Enganya, the Chief Justice, say in a letter to Mr. Andrews:

"With reference to our meeting with you in our Native Parliament this morning, we beg to confirm in writing our opinion we expressed on the following two points which came out—namely: (a) We do want the Indians to remain in our country, as we consider that their being here would improve our country, and would do no harm to the country. Besides, we find them a moral people. We would, of course, like better Indians. (b) We do not want our country to be united to any other Protectorate, for we consider that if this was done it would greatly interfere with our Uganda Treaty, 1900, and our customs. We have other reasons besides. Therefore, we would very much like this Protectorate to remain as it is."

Dr. Cock, the wellknown East African medical expert, has publicly corroborated the evidence of the Native leaders regarding Indian morality. In the light of this disinterested testimony, it is clear that the sole motive for the hostile activities of the European colonists lies in colour and race prejudice and trade jealousy. It is significant, too, that the Convention of Associations has deliberately sought to raise the question of religious privilege and to destroy the religious neutrality for which the British administration is supposed to stand, as the word "christian" does not appear in the original draft of the declaration that the Convention circulated to its members. It is, however, no function of His Majesty's Administration in East Africa to promote specially any form of religious belief or civilisation. The threatening attitude of European settlers towards the Indian colonists and sympathetic officials alike has filled Indians with alarm lest His Majesty's Government should mistake a clamorous and spurious agitation, based upon crude self-interest, for a reasoned demand for changes in the Administration that will, if given effect to, completely alter its character, with calamitous consequences for the old-established Indian population. Indians recognise fully the fact that there are a number of officials of all ranks in the country

who are anxious to administer it sympathetically and impartially. But they are not blind to the hostile activities of the bulk of the European population, which includes a most violent element, and which threatens them whenever they show a disposition to fair-minded and just administration. Recent episodes of this character are well-known, and it is strongly felt that His Majesty's Government ought to discourage severely the anti-Indian tendencies that are locally prevalent, and which are fraught with untold mischief to the Empire.

Having thus reduced to its true meaning and proportion the European opposition, the Indian Community desires to place the following views on record, in the knowledge that they have the support of the Indian people and the sympathy of the Government of India.

What Indians Want.

It is no longer possible for the people of India and the Indian settlers in British East Africa to tolerate or recognise anything in the nature of racial differentiation, whether as a matter of "administrative convenience" or by statutory enactment. If the European settlers could not content themselves with equality of treatment with their Indian fellow subjects, they need not have come to or stayed in a country already widely populated by Indians, and in which Indians had preceded them by many generations; had His Majesty's Government done their duty towards the Indian population, the disabilities today complained of would never have been imposed. The Imperial Government have never justified and cannot possibly justify to the people of India the anti-Indian policy that has been tacitly and officially adopted for the past thirteen years. The Indian communities in the neighbouring territories of Zanzibar, Uganda, and Tanganyika have watched with alarm the growth of anti-Indian feeling in the Protectorate whose effects they are already beginning to feel. The policy of racial differentiation as regards ownership of land in townships has already been put into operation in Uganda, where it has hitherto been absent. Yet the Uganda Economic Commission, which has just reported, says of the Indian settler: "The country owes much to the Indian trader, and we consider a broad policy of toleration should be adopted towards him. He has shown energy and enterprise, and has assisted in the opening up of the more remote district. He is also of value as an agriculturist, and his activities in this direction might be well encouraged." That India is far from reconciled to the evil fate that has befallen her children in South Africa is evident from the anxiety with

which the mission to the Union of Sir Benjamin Robertson, on behalf of the Government of India, is being watched. It would be disastrous, and it would be regarded as a breach of faith on the part of the British Government, if the history of the South Africa Indians were repeated in the East Africa Protectorate and the adjacent territories. India is proud of results of the efforts of her colonists settled for centuries in East Africa, and she cannot possibly look with equanimity upon a movement calculated to injure fatally a most important portion of her foreign trade. It is felt by all classes of the Indian people that when the temperate parts of the Empire, controlled by self-governing European communities, are for all practical purposes, closed to Indian immigration, it would be inequitable and unpardonable if, as is now being attempted in the East Africa Protectorate, the same policy of exclusion were adopted. Therefore, Indians deem it essential, in the interest of all the elements of the mixed population of the country, that an absolutely open door, as regards immigration, should be maintained. Immigrants of both European and Indian origin should be equally welcome and given equal opportunities for the development of individual enterprise, and no special privileges should be given to any section of the population.

The political as well as the municipal franchise, which are at present confined to Europeans, should be equally conferred upon Indians. It is absurd to hold that Indians, who, in large numbers in their own country, in British Guiana, Trinidad, Fiji, and even in the Cape Colony, have been enfranchised, should, when settled in East Africa, where the average franchise is higher, be incapable of exercising the franchise. It is not even disguised that the European community have opposed an extension of the franchise to Indian because they wish, in a Colony that owes its very existence to Indian foresight, courage, and enterprise, to enjoy a monopoly of political power in the pretended interest of the Native inhabitants.

The people of India naturally look to His Majesty's Government to remove all racial checks, bars and differentiations: such, for example, as the exclusion of Indians from the Executive Council; the practical municipal disfranchisement of Indians in Nairobi; the preferential grants of land to Europeans; the encouragement of settlement by European ex-soldiers without corresponding encouragement of settlement by Indian ex-soldiers; the sale of Crown lands by auction at which Indians are forbidden to bid to the detriment of the finances of the colony; the power granted to the Governor, under the Crown Lands Ordinance (1915), enabling him to veto (as he has invariably done in practice)

the transfer of Europeans owned land to Indian purchasers ; the policy of racial segregation in townships and extra-municipal areas ; and the introduction of legislation, ostensibly of a general character, but capable of special administration for political purposes against Indians by an Executive controlled by a hostile White minority.

The East African Indian community has placed its views on the various matters of complaint and disability upon record in a series of moderate and constructive resolutions passed unanimously at the recent session of the Eastern Africa Indian National Congress, (see Register, 1920) to which reference is hereby made, in the earnest hope that in so far as they fall within the competence of His Majesty's Government, full relief will be granted. And here it may be added that the local Indian community is much alarmed at the prospect of ruin resulting from the adoption by the Colonial Office of a new policy of currency and exchange without consultation with the East African Indians, or reference to the India Office and which it believes to have been adopted mainly in the interests of a small section of the European settlers. That this view is held by independent observers is evident from the opinion of the English President of Kisumu Chamber of Commerce, among others, and from the following message to "The Times" from its Mombasa correspondent:—

The Times,' March 12, 1920

Mombasa, March 6 (delayed)

"Recent legislation respecting the rate of exchange enforced on instructions from the Colonial Office, by which the value of the rupee is fixed at 2s. 4d. now, 2s. 2d. as from July 1, and 2s. as from December 1, while in India the rate remains at about 2s. 8d., resulted in a serious dislocation of the trade of the Protectorates of Zanzibar and Tanganyika (formerly German East Africa). In the first place a considerable quantity of the trade and finance of the territories is geographically dependent upon India ; secondly, the position is aggravated by the already serious shortage of silver ; and thirdly, the legislation is enforced during the harvesting of the Uganda crop requiring about 150 lakhs (L1,750,000 at the exchange of 2s. 4d.) to purchase the 60,000 bales of native production. The impression locally is that in the introduction of the recent measures too great consideration was given to settlers' interests, to the direct exclusion of established commercial and industrial interests, and entailing restrictive consequences upon native production. The local conditions resulting from these factors warrant the assumption

that there will be a breakdown of the country's trade, and that a financial crisis is imminent."

Conclusion.

India is to day entering upon a new path as a free Nation, on the road to Dominionhood, within the British Empire. The susceptibilities of her people can no longer be ignored, as have, in the matter of the welfare of her colonists, been only too often in the past. In South Africa, the existence of an independent Dominion Government has been held by the Imperial Government to excuse them for non-intervention on behalf of the unhappy and ill used Indian population. The same considerations do not apply to East Africa, where the Imperial Government are solely responsible for policy and administration, a responsibility which they cannot share and have no right to delegate. As to the Tanganyika Territory which will be governed under a mandate from the League of Nations, the British Government will be responsible to the international conscience of the world. But India, too, is an original member of the League of Nations, and is entitled to demand not only that all peoples alike should be treated equally in the mandated area, but that in the neighbouring British Territory equal treatment should be adopted, lest the evil results of the opposite policy react adversely upon the peoples on the other side of a vague and artificial boundary. In the eyes of the Indian public, the sincerity of Great Britain's attitude towards India on Imperial questions will be tested to a great extent by the policy enforced in East Africa.

Indians look upon the British East Africa Protectorate, Uganda, Zanzibar, and Tanganyika as one territory which was for centuries settled and developed by Indians residing under the jurisdiction of Asiatic sovereigns, and who brought with them large amounts of capital whose investment in the country accounts for its present prosperity. Throughout this vast area there was no European settlement whatever until the mushroom growth of the last twenty years. If the Indian population were to leave East Africa to-morrow the entire territory would immediately fall into ruin and decay, and its Native population relapse into barbarism. It is believed in India that, when reminded of all the facts, the British people and the British Government will not allow judgment to go by default, but will respond generously to India's claim to the equal treatment of her colonists in East Africa, and the reversal of the present prevalent anti Indian policy.

The Fizi Papers

The Fizi Despatch .

The following papers on the conviction of Mr. D. M. Manilal and the Indian riots in Fizi are published by the Govt. of India

*Despatch from the Governor of Fiji to the Colonial Office No. 25,
dated the 22nd January 1920.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 8th (? December) instant, asking for a report on the circumstances in which a sentence of imprisonment was passed on Mr. D. M. Manilal.

2. The facts of the case are as follows :—Early in 1918 Mr. Manilal applied for the lease of a piece of native land in the village of Nausori, Rewa, on which he desired to erect an office. The Board which reports and advises on applications for leases recommended in this case that the application should not be approved, as the land, which is on the bank of the Rewa river, was “right in the native village, and close to the ferry approach, which at any time may require to be deviated owing to flood wash, or to give a better gradient.” The Governor in Council concurred in the Board’s recommendation, and Mr. Manilal was accordingly informed that his application could not be approved.

3. Early this year Mr. Manilal apparently came to some irregular agreement with the native owners of the land, and, notwithstanding a warning given him by the Acting District Commissioner, Rewa, and that there are other sites in Nausori suitable for an office, commenced to erect a building on it. The Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, with my approval, given on the advice of the Acting Attorney General, thereupon issued a notice to Mr. Manilal under the provisions of section 3 of Ordinance No. 5 of 1889, warning him to depart forthwith from the native town of Nausori and to cease to occupy any land or building within the said town or its precincts.

4. As Mr. Manilal did not comply with this notice, proceedings were instituted against him, and, on the case being heard before the District Commissioner, Rewa, he was fined 10*l.* or in default one month’s imprisonment. The fine was paid.

5. The only protest received in connection with this matter came from the "Indian Imperial Association of Fiji." of which Mr. Manilal is Chairman. As it was a case in which Mr. Manilal, who is himself a lawyer, deliberately flouted the law, in spite of official warnings, I did not consider that the protest called for any consideration.

6. I enclose copies of a paragraph which appeared in the *Fiji Times* of 25th September last on this subject and of a letter dated 3rd subsequently sent to the same newspaper by members of the Indian community not belonging to the Association.

ANNEX 1 :—*Excerpt from "Fiji Times," 25th September 1919*

MOTION OF PROTEST. FAVOUR MR. MANILAL

At a meeting of Suva Indians on the 24th, the following motion was passed :—

"This meeting of the Indian Imperial Association of Fiji views with alarm, deep sorrow and profound indignation the prosecution and conviction of Mr. D. M. Manilal, M.A., LL. B., Barrister-at-law, and the sentence of 10l. fine or month's imprisonment pronounced against him for the crime of building an office on a piece of land for which a grateful native had given him license to occupy without any tenure, simply because this convenient business site had originally been coveted by a company of which the Government has refused a proper lease to Mr. Manilal without any objection, that he was not prepared to meet, singling him out from amongst many others, withdrawing the charge against the native himself for the alleged offence. And this Association strongly protests against the conviction knowing that many of the European settlers in this Colony have already acquired large areas of freehold lands from natives by presents of match boxes, matchlocks, and illicit liquor, while our only leader in this Colony and Chairman of this Association is prosecuted to conviction in spite of irregularities in procedure and unsufficiency of evidence for putting up a place of business where the local European elite do not wish an Indian to remain without dependency on themselves, which precaution was entirely uncalled for and unnecessary after he had complied with the Government notice to leave the premises and sold the building to the native himself."

ANNEX 2 :—*From "Fiji Times," 3rd October 1919.*

THE INDIAN PROTEST.

SIR,

We, the undersigned members of the Indian community of Suva, feel that we cannot allow the contributed article in your issue of

Monday, 25th September, headed "Indian Meeting Motion of Protest," "Favour Mr. Manilal," to pass without a slight comment.

The so-called Indian Imperial Association is in no way an association representative of the Indian community of Fiji. It is a quasi secret society. To become a member you must be an intimate friend and approved by one or more of the few gentlemen who run the society.

Mr. Manilal, Mr. George Suchit and Mr. Ram Singh are the leaders, we believe, and the remainder of the society is comprised roughly of some dozen of their personal friends.

The Association is not open to the Indian community here in general, and unless one shares the views held by the above-named gentlemen, one is not eligible.

The law in respect of a breach of which Mr. Manilal was fined is a law to prevent Fijians exploiting Indians, and Indians in their turn from exploiting each other.

We do not infer that Mr. Manilal had any idea of committing a crime, but if he had been suddenly called to India and had sold his right and title in his building, the purchaser would have found that his right and title was on a very precarious footing, and we understand that the Ordinance was passed by the Government solely to prevent dealings of this kind, and it ill behoves us to grumble at legislation passed in our interest.

We hope that this letter will, to some extent, remove from the public any idea that the so-called Indian Imperial Association is in any way representative of the Indian community, consisting, as it does, of a few malcontents and quidnuncs.

We are, &c.,

Non Members,

Telegram from the Governor of Fiji to the Secretary of

State for the Colonies, dated 6th March 1920.

Your telegram dated 3rd March. Following is statement of offences, arrests, convictions and dismissals during riots:—Cutting telegraph wires, two men arrested, one committed for trial, one remanded. Bridge wrecking, 27 men arrested and remanded. Wounding with intent, eight men and three women arrested and committed for trial. Unlawful assembly, summary jurisdiction, nine men arrested and convicted. Intimidation, summary jurisdiction, one man (?) arrested, and convicted. Riot, common law, 14 men and three women arrested and committed for trial. Riotous behaviour, summary jurisdiction, 168 men 18 women arrested, 128 men 14 women convicted, 40 men and 4 women cases dismissed, all refused bail.

*Telegram from the Governor of Fiji to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, dated 18th March 1920.*

Following is summary of petition addressed to Government by numerous Indians of Suva and district:—

“Loyal Indians respectfully ask Government to take steps to punish agitators responsible for recent troubles among Indians. We feel that many who have been committed to gaol have been incited to do acts for which they have been punished by leaders who are still at large, and we pledge ourselves to render to Government every assistance in our power to bring agitators to justice.”

*Telegram from the Governor of Fiji to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, dated 29th March 1920.*

In connection with recent Indian disturbances I have to inform you that by Order made under Peace and Good Order Ordinance, 1875, following persons: (1) D. M. Manilal, (2) Mrs. Manilal, (3) Harapal Maharaj, (4) Fajil Khan, have been prohibited from residing for two years within (a) Island of Vitu Levu, (b) Island of Ovalau, (c) District of Vanua Levu, known as Macuata Province. Order served 27th March and takes effect from 1st April, but reasonable latitude will be allowed for making transport arrangements, &c.

*Despatch from the Governor of Fiji to the Colonial Office,
No. 66, dated the 12th March 1920.*

I have the honour to make the following report on the recent strike of Indian labourers in Fiji and the consequent disturbances at Suva and other centres.

2. The first indication of trouble was a strike of the Indian employees of the Public Works Department on 15th January; on 19th January the employees of the Municipal Council followed suit and the strike became fairly general in Suva. No definite demands were put forward, but there was talk of a general demand for 5s. per diem pay. On 21st January a strike began on a small scale in the Rewa district and minor cases of intimidation were reported both there and at Suva. At this stage it was thought advisable to enrol 24 European constables at Suva, in case they should be required. In the course of the next three days the strike became general in the Rewa district and was reported to be spreading to the up-river centres, Viria and Vunidawa.

3. Up to this point there was no disorder and no reason to anticipate any. There was no evidence of hostility against the Government. Meetings were held among the Indians, but the speakers generally counselled respect for law and order and the observance of constitutional methods. The initial grievances felt were

apparently against the merchants, whose high prices were regarded as being the cause of the increased cost of living.

4. On the afternoon of 27th January news was received by telephone of a threatening demonstration at Nausori on the Rewa river, where the Colonial Sugar Refining Company have one of their principal mills. The trouble began with the arrest of certain Indians for intimidating others desiring to return to work. The arrested men were rescued from the police by a crowd, which rapidly increased to the number of 1,000 or more, and attempted to rush the police station at Naduruloulou in order to attack the witnesses. Late in the afternoon Captain R. Kane, M. C. the District Commissioner, reported that there was every prospect of a riot, and in response to his request for assistance I authorised the despatch of 12 native constables from Suva, followed later by 20 Europeans and a machine gun section of the Defence Force. The arrival of these reinforcements had a tranquillising effect, and the night passed without further incident. On this occasion and in the subsequent emergencies at Rewa, the situation was resolutely and judiciously handled by Captain Kane.

5. On 28th January the elected members of the Legislative Council resident at Suva, called upon me and asked what steps the Government were taking to deal with the situation. They represented that the public were seriously alarmed, that the attitude of the Indians was believed to be largely racial, and that there were reports of a large and probably hostile demonstration at Suva being planned for 2nd February. I informed them fully of the steps already taken and of those which it was proposed to take. On the same day I received a telegram from the Mayor of Levuka reporting that all the Indian labourers employed on the municipal and harbour works there had struck, but eventually these men went back to work and there was no trouble at Levuka. There was still no evidence of any intention on the part of the strikers to formulate their demands, though it was reported about this time that they were selecting delegates to represent their grievances to me.

6. On the evening of the 29th, a mob of about 200 Indians, armed with sticks, gathered in Toorak (the Indian location at Suva) with the object of attacking the manager of one of the hotels (Patesan by name), whom they accused of having flogged an Indian servant and of having used insulting language to Indians passing his hotel. The mob was dispersed by the constabulary, but not without a baton charge. Other mobs assembled at Tamavua (a village on the outskirts of Suva) with the same object, but were met by the Inspector-General of Constabulary, who persuaded them to go home and told them that their proper course was to seek

redress in the magistrate's court instead of taking the law into their own hands.

7. Meanwhile a request had been made to me, through the Agent-General of Immigration, that I would receive a deputation of Indian workers and hear their grievances. I at once consented to receive the deputation, which waited upon me on 30th January. The deputation consisted of about 15 leading Indians and several women, and was headed by a Mrs. Manilal, the wife of D. M. Manilal, a local Indian lawyer who was already under suspicion, and is now regarded beyond all reasonable doubt as being the prime mover in the agitation. Manilal himself was not present. A long statement of grievances was read to me representing the increased price of foodstuffs and other necessities and the inadequacy of the prevailing rates of wages, and concluding with the request that the Government should pay its labourers 5s. a day, and appoint a Commission to consider the question of controlling prices after work had been resumed. I had already decided, in consultation with my advisers, that no increase should be promised until work was resumed ; but, after asking the deputation, a number of questions and discussing the subject matter of their petition, I informed them that I was prepared to appoint a Commission, and that I had already obtained the consent of the Chief Justice to act as Chairman. I added that, if after considering the findings of the Commission the Government decided to give an increase of wages to its employees, the increase would have effect from the date on which they resumed work—an offer which I hoped might induce the strikers to resume work quietly.

8. I proceeded immediately with the appointment of the Commission, and on the following day I published the names of the members, and the terms of reference, which were to enquire and report as to—

- (a) the present cost of living as compared with the cost in former years ;
- (b) the present rates of salaries and wages as compared with the rates prevailing in former years ;
- (c) Whether at the present cost of necessities the salaries or wages earned by different classes of the community afford a reasonable means of livelihood ;
- (d) if not, what measures the Government should take with a view to adjusting any disproportion between cost of necessities and the prevailing rates of salaries or wages.

In response to a request made to me by the deputation, provision was inserted enabling the Commission to include as an additional member a representative of the Indian wage-earning class in any particular district, a concession of which the Indians promptly availed themselves by nominating as their representative Mr. S. S. Chowla,

a clerk in the Law Department. News of the appointment of the Commission was quickly circulated among the Indians at Suva and Rewa, apparently with good effect, as they spent much time during the following days in discussing the means of appointing delegates and presenting evidence.

9. Meanwhile reports were being received of further cases of intimidation and of preparations for the large demonstration which was expected on the following Monday, 2nd February. There was nothing to indicate what form this demonstration was likely to take, and no actual reason to anticipate that it would be otherwise than pacific, but the possibility of a concentration of five or six thousand Indian strikers at Suva was a little disturbing in view of the small forces at the Government's disposal, and there was, not unnaturally, a certain amount of anxiety on the part of the public. In the circumstances it was thought advisable to be prepared for any contingency. Accordingly a rough scheme of defence was improvised, by which all available forces were to stand to at day light on the Monday morning. On Sunday morning I met the leading citizens of Suva at the Defence Force Club and addressed them informally on the situation. I said that, although the Government had thought it wise to make all possible preparations in case of trouble on the following day there was nothing in the reports received inconsistent with a perfectly peaceable intention on the part of the strikers; and that even if a demonstration took place, it need not necessarily be accompanied by any disturbance. At the same time I observed that in times like these men with grievances, whether white or coloured, were prone to excitement, and that Europeans might hear things said by the Indians which would try their patience severely; but I deprecated interference with any crowds so long as there was no actual violence or threat of damage to life or property.

10. Sunday, the 1st of February, passed off quietly. A large meeting of Indians was held at Rewa, but the meeting was entirely peaceable and was largely occupied with discussion as to the representation of grievances before the Commission, the appointment of which had apparently given satisfaction. On the following day, 2nd February, everything was in readiness for the expected demonstration at Suva, but nothing happened beyond a meeting of Indians in one of the suburbs. On the following day, however I received a disquieting report of the attitude of the Indians at Rewa. Gatherings of Indians at outlying points in the Rewa district were reported, the intention undoubtedly being to concentrate on Nausori. The object of the concentration was clearly hostile, and there was much talk of looting stores and damaging property. Visits paid by Rewa Indians to Suva and the evidence which they saw of the Government's pre-

paredness there no doubt had the effect of checking for the moment the plans of the strikers at Nausori. Nevertheless the time had clearly come for the Government to be in readiness for grave developments. Accordingly, I decided to mobilise the Defence Force and to send two sections to Nausori, the remainder being concentrated in barracks at Suva. At the same time I gave orders that the crossing of the Rewa river by Indians in considerable numbers in either direction was to be stopped. Trouble of a more or less serious nature seemed inevitable and preparations were hurried forward. Interference by Indians with the telephone wires between Nausori and the up-river centres was reported. Late in the evening a heavy thunder-storm burst over Suva, and the lighting, which was the most vivid I have ever seen, made telephone conversation difficult and hampered the work of preparation. At 7 P. M., a great blaze was observed on the sea front. At first it was thought that the Government workshops were on fire, but afterwards it was found that a cutter in the harbour, loaded with benzine, had been struck by lightning. The incident provided an exciting close to an eventful day.

11. At this stage considerable activity among Indian women became noticeable, the most prominent among them being Mrs. Manilal, who addressed meetings of Indians, exhorting them not to go back to work and to prevent all their countrymen from doing so. Mrs. Manilal, accompanied by a crowd of women, attempted to force an Indian employee at one of the motor garages to leave his work, but the police appeared on the scene and the women went home. Bands of women of the lowest class were organised to intimidate workers with obscene language and filthy practices.

12. On 5th February the Commission held its first sittings, and I issued a Proclamation calling upon the strikers to resume work and explaining the situation to the Indians. In the course of the week I had been verbally approached through the Agent-General of Immigration with the suggestion that, on the following Sunday, 8th February, I should go out to Nausori unofficially, accompanied only by the Agent-General of Immigration and the Inspector-General of Constabulary, and attend a meeting of the strikers at which no other European should be allowed to be present. The Agent-General very properly declined to submit any such request to me unless it were made in writing, which was not done. The request was illustrative of the dictatorial attitude now being assumed by the strike leaders. The proposal that the Governor should make a journey of 14 miles, in order to parley in a clandestine fashion with strikers, was one which, I need hardly say, I should not have been prepared to entertain for a moment, and I regret that the leaders did not put forward their request in writing and

so afford me an opportunity of telling them what I thought of the suggestion. Later on, I was shown the draft of an address which had been prepared to be presented to me at the proposed meeting. It had very little to do with the stated grievances, namely, the cost of living and the rate of wages, and consisted of a long *resumé* of political complaints and aspirations. It was in fact a clear proof that, the economic grievances, on which the leaders had induced the labourers to strike, had been relegated to the background, and that the movement had been converted into a political agitation. I may mention here that, at one of the previous meetings at Suva above referred to, a resolution was solemnly passed ordaining that, while all other Indian domestic servants were to be called out under threats of beating, those in the employ of the Governor, the Chief Justice and the Colonial Secretary might be specially exempted.

13. On 7th February there was an attempt at arson on the premises of the Public Works Department at Suva, which was fortunately discovered in time to prevent a serious conflagration.

14. I have not so far referred to Navua, an important sugar centre on the south coast where the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Company have a large mill. The Indian labourers here also, to the number of two or three thousand, went on strike; but there was no disorder, and the situation was well handled by the District Commissioner, Mr. A. H. Roberts, with the aid of the local police and 50 Fijian special constables. There were, nevertheless, moments of anxiety for the safety of residents and property at Navua, and for several days an armed party was held in readiness to proceed there by launch from Suva at half an hour's notice.

15. Hitherto no serious developments had been reported from the up-river centres beyond Rewa, but on the afternoon of Sunday the 8th of February disturbing news was received from the District Commissioner at Vunidawa, who reported that all the Indian labourers had struck, that intimidation was rife, and that on the previous day bloodshed had been narrowly averted, one of the European planters living with his wife and two children on an isolated estate having been attacked by Indians. All the planters had been brought into the Government station, but they had no means of defence. After consultation with the District Commissioner by telephone, I authorised him to enrol local Fijians as special constables, and told him to defend the station as best he could pending the arrival of reinforcements. These, to the number of 12 half-caste and Fijian members of the Defence Force under a European officer, were dispatched at once, proceeding part of the way by motor-car and the rest by river.

16. The first serious collision occurred at Suva on the afternoon of the 11th February. Shortly after 2 P.M., a report reached the Inspector-General of Constabulary to the effect that some 60 or 70 Indians, armed with sticks, were coming into Suva from one of the suburbs. The Inspector-General immediately proceeded in his car to the outskirts of the town, accompanied by an Inspector and a small body of constables. The police were drawn across the road and held up the mob. When asked what they intended to do, the Indians said that Mrs. Manilal had been arrested, and that they intended to go to the prison (apparently with the object of attempting to release her). The Inspector-General told them that they could not be allowed to pass. This was resented, and the women persisted in passing. The Inspector-General, having insufficient men to deal with the rest of the crowd, and being unwilling to precipitate trouble, decided that it would be unwise to interfere with the women; but he took away the loaded and other sticks from the men that had them, and informed the crowd that the report of Mrs. Manilal's arrest was untrue. As they were disinclined to believe, Colonel Golding offered to take their leader into Suva in his car, in order that he might see for himself that Mrs. Manilal was in her house, provided that the crowd remained where they were. This was done, and on Colonel Golding's return the crowd were satisfied, and slowly dispersed. On his way back to Suva the Inspector-General met another crowd of Indians, armed with sticks, coming from a different direction. He stopped them, and asked them where they were going, and what they intended to do. The replied that white men were being beaten, and that they were going to see what the trouble was. Colonel Golding told them that this was not true, and turned them back. Shortly after his return to the police station the Inspector-General received information that there was likely to be trouble at Toorak, where Indians were reported to be gathering with the intention of a hostile attack upon loyal Indians returning from work. He thereupon ordered Inspector Swinbourne to take some special constables to Toorak, and patrol the neighbourhood. Inspector Swinbourne subsequently reported as follows:—

“Approaching Toorak, a riot was found to be in progress, and it appears that Special Constable Reay, whilst endeavouring to arrest an Indian woman named Rahman, was set upon and beaten by Indian men and women, as were the Fijian constables and an elderly European gentleman named Pilkington, who had gone to his assistance. Reay and the police were forced to retire and were pursued down Toorak road by a howling mob of some 300 Indians, who hurled sticks and stones after them and generally terrorising the whole neighbourhood. With the individual arrival of ‘Specials’ and Sub-Inspector Lucchinelli, the Indians were driven off the Rewa road into a gully near the com-

pound, where the Indian women were originally seen in the morning by the constabulary officers. There Special Constables Caldwell, Savage and James Brown (police van driver) were severely beaten and wounded and the police driven back to Toorak road. The Magistrate was asked to attend by Inspector Swinbourne. The Chief Police Magistrate and a party of soldiers under Major Knox soon afterwards arrived on the scene."

The Inspector-General himself arrived upon the scene about the same time as the Military. The Indians who had been participating in the riot ran into some houses in the neighbourhood. Colonel Golding ordered these houses to be surrounded and caused all found inside to be disarmed and collected in one spot. A Party of 175 men and 14 women were marched down to the police station under escort. Meanwhile, Colonel Golding despatched some specials, under command of Inspector Swinbourne, to deal with a crowd of Indians armed with sticks who had been reported as coming into Suva from another quarter. This crowd was intercepted and forced to retire to the outskirts of the town.

17. Late in the evening I visited the police station and congratulated the police and special constables on the way in which they had handled a very difficult and dangerous situation. I also visited the hospital, where I saw Mr. W. Savage and Mr. C. Caldwell, Special Constables. They were both very badly injured and almost unconscious, Mr. Savage's head and face being a mass of bruises, while Mr. Caldwell had an arm and several ribs broken. I also saw Mr. Pilkington, a gentleman, over 70 years of age, who had very pluckily gone to the assistance of the police and had had an arm broken.

18. At an early stage of the trouble it had become apparent to me that naval or military assistance, or both, from outside the Colony would be required. Even if a sufficient force could have been organised locally, it was clear that the Indians would never believe in its sufficiency; and the inevitable result of a collision between several thousands of Indians and a force which they believed they could overpower, although in the end the armed force would probably have prevailed, would have been a resort to rifle and machine-gun fire involving serious bloodshed and damage to property. In the circumstances I decided to ask the Government of Australia to send a warship, and at the same time, in case a vessel should not be available from Australia or should not arrive in time, to ask the New Zealand Government for assistance also. Both requests were generously and promptly complied with, and I desire to record the deep appreciation of the Government and people of this Colony of the action of the Commonwealth and the Dominion Authorities. The assistance from New Zealand, which arrived first,

consisted of a detachment of 60 officers and men of the New Zealand Defence Forces with Lewis gun sections. These arrived on the morning of 12th February on board the New Zealand Government vessel *Tutanekai*. Being uncertain at what point this force might be first required, I had requested the *Tutanekai* to proceed to Levuka and there to await developments. On the night, however, of 12th February, in view of the serious affray in Suva and possibility of further trouble here, I requested the *Tutanekai* by wireless to come direct to Suva. The arrival of the force was most opportune. A portion of the force was immediately called upon to support the police in preventing the incursion of crowds into Suva and generally in restoring order in the town and neighbourhood, while late in the same day a section was despatched by launch up the Rewa river in order to reinforce the Fijian police and Defence Force already stationed at Nausori, who had had to deal during the day with serious disturbances amounting to riot.

19. The following is a detailed account by Inspector A. Pictor, of the Fiji Constabulary, on the riot at Nausori on 12th February :—

"On account of trouble occurring at Suva on the 11th instant in the afternoon, the special constables who had already been sworn in were mobilised, rifles issued and Nausori picketed with posts of regular and special constabulary that night. No disturbance occurred, however, and nothing out of the ordinary until 11-20 p.m. it was found that the telephone wires to Suva had been cut. A special constable motor cyclist and linesman were sent out to locate the break, while despatch runners (Fijian) were sent to Suva at the same time. The cut was located and reported to Suva. On Thursday, the 12th instant, crowds were reported as coming in at an early hour from Raralevu, Vuci, Waimbokasi, &c., with sticks, knives, &c., and concentrating at Vuni-moni. These people did not seem to know why they had been summoned, and a large number dispersed when called upon to do so. I ordered all sticks to be thrown away, and this was carried out. At 10-30 p.m., however, a crowd of about 300 men were reported as coming from Suva direction towards Davuilevu. The bridges from Nasinu to Nausori had previously been reported as broken, and this crowd were the perpetrators. I at once repaired to Davuilevu by launch with a detachment of Fijian constables, followed later by a launch load of specials (with rifles). A guard of six specials was already posted at Davuilevu Hotel, and on arrival I found the crowd had passed the hotel and had proceeded to the pontoon landing. I followed them up and asked their intentions. They stated that they were going to Nausori and that nothing would stop them. The pontoon having previously been withdrawn to the Nausori side, they were unable to proceed further, and the Fijian constables were in their rear. I called upon them to throw down their sticks and other arms therefore, which about 50 per cent. did; the remainder, however, escaped up the road towards Suva again. They were followed up and when opposite the hotel the 'specials' previously referred to reinforced the Fijians. The crowd somehow obtained other sticks and iron palings, however, and their numbers were momentarily

being swelled with reinforcements brought over in EVINEUDE boats from the Nausori side. As the tember of the crowd was ugly I formed square and telephoned Nausori to have a patrol sent on to the river to cut communication between the Nausori and Davuilevu side to prevent further reinforcements, and requested Captain Kane, the District Commissioner, to come over as I anticipated the necessity of reading the Riot Act. At the same time I sent for certain Indian leaders I could more or less trust and try to disperse the crowd by peaceable means. This latter move was successful, and the Nausori men who had crossed in small boats expressed their desire to return to their own side peaceably. This was consented to, and the pontoon sent for; nobody, however, was to be allowed to land at Nausori with a stick. I telephoned to Captain Faddy, Officer Commanding Defence Force, who had a guard on the Nausori side of the pontoon-way, to request him to have this order enforced, and to this he agreed. Left by the Nausori men, the Nasinu crowd rapidly dispersed, the majority throwing away their sticks. The Constabulary then returned to the Nausori side at 2 P. M. The Constabulary had scarcely landed at the Company's wharf, Nausori, when whistles were heard from the pontoon bridge. Collecting the Fijian constables who had fallen in at the first alarm, I proceeded to the spot, accompanied by Sub-Inspector Tucker. On arrival at the bridge the Defence Force guard was found to be in difficulties, as an angry crowd, armed with sticks, were on the bridge, and actually at grips with several members. It appears the trouble arose through the pontoon guard taking away sticks from the second pontoon load of people from the Davuilevu side as requested. It was obviously a case for swift measures, and so the Fijians were formed up in front of the Defence Force guard, across the bridge which was then held by a line of Fijian constables, with fixed bayonets. At sight of these the crowd fell back to the far end of the bridge, while the Fijians were subjected to a lively fusilade of stones. I am glad to be able to state that no trained troops could have stood this more steadily than the Fijians, whose behaviour throughout has been exemplary. The special constabulary now came up behind the Fijians, but seeing bodies of the crowd moving back at a run towards Vuci, I sent the specials back to take up a position blocking the Vuci road, which enters Nausori opposite Marks store at right angles to the river, while others were to hold the Naduruloulou road, to prevent people from the Nausori coolie lines taking us in reverse. Both these forces came face to face with armed crowds, but the sight of the rifles and the coolness of the N. C. O.'s was sufficient to meet the situation. Captain Kane now arrived at the bridge, and having spoken to the crowd without effect, read the Riot Act. The crowd, under the influence of certain of their leaders who were not inclined to violence, retired slightly and gradually dispersed without any firing taking place. There were no further incidents this day. On this date all European women and children were concentrated at Nausori, arrangements having previously been made."

20. The affair at Nausori on 12th February was the most serious of any that have occurred. Although, however, the most serious, it was not the last, for on the following day the police came into collision with a mob of several hundreds of Indians who had been wrecking bridges and telephone wires on the road between Suva and Rewa. I cannot describe this incident better than in

the words of the Inspector-General of Constabulary, whose report reads as follows :—

“On Friday the 13th instant at about 3 o’ clock I received information that Major Knox with some mounted men and his Lewis gun section were holding up at the Samabula Bridge a crowd of between 200 and 300 Indians who were demanding to be allowed to come into Suva. Permission to do so had been refused, and Mr. Pennefather, Chief Police Magistrate, had proceeded to the scene and called upon the Indians to disperse. The Indians refused and remained in the vicinity of the bridge. I proceeded to the scene with inspector Swinbourne, Sub-Inspector Lucchinelli and party of 25 European special constables and Fijian Constabulary. I conferred with Mr. Pennefather, who told me of the situation, whereupon I told Major Knox, officer in charge of the Defence Force party, that I was going to advance on the mob and asked him to follow up my party with his mounted men in case I should require their assistance. I then crossed the bridge with the constabulary and hustled the mob of Indians, taking care not to inflict damage on those who did not resist. The main body of Indians ran up the road a distance of about 400 or 500 yards, and in the vicinity of an Indian dwelling house a number picked up poles and bludgeons and offered us serious resistance by flinging rocks, stones and sticks at us and striking at us with their weapons. One tall Indian I noticed in particular came for me with a pole, but was prevented reaching me by one of the Corporals of Constabulary, who was himself stunned by a staggering blow. At this moment I heard revolver and pistol shots being fired behind me, but I am unable to say who fired them. I saw Sub-Inspector Lucchinelli discharge his revolver twice at the Indian who attacked me, but the shots did not take effect, as I saw the Indian making off when I had ordered constables to take him in flank. Had not fire been opened on the crowd of Indians, who vastly outnumbered us, I do not hesitate to say that there would have been serious loss of life on our side. I remained on the spot half-an-hour after the action and collected the wounded Indians and constables and had them conveyed to Suva in the police van for treatment at the hospital. Three Indians were suffering from gunshot wounds (one of whom has since died) and several others from contusions on the head and body.”

A magisterial enquiry was subsequently held on the death of the Indian who was killed, and the Magistrate’s finding was that the case was one justifiable homicide. This was the only life lost, but the few shots that were fired and the death of the Indian may have been the means of saving greater loss of life. There is no doubt that the Indians had been led to believe by agitators that firearms would under no circumstances be resorted to by the Government forces—a belief which greatly increased the difficulties of the police in effecting peaceable dispersals. I cannot speak too highly of the restraint and forbearance shown both by the European and by the Fijian members of the constabulary and the Defence Force in the three affrays at Toorak, Nausori, and the Samabula Bridge.

21. The pacification of the district between Suva and Rewa presented no little difficulty. On each side of the road between the two centres there are scattered settlements of Indians of a miscellaneous class, of whom only a few were genuine strikers, and who, for the most part, were merely out for trouble and ready to join forces with any crowd that might collect either at Suva or at Rewa. After the Samabula affair it was necessary to patrol the Rewa road. At the same time it was desirable to give these people every chance of coming to an understanding with the Government. Accordingly, with my consent, Mr. T. E. Fell, C. M. G., the Colonial Secretary, went out by motor-car on 15th February in order to get into touch with the Indians in this neighbourhood and to hear what they had to say. The attitude of the Indians after the events of the 13th was very uncertain, and, although Mr. Fell was accompanied by two motor cyclists and arrangements had been made for relief in case of any mishap, the journey was by no means unattended by risk. After at first displaying considerable mistrust, about 50 Indians collected and were addressed by Mr. Fell, who explained the position to them from the point of view of the Government, assuring them that if they were law-abiding and peaceful the Government was ready to help them, but warning them that if they persisted in opposing the Government and damaging property it would be their own fault if they found themselves in trouble. Having eventually received assurances from the Indians that they would do no more damage to property or interfere with men guarding the roads and that they would obey the law and not assemble in crowds without permission Mr. Fell gave permits to a few Indian storekeepers to come into Suva to make necessary purchases, and told them that, if their conduct warranted it, a larger number would be allowed to come into the town later. The meeting was not regarded by Mr. Fell as entirely satisfactory, but it clearly pointed to the advisability of appointing a civilian official to act as intermediary between the Government and the Indians and to take note of any complaints against patrols operating in this area. I therefore appointed Mr. C. E. de F. Pennefather (Magistrate, Suva) as Political Officer for this purpose. During the ensuing 10 days Mr. Pennefather paid frequent visits to the district and received numerous minor complaints, which were all investigated and, as far as possible, adjusted. I believe that this appointment had a good effect.

22. The difficulty of restoring order in Suva was increased by the presence of bands of young Indian hooligans, who together with the women, were chiefly responsible for the intimidation of loyal Indians for preventing them returning to work. At a meeting of

"Loyal Indians, British subjects" a resolution was passed thanking me for having appointed the Commission, expressing a desire to return to work forthwith, and asking for protection against interference. The only effective way of ensuring protection for the loyal element and of preventing further riotous behaviour by these hooligans (or "larrikings," as Mr. Badri Maharaj described them in conversation with me) was to prescribe an area within which movements and gatherings of Indians should be restricted and to which only those should be admitted who were engaged in *bona fide* business or employment. On 12th February the Legislative Council passed an Ordinance enabling the Governor in Council to take certain measures for the public safety in the event of civil commotion, and under this Ordinance a simple but effective system of permits was instituted, and an area, including the greater part of the town of Suva, was prescribed with the above objects. The system has worked satisfactorily, and, while it has had a good disciplinary effect on the disorderly element, has involved the least possible irksomeness to the law-abiding Indian population. The policy will be to relax it gradually, and already certain of the restrictions at first imposed have been removed.

23. His Majesty's Australian Sloop *Marguerite* arrived at Suva on 14th February and after remaining for a day, paid a visit to the north-western coast of Vitilevu. I have reason to believe that the appearance of this vessel had an excellent effect, and I greatly regret that it has only been possible for her to remain in these waters for one month. The Government forces were further augmented by the arrival, on 16th February, of 200 natives from Lau, whom Mr. G. M. Hennings, a leading resident in the Lau Group, had volunteered to recruit and who formed a most useful auxiliary to the police in patrolling roads and protecting bridges. I may here say that the attitude, both of the local Fijians and of those who were recruited in Lau, Rewa, Navua and elsewhere to assist the police, has been most gratifying. They have shown a keen desire to help the Government, and there have been very few complaints of vexatious behaviour towards the Indians with whom they have been brought in contact.

24. On 15th February the Hon'ble Badri Maharaj, M. L. C., arrived at Suva and proceeded to Nausori, where he addressed a meeting of Indians, warned them against the danger into which they were being led by agitators, and strongly advised them to return to work. This advice, following upon the prompt measures taken by the Government to deal with the rioters, apparently had a good effect. On the following day, 16th February, the strike ended as suddenly as it had begun, and the Indians at Rewa, Suva and Navua were all reported to be returning to work.

25. I am glad to say that, although efforts were undoubtedly

made by the agitators to extend the strike to the principal sugar centres in the north-western districts, there has been no trouble among the large Indian population on that side of the main island. It was persistently rumoured that large bodies of Indians from the north coast were arranging to march across the country to join in a concentration at Suva, but nothing of the sort happened. The Indians residing in Suva, Nausori, Navua and on the south coast generally are of a different and, generally speaking, of an inferior class to those belonging to the north-western districts. There has always been a tendency for malcontents and bad characters to gravitate towards the south coast centres. Neither is there any identity of interests between Indians on the Suva side and those elsewhere. The latter include a considerable element of substantial cane-growers who are themselves employers of labour, and who have a stake in the country. If strike had extended to the north-western districts, it would probably have been from different causes (*e.g.*, dissatisfaction with the terms offered by the Colonial Sugar Refining Company as regards the price of cane and the rate of wages). While the Government has been by no means free from anxiety concerning possible developments in the north-western districts, this anxiety was in a large measure relieved by an announcement which the Colonial Sugar Refining Company made to the Indian cane growers at Loutoka and other centres on the 4th February. This was briefly to the effect that an additional bonus of 2s. 6d. per ton would be paid to growers for their cane, together with a special grant of 20s. per acre on all land under proper cultivation. Although this concession applies to the present year only and still leaves growers in uncertainty as regards the treatment for future years, and although I have not yet heard that the offer has been definitely accepted, there is reason to hope that any immediate likelihood of a general cessation of work has been averted. At the same time it is to be regretted that the concession was not made earlier. If it had been, it is possible that the strike at Nausori, which has been the chief cause of anxiety and expense to the Government, might have been avoided.

The following order of prohibition and removal of Mr. D. M. Manilal was handed over to him on the 27th March 1920.

Order under Peace and Good Order Ordinance 1875, Fiji.

“Whereas by the Peace and Good Order Ordinance, 1875, the Governor in Council is empowered by Order under his hand to prohibit any person whom he shall believe to be disaffected to the King or otherwise dangerous to the peace and good order of the Colony, from residing or being within any particular district or districts of the Colony during any space of time not exceeding two years, and by the same or any subsequent order under his hand to authorize and direct that if such prohibition be not obeyed forthwith or within a specified time, the person disobeying the same shall be arrested and imprisoned beyond the limits of the

prohibited district and in such removal force may be used if need be for the purposes thereof ;

"And whereas the Governor in Council believes that Doctor Maginmal Manilal is dangerous to the peace and good order of the Colony,

"Now, therefore, by and with the advice of my Executive Council, I do by this order under my hand prohibit the said Doctor Maginmal Manilal from residing or being within all or any of the undermentioned districts of the Colony during the space of two years, that is to say, the Island of Vitilevu, the Island of Ovalau, the province of Macnata.

"And I do further, by and with the advice of my Executive Council, by this order under my hand, authorize and direct that if the above prohibition be not obeyed within the following specified time, that is to say, by or before noon on the first day of April 1920, then and in such case the said Doctor Maginmal Manilal shall be arrested by the Inspector General Constabulary or by any Police Constable or by any other Peace Officer within the Colony and imprisoned, and shall be removed being so arrested and imprisoned beyond the limits of the prohibited districts, and in such removal force may be used if need be for the purposes thereof.

Dated at Government House, Suva, this twenty-seventh day of March, 1920.

The Fiji Government published the following Petition from 1500 Indian Residents to His Excellency the Governor of Fiji, dated April 1st 1920.

"We, the undersigned, Indian residents, beg most respectfully to submit the following representations to His Excellency the Governor for his kind consideration. We have learned with profound sorrow that an order has been served by His Excellency the Governor on Mr. Manilal, our foremost leader in Fiji, which amounts to his expulsion from this country. We deeply grieve for this and earnestly request His Excellency to cancel the order immediately. We beg to express our views regarding the matter that we do not want to live in this country if our leader or leaders are expelled from here. We would also mention here that in case our petition is not considered favourably, we all intend to return to our mother country together with Mr. Manilal. We would therefore request Your Excellency's Government to make immediate arrangements for repatriation of those amongst us who are entitled at this moment to a free return passage to India. We may suggest that if these arrangements cannot be made immediately the order for Mr. Manilal be withdrawn for the present and postponed, until the Government can make the above-mentioned arrangements asked for. Otherwise, we would refrain from doing any work in the Colony until we are repatriated, as a protest against such action of the Government. We do not mean to interfere with the work of Government of this Colony, but we fitly express our feelings. The simple thing is that, as we have already stated, we do not want to live in this country without a proper leader to guide us and one who safeguards our interests. If it is contended that he has committed any offence or has broken

any law of the country, we do not see any reason why the Government prefer expelling him from here rather than proceeding against him in a Court of Justice. In the absence of a prosecution against him we are inclined to think that it is because he might be an undesirable person, in the estimation of the European community and the Government of this country, in advocating our case. In that case we do not see how any self-respecting Indian can continue to live here any longer. In view of the above fact we submit the petition, hoping that it will receive due consideration at the hands of His Excellency's Government. In the absence of a prompt reply to this petition we will be compelled to stop all work for the future, and get ready to return home."

To this His Excellency the Governor sent the following reply dated April 14th 1920.

His Excellency the Governor has received the petition of Indian residents in the Ba district, with reference to the order recently served on D. M. Manilal.

The order in question prohibits Manilal and others from residing for two years in Vitilevu or the Macuata Province. Outside these districts the persons concerned may go where they please and there is no restriction on their movements. The order was issued by the Governor in Council after full deliberation because these persons are believed, while resident in any of the districts mentioned, to be dangerous to the peace and good order of the Colony. Under no circumstances will His Excellency reconsider the decision, and he dismisses forthwith the request in the petition that he should cancel the order.

Manilal has not deceived the Government, but he has grievously deceived the Indians at Suva and Rewa with the result that many of them are in prison or awaiting trial, while he has been careful to save his own skin. Loyal Indians here have protested to His Excellency against these agitators, who are responsible for the recent trouble, being allowed to remain at large while their dupes are punished.

Manilal has been the worst enemy of Indian progress in Fizi. If the petitioners knew all that the Government knows about him they would rejoice at his departure. It is entirely owing to him and to the trouble which he has caused that the Government has been unable to proceed with its intention, already publicly announced, to make provision for the election by the Indian community of two representatives in the Legislative Council. This would, in the Governor's opinion, have afforded a safeguard of Indian interests, such as the Petitioners desire, and a constitutional means of voicing Indian aspirations through their chosen and recognised leaders. The enforced postponement of this important concession has been a matter of regret to His Excellency.

The petitioners ask that if the order against Manilal is not withdrawn they may be repatriated, and they threaten to strike. As regards repatriation, arrangements have already been made for two ships to come to Fiji to fetch those who are entitled to repatriation and who wish to go. The first ship is due to arrive at the end of next month, and it is hoped that the second will follow not long after. Lists of those desiring to be repatriated are being prepared, and those who are entitled to free passages and wish to go should send in their names to the Agent General of Immigration. The Government has no desire to impede or delay the departure of those Indians who do not wish to remain in Fiji. Malcontents are not wanted here.

As to the threat of a strike, the petitioners are making a grave mistake if they think that the Government is to be intimidated by threats of this nature. The petitioners state that "they do not mean to interfere with the work of the Government." If, by this they mean that they do not intend to commit any breach of the peace, His Excellency strongly advises them to abide by this intention. Any disorder or violation of the law will be promptly and sternly dealt with.

Mr. Manilal's Letter.

Mr. Manilal's version of the affair is given in the following letter which he addressed to the Press on February 19th 1920.

Since my arrival here in Fiji I have strenuously laboured to have an end put to the system of indentured labour which was slavery in disguise. Eventually the system received its *coup de grace* on the 2nd. of January last, when all remaining indentures was cancelled by the Fiji Government, presumably at the cost of the revenues of land.

The cancellation of indentures set all Indian labourers on an equal footing and they all began to realise painfully how their lives have economically, morally, socially, and politically been influenced by their arrival and stay in Fiji under that monstrous system. The incidents of coolie life formed a sort of shuttlecock to weave the web of colonial life round them; and their depressed and ruined condition became more patent under the strain of 200 and 300 p. c. rise in the prices of the necessaries of life, without a rise in their wages. The want of a steady homelife, of a wife worth the name, promiscuous intercourse and natural children, dirt and squalor and immorality in general, can be geneologically traced to the indenture system.

People who had finished their indentures had been for years in receipt of two shillings a day wages for unskilled labour before

the War. And they have continued receiving that until a few months ago when a sixpence was added only for some labourers.

The labourers had approached the Indian Imperial Association of which I am President to represent their grievances to Government. And my Association wrote to the Government recommending legislation for 5 per cent. minimum wages for labourers, expressing our readiness to prove our case. The Government paid no heed to our representations and the Immigration Department had hitherto followed a policy of bluff, browbeating and disguised threatening towards those who have been clamouring for better pay. The local news-paper, an only paper, pursued a campaign of malicious misrepresentation against me and my Association at the instigation of a number of colonial-born Indians who are converts to Christianity and whose conduct is influenced by their pastors or shepherds. The Indian people in Fiji had felt very much that the Government prosecuted me for building an office on a Fijian Chief's land with his permission, when any number of European and other Indians who have done similar things have not even been warned. But at the General Indian Conference held on Dec. 20th. last at the Town Hall, all sections of Indian settlers in and around Suva, Rewa and Navua, attended in great numbers and with the exception of half-a-dozen Indian Christians and a number of their European patrons, the meeting was a great initial step towards Indian organisation; and the labourers invited me to two of their meetings, where I was enthusiastically received. I then left for Lovuka and subsequently for Ba, where I heard that some Indian labourers in Suva were on strike. All sorts of rumours were rife and the campaign of misrepresentation by the Suva press had the desired result of making every white person highly indignant or ill-disposed towards me. Anyhow, the Indian element in Ba district was so important that the Ba Europeans did not care about to unpleasant lengths with me and the District Commissioner who is also the Magistrate, being a Theosophist and a good type of Oxford graduate, was sympathetic towards Indian aspirations. In face of some opposition, after some hesitation he attended and presided over a large representative gathering of Indians on the last Sunday in January where the Indian Association was formed with rudimentary Panchayets in important Indian settlements. Here I was, as expected, unanimously chosen as President of the Association, which was now formed, and Mr. H. G. Pilling, District Commissioner placed his name at our disposal as patron and promised to audit our accounts. This is the same gentleman who had given unique assistance to Mr. C. F. Andrews and to the schools he initiated—

the establishment of the Misses Priest and Dixon—who have been sent out from Australia at Mr. Andrews' instance to work educationally (and the latter lady professionally as nurse also), amongst Indian women and children in Fiji, derived great help and sympathy from the Englishman, the like of whom are not as frequently met with (in little Crown Colonies as this) as one may desire.

I was hardly on the way to settle in Ba district when a sudden call came from Suva informing me that the Indian strike in south had led to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the cost of living wages, reasonable means of livelihood etc. before and after the war. A special launch came to Ba to fetch me to Suva. It was not to be expected that the Government would place me on the commission and the Agent-General of Immigration had succeeded in convincing Indians that I might be more useful as counsel to lead evidence on behalf of the Indians labourers, who then chose Mr. S. Chowla, an experienced and patriotic Indian Interpreter, to be on the Commission. I came to Suva and great crowds of Indians poured in to see me offering to help with the evidence. Some of the members of the Indian Imperial Association had been so threatened and treated by their European employers and others and for their consequent advice to strikers had become so unpopular amongst Indians, that they themselves kept out of the labour movement; and I did not press them further. I also pacified those who had cherished strong feeling against them and I held one meeting at Muanivetu and another on the Cricket ground in Suva and the next day in Nausari. It was wonderful how the strikers were of one mind and what is more, absolutely peaceful so far so that the Inspector General of Constabulary, Col. Colging, telephoned to Inspector Picto of Rewa to motor down from his station to the Indian meeting and convey to me his message of thanks and appreciation of the quiet and orderly way in which the meetings had been conducted. It is worthy of note that this labour movement was contemporaneously signalled by the formation and support of the Indian Women's Association in Suva, who pressed my wife to be the president. The moral support rendered by this Association during my absence in Ba and ever since was a powerful factor in the insistent demand of men for 5 per cent wages as a minimum to enable a person to live in decency and comfort under the present high cost of living. When I came to Suva, I appreciated their work but warned people of both sexes in public as well as in private against the use of force to prevent weak minded persons from returning to work. But some of the women could not bear insults and injuries and assumed a militant attitude towards any Indian Christians or European Special Constables interfering with

their meetings or their movements. I must point out here that without the least necessity for doing so the Fiji Government became funkey and called in the aid of their military consisting of the Returned Soldiers and Sailors and the local Defence Force men. They disarmed the Indians by taking away their sticks and the Military Special Constables and rowdy Europeans established a reign of terror in Suva. The Fizi Government have never displayed any tact in such situations. They did not dismiss these Europeans from their duties of special Constables against whom the Inspector General of Constabulary heard authentic genuine complaints from peaceful Indians. The Police themselves began to act under the instruction of half of the dozen Indian Christians and the "Methods of Indian Police" (vide the pamphlet of Mr. Mackerness) began to be taught. These Europeans committed excesses. Prominent Indians were waited for and threatened, abused, ill-treated, assaulted and others prosecuted. The women could not remain quiet under these circumstances. They held meetings privately and the fatal one was the last near the house of Ilahi Ramkan, on whose advice a European special constable walked roughly over the women sitting and used provoking language which led to a quarrel and then Indians who could not bear the sight of their women being treated in a cowardly manner rushed with the sticks of firewood from a kitchen in the vicinity. The Police whistled for help and the European force and the military arrived and Fijian policemen with rifles—a machine gun also was set against these women. Instead of pouring oil on troubled waters, some responsible persons are reported to have foolishly circulated a rumour that there were warrants out to arrest women, including my wife, and strong rumours spread through the length and breadth of Suva, Rewa and Navua that she had actually been arrested as leader of women. Those who started such tactics, whether they be in the Constabulary service or outside, whether white or brown, are themselves responsible before God for subsequent riots and bloodshed which took place in several localities. I am openly told by the Mayor of Suva, the Hon. H. M. Scott K, C. that I am at the bottom of the whole trouble. But I am not. I was away weeks before the strike started, the immediate cause of which was the order to do work for 9 hours instead of 8 as before, and the contagion spread to other centres. I was away at Tailevu when the riots were provoked. After I came back I went to the Chief Police Station in Fiji on appointment to interview women who were under arrest; but I was refused permission to see them on that occasion and whilst I waited I was kept out of Inspector Swinburn's office, where confidential matters were being reported or advised upon by the Indian Christians and their Pastor, who could have any man or women locked up,

any man's house and premises forcibly entered and searched, any person on the street stopped, sleeping passengers or inmates in boarding houses examined. A special constable—white man with a blackened heart—used filthy language to me. I did not know whether I should wait for the arrival of the Inspector General. In the meanwhile, Inspector Swinburne appeared to be annoyed at my persistence and clearly told me that I was hindering his work. I therefore accompanied him to go out, when at the gate the special constable lifted the frame of my left ear, another white man caught hold of my right shoulder and in spite of Inspector Swinburne's warning, gave me a blow on the back of my head which did not hurt me, however. The Inspector General has now advised me to remain practically a prisoner in my own house as he will not have me interfered with by the ruffians. There are many others in my position in this respect. I must in fairness admire that he has given all the protection he could against a man called Pateson and he has promised me escort whenever I want to go out. But this same officer, either of his own accord or under pressure, applied for and obtained a special Legislation which puts in shade all Rowlatt Acts and other repressive Legislations in India put together. You cannot leave your locality without a permit to move about, not more than six persons can meet at your residence, not more than four go with you, you can take no sticks with you. The returned soldiers and sailors move about with rifles and bayonets and machine guns and any White man or Fijian or half-caste can do you anything. Moghul rule in India could not have been worse. Women are beaten and tortured to confess and testify against my wife or me, and men and women are exposed to season and melow their confession under the scorching rays of the sun, and are refused even water to drink and kept on little or no food.

Men are dead or dying—a great many whose trace is lost—a few are lying unattended in the bush. Bayonets have passed through the entrails of some, and bullets through the bodies of others. This German rule of the Whites masquerading under the British flag can not last much longer. Our cup is now full and we earnestly believe “the Gods confound the intelligence of those whom they destroy”, which though a translation from some Greek source seems to be the same as “Tulsidas.”

Indians want either to obtain a living wages or provisions cheap as before, or food and clothing etc. with nominal wages or piece of land to cultivate, or to be shipped back to India, or to be shot down or gaoled.”

The Fiji Deputation

The Colonisation Committee mentioned on p. 328 met the Fiji Deputation consisting of the Rt. Rev. Turtchell, Bishop of Polynesia, and the hon. Mr. Rankine, C.M.G., on February 19th, afternoon in the Secretariat, and in two hours finished the inquiry into their scheme of free emigration to that Colony.

An Outline of the Fiji Scheme

Their suggested scheme was a system of free and voluntary State aided emigration, the object being the encouragement of the settlement of Indians. The emigrant would be free of any financial liability connected with the costs of his introduction in Fiji and would in no way be restricted to service under any particular employer. A Protector of emigrants would be appointed by local Governments in India to exercise supreme control of emigration in the Province. At the ports of departure, colonial camps would be started which could be visited by Indians of standing nominated by the Provincial Governments. The Colonial Government would bear half the cost in the case of those wishing to return to India if they had stayed in the Colony at least three years, three-fourth of the cost if it was five years, and the whole cost if seven years. Land, suitable for settlement, would be available for all who desire it. The scheme also stated as follows:—Indians in Fiji already enjoy the same facilities for primary education as are possessed by other inhabitants of the Colony. Under the Education Ordinance of 1916 provision is made for grants in aid to any private or vernacular school for Indians. Government schools are being established at necessary centres of the settlement where assisted schools do not exist. Since 1916, new schools have been opened every year and the Board of Education aims at providing facilities for every child in the Colony, no matter how remote the district may be. Provision is also made under the Education Ordinance for secondary schools as required. Indian colonists already acquired the same municipal rights as any other inhabitants and under the Constitution of the Colony two East Indian Members of the Legislative Council of Fiji are elected by East Indian constituencies.

Questioned by Mr. Banerjee, the Deputation replied that they were not at present prepared to give guarantee like the British Guiana Deputation, (see p. 337) because there were certain matters like repatriation, equality of status, etc., in regard to which they could not speak authoritatively. But they would communicate to

the Government of Fiji as to whether they could give a guarantee or not. At the same time, the Committee was assured that there was perfect equality of all mankind in the eye of law in Fiji, but admitted there was not the same franchise for all people. Fijians, for instance, had no franchise at all. Their's was an old-fashioned Crown Colony and was exactly in the same position as, or perhaps a little more democratic than, Ceylon, or the Federated Malaya States. The Legislative Council had a majority of nominated European members who were always in favour of the Government. Fijians also had been nominated to the Council and in the coming general election they could be elected. No Indian stood for municipal election until now although he had the same privileges as a European.

No Racial Animosity.

Questioned by Sir Dinshaw Wacha, they said there was no differentiation of treatment between Indians and Europeans in trains, etc.

The Committee subjected the deputation to questions about cultivable lands, wages, housing, etc., and were told that it was very extraordinary that Indians were able to become capitalists in a few months. The Deputationists promised to consider the question for Indians until they were in a position to maintain themselves in the Colony. The minimum wages was two shillings a day, which came to about Rs. 2-8, one-third of which could be easily saved. Primary education was not compulsory at present. We must confess, said they, that we have been very remiss in giving education to all classes, but in 1916, a new Ordinance was passed which provides for the establishment of both primary and secondary schools. A sum of £8,100 had been set apart for the education of Indians. In the last two years, 28 schools had been established, twelve of which were under the direct control of the Indian community. They wanted Indians not only to cultivate lands, but also to work for wages. The new comer would be granted land, but not money. The climatic conditions were unsurpassable on the face of the earth. There was no small-pox, cholera or any such disease. In order to remove the sex inequality, their object was to import families, but at the same time there ought to be exceptional cases which should necessarily be very few.

Mr. Sastri: If there is perfect political equality, the Colony would get more and more into the hands of the Indians. Then, don't you think there would be a feeling among the European population to try to get rid of these people?

A: There is no sign of racial animosity at present, and I see no reason to anticipate it in the future.

Here ended the work of the Committee, and their final report is given on p. 337.

India in the International Labour Conference

Part 13 of the great Peace Treaty of 1919 deals with Labour and gave birth, along with the League of Nations, to the International Labour Bureau. The first International Labour Conference was held at Washington U. S. A., in November 1919, and India being an original member of the League of Nations also comes under the Labour Conference. For the Proceedings of the Washington Conference see P. 238, Part II of 1920 Register. The permanent office of the Bureau is established at Geneva, Switzerland. It has primarily a two-fold function :—

1. It has to insure the drawing up, passing and enforcement in all States of an international labour legislation, which, subject to differences of climate, habit and custom, should aim at being uniform throughout the world.

By this means unfair competition will be prevented and those States which are anxious for progress will not be hampered by States which exploit their workers.

2. The office is charged with the duty of making every endeavour to better the condition of the working classes in all countries by its studies, enquiries, and propaganda. It aims at men being more free, better able to think for themselves, at making men educated and happy. It has to contribute towards the creation of that higher form of civilisation which alone can insure peace.

The Washington Labour Conference adopted six draft conventions and six recommendations as follows :—

Draft Convention.

1. The application of the principle of an eight hour day and forty-eight hours week. (10 hours for India) 2. The question of preventing or providing against unemployment. 3. The employment of women before and after childbirth. 4. The employment of women during the night. 5. The minimum age of employment of children in industry. 6. The night work of young persons employed in industry.

Recommendations.

1. Concerning public employment exchanges. 2. Concerning reciprocity of treatment of foreign workers. 3. Concerning the prevention of anthrax. 4. Concerning the protection of women and children against lead poisoning. 5. Concerning the establishment of Government Health Service. 6. Concerning the application of the Berne Convention of 1906, on the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches,

The Geneva Assembly

At one of the closing meetings of the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva held in December 1920, consideration was given to India's claim to representation on the International Labour Board as a matter of right, as India is one of the eight States of chief industrial importance. Sir William Meyer and Sir Ali Imam were deputed by the Govt. of India to submit a case to the Assembly, and thus bring the issue to their attention.

Sir William Meyer's Account.

"I found at the Assembly a disposition to put India in the first place when it was a question of making her pay, but when it comes to the distribution of privileges, her very existence was ignored, and the smallest European countries were given the prizes. That may sound cynical, but it is the bare truth.

"A special organising committee was appointed, with reference to the first Labour Conference at Washington, to select the eight States of chief industrial importance which, as contemplated in article 393 of the Treaty of Versailles, were of right to serve upon the Governing body of the International Labour Bureau. This was because the Council of the League, with whom the decision ought to have rested, had not yet come into being. The members of that Committee consisted of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, and Switzerland. Seven of the eight countries selected were those to which these representatives belonged. The eighth was Germany. The United States declined to serve and the place earmarked for her was assigned to Denmark.

"Sir (then Mr.) Louis Kershaw, Mr. A. C. Chatterjee and Mr. N. M. Joshi, who represented India at that Conference, were so indignant, that India with her many millions of industrial and agricultural labourers—for it must be remembered that agricultural labourers come within the scope of the International Labour Office—had been ignored in favour of such small European countries as Denmark, Belgium and Switzerland, that they refused to take part in the election of States to fill the four seats assigned to "Secondary States."

"The result of the nominations made and of the election held was that out of 24 seats on the Labour Council, including representatives of employers and employed, 20 are appropriated by Europe, while four are divided among the other five countries.

"The Labour Conference at Washington was struck with that anomaly, and a resolution was carried on the motion of a South African Delegate, condemning the constitution of the governing body which, however, philosophically continues to hold office.

"The Secretary of State for India tried to have the injustice done to India removed by making representations to the Council of the League of Nations, which did not exist at the time of the Washington Conference. But almost a year passed before the matter came before it.

"Although the Covenant of the League of Nations had expressly provided, in the penultimate paragraph of Article IV, that any member of the League not represented on the Council should be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting for the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that members, the Council did not accord that privilege to India. No one who could speak with authority for India was, therefore, present to plead her cause, and the Council dismissed the Indian appeal on the following grounds :—

"(1) The Governing Body was organised and in actual operation before the Council came into existence.

"(2) The composition of the Governing Body was formally endorsed by the delegates at Washington (this was not, in fact, correct).

"(3) Recognition of India's claim would involve the replacement of some country already on the Governing Body and, (it may be), a general reconstruction of the list

"(4) The principle upon which the Organising Committee's list was finally approved have never been formulated, or communicated to the Council and the Council profess their ignorance of the precise meaning to be attached to the phrase, 'industrial importance.'

"The Council added that they were fully cognisant of the importance of India as an industrial Power and that the present governing body would only hold office till 1922, during which period the Council would have studied the subject fully and be ready to deal with the matter of nomination to a fresh Governing Body when the present one's term expired.

"The Secretary of State felt that the reply was unsatisfactory, that the claim of India had been largely 'burked' on technical considerations, and that it was not fair to ask her to wait, seeing that it was just in these early years that any new departures might be taken and precedents created. Accordingly, he put before the Assembly relevant papers and asked that the matter might be considered.

"The Assembly referred the case to one of its Grand Committees, on which I sat, and I put forward the case for India with all the emphasis I could command. I pointed out that it was not only her interests that were involved, but those of non-European countries generally. The difficulties that the Council had raised in respect of immediate action could be overcome, e.g., by the present Governing Body, discredited by the vote of Washington above referred to resigning. The following extract will show in what way I summarised India's industrial position :—

"Excluding peasant proprietors, there are nearly 28,000,000 agricultural workers in India who come within the scope of the International Labour Office. India has 141,000 maritime workers, lascars, etc., and in this respect come second only to the United Kingdom. She has over 20,000,000 workers in industries, including cottage industries (in which the 'industrials' of Japan are also largely employed), mining, and transport. Factories, mines and railways provide employment for nearly 2,000,000 persons. The mileage of her railways is in excess of every other country except the United States. Her export of manufactured goods in itself is very considerable, would be much greater were it not for the huge size of the country and resultant large home consumption. The export test, of course, favours countries whose whole area is relatively small."

"I laid stress on the fact that while India was denied the position of a first class Power on the Labour Body, she was given it without question when it came to the contribution of the assessment of expenses, whilst Belgium and Switzerland were given third place and Denmark fourth."

"I was sorry to find that my British colleague, the Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes, M. P., who took a leading part in the drafting of the constitution of the labour organisation, tried to defend what had been done in Washington. The committee, however, declined to consider the case on its merits, arguing that under the constitution of the League the matter was one for the Council and not for the League. Technically this was correct, and I had to accept the decision; but I pointed out that India had expected an adequate measure of sympathy which, I regretted, had been denied to her. When the Committee reported to the Assembly, I repeated my previous arguments that India could not regard the Governing Body fairly representing Labour interests."

The £ 50,000 Contribution of India

As regards the way in which financial contributions are levied, Sir William said that "it was according to the grouping system laid down by the International Postal Union," "That system, which classifies States into seven groups each representing many units of expenditure, is good enough for the purpose for which it was devised ; because the share of the expenditure in connection with the International Postal Union, which falls upon the various countries, is quite small. But in a matter such as the contribution to the League, which is already costing India £ 50,000 a year, the scale of allotment needs to be worked out much more carefully, and with reference to such considerations as net revenue. At present the British Empire collectively pays over one-fourth of the total expenses of the League ; and India, Australia, and South Africa (as well as Canada) are placed in the first class of contributors along with Great Britain and France.

"Everybody admits that the present system is bad and that Article VI. of the Covenant, which tied the League to the Postal Union methods, was very unsatisfactory. The Budget Committee proposed to get the Postal Union to revise their system and to obtain, if possible, a method which should be fair alike for the Postal Union and the League.....but the Assembly rejected this in favour of the Committee's scheme"

The Indian Delegates at the Geneva Conference Dec. 1920

The following speech was delivered by Sir William Meyer, High Commissioner for India, before the meeting of the Council of the League :—

"I do not propose to move any amendment or resolution on this subject, but my Government wishes the Assembly to be in possession of the reasons for which India has felt and still feels aggrieved by her exclusion from the eight Powers of chief industrial importance contemplated in Article 392 of the Treaty of Versailles. A note stating the ground on which India claims this position has been circulated as Assembly Document No. 226 and I need only add a very few remarks to the points there set forth.

"The eight chief industrial powers were to be selected by the Council of the League, but as that Council was not in existence at the time that the Washington Conference met towards the close of last year, the selection of the eight States of chief industrial importance was left to a special organising Committee which contained representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, and Switzerland. It is a somewhat remarkable coincidence that the Committee proposed all the seven States to which they collectively belonged as great industrial Powers. The eighth selected was Germany. India has never been able to understand on what valid principles some of the selections were made. For instance, why was Switzerland, whose population is about one hundredth part of that of India, preferred to her ? When the United States of America decided not to be for the present on the Governing Body or the Labour Office, Denmark was put into her place, a selection which, with all respect to Denmark, was still less intelligible to India. It may be added that when it was a question of contribution to the funds of

the League, India's importance was at once recognised. She was put into the first class of assessees while Belgium and Switzerland were relegated to the third and Denmark to the fourth.

"Among the documents which have already been furnished to the Assembly are statistics which show India's pre-eminent claim, and I would merely mention here a few salient figures illustrating her industrial importance.

[Here Sir William gave the figures mentioned above on p. 397]

"The Council of the League, having now come into definite existence, India lodged a protest with it, the result of which is set forth in the Council's Report of August 5th 1920. The Council expressed itself fully conscious (to use its own words) of the magnitude of India's industrial output, the large number of her population engaged in industrial pursuits, the international importance of her overseas trade and other circumstances which might be urged in favour of her claim to be one of the eight States of chief industrial importance. The Council considered itself, however, precluded from taking any immediate action in support of India's claims, for reasons set forth in its Report of August 5th last above referred to. I will not discuss these in detail now, but will merely say that they seem to India to savour too much of technical pleading, as for instance, that the Council was not in existence when the Governing Body was organised; that the composition of the Governing Body was endorsed by the Conference at Washington—I have already indicated that the conference passed what may be called a vote of censure on the composition of the Governing Body—that recognition of India's claim would involve the elimination of some other State; that the Council did not know the principles on which the Organising Committee had acted, and found some difficulty as to the exact meaning of the words "industrial importance." Surely it is not more difficult to come to a conclusion as to what are the most important Industrial Powers of the world than to specify what are the Great Powers with reference to other matters.

"The Council, therefore, held that the existing Governing Body should sit on till 1922, and in the meantime proposed to investigate the methods of coming to a decision on the "Industrial importance" question and directed the Secretary General to take this matter up with the International Labour Office,

"It may be urged that, after all, consideration of India's claim was only delayed for two years more, but it is just those early years that are of importance, having regard to the fact that principles will be evolved and precedents created and that a great oriental country with its special labour conditions deserves special consideration.

"One more point I may mention, having regard to the penultimate paragraph of Article 4 of the Covenant, which states that any member of the League not represented on the Council should be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting for the consideration of matters specially affecting the interest of that member. It seems to me that India ought to have been asked to send a special representative to the Council meeting which resulted in the Report of August 5.

"I quite realise that although the decision arrived at has been a bitter disappointment to India and to her intellectual and industrial classes, who are apt to look suspiciously on procedure which in their view subordinates the interests of Asia to Europe, committee No. 2 were technically justified in holding that the Assembly was not in a position to override the Council's decision. We had not, in fact, asked for this. What we did hope was that a sympathetic reception of our representations might nevertheless lead to some solution which would have been welcomed by us. For instance, the resignation of the Governing Body, on the ground that it had been selected, if I may say so, in a somewhat irregular way, and its replacement at the Conference of 1921 by a body which

would be more regularly constituted under the Council's decision as to what the eight industrial Powers are, would have effected a satisfactory solution.

"It was for these reasons that my Government desired that the matter should be ventilated before the Assembly, and the fact that the claim was included in the Assembly's Agenda seemed to us to show that it was regarded as "Prima facie" suitable for discussion. But, as I have said, though disappointed with the decision of Committee No. 2, we must for the moment endure it. We can only wish that the Governing body were constituted in a manner which would render it more capable of giving full consideration not merely to India's interests but generally to those of countries outside Europe."

Sir Saiyad Ali Imam said :—"The hour is late, and I should be guilty of trespassing on the attention of the Assembly if I were to say one word more than is necessary. "The case has been so admirably put before the Assembly by my colleague Sir William Meyer that it is not necessary for me to point out the importance of India from the point of view of labour. With regard to a country where we have got over 10,000,000 people employed in labour, if a voice is raised for representation on the Governing Body of the International Labour Bureau, I suppose, that there is some justification for it. But there is one point in connection with this, that I would like to mention, and that is this. I heard it said, and I think that there is a certain amount of impression abroad, that because India is within the British Empire, therefore her membership of that Empire is sufficient for the protection of her interests. I would like to mention in this Assembly, that so far as fiscal, economic and labour conditions are concerned, there is not always necessarily identity between her interests and the interests of the rest of the British Empire. Therefore, there is an additional reason why India should be given a certain amount of recognition. I know that the Assembly cannot decide this question : perhaps the Assembly cannot deal with this question, but when a voice is raised here, that voice is heard in quarters where the appeal can be answered. Therefore, I entirely support the views which have been put forward by my colleagues Sir William Meyer"

The Net Result of the Conference.

The Indian delegates did not move any resolution on the subject of India having a seat on the International Labour Board. The Assembly of the League could not over-ride the decision of the Council. The Council in their decision, given on 5th August, 1920, at San Sebastian, practically admitted India's right to rank among the first eight nation of "industrial importance," though they were careful to add that they were aware of no authoritative interpretation of the meaning of the phrase. They declined to allow India's claim on the ground that they could not question the right and authority of the Organising Committee which, as the Council were not in existence at the time, selected the eight favoured countries, and also that the Washington Labour Conference 1919 had endorsed the list. The Council could easily have secured, under Article 4 of the Covenant, an Indian delegate to give expert evidence, but instead decided that India should wait for its chance till 1922, when the Governing Body will be reconstituted. The result is that India will be unrepresented on the Board during the year of its existence when, as said Sir William, the most important decisions of first principles will be taken !

The Brussels Conference

The following letter was addressed by the Finance Secy, Govt. of India to all chambers of Commerce for information.

1. I am directed to enclose, for the information of your Committee, copies of the Report of the Delegates for India to the recent International Financial Conference held at Brussels.

2. It is understood that the resolutions accepted by the Conference will shortly be considered by the League of Nations, and meanwhile the Government of India will be glad to receive any observations which your Committee may desire to offer with regard to them. It will be observed, however, that most of the resolutions merely register the unanimous adherence of the Conference to certain canons of sound public finance, and set forth certain generally-accepted principles, in the light of which India may justly claim that her public finance has been consistently administered.

3. Apart from the recommendations of general application, this country is specially interested in those relating to international credits, and I am particularly to invite the attention of your Committee to the scheme referred to in paragraph 8 of Appendix A, Enclosure IV and set forth as Annex A thereto. The Government of India are disposed cordially to welcome any endeavour to work out a scheme of international credits, the importance of which to India's export trade need not be emphasised. They think, however, that it is essential that for any such scheme to be of practical value, so far as India is concerned, the bonds in question must be fully negotiable, and for this reason your Committee will probably agree with them that the amplifications suggested by Sir Marshall Reid, as printed in Appendix H, are an improvement.

4. The present depression in the export trade is no doubt partly due, in the case of some exports, to the existence of large unused stock in foreign countries, but, in the case of other exports, it is probably due to the lack of credit facilities. It is as regards the latter class of exports that a scheme such as that put forward at the Brussel's Conference may be of value. I am accordingly to invite the opinion of your Committee, firstly, as to how far any such scheme is likely to assist various export interests represented in your Chamber, and secondly, whether your Committee have

any criticisms or suggestions to make regarding the practical details of the scheme adumbrated by Sir Marshall Reid in Appendix H. In the event of a scheme on such lines proving practicable and finding general acceptance among the nations represented at the conference, the Government of India will then consider the question of participating thereon to the extent of accepting responsibility for some definite share of the international guarantee.

5. The Government of India have expressed to the Secretary of State their appreciation of the able way in which India was represented in Brussels by her delegates, Mr. H. F. Howard, Sir Marshall Reid and Sir Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy.

The Report of the Indian Delegates

The International Conference was convened by the League of Nations "with a view to studying the financial crisis and looking for the means of remedying it and of mitigating the dangerous consequences arising from it." The original intention was that the Conference should be held about the end of May 1920, but it was, for various reasons postponed, and it finally assembled at Brussels towards the end of September, under the presidency of Mr. Gusstav Ador, ex-President of the Swiss Republic. In all no less than 39 States were represented, and the Conference held 17 sittings commencing on the 24th September and concluding on the 8th October. In the invitations issued to the members of the League of Nations the Council of the League requested that each Government should send not more than three delegates conversant with public finance and banking as well as with general economic questions. The delegates appointed to represent India were :—

Mr. H. F. Howard, late Secretary to the Government of India (Finance Department), and at present Controller of Finance, India Office.

Sir Marshall Frederick Reid, late Member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, and previously Chairman of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce.

Sir Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy, a prominent Member of the Bombay Business Community, late President of the Bank of Bombay, and for several years a Member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council.

2. The Conference was opened by an address by the President, Mr. Ador. Copies of this, as also of the general proceedings of the Conference, have been submitted as the Conference proceed-

ded, and the conclusions arrived at by the Conference are embodied in its report (Appendix A). It will, therefore, be sufficient in the present report to give a brief outline of the proceedings, merely referring to matters of special interest from the point of view of India. The address by the President was followed by the presentation of written statements from each country setting out its general financial situation, including its budget situation, internal and external debt, currency, exchange, foreign trade, import and export restrictions, exchange control etc., and the present policy of each Government on these questions. These statements were introduced by each delegation in a brief speech. Many of these statements were of much interest, and the bulk of the delegations were at pains to show the efforts which their countries were making to arrange their finances, etc., on sound lines.

3. While fully realising the difficulty of many of the problems with which India has to deal at the present time as the aftermath of war, the Indian delegation could not fail to be impressed with her great inherent financial and economic strength, if her position be compared with that of the bulk of the participants in the Conference. To quote from the opening sentence of the Conference resolutions: "Thirty-nine nations have in turn placed before the international Financial Conference a statement of their financial position. The examination of those statements brings out the extreme gravity of the general situation of public finance throughout the world, and particularly in Europe. Their import may be summed up in the statement that three out of the countries represented at this Conference, and 11 out of 12 of the European countries, anticipate a budget deficit in the current year. Apart, too, from the fact that India has emerged from the war with her resources relatively unimpaired, she stands in a special position at the present time and possesses special opportunities, in as much as she has a surplus of important commodities to dispose of, whereas many countries are suffering from a deficiency of foodstuffs and raw materials and from a depreciation of their currencies which make it impossible to carry on the normal process of production or even to set its machinery once again in motion.

4. The written statement (Appendix B) of the delegates for India, while briefly reviewing her financial situation, brought out the fact that she is able to export considerable supplies of various commodities as regards which the Government of India had furnished information, and Mr. Howard in his speech (Appendix C) emphasised that she is anxious to so assist the world's reconstruction by doing so, provided that satisfactory financial arrangements can be made.

5. Apart from the above review of the financial and economic situation of the various countries, the main business of the Conference consisted in a discussion of financial policy. The field was subdivided into the four following subjects, a separate debate on each subject being opened by the Vice-President whose name is noted against it :—

- (1) Public Finance—Hon. R. Brand, England.
- (2) Currency and exchange—Dr. Vissering, Holland.
- (3) International Trade—M. de Woutersd' Oplinter, Belgium.
- (4) International Credits—M. Celier, France.

6. In opening the first debate Mr. Brand gave a striking address setting out the correct principles which should govern the conduct of public finance. Mr. Howard had submitted his name to speak on this debate, as the acceptance of the principle set out by Mr. Brand appeared to be of fundamental importance from the point of view of the re-establishment of international credit, in which India is vitally interested ; but as these principles were not questioned in any quarter, he considered it sufficient to confine himself to a few remarks (Appendix D) noting the universal acceptance with which these principles had met.

7. In the debate on currency and exchange the delegates were in full accord with the views stated by Lord Cullen, representative of Great Britain and considered it unnecessary to intervene. A paper read by Mr. Strakosch, delegate for South Africa, with regard to the future of gold, possesses special interest for India (Appendix E).

8. In the debate on international trade the question of tariffs was touched, and it seemed possible that this might be made an important issue. Sir Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy accordingly intervened in the debate to emphasise that while India was anxious to co operate in the world's reconstruction, there was a strong body of public opinion in India which favoured a policy of protection for her industries, and he urged that the question of tariffs should be excluded from discussion as not relevant to the matters actually at issue. A copy of this remark is appended (Appendix F).

9. Special interest centered in the debate on international credits, since this afforded an opportunity for constructive measures. The Conference had before them numerous schemes varying widely in scope and apparent practicability. That of M. Delacroix, Prime Minister of Belgium, had perhaps attracted most attention, and formed a starting point for discussion. It was, however, generally felt that his proposals were on too ambitious a scale, and the Indian delegates think they are correct in stating that Sir Marshall Reid (*vide* copy of his speech at appendix G) focussed the general sense of the Conference in urging that what was required for the

purposes of reconstruction was not the setting up of entirely new, expensive and untried machinery, but an attempt to repair and lubricate the machinery which was already existing though it had in large measure fallen into disuse. This point of view was further developed by Mr. C. E. ter Meulen (Holland), and a scheme outlined by him formed the basis of discussion later.

10. After the formal debates in plenary session, the separate heads of discussion were referred to general Committees for the purpose of preparing draft resolutions for the adoption of the Conference. On these Committees each country was allowed one representative, India's representation being as follows :—

- (1) Public Finance ...Mr. Howard.
- (2) Currency and Exchange...Sir Marshall Reid.
- (3) International Trade ...Sir Fazulbhoj Currimbhoj.
- (4) International Credit ...Sir Marshall Reid

Each Committee in turn selected from its members a small "drafting" committee, which was entrusted with the active preparation of the drafts for consideration of the main committees. Sir Fazulbhoj Currimbhoj and Sir Marshall Reid were selected to serve on the drafting Committees in the case of International Trade and International Credit respectively. The draft resolutions so prepared were after approved by the main Committees, presented to the Conference and passed without a dissentient vote.

11. The resolutions of the Conference (of which copies will be found as Enclosures I, II, III, and IV of appendix A) have already been published. The delegation found themselves able to subscribe to these without reservation, and it is only to the resolutions with regard to International Credit that they desire to make any further reference. The operative part of this group of resolutions is contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of Appendix A, Enclosure IV. The scheme referred to in paragraph 8 as Annex A had the support of a number of delegates of a great internal experience, who expressed confidence in its practicability. Paragraph 9 of the same group of resolutions refers to a scheme put forward by Sir Marshall Reid (a copy is attached as Appendix H). This proposal was made by Sir Marshall Reid in the light of commercial experience, and he explained that he could not in any way commit his Government. The Indian delegates wish to say, however, that Sir Marshall Reid's proposal was elaborated with full concurrence of his colleagues, who considered that its adoption would materially conduce to more normal conditions in the consuming markets, with corresponding advantages to the producers of raw materials. They suggest, therefore, that an early expression of the views of the Government of India in this matter should be obtained. For, while some delay is inevitable before a definite con-

clusion can be arrived at on the practical recommendations of the Conference, serious consideration of these recommendations will begin at an early date, and the various countries affected will then be expected to define their attitude at short notice.

12. Apart from the four Committees mentioned above, a further important Committee was appointed "to consider the principles on which the expenses of the League of Nations should be distributed among its members and to make recommendations for a new basis of apportionment." Mr. Howard was a member of this Committee and of its drafting Committee. The report of the Committee was not published, M. Ador the President, informing the Conference that this would be forwarded to the Council of the League of Nations.

13. In conclusion, the Indian delegation wish to say that it has been a great privilege to them to take part in this historic and instructive Conference. The general atmosphere of courtesy and goodwill, and the desire to find common ground where points of view were necessarily divergent, were very remarkable. The delegates also desire to acknowledge the great hospitality which was extended to the delegations by the Government and people of Belgium.

(Sd.) H. F. HOWARD,
,, MARSHALL REID.
,, FAZULBHOY CURRIMBOY.

The Indian Scheme.

The following is Sir Marshall Reid's Scheme referred to above :

In accordance with Annexe A there will be created:—

- (a) The undertaking of the buyer to fulfil his contract.
- (b) The assurance of the buying country that he is probably capable of doing so.
- (c) The confirmation of the assurance by the Central Commission.
- (d) The bond of the buying country to be handed over to the seller as collateral.

While supporting the scheme of M. ter Meulen (Annexe A), the Indian Delegation are of opinion that it will serve only a limited purpose, and that it will be of little practical value to countries which are remote from Europe, but which produce so much of the raw materials essential for reconstruction. They are of opinion that the bonds created under Annexe A will not be acceptable as collateral except at a considerable discount by the banks abroad to which they look to finance their shipments. The large proportion

of risk which will thus remain with the seller will seriously affect the usefulness of the scheme.

The aim of the present proposal is to create a bond which will be of value in international markets, and will be readily accepted by banks as collateral at approximately its face value, in fact will be practically equivalent to confirmed letter of credit.

The following are the outlines of the scheme :—

(1) The bond created under Annexe A [paragraph (d) above] be delivered to the Central Commission instead of being handed over to the seller. The Central Commission would retain it as collateral and issue in its place a "Central Commission Bond," which would be secured under a limited joint guarantee of the countries or bodies participating in the scheme.

(2) The Guarantee Fund would consist of an unlimited number of shares of such value as may be considered convenient. Subscribers would be entitled to an allotment of Central "Commission Bonds" which would bear the same proportion to the total permissible issue of bonds as their share contribution would bear to the total amount subscribed. Thus if the ratio of 10 to 1, as suggested in paragraph 4, were adopted each subscriber of, say, 10,000l would be entitled to an allotment up to 1000,001, in bonds.

(3) Seeing that Central Commission Bonds would have the full benefit of the security of Annexe A Bonds, it may be fairly assumed that the calls on the guarantee would at the worst amount to a very small proportion of the transactions carried through under the collateral of the bonds.

(4) It is therefore suggested that the volume of transactions current at one time under the system might quite safely amount to ten times the amount of the guarantee. Thus if shares were subscribed to the amount of say, 101, millions gold, transactions up to 1001, millions gold be guaranteed.

(5) Subscribers would not be required to pay for their shares in cash, but would furnish such securities as the Central Commission required; the risk of each subscriber would be definitely limited to the amount of shares subscribed.

(6) Central Commission Bonds would be available for use only in connection with transactions between countries or bodies who were subscribers.

(7) The Central Commission Bonds for transactions between two subscribers might be furnished either from the allotment of the buying or selling subscriber. This provide the buying parties with bonds in excess of their allotments, provided always that they were able to furnish Annexe A Bonds for the full amount.

(8) On the completion of the transaction, the bonds would be

returned to the Central Commission who would cancel them and return the relative Annexe A Bonds to the buying country.

(9) The maturity of the bonds would be the same as in the case of the Annexe A Bonds.

(10) The Central Commission would publish periodical statements showing such important particulars as total bonds current and totals of each buying and selling country—also total of Annexe A Bonds of each country in its keeping.

(11) A commission would be charged on all "Central Commission Bonds" to cover expenses and to compensate guarantors.

(12) It might be that some countries might not find themselves in a position, for one reason or another, to participate as a nation in a scheme of this sort, but it would be quite open to a trade or section, e.g., the cotton growers of America, to join in the guarantee, and to get the full pro rata benefit of it.

(13) Bonds under Annexe A scheme would only be issued to buying countries for limited quantities of specific commodities and Central Commission Bonds would only be issued for the same commodities, but it would be open to selling subscriber independently to restrict the purposes for which their bonds should be utilised.

(14) If the Central Commission had at any time reason to fear that heavy calls were likely to be made in the near future, they might have to consider the expediency of restricting or discontinuing the issue of further bonds until the situation cleared and it became evident that the amount of the Guarantee Fund was ample to cover the risks in outstanding transactions.

NOTE—M. Celier, Vice-President, has kindly promised to submit these proposals to the League of Nations for the consideration of the Committee which will deal with the Conference resolutions on International Credits, particularly paragraphs 8 and 9.

The Meulen Scheme.

Regarding International Credits, the Brussel Conference make the following recommendations:—

8. An international organisation should be formed and placed at the disposal of States desiring to have resort to credit for the purpose of paying for their essential imports. These States would then notify the assets which they are prepared to pledge as security for the sake of obtaining credit, and would come to an understanding with the international organisation as to the conditions under which these assets would be administered.

The bonds issued against this guarantee would be used as collateral for credit intended to cover the cost of commodities.

A plan based upon these principles is developed in Annex, A.

It has been devised to enable States to facilitate the obtaining of commercial credits by their nationals. It is easy to see that the scheme is susceptible of development in various directions and that some of its provisions might be adapted so as to facilitate the extension of credit direct to public corporations.

A committee of financiers and business men should be nominated forthwith by the Council of the League of Nations for the purpose of defining the measures necessary to give practical effect to this proposal.

9. It has been represented to the Conference that more complete results might be achieved if the bonds used as collateral were to carry some international guarantee.

The Conference sees no objection to the further consideration of this proposal. The committee referred to in paragraph 8 above might usefully consider the conditions under which it could be applied.

The Meulen Scheme

Annexe A.—International Credit

1. In order that impoverished nations, which under present circumstances are unable to obtain accommodation on reasonable terms in the open market, may be able to command the confidence necessary to attract funds for the financing of their essential imports and International Commission shall be constituted under the auspices of the League of Nations.

2. The Commission shall consist of bankers and businessmen of International repute, appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

3. The Commission shall have the power to appoint Sub-Commissions, and to devolve upon them the exercise of its authority in participating countries or in groups of participating countries.

4. The Governments of countries desiring to participate shall notify to the Commission what specific assets they are prepared to assign as security for commercial credit to be granted by the nationals of exporting countries.

5. The Commission, after examination of these assets, shall, of its own authority, determine the gold value of the credits which it would approve against the security of these assets.

6. The participating Government shall then be authorised to prepare bonds to the gold value approved by the Commission each in one specific currency to be determined on the issue of the bond.

7. The date of maturity and the rate of interest to be borne by these bonds shall be determined by the participating Government in agreement with Commission.

8. The service of these bonds shall be secured out of the revenue of the assigned assets.

9. The assigned assets shall in the first instance be administered by the participating Government, or by the International Commission as that Commission may in each case determine.

10. The Commission shall at any time have the right of making direct representations to the Council of the League of Nations as to the desirability of transferring the administration of the assigned assets either from the Commission to the participating Government or from the participating Government to the Commission.

11. The decision of the Council of the League of Nations on this question shall be binding.

12. After the preparation of these bonds the participating Government shall have the right to loan the bond to its own nationals, for use by them as collateral security for importations.

13. The bonds shall be made out in such currencies and in such denominations as are applicable to the particular transaction in respect of which they are issued.

14. The participating Government shall be free to take, or not to take, security for the loan of these bonds from the nationals to whom they are lent.

15. The maturity and the rate of interest of the loan of the bonds shall be fixed by agreement between the participating Government and the borrower of the bonds; they need not be the same as the maturity and the rate of interest of the bonds themselves.

16. When making application to his Government for a loan of these bonds, the importer must furnish proof that he has previously obtained from the International Commission express permission to enter into the transaction for which the bonds are to be given as collateral.

17. Each bond, before it is handed over by the participating Government to the importer, shall be countersigned by the Commission in proof of registration.

18. Having obtained the consent of the Commission, and received from them the countersigned bonds, the importer will pledge these bonds to the exporter in a foreign country for the period of the transaction.

19. The exporter will return to him on their due date the coupons of the pledged bonds, and the bonds themselves on the completion of the transaction.

20. On receipt of the coupons and the bonds respectively, the importer will return them to his Government.

21. Bonds returned to the participating Government shall be cancelled, and may subsequently be replaced by other bonds,

either in the same or in a different currency, up to an equivalent amount.

22. The exporter, or if he has pledged the bonds, the institution with which he has repledged them, acting on his behalf, would be free, in the event of the importer not fulfilling the terms of his contract, to hold until maturity the bonds given as collateral by the importer, or to sell them in accordance with the custom in his country in the case of default.

23. In the second alternative an option of repurchasing the bonds direct must first be given for a short period to the Government which issued them.

24. If a sale is resorted to and results in a surplus beyond what is necessary to cover the claims of the exporter upon the importer, the exporter shall be held accountable for that surplus to the Government which issues the bonds.

25. The revenues from the assigned assets shall be applied as follows to the service of the bonds.

26. Out of these revenues the Commission or the participating Government, as the case may be, shall purchase foreign currencies sufficient to meet at their due date the coupons on all bonds at any time outstanding in the different foreign currencies.

27. In addition, they shall establish abroad in the appropriate currencies a sinking fund calculated to redeem at maturity 10 percent of the bonds outstanding in each of the different countries.

28. Further, in addition to the amounts provided for payment of coupons and for the endowment of the sinking fund, they shall establish out of the assigned revenues a special reserve in one or more foreign currencies for the redemption of bonds sold in accordance with paragraph 22.

29. The amount to be set aside for the special reserve shall in each case be determined by the Commission.

30. Any surplus remaining at the end of each year after the provision of these services shall be at the free disposal of the participating Government.

31. A participating Government shall have the right to offer its own bonds as collateral for credits obtained for the purpose of importations on Government account. The previous assent of the Commission will in these cases also be required for the particular importations desired by the participating Government.

32. If a participating Government, which has been in control of its assigned revenues should fail to fulfil its obligations, the exporter concerned will notify the Commission and the Commission will apply to the Council of the League of Nations for the transfer of the management of the assigned revenues to the Commission.

33. The consent of the Commission is necessary whenever bonds secured on the assigned assets are given as collateral, and shall, as a rule, be accorded only for the import of raw materials and primary necessities.

34. The Commission may, however, at its discretion, sanction in advance the importation of specified quantities of such goods.

35. Even in the case of imports under such a general sanction, a notification of the particular transaction must be registered with the Commission.

36. The assent of the Commission must also be obtained in every case to the term of the credit which it is proposed to open.

The Murray Report

The following is the report of Mr. A. R. Murray, C. B. E. representative of the employers of factory labour in India at the Washington International Labour Conference, 1920 :—

At a meeting of the Indian Jute Mills Association held in Calcutta on 5th September, I had an opportunity of ascertaining generally the views of the members of that Association regarding the hours of work and conditions of factory labour in the Bengal jute mills. On the morning of 15th September, too, I attended an informal meeting of the Committee of the Mill Owners' Association at Bombay and had a short discussion regarding the hours and condition of factory labour in the Bombay cotton mills. Apart from these two meetings I had no opportunity of formally ascertaining the views of employers of labour in India. It was not until I was sailing from Bombay on the 15th September that I received copies of the Organizing Committee's letter and questionnaire and relative papers. On my arrival in London on 6th October, I received at the India Office copies of the three reports prepared by the Organising Committee for the International Labour Conference, which had been published in August. These reports analysed and summarised the materials contained in the replies to the questionnaire received from different Governments, and in them the Committee presented, as a result of their examination of the materials, certain conclusions and recommendations in the shape of draft conventions as a basis for the discussion by the Conference of the several subjects on the Agenda. The first three reports deal respectively with—(1) The eight hours day or 48 hours week, (2) Unemployment, (3) The employment of women and children, and the Berne Conventions of 1906 : but they contain nothing about India or Japan except provisional suggestion of the Organizing Committee that these and similar countries might be able to accept certain alternatives to the conventions drafted for the other countries of the world. These notifications will be dealt with later and I merely refer to them at this stage to show that the Organizing Committee felt themselves justified in making suggestions to meet India's special circumstances without having before them materials on which to form opinions of any value.

Before I left India, the Government of India had drawn the attention of the local Governments to certain paragraphs in the Indian Industrial Commission's Report and had invited the opinion

of the local Governments whether, taking into account the present position of Indian mills and mill operatives, they think that the hours of labour should be shortened, and if so, to what extent, for what classes of labour and by what stages, if any, and also whether there are other points in the existing factory law requiring amendment. On receipt of replies the Government of India were to consider what further actions should be taken ; whether, for instance, it would be necessary to appoint a Committee of Enquiry, or whether the opinions received would warrant the framing of legislation, either with or without further discussion with local Governments. When I sailed, the Government of India could not have received replies, from all local Governments, to their request for expressions of opinion as to shortening the hours of labour ; far in less have had time to consider carefully such an important question in all its bearings as affecting Indian labour and Indian industries. I was, therefore, surprised to learn, in the course of informal discussions with the Indian Government delegates when crossing the Atlantic, that they were prepared to agree, on behalf of the Government of India, to the principle of a sixty hours week. On the face of the Government of India's replies to the questionnaire and relative explanatory Memorandum on Indian labour conditions, there is nothing to indicate why the Government of India should commit themselves to a precise reduction of working hours. In discussions with the Indian Government and Workers' Delegates, I urged that the enquiries instituted by the Government of India should be completed, and all the facts taken into consideration before agreeing to any particular amendment of the existing Factory Act. This seemed to me the correct attitude for the Indian Delegation to take up at the Conference, but unfortunately I was unable to carry my fellow delegates with me on this point, and we, therefore, arrived at Washington on 27th October 1919, holding divided opinions on what the Organizing Committee described as the most important subject on the agenda for the consideration of the Conference.

The recommendations of the Committee as regards India are incorporated in Article 10 of the Draft Convention adopted by the Conference which reads as follows :—

In British India the principle of a sixty hours week shall be adopted for all workers in the industries at present covered by the factory acts administered by the Government of India, in mines and in such branches of railway work as shall be specified for this purpose by the competent authority. Any modification of this limitation made by the competent authority shall be subject to the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of this Convention. In other respects the provisions of this Convention shall not apply to India, but

further provisions limiting the hours of work in India shall be considered at a future meeting of the General Conference.

Under the existing Indian factory laws, adult males may work twelve hours per day in Indian textile industries, women 11 hours, and children (between the ages of 9 and 14) 6 hours. If the draft Convention is ratified by the Indian Legislature, the effect of the foregoing article will be to limit the hours of work in Indian industries to 60 per week for both men and women. It will be observed that Article 10 applies to mines as well as other industries. The limitation of hours of work of adults in mines will, if adopted, form a new departure in Indian mining legislation and this question will require careful consideration by those interested. Indeed, the Committee recommended that the Government of India should be asked to consider the possibility of limiting the hours of underground work in mines to 54 in the week. They also recommended that the Government of India should be asked to consider the possibility of adopting modified definition of "Factory," which would reduce the number of workers required to bring a factory under the scope of the Act. Under the existing Indian factory laws, this number is fixed at 50 although in certain cases, it may be, and has been, reduced to 20.

Mr. Joshi, the Worker's Delegate from India, gave notice of a motion to add to the proposed Convention concerning India.—

1. The word "Factory" in the Convention to be applied to India should mean, "any industry worked with steam, water or any other mechanical power or electrical power and employing not less than ten persons."

(2) The hours of work for women employed in factories shall not exceed 54 a week.

(3) Children under 14 shall not be employed for more than 30 hours a week.

These particular proposals had all been fully discussed in the Committee and were brought up in the Central Conference by Mr. Joshi in the hope that he might be successful in getting them adopted there. On the second last day of the Conference, however, Mr. Joshi withdrew his proposed Amendment in order to save time, and contented himself by putting in a written statement which appears in the Provisional Record of the 20th day of the Conference. He closes that statement by saying that he postpones consideration of the question mentioned in his amendment to the next year's meeting of the Conference in the strong hope that they will then receive very sympathetic consideration. The Committee's Report regarding India and the other countries, except Japan, was adopted by the Conference by a vote of 67 to 1, the dissenting vote being

that of the Worker's Delegate from Belgium, Mr. Martens, who is one of the Vice-Presidents of the International Federation of Trade Unions.

In addition to the Draft Convention limiting the hours of work in industrial undertakings to eight in the day and forty-eight in the week, two resolutions were passed by the Main Committee on the Hours of Work. One had reference to work of re-construction in devastated areas which, it was agreed, justified special consideration. The other was in the following terms :

The provisions of this Convention shall not interfere with any better conditions already in operation, or agreed upon, for all or part of the workers of any country ; neither shall they interfere with any negotiations now proceeding in which the workers are asking for better conditions than the convention provides.

Both resolutions were adopted unanimously at the plenary sitting of the Conference on 25th November. Another resolution of importance was proposed by the Worker's Delegates from France and Italy and was ultimately carried unanimously on the second last day of the Conference in the following form :—

The Conference hopes that in no case should the wages of workmen be reduced simply by reason of the introduction of the 8-hours day, and the 48-hours week, in order that the conditions which exist in certain industries and which the present Convention allows to continue may not be aggravated by the imposition of lower wages on the workers.

If ratified by the Indian Government, the effect of article 3 will be to raise the age limit of children from 9 to 12 years, to widen the existing definition of a factory and to bring mining and the transport and handling of goods within the scope of factory legislation in India.

India in Parliament, 1920

The House of Commons first met in 1920 on Feb. 10th. In the following pages are given some of the more important interpellations of the year on Indian affairs, excepting military, pension and cognate matters of a technical nature. The outstanding features of the debates relate to the 1919 affairs of the Punjab under that arch-enemy of India, Michael O'Dwyer, and the Rules framed under the new Reform Act—the former by far the most stormy that has ever taken place since a very long time in Parliament.

The first report of the Punjab Government on the riots (rebellion, according to it) was submitted to the Government of India on October 11th, 1919,—six months after the tragic massacres! This report was kept a secret till it was issued as a White Paper on January 30th, 1920. On December 16th 1919, Mr. Montagu stated in reply to a question in the House that he was not then fully in possession of the facts relating to the Punjab Massacre (see Register 1920, Part II. p. 381) and implored the House to suspend judgment till the Report of the Hunter Committee then sitting in India was out.

But meanwhile the Punjab Government's admittedly one-sided report was issued on the eve of the meeting of Parliament, and the reason is obvious; for the intention was to influence public mind in favour of the Punjab officials. In answering a question on this subject on February 10th. Mr. Bonar Law described the report as merely "a narrative of events" when it was in fact a strong case deliberately prepared in its own favour by O'Dwyer's Government. In reply to another question, however, he said, "until the Committee now sitting in India under Lord Hunter to enquire into the disturbances had reported to the Government of India, and the Government of India have expressed their views to the Secretary of State, it would obviously be improper to take any action", though it was thought quite proper to publish and make known the facts abroitly marshalled by the Punjab Government.

All this in the House of Commons. In the Lords, the Sydenham gang was not inactive.

On Feb. 25th. 1920 Lord Sydenham asked the following question :—

Lord Sydenham :—My Lords, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India (Lord Sinha) whether the Secretary of State has been informed that—

1. Among the inflammatory notices posted at Lyallpur on April 13th last was one suggesting to the mob that there were European women at the rallying post who should be outraged.

2. The necessity for proclaiming martial law at Lyallpur has been denied.

3. During the week ending January 17th last, all Europeans were directed not to enter Delhi, the capital city of India, for four days, in consequence of celebrations attending the release from internment of Mahomed Ali and Shaukat Ali.

4. Indian witnesses before the Hunter Commission, who gave evidence not in accordance with the views of the National Congress, have been cruelly persecuted and boycotted.

5. Public buildings, such as schools, have been permitted to be used for political meetings organised by the party which has demanded the recall of the Viceroy.

Viscount Sandhurst :—My Lords, I hope that my noble Friend will allow me to answer the questions in the absence of the Under Secretary of State, who is in India. The Secretary of State for India is aware that a notice suggesting the dishonouring of English women was found posted up at Lyallpur. He is also aware that the necessity for proclaiming martial law in any Punjab district has been widely questioned in India. This indeed is one of the main subjects of inquiry by the Hunter Committee. On the third, fourth, and fifth points the Secretary of State is informed as follows : Europeans generally avoided Delhi city at the period in question, but no prohibitory orders were issued to civilians and, in fact, the Chief Commissioner reports that certain Europeans were assisted through the crowd by volunteers on the day of the Ali brother's reception. Orders were, however, issued to the troops, British and Indian, by the General Officer Commanding Delhi Brigade, placing Delhi city out of bounds from January 14 to 18 inclusive. The object was to avoid possible collisions between the troops and the mob. This course has frequently been adopted on occasion of festivals. The Government have had reports that Sir Umar Hayat Khan and other pro-Government witnesses before the Hunter Committee have been accorded hostile receptions. Reports have also been received that Indians considered to be pro-Government are subject to social persecution and boycott. No reports have been received that meetings of the nature referred to have been held in schools. The foundation of the rumour is probably due the fact that school boys often take a prominent part in meetings of the extremist party and are employed as volunteers in public demonstrations. It may be added that agitation for the recall of the Viceroy is very little in evidence at present.

Lord Hunter's Report was submitted to the Govt. of India on March 8th. 1920; it was forwarded by that Govt. to the Secretary of State on May 3rd and was issued to the public in June, together with the famous despatch of the Secretary of State. Then came that nauseating fusillade of questions in the Commons inspired by a sympathy of Dyerism given on page 460, *et seq.*, and then that historic debate in Parliament on July 8th 1920.

Regarding the Debate on Amritsar and General Dyer, the following critical account given by a 'Student of Politics' and published in the London *Times* is worth reproducing.—

"When the Secretary for India rose to-day to speak on General Dyer's conduct at Amritsar, the benches were more crowded than they have been for a year, except in some of the Russian debates. Before a word was said, one could feel the air beating with excitement.

"Mr. Montagu is a sincere man and a genuine Liberal, but he does not know the House of Commons. His opening speech was bad advocacy, and one could see his critics growing more and more irritated with each sentence. He acknowledged the services of General Dyer, but said his principles were wrong when he declared that his intention was to read Indians at large a "moral lesson"—that was terrorism. His compulsory salaaming and his "all fours" order were racial humiliation. His setting up of the whipping triangles was the policy of frightfulness. These things were inconsistent with our policy in India. If you justified General Dyer, it meant that we ruled India by the sword; and the end of that policy would be that our rule in India would stink in the nostrils alike of our own democracy and of the Indian people, and that the two would combine to close it. You must choose between the policy of force and the policy of partnership. You could not mix the two, voting for partnership one year and for force the next. As Mr. Montagu developed this argument the House became more and more restive. When he went on to say that there was a theory abroad that an Indian was tolerable only so long as he obeyed orders, interruptions swelled into a prolonged roar of anger. He persisted courageously and lowered the horns of his dilemma more menacingly. "Choose, choose," he said, "between race ascendancy and partnership, and on your choice will depend the continuance of the British Empire."

"The House was now thoroughly angry. It had not expected this sort of speech. It was bad advocacy in two ways. It was too passionate, and the malcontents were irritated by its sharp logical dilemmas. Secondly, the English mind does not work in that way. We are the most daring political generaliser in the world, but:

is our way in politics, as in science, to proceed inductively from the particular to the general, and not from the general to the particular.

"The House would have welcomed the principles of Mr. Montagu, which were not merely sound, but noble, if he had led up to them by an accumulation of instances. But between our inductive English method of political argument and this deductive argument from sharply opposed logical propositions, there is an interval of 2,000 years, and 30 deg. of longitude. East and West, be they produced ever so far, will never meet, and Mr. Montagu, patriotic and sincere English Liberal as he is, is also a Jew, and in excitement has the mental idiom of the East. That was the fault of a speech which in logical idea was a singularly pure and brilliant expression of Liberal doctrine.

"A more violent contrast than that between the speech of Mr. Montagu and that of Sir Edward Carson who followed, it would be impossible to conceive. There was not a general idea in Sir Edward Carson's speech, unless we regard his passion for justice to the individual as a general idea. "We cannot try him, but we have a right to insist that he should have a fair trial." For the rest, his speech was an appeal to prejudice. To break a man without fair trial, was un-English; you must trust the man on the spot. Even if there had been an error of judgment, ought he alone to bear the consequences? His strongest point was that the punishment was not immediate, but was delayed. How unfair for armchair politicians in Downing street to pass these judgments on men who had these frightfully difficult practical problems, not of their own making, to solve. You must encourage your agents by your support if they do the onset. Perhaps General Dyer had saved India. The substance of the speech was extraordinarily poor; the manner was impressive, and the advocacy perfect.

"Mr. Churchill, who followed, was amazingly skilful, and turned the House (or so it seemed) completely round. He began so haltingly as to get the patient ear of the House. He avoided at first expressing an opinion on the merits and entered on an elaborate, not to say, dry discourse on the law of master and servant in the Army. He defined the three degrees of dissatisfaction with the conduct of an officer in the Army. General Dyer's retirement on half-pay was the mildest of the three punishments, and you could not say he had been treated unfairly unless you were also prepared to insist on a special trial for the hundreds of officers who had been treated so during and since the war. He met the argument that General Dyer's conduct had been condoned by his superiors by making it clear that but for that he would have been subjected to severe punishment.

"Having thus met the suspicion that there was something especially vindictive in the treatment of General Dyer, Mr. Churchill

began to deal with the merits of the case. He admitted the difficulties that confronted an officer in dealing with civil disturbances. Still there were certain elementary tests. Was the crowd with which he had to deal attacking or threatening to attack? Was it armed? At Amritsar the answer to both the questions was in the negative. He then went on to describe the slaughter. We had a picture of the crowd massed in a narrow space, rushing wildly from centre to the corners and back again, as the guns were turned to this direction or that. The feeling of pity grew dominant as the picture became more vivid.

"Mr. Asquith followed with a criticism of Sir Edward Carson's speech. He complained that he had not addressed himself to the merits of the case. To ask the House of Commons to reverse the decision that had been taken was to condone one of the worst outrages in our history.

"After that the debate flagged. Mr. Spoor for the Labour Party developed that General Dyer was typical of an Anglo Indian spirit which was not only illiberal and tyrannical, but was undermining the foundations of our rule.

"Feeling was again very high when Mr. Bonar Law rose to wind up the debate. He laboured to show that he understood all the difficulties of General Dyer's position, but hardly succeeded in soothing the anger of the malcontents. He seemed less successful usually in gauging the moods of the House, and in managing them.

"The Labour amendment to reduce the India Office Vote by £100 was lost by 247 votes to 37; and Sir Edward Carson's amendment, also for a reduction of the vote, by 230 votes to 129."

"General Dyer listened to the debate from a seat under the gallery. The following Indian Princes were in the Distinguished Strangers' Gallery; The Maharaja of Jhallawar, the Maharaja of Kapurthalla, the Tikka Saheb of Kapurthala, the Maharaja of Cooch Behar, the Yuvaraja of Mysore, the Maharaja of Alwar, and the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar."

The Lord's Debate

The Debate in the Lords on Lord Finlay's Motion "to deplore the conduct of the case of General Dyer as unjust and as establishing a precedent dangerous to the preservation of order in the face of rebellion" lasted for two days and was lively in the extreme. It had all the accompaniments of a great occasion. For once the Peers of the realm found means to leave their shady career and congregate

to assert a principle on which lay the foundation of their decrepit existence. More than 200 of their Lordships, most of them as innocent of that pampered chamber as of India, attended and a very "distinguished" gathering of Peeresses and 'fashionable' society-women, reeking capitalists and other friends and admirers of the "Hero of the Punjab", lent an imposing air to the assembly. The Gaekwar of Baroda, the Maharani, and other Indian Princes and noblemen also attended.

Lord Finlay had been well briefed for his job. He stuck to the case of General Dyer throughout, without any concern for the graver issues involved for the people of India or a word of sympathy for the innocent victims of the massacre. He condemned the partisanship which the Indian members of the Hunter Committee had displayed and depicted the disadvantages under which the accused officer laboured.

Lord Sinha, apologetic in his tone and manner, was more placid and restrained. Perhaps the atmosphere of the House was too strong for him and he thought it wiser to leave the more unqualified denunciations to those who could speak with cabinet authority. He went out of his way to condemn the activities of Mr. Gandhi, which was altogether uncalled for, especially in relation to the new movement of Non-Co-operation. It was a calm well reasoned speech.

The Lord Chancellor mercilessly denounced the cruel acts of General Dyer. He did this certainly in unqualified language such as one does not often hear from such lofty quarters; but he also showed that he was not unaware of the deeper issues that were at stake and of the fundamental principles that there were involved. In words that were worthy of the high office which he holds, Lord Birkenhead asserted the right of Indians to equal treatment with other citizens of the empire, and he warned their Lordships of the harm they would be doing in India if they passed the resolution.

The case for the Government of India was stated by Lord Meston. His business was to justify the policy of finding a scape-goat for others (himself included). He was the only speaker who thought it necessary to defend the action of the Viceroy.

Lord Curzon declared his distrust of the theory that General Dyer saved the Punjab by his exertions, and he altogether denied that he saved India by example. Were the principles upon which General Dyer acted approved, said his Lordship, we should lower our reputation in India, lower our own standards of justice and humanity, and debase the currency of our national honour. The House heard him throughout with breathless interest, but with scarcely a sign of approval. The motion was adopted by 129 votes to 86—a direct defeat of the Government!

HOUSE OF COMMONS—Feb. 18th, 1920

Mr. Ormsby Gore asked the Secretary for India what instruction, of any, have been sent by him to the Government of India or to the Governor of Madras with regard to the framing of the franchise rules governing the representation of non-Brahmins in the province of Madras; and whether an agreement has been reached by the Government of India with regard to the method and amount of representation to be given to the non-Brahmins in Madras?

The President of the Board of Education (*Mr. Herbert Fisher*): My right hon. friend has sent no instructions either to the Government of India or the Governor of Madras, beyond requesting them to carry out as speedily as possible (along with other recommendations) the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee contained in paragraph (c) of their Report under the heading "Clause 7", and explaining to the Governor of Madras that in recommending provision for non-Brahmins of "separate representation by means of reservation of seats" the Committee did not intend to recommend the setting up of separate electorates consisting only of non-Brahmins. The Viceroy reported on January 26th that Lord Willingdon was hopeful of a speedy settlement of the matter. I am not aware whether a settlement has actually been reached.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: Is the right hon. gentleman not aware that the Joint Committee expressly suggested that the matter should not be left to the Governor of Madras but dealt with by the Government of India on its own initiative and that a great deal of unrest has been caused in Madras by the intervention of the Governor of Madras in the very delicate negotiations?

Sir J. D. Rees: Who would properly intervene, or more properly intervene, than the Governor of Madras?

Mr. Fisher: I think it is quite obvious that the Governor of Madras is the proper person.

Sir J. D. Rees asked what progress had been made by the Committee on financial relations which is considering the question of provincial contributions to the Government of India in view of the eventual equalisation in incidence of such contributions?

Mr. Fisher: The work of the Committee is barely begun, and no report of its progress has yet been received. (See P. III, p. 49).

HOUSE OF COMMONS—Feb. 25th 1920

Strikes at Bombay.

Colonel Wedgwood asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Bombay mill strikers were fired on in January of this year; and how many casualties resulted among the Indian population?

The President of the Board of Education (Mr. Herbert Fisher):

I am informed, that before a settlement of the strike was reached, the mob attacked a picket of military police accompanied by a magistrate, the magistrate and others of the party being struck by stones. On the crowd being ordered to disperse they displayed a defiant attitude; threats of firing had no effect on the mob, and the magistrate gave orders to disperse it by force. The serjeant and one private fired one round each, killing one rioter and seriously injuring another. Subsequently, when as the result of the Governor's mediation, concessions were made to the strikers and preparations made to start work at four or five mills, determined efforts to prevent this were made. At one mill large crowds stoned the military posts, forcibly entered the mill compound and stoned the cashier and two sepoys. A few rounds were fired, one mill hand being wounded in the thigh. The Governor of Bombay has brought to my notice the admirable conduct during these disturbances of the military and police, who were on duty continuously for nearly a month and were constantly engaged in minor conflicts with the mob. I feel sure that the House will agree that Sir George Lloyd was justified in this opinion.

Legal Proceedings Against Ministers.

Colonel Yate asked whether the exclusion of Ministers from being sued in the High Courts in India, as provided for in the Government of India Act, will have the effect of differentiating the constitution of India from that of all the Dominions and of this country, and of denying to the peoples of India any means of redress in the case of illegal proceedings by Ministers.

Mr. Fisher: I understand that my hon. and gallant friend is referring to the Amendment made by means of part II of the Second Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1919, whereby ministers appointed under that Act are brought within the scope of Section 110 of the Government of India Act, 1915-16. The Amendment referred to has no effect at all in five of the major provinces in India. In three provinces it has the effect of placing Ministers in the same legal position as that occupied by Governors and Lieut.-Governors of provinces and members of their Executive Councils. To a limited extent no doubt the position of Ministers in India will in this respect be different from that of Ministers in the Dominions, but it must be remembered, that Ministers in India are not in all respects on the same footing as Ministers in the Dominions. It is not the case that the Amendment will have the effect of denying to the people of India all means of redress in the case of illegal proceedings by Ministers. Proceedings may be taken against Ministers under other provisions of the Act. The provisions of the section in question may be repealed or amended at any time by the Indian Legislature.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—10th March 1920

Mesopotamia (Army of Occupation)

Colonel Wedgwood asked how much of the cost, if any, of the Army of Occupation and the civil administration in Mesopotamia falls directly or indirectly upon the Exchequer of India?

Mr. Fisher: No part of the cost of the civil administration of Mesopotamia falls upon the India Exchequer. The same is now the case as regards the Army of Occupation. During the War the ordinary (but not the extraordinary) charges of the troops despatched from India for service in Mesopotamia and other theatres of War were borne by Indian revenues under the Parliamentary Resolutions of 16th September and 26th November 1914. No contribution is now being made by India towards the cost of the troops overseas.

Military Affairs (Commission of Inquiry)

Mr. Spoor asked the Secretary for India if he will state how far the Committee or Commission enquiring into Indian military affairs has been able to proceed with that enquiry and how soon the Report will be forthcoming; whether he will state if the deliberations of that body are being carried on under the presidency or acting chairmanship of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the ex-Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, whose administration of that Province during the spring of last year came under examination by the Hunter Committee and has been the subject of controversy both here and in India; and, if he is so acting, whether he will consider the advisability of relieving him of that position until his administration of the Punjab, which supplies a considerable percentage of the recruits for the Indian army has been cleared?

Mr. Fisher: The Committee will shortly complete their inquiries in India, but no estimate can be given of the date when their Report will be issued. Sir Michael O'Dwyer is acting chairman of the committee. The Secretary of State sees no reason for relieving him of the position. His administration of the Punjab has no bearing on the matters under discussion by the Committee.

Industrial Workers (Wages)

Mr. John Davison asked the present rates of wages paid to Indian workers in the principal industries; and whether it is the intention of the Government to take steps to ensure an early approximation of Indian industrial conditions to British standards?

Mr. Fisher: As in several cases, increases have recently been granted I have no exact information as to the present rates of wages in the various industries in India, but I will enquire. The settled policy of the Government of India, which has the full

approval of my right hon. Friend, is to improve as rapidly the condition of Indian workers, but in a country like India British standards cannot in all cases be adopted. This, as the hon. Member is aware, is recognised in Article 405 of the Treaty of Peace, which lays down that in framing Draft Conventions and Recommendations for general adoption, the International Labour Conference shall suggest modifications to meet the case of those countries in which, to quote the words of the Treaty, "climatic conditions, imperfect development of industrial organisation or other special circumstances, make the industrial conditions substantially different."

Lieut. Commander Kenworthy: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is the intention of the Government of India to retain power over Labour legislation and to introduce any system of legal minimum wage in India as has been suggested?

Sir J. D. Pies: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the approximation to the British standard will include the compulsory adoption of English clothing, food and housing, and if so, who will pay for the mutiny which must result?

Mr. Fisher: It is obvious that there must be great differences between economic legislation in India and in England. The differences must be adjusted to the economic circumstances in the two countries. The whole matter of the economic legislation suitable to Indian conditions is under the consideration of the Government of India.

Colonel Wedgwood: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that at present there are 60,000 mill workers out in Bombay, striking for higher wages, and may we understand that the cause of these striking mill-workers is being supported by Sir George Lloyd and the Government against the employers, with a view to securing a wage more compatible with that paid in other countries?

Mr. Hailwood: Under the Government of India Act, are they not capable of dealing with these cases in India?

Mr. Fisher: Sir George Lloyd has already intervened in an important labour dispute in Bombay and his intervention has been effective in securing a settlement, and I have no reason to suppose that his intervention in any later dispute will be less successful than in the past.

Colonel Wedgwood: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that there is a dispute on now and that 60,000 men are out in Bombay?

Burma Rice Trade

Mr. Talbot asked the Secretary for India whether he is now in the position to make a statement respecting the excessive price

fixed by the Government of India for rice exported to Ceylon and certain other British Dominions ?

Mr. Fisher : As the reply is somewhat long I propose, by the permission of my Hon. Friend to circulate it in the Official Report ..

THE FOLLOWING IS THE REPLY REFERRED TO :—

The object which the Government of India had in view in assuming control over the Burma rice trade was to enable consumers in India and Burma to obtain a stable food at a reasonable price and to supplement the seriously depleted stocks in India. As this necessarily involves a limitation of the profits of producers, the Government of India are under an obligation to obtain a fair market price for the exportable surplus and to restore the profits to the producers. But although the world shortage of rice, caused by the failure of the Siam crop and a short Burma crop, would have enabled exceedingly high prices to have been obtained, the moderate minimum export price of about Rs. 15 per cwt. f. o. b. Rangoon has been fixed against a cost price of Rs.9 at which India is supplied. This export price is very considerably less than the world price, which but for the control, British Possessions would have been compelled to pay. Further—and perhaps more important—practically the whole of the exportable surplus has been reserved for British Possessions. This surplus, unfortunately, is insufficient to meet all demands, but is being distributed as fairly as possible. Had this control not been established it is reasonably certain that the Colonies would not only have been forced to pay a much higher price, but would have been unable to obtain the quantities allotted to them under the scheme.

Last week the Viceroy received a deputation from Ceylon which represented the serious condition of affairs in the island caused by the high price of rice. Lord Chelmsford, while sympathising with the deputation, emphatically repudiated the suggestion that the Government of India were in any way responsible for the rise in the price of rice in the world's markets, and pointed out, as explained above, that the control which had been established enable Ceylon to obtain her requirements at much below world prices. In the matter of allotments also, Ceylon had been treated very favourably, as 360,000 tons had been reserved for the colony. To the complaints of the deputation, that no previous warning had been given, the Viceroy replied that, so long ago as November last, the Ceylon Food Controller knew that the control over exports might be removed, and the Government of Ceylon therefore should have been prepared for a rise in the price of Burma rice to the level of world prices. As regards the claim of the deputation, that Ceylon should be treated as part of India, Lord Chelmsford, while recognising the close histori-

cal and geographical connection between the two countries, pointed out that Ceylon was politically and financially independent of India, and could not expect to obtain what would in effect amount to a large subsidy from India by receiving its supplies of rice at less than the price which had been accepted by other Colonies without question. But moved by the appeal on behalf of the general population, and especially the Indian population, and having regard to the fact that Ceylon affords employment for the surplus population of Southern India, which might be forced to return to India in the event of a food shortage in Ceylon, he agreed to supply 180,000 tons of rice at the flat rate of Rs. 12 cwt. I feel sure that my Hon. Friend will agree that the concession which the Viceroy has found it possible to make—involving as it does a surrender of over £1,252,000—is a substantial one and I trust that it will serve to relieve the situation in Ceylon.

Mr. Gideon Murray: Is the reply satisfactory?

Mr. Fisher: It depends upon the point of view from which the reply is regarded.

Mr. Murray: Will a reduction be made in the price that is being charged for the rice?

Mr. Fisher: Yes.

Indentured Labour (Fiji) •

Mr. Fredric Roberts asked the Secretary of State for India whether a deputation of Fiji planters is at present in India: whether this deputation is demanding the continuance of indentured labour in Fiji: and whether His Majesty's Government and the Government of India will make a public denial that there is any intention of supplying indentured labour to Fiji, in view of the recent unrest there?

Mr. Fisher: The unofficial Fiji Mission now in India is certainly not asking for a renewal of indentured labour, which is quite well understood to have been finally stopped. The recent unrest in Fiji occurred after the cancellation of all remaining indentures.

Mr. William Carter asked the Secretary of State for India if he will state how many Indians have left India during the last 10 years under indenture and how many are at present under indenture, and in what localities.

Mr. Fisher: In the last 10 years, 6,401 Indians have left India under indenture but none have gone since 1917. I gave the hon. and gallant Member for Gateshead, on the 24th February, the latest figures as to the number still under indenture in the several Colonies.

Strikes and the Military

Mr. Lunn asked how many strikes have occurred in India since the beginning of this year ; in how many cases were troops called out ; on how many occasions have there been conflicts between the strikers and the military in which the military fired on the crowd ; and what has been the total number of casualties resulting among the Indian population ?

Mr. Fisher : Information available at the India Office shows that since the beginning of the year, in addition to the widespread strikes in the Bombay Presidency, which affected the cotton mills and other industries, strikes occurred in the Jamalpur railway workshops, at four Calcutta jute mills, and at Cawnpore. No official information has yet been received regarding the more recent strike at Jamshedpur. As regards the latter part of the question I would refer the hon. Member to the replies given on the 25th February and the 3rd March to questions asked by the hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle under-Lyme and the hon. Member for Barnard Castle,

Mr. W. Throne : Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that the economic conditions of the Indians would be very much better if they were not compelled to carry on their backs some of the tribe of Civil Servants ?

Mr. Lunn asked how many iron and still workers are at present on strike in Jamshedpur District : and whether an attempt is being made to give the strikers' claims a fair hearing and to arbitrate the strike on British lines, in view of the regrettable occurrences at Sholapur and elsewhere ?

Mr. Fisher : I have received no report from the Government of India regarding the strike.

Colonel Wedgwood : Will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to obtain a report on this strike from the Government of India ?

Khilafat Delegation.

Lieut. Colonel James asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Indian Khilafat or Islamic delegation at present visiting this country is led by certain Muhammad Ali : whether this Muhammad Ali is the same individual who, on account of his revolutionary tendencies and his intimate association with the Committee of Union and Progress, was interned on his own responsibility by His Highness the Nawab of Rampur and who was subsequently interned by the Indian Government, together with his brother Shaukat Ali, who had earned a similar reputation at the University of Aligarh ; whether the inclusion of a man of such revolutionary tendencies on this Islamic delegation is approved by the Government of India and whether he will consider the possible prejudice to the cause of the

millions of loyal Islamic subjects of the Crown of the inclusion of an avowed revolutionary on a mission of this kind?

Mr. Fisher : The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part, the leader of the delegation is the same individual who was interned by the Government of India. With regard to the third and fourth parts of the question, the Government of India had no hand in selecting the personnel of the delegation. I can accept no responsibility on this point.

Lieut. Colonel James : Is it a fact that members of the delegation have been officially received by representatives of the Indian Government in this country; does not such reception constitute an act of approval of the constitution of the delegation; and is it a fact that the Government of India, quite properly, had no hand in selecting the personnel of the delegation?

Mr. Speaker : The hon. and gallant Member should hand in his question at the Table.

Colonel Wedgwood : Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a visit of a Committee of this kind is of the utmost advantage to the relations between ourselves and the Muhammadans in India; and is he also aware that it can only be of advantage to this Empire for men like Muhammad Ali to come here?

Mr. Speaker : The hon. and gallant Gentleman must follow the example of the hon. and gallant Member and hand in his question.

The following Questions appeared on the Order Paper for non-oral answers :

Colonel Wedgwood asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (1) whether Indian soldiers who served in the campaign against the Germans in East Africa are receiving grants of land from the East African local Governments in the same way as the British soldiers of European descent; if not, whether His Majesty's Government will instruct the East African authorities to do so, in view of the resentment which is caused among the Indians by the differential treatment of British white troops and Indian soldiers who fought side by side in the same campaign; (2) whether he is aware that resentment is caused among the Indians in East Africa by the omission on the part of the Government of East Africa to appoint any Indian member on the British East Africa Economic Commission and by those parts of the Commission's Report which affect the Indian community; and whether His Majesty's Government will consider the advisability of appointing another Commission with at least one Indian member to safeguard the interests of the Indians in East Africa?

Lieut. Colonel Amery : I will answer these four questions together. The matters dealt with in the hon. and gallant Member's

four questions, including that addressed to the Secretary of State for India, are included in the Resolutions adopted by the East Africa Indian National Congress in the November last. (*See Register 1920.*) These Resolutions, and the position of Indians generally in East Africa, will be discussed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on arrival in England, with the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate, who is remaining in England for the purpose. In the circumstances, I am not in a position to make any statement on the points raised in the questions.

Colonel Wedgwood: Will this discussion include a representative of the India Office, preferably the Secretary of State?

Lieut.-Colonel Amery: I have no doubt the Secretary of State for the Colonies will consult him.

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy: Will the hon and gallant Gentleman convey to the Colony in question the views of the Colonial Office on the question of flogging?

Lieut.-Colonel Amery: I am not prepared to do that.

Mr. Spoor asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (1) whether a Government Commission on Native Labour sat in British East Africa in 1912-13; whether the Hon. A. C. Hollis, C. M. G., Secretary for Native Affairs, gave evidence showing that labour recruited through the Native Chiefs was in practice compulsory labour; whether it is the policy of His Majesty's Government now to introduce compulsory labour in British East Africa; if not, whether the Governor's instructions to Provincial and District Commissioners, that the onus of finding labour was to be put on Native Chiefs and elders, will now be withdrawn; (2) whether the Governor of British East Africa has issued instructions to Provincial and District Commissioners to inform Native Chiefs and elders that it is part of their duty to advise and encourage young men in their areas to go out and work on plantations; whether any such duty has been imposed by law on Native chiefs and elders; if not, on what authority the Governor's statement was made; on what authority reports are called for on any headman who is impervious to His Excellency's wishes; and what is the nature of the action which the Governor proposes to take against any such headman?

Lieut.-Colonel Amery: As I informed the Hon. Member on the 23rd February, the whole question of native labour in East Africa, including the issue raised by the administrative circular to which the Hon. Member refers, will be discussed with Sir E. Northey by the Secretary of State on his return.

Colonel Wedgwood: That circular has not yet been received?

Lieut.-Colonel Amery: No.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—24th March, 1920.

Committees of Inquiry [Composition]

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy asked the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been drawn to the complaints in India that representatives of the Indian National Congress have been persistently excluded from the Committees appointed for purposes of investigation of public questions by the Government of India, for instance, the Hunter Committee and recent Advisory Committee regarding Rules and Regulations to be framed under the Government of India Act, 1919 ; and whether he will take steps to ensure that this body is represented on such public Committees in future?

Mr. Fisher : The Secretary of State has seen these complaints in Indian newspapers. As regards the Hunter Committee it was obviously necessary to select members who had not, as prominent adherents of the Congress, had already committed themselves to strong views on the points which required investigation.

As regards the Reforms Committees appointed in the Provinces, the Secretary of State has not full information on their composition. But the hon. Member is probably aware that the prevailing party in the National Congress, being dissatisfied with the Reforms, and having declared itself sceptical as to their sincerity and value, great number of Indian Liberal politicians, who are desirous of obtaining the best results from the new system have left its ranks and formed a separate Congress of their own. It is probable, and the hon. Member will perhaps recognise that it would be reasonable, in appointing Committees to work out the details of changes consequent on the recent Act, to enlist the services of men who, while criticising certain features, have promised sincere co-operation in working the new system rather than those who have denounced the Act as unacceptable or unworkable.

Lieut. Commander Kenworthy : Would it not be desirable that men of pronounced views, even if hostile to certain aspects of the present Government of India, should be on this Committee ?

Mr. Fisher : My right hon. Friend is of opinion that the Hunter Committee in its composition should be a judicial body, and that it is undesirable to appoint on that Committee men who have taken a very strong line in public controversies.

Lieut. Commander Kenworthy : If this Hunter Committee is a judicial body it must be impartial, and why should not distinguished legal luminaries, even if they have pronounced views, be upon it

Lord Hunter's Committee.

Colonel Wedgwood asked the Secretary of State for India if Lord Hunter has left or is on the point of leaving India; if the Report by his Committee has been submitted or is ready for submission; if he could state when that Report is to be published; and when time can be allotted for discussing in the house the issues that the Report is sure to raise?

Mr. Fisher: I understand that Lord Hunter is on his way home, and that the Report of his Committee reached the Government of India few days ago. It will be published as soon as possible, but cannot be published before the house rises, so that the question of allotting time is not immediate.

Mr. Neil Maclean asked the Secretary of State for India whether Lord Hunter, before leaving India on or about the 13th instant, handed in the Report of his Committee to the Government of India; whether it is the intention of the Government to publish that Report in this country and in India; and whether the evidence tendered by the ex-Governor of the Punjab, the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government, and on behalf of the military authorities will be included or published separately?

Mr. Fisher: The answer to the first two parts of the question is in the affirmative. I cannot yet make any definite statement as to the publication of evidence.

Deportation of B. G. Horniman.

Colonel Wedgwood asked the Secretary of State for India whether Mr. B. G. Horniman, who was deported from India by the Government of Bombay to this country in April last without charge or trial, has been refused permission to return to Bombay, where he had been domiciled for several years, and resume his professional occupation and whether he will state why Mr. Horniman has been excluded from the amnesty recently extended under the terms of the King's Proclamation to persons against whom Orders under the Defence of India Act affecting their entry into British India were in force?

Mr. Fisher: The Secretary of State refused to recommend Mr. Horniman for a passport to India so long as the Government of Bombay considers it necessary to enforce the Order made against him. I do not understand the last part of the question, and doubt if there were any persons excluded from British India in the same manner as Mr. Horniman, who have been allowed to return to it.

Lajpat Rai

Colonel Yate asked whether Lajpat Rai, who was deported from the Panjab in 1907 was concerned in any way during his resi-

dence in America with the plots that were hatched there for revolution in India; and how many other deportees similarly situated have also been permitted to return to India?

Mr. Fisher: I must refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the statement made in this House on the 28th November, 1917, by the Home Secretary (Viscount Cave). I am not aware that any Indian has been deported to a foreign country. Lajpat Rai was released from internment nearly 12 years ago, and went voluntarily to the United States in 1914.

Colonel Yate: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question whether Lajpat Rai was concerned in any of the plots that were hatched in America for revolution in India?

Mr. Fisher: I am not aware that he was.

Muhammad Ali

Colonel Yate asked whether Muhammad Ali, who has arrived in England as a member of the Indian Khilafat deputation, is the same Muhammad Ali mentioned in paragraph 164 of the Report of the Committee appointed to investigate revolutionary conspiracies in India as concerned in the project hatched in India with the object of destroying British rule by means of an attack on the North-West frontier supplemented by a Muhammadan rising in India itself; whether it was for this reason that he was interned; and, if, not, for participation in what conspiracy was he interned?

Mr. Fisher: The individual mentioned in paragraph 164 of the Report cited in the question is not the Muhammad Ali who is now in England as a member of the Khilafat Deputation. The latter was interned during the War for conduct tending to promote the interests of His Majesty's enemies.

Khilafat Delegation

Mr. Ormsby Gore asked what steps have been taken to secure early and wide publicity in India of the Prime Minister's recent reply to the Indian Khilafat delegation regarding British policy in the Near and Middle East?

Mr. Foreman asked the Secretary of State for India whether steps have been taken to telegraph to India the reply of the Prime Minister to the Indian Muslim delegation on the future of Turkey, and to publish it throughout the whole of India in all the vernacular papers; and, if not, will he at once consider the desirability of taking these steps?

Mr. Fisher: A very full summary of the Prime Minister's reply to the delegation was telegraphed to the Viceroy on the 21st March for purpose of publication in India.

Constitutional Reform (Lord Hardinge)

Mr. Waterson asked the Secretary of State for India whether Lord Hardinge, at the request of the India Office or otherwise, sent, prior to his retirement from the Viceroyalty and Governor-Generalship of India, a despatch making important recommendations for constitutional reforms; if so, would he have any objections to the publication of that despatch to complete the series of records issued on that subject; and would he state the main recommendations contained in the despatch and the principle upon which Lord Hardinge's recommendations were based, and particularly would he indicate whether Lord Hardinge contemplated the introduction of the principle of duality or diarchy, or did Lord Hardinge elaborate the suggestion of provincial autonomy made in the despatch sent by him about the time of the last Delhi Durbar?

Mr. Fisher : Though the question of constitutional reforms was, of course, under consideration before Lord Hardinge left India, his Government had not addressed any despatch on the subject to the Secretary of State.

British East Africa (Indian Medical Practitioners)

Mr. Waterson asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether Indian medical practitioners in British East Africa are forbidden to carry on independent medical practice; and, if so on what grounds?

Lieut.-Colonel Amery : The question of medical practice in the East Africa Protectorate is governed by the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Ordinance, 1910. Under that ordinance the holder of any British Indian degree, diploma, or licence entitling him to registration in the United Kingdom is entitled to be registered as a medical practitioner in the East Africa Protectorate. Under the same ordinance the practice of systems of therapeutics according to native, Indian or other Asiatic method is permitted for persons recognised by the community to which they belong to be duly trained in such practice, subject to provisos that such systems may only be practised amongst the community to which the practitioner belongs and that no act under any such system on the part of such persons as is dangerous to life shall be permitted.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—31st March 1920

Disturbances at Jamshedpur.

Lieutenant Commander Kennworthy asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has any information with regard to the recent disturbances at Jamalpur, in the North West Provinces; what was the cause of the disturbance; whether strikers were fired

on by the troops; if so, whether there were any casualties among the troops or among the strikers; and whether any form of inquiry will be held into the occurrence?

The President of the Board of education (Mr Herbert Fisher): The honourable and gallant Member no doubt refers to the recent disturbances at the Tata Ironworks at Jamshedpur, in the Province of Bihar and Orissa, erroneously reported in the newspapers as having taken place at Jamalpur. The strike, which was declared towards the end of February, involved some 30,000 workers. Disturbances began on the 13th March, when determined and well-organised attempts were made by armed bodies of strikers to prevent those who wished to attend work. The factory was besieged and troops escorting a motor lorry bringing food to workers were attacked. The Deputy Commissioner of the district was able to avert a collision, but picketing continued and no workmen were allowed to enter the works. On the morning of the 15th it was discovered that the railway lines had been tampered with, and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police ordered two parties of mounted police to arrest the offenders, with instructions not to fire unless in self-defence. About forty arrests were made, but the prisoners were rescued and a large mob of strikers then attacked the police, who were compelled to fire in self-defence. Mr. Ashby and several police were seriously injured, five of the crowd being killed and 21 wounded. The police fell back on the works and fired only when closely pressed. The injured were taken to hospital for treatment. The situation then improved rapidly, and on the 17th 2,000 men had resumed work. An announcement by the directors seems to have had a favourable effect, and my latest information is that on the 18th 15,000 men had returned to work, the rest being expected to return on the 20th.

Lieutenant Commander Kenworthy: Will there be any form of inquiry held into the occurrence as asked for in the last part of my question?

Mr. Fisher: The facts will certainly be investigated.

Muhammad Ali [*speech at Woking.*]

Sir Charles Oman asked the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been drawn to a speech delivered at Woking on 21st March, by Mr. Muhammad Ali, leader of the Indian Khilafat delegation, in which the speaker declared that if England fought the Turks on the question of the temporal powers of the Khalifa then the Indian Muslims must fight on the side of the Turks, and that they did not want it, but they must fight for

their religion ; and whether he intends to take any action with regard to such speeches?

Mr. Fisher : I do not propose to take any action.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—14th April, 1920.

Punjab Legislative Council

Colonel Wedgwood asked the Secretary of State for India if he has received any intimation that a representative Provincial Conference held early this month at Jullundur, in the Punjab, protested against what it considered to be an attempt to deprive the Punjabis of the opportunity of getting the utmost out of the Government of India Act by so framing rules under that Act as to keep the Punjab Legislative Council small, pack it with landed aristocracy and other conservative elements, and otherwise keep as far as possible educated Punjabis out of that council; and whether he would give an assurance that consideration of the Punjab rules will be postponed until detailed representation of the Conference's wishes is received in England.

Mr. Montagu : I have seen a telegram, the general purport of which, though less specific, is of the kind indicated in the question. If the complaints are well-founded I have no doubt that the Government of India and their non-official Advisory Committee (on which the Punjab is represented) will pay due attention to them in considering the draft rules, which will eventually come before Parliament.

Deobund Arabic School

Lieut. Colonel James asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Sheikhul Islam, of the Deobund Arabic School, in the Shaharunpur district, has recently been arrested and deported from India on account of the subversive and anti-Government propaganda in which he has been engaged ; whether, for many years past, the Deobund Arabic school, originally inaugurated with the intention of grounding trans-frontier Pathans in the principles of Islam, has, in fact, been a centre of seditious propaganda ; and whether, in view of this, the school will now be closed ?

Mr. Montagu : I presume the Hon. Member refers to one of the doctors of the school in question, who had mixed himself up in seditious intrigues before leaving for Mecca in September, 1915. His conduct in Arabia led to his arrest by the Hedjaz authorities. He was removed to Egypt and eventually interned at Malta. Neither before these intrigues nor since the departure of the particular doctor has there been, to my knowledge, complaint of seditious propaganda at Deobund, and there appears to be no reasons for the suggestion that the school should be closed.

Border Districts

Mr. Waterson asked the Secretary of State for India if he is aware that a representative Provincial Conference that met on 2nd April at Jullundur in the Punjab expressed great concern at conditions of insecurity of life and property in border districts and in the North-West Frontier Province and if he will enlighten the house as to the steps that he is taking to protect life and property in those districts?

Mr. Montagu : I have received no report of the proceedings at the Conference referred to. The hon. Member is aware that military operations are in progress for the purpose of restoring order, and he may rest assured that conditions on the border are engaging the active attention of the Government of India.

Colonel Wedgwood : Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this question refers also to Baluchistan, where, apparently, Indian life and property are not safe at the present time?

Mr. Montagu : I was not aware of the geographical area to which it refers.

Colonel Wedgwood : I have sent the right hon. Gentleman a letter about it to day.

East Africa Protectorate

Indian Medical and Legal Degrees

Mr. Waterson asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies if he is aware that persons holding Indian university medical and law degrees, such as L. M. S. and B. A. B. L., who are eligible to practise medicine and law, respectively, in India, are not allowed to so practise in British East Africa; and, if so will he state why in British East Africa, where the Protectorate was first established with the object of safeguarding the interest of His Majesty's Indian subjects in that country, where Indian law is to-day administered, and where Indians preponderate both in point of numbers and vested interests, the said Indian university medical and law degrees are not recognised?

The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (*Lieut. Colonel Amery*): I explained to the hon. Member in my answer to his question on the 24th of March that Indian medical degrees or diplomas are recognised in the East Africa Protectorate, provided that they entitle the holder to registration in the United Kingdom. Advocates who have been admitted and are entitled to practise before one of the High Courts in British India are entitled to practise in the East African Courts.

The general question of the position of Indians in East Africa is under consideration between the Secretary of State and the Governor of the Protectorate.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—15th April 1920.

Major Entwistle asked the Secretary of State for India if Lord Meston's award, granting only 28 seats out of 65 in the future Legislative Council of the Madras Presidency to the non Brahmins, is final in view of the opposition of the non-Brahmins to the proposal?

Mr. Montagu : The allocation of seats on the Madras Legislative Council will not be final until the rules in which it is embodied are approved by the Parliament. But I hope that the general principle that the award of an independent arbitrator is the final (and only possible) settlement of a question on which the parties cannot agree will be accepted in this case by both parties.

Prince of Wales's Tour (Advisory Committee)

Captain Terrell asked the Secretary of State for India if he will inform the House what Indian representatives have been appointed to the Advisory Committee to discuss the arrangement for the Prince of Wales's tour to India ; and if he will state whether they are Brahmins, Moslems, or non Brahmins !

Mr. Montagu : The Indian representatives are as follows ;—

H. H. the Maharaja of Gwalior (Hindu) ;
H. H. the Maharaja of Bikaner (Hindu) ;
H. H. the Maharaja of Patiala (Sikh) ; and
Mr. Banerji (Brahmins) ;
Sir Umar Hyat (Moslem) ;
Sir Dinsha Wacha (Parsee)

Fiji Islands (Disturbances)

Mr. Bennet asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies if he has received information of a disturbance reported to have occurred at Levuka, Fiji Islands, on Saturday last in favour of Indians awaiting deportation : who these Indians are and for what reason and under whose authority they are to be deported ; whether they have been tried by any of the ordinary courts of the Colony ; whether there has been a renewal of trouble since the announcement in this House that the situation had been restored ; and for what reason New Zealand troops are being kept in the Fiji Island ?

Lieut.-Colonel Amery : No information has been received from the Governor as to a disturbance having taken place on the day mentioned, or as to there having been a renewal of the recent trouble since my statement in the House on the 3rd March. A telegram has been received from the Governor stating that by an order made under the Peace and Good Order Ordinance, 1875, the following four persons : D. M. Manilal, Mrs. Manilal, Harapal Maharaj, and Fazil Khan, have been prohibited from residing for two years within certain parts of the Colony. The Governor states

that he is reporting by mail the grounds for the action taken. As I stated in the House on the 10th March, an armed guard of about 50 men was sent from New Zealand. This small detachment afforded valuable help during the actual rioting, and if they are still being kept in Fiji it is no doubt because their presence is considered desirable by the Governor.

Mr. B. G. Horniman.

Mr. Lunn asked the Secretary of State for India whether in view of his assertion at the time of Mr. B. G. Horniman's deportation from India a year ago that this measure was necessitated by the emergency of the moment which required swift and prompt action to be taken, he will state the reasons why the Government of India, after this lapse of time, consider that Mr. Horniman's return to India is still incompatible with the public safety?

Mr. Montagu: The Government of India have stated that they do not consider that Mr. Horniman's return to India is compatible with the public safety. As I stated in the House on 21st April, I do not propose to interfere with their discretion. I presume they have taken into account Mr. Horniman's journalistic work, and I am content to leave to the Government of India and the Government of Bombay the decision as to the date on which Mr. Horniman can be allowed to return.

Lieut. Commander Kennworthy: Will Mr. Horniman be allowed to return after peace is finally ratified?

Mr. Montagu: The decision as to when he will be allowed to return will be left to the Government of Bombay. If they decide that he shall return when peace is signed I shall accept their decision. If they do not so decide I shall again accept their decision.

Sir W. Joynson Hicks: May I ask whether peace after the Great War has anything whatever to do with Mr. Horniman and his conduct?

Sir J. D. Rees: Would not Mr. Horniman's return distinctly tend to destroy peace in India?

Mr. Montagu: The point on which I prefer to rely is that by statute discretion is left with the Governor of Bombay. In the exercise of my responsibility to this House I propose to leave the matter to his discretion. If hon. Members do not like that, the best thing to do is to put down a Motion.

Sir Thomas Bramsdon asked the Secretary of State for India, in view of the fact that Mr. B. G. Horniman was deported from India 12 months ago without trial, that he has been refused inquiry into the charges made against him, and that he denies the truth of these charges or any other justification for such deportation,

if he will say what is the earliest occasion upon which the matter can be debated in the House?

Mr. Montagu : My Hon. Friend must address the Leader of the House as to opportunities for debate.

Indian Reforms [Lord Meston's Award.]

Mr. Forrest asked the Secretary of State for India whether he contemplates the re-appointment of the Joint Committee on Indian Reforms to reconsider the rules and regulations governing the working of the Indian Reforms ; whether in that case the protest of the Non-Brahmanas of Madras against the award of Lord Meston will also be considered ; and how he proposes to ensure that Parliament is properly advised on the matter ?

Mr. Montagu : The answer to the first two parts of the question is in the affirmative ; to the last part, I will do all in my power to see that the Joint Committee receives all the information it requires.

Mr. Forrest asked the Secretary of State for India whether he sent any instructions to Lord Meston or to the Government of India regarding the interpretation of the Joint Committee's recommendation for the separate representation of non-Brahmanas.

Mr. Montagu : The answer is in the negative.

Civil Service.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether he received a series of petitions, sent through the Madras Government in May, 1919, from a large percentage of the Indian Civil Service in that province ; and when he proposes to make an answer to such petitions ?

Mr. Montagu : The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative, although a day or two ago my hon. Friend was good enough to forward me copies. The second part therefore does not arise.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : Will my right hon. Friend inquire of the Government of Madras as to what has become of this very large block of petitions ? I personally know that they were addressed to him.

Mr. Montagu : I will inquire, if my hon. Friend wishes. Of course, a memorial from the Civil Service must be transmitted through the local Government, which has a discretion as to what it will forward.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether he can see his way to giving an option to the members of the Indian Civil Service to retire during the next five years if

they feel unable to serve under the new altered conditions on the basis of a pension proportionate to service and loss of prospects?

Mr. Montagu : I would ask leave to refer my hon. Friend to my explanation in this House on 4th December last on Clause 36 of the Government of India Bill, of which I will send him a copy.

Government of India Act. [Draft Rules]

Motion made, and Question proposed :

"That it is expedient that a Select Committee of Seven Members be appointed to join with a Committee to be appointed by the Lords to revise the Draft Rules made under the Government of India Act."—[*Mr. Montagu*.]

Lieut.-Colonel Malone . The Committee which is going to re-draft these rules is considering one of the most important measures concerning the Government of India. Those draft rules are, in my opinion, as important, if not more so, as the Government of India Bill, which we are to discuss next week and I consider that seven members on this Committee is totally inadequate. We presume that one of the seven will be a Liberal and one a Labour member, and in case these two members are absent there will only be five members left representing the supporters of the Government to consider these very important questions. If the number of members of the Committee cannot be increased, what opportunity, if any, will be given to this House to consider the draft regulations when they have finally been re-drafted? Will they be placed upon the Table of the House, and will an opportunity be given to Hon. Members to discuss these Orders, and will they be given full opportunities to examine all the evidence and all the particulars which have been put before this Committee when it discussed these Orders? I shall be much obliged to the Right Hon. Gentleman if he will give us some information on those points before we pass this Motion.

The Secretary of State for India (*Mr. Montagu*) : I quite agree that the duty of this Committee is very important. This is being done in conformity with the Act passed last year, and it seems to be advisable that the same men should deal with the rules. Most of the rules will have to be laid on the Table of the House, and some of them will have to receive the consent of both Houses of Parliament. I can promise my hon. and gallant Friend that there will be ample opportunity for consideration by this House, and all the evidence taken by the Joint Committee will be laid before them in the Report of that Committee.

Colonel Yate : Do I understand that the intention of the Government is to appoint the same Committee as was appointed

last year? If so, the Right Hon. Gentleman seems to me to be departing from the Regulations which have been laid down in Clause 295 of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. In that report it is distinctly stated that a Select Committee on Indian Affairs shall be appointed at the beginning of each Session. Last year the Right Hon. Gentleman appointed a Committee and put himself on it with six other members who had all signified on the Second Reading their approval of his scheme. I do not want, however, to enter into that question now. I spoke on it last year. The Bill then under discussion has now become an Act of Parliament and I shall, as I am sure all men serving in India will, loyally do my best to make it a great success. But the Right Hon. Gentleman has not followed the proposal laid down in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, which distinctly says that a new Committee shall be appointed at the commencement of each Session. I know the Committee suggests that they should be continued in office, but I do not think a Select Committee should have power to make any such suggestion, and at any rate, it should not be carried into effect. It is further laid down that the Secretary of State shall appear before the Committee to answer questions about Acts of Administration over which he and, therefore, Parliament, exercises control. There is nothing said in the Report about the Secretary of State being himself a member of the Committee, and I think it is entirely wrong he should be so. I, therefore, ask him to consider the propriety of his present action, and whether it is not right that a fresh Committee should be appointed to deal with this question in accordance with the Montagu-Chelmsford report.

Mr. Montagu: The Committee to which my hon. and gallant Friend referred will only come into existence when the Act is working. This is not that Committee at all. When the Act comes into operation another Committee will be appointed by the Houses. The Committee, the appointment of which I am now moving, will complete the work of bringing the Act into force, and it was for that purpose that it was considered by the Joint Committee desirable to make the recommendation referred to. The names of this Committee will be submitted to the House for approval in a subsequent Motion, and my hon. and gallant Friend can then use his discretion as to whether he will ask the House to take other names than those recommended by the Government. The Committee was appointed last year by the vote of the House, and I was not upon it.

Motion agreed & Message to the Lords to acquaint them therewith

HOUSE OF COMMONS—6th May 1920.

General Dyer

Mr. Spoor (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been called to an interview alleged to have been given by General Dyer to a Press representative, in which the statement is made that General Dyer has been requested to resign his appointment; whether this statement is correct and if so whether this action on the part of the Government is consequent upon their consideration of the Hunter Committee's Report?

The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Montagu): I am informed that the Commander-in-Chief directed General Dyer to resign his appointment as Brigade-Commander in India. The whole matter is now engaging the consideration of His Majesty's Government. I hope that full documents will be available to Parliament within the next fortnight and I hope hon. members will be content to delay discussion until they have full information.

Colonel Wedgwood: If General Dyer is allowed to resign his commission, does that mean he will not be court-martialled for these massacres?

Mr. Montagu: This is a very serious question and very difficult to discuss by way of question and answer when, unfortunately no papers are before the House. I am prepared to answer all these questions when the time comes for the debate and I hope that the House, which has been so patient so long, will wait the few remaining days in order to get full information.

Colonel Wedgwood: Can we be assured that the question will not be prejudged by General Dyer being allowed to resign?

Mr. Lambert: Will the papers circulated include Lord Hunter's Report on the subject?

Mr. Montagu: Yes, certainly; the papers I propose to lay are Lord Hunter's Report, the evidence taken before the Hunter Committee, and the resolution of the Government of India on the subject.

Colonel Wedgwood: Will they include all the evidence that was given, or will Sir M. O'Dwyer's evidence be omitted?

Mr. Montagu: My hon. and gallant Friend knows that certain evidence was taken in camera for public reasons, and it is not proposed to publish any evidence which the Committee thought ought to be heard in private.

The Bombay Chronicle (Distribution Among British Troops)

Lieut. Commander Kenworthy asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Chairman of the Indian Newspaper Company, Limited,

in his cable informed the right hon. Gentleman that the directors of the company had made careful inquiry into the allegation that the paper which Mr. Horniman edited had been distributed free to British troops in the hope of exciting insubordination and found it to be absolutely without foundation, and the board of directors had ascertained that no copy of the "Bombay Chronicle" was distributed free to the British troops in Bombay; whether to say merely that the Chairman of the board of directors of the Indian Newspaper Company denied all knowledge of the free distribution to British troops is a proper description of this categorical and authoritative refutation of the charge; and whether, in such circumstances, he will make public the evidence on which his assertion that there was such free distribution is based?

Mr. Montagu : The terms of the cable message were as quoted by the hon. and gallant Member. I accepted the assurance as far as I could, but the directors were not in a position to say that distribution had not taken place. All that they could say was that they were in no way connected with what I believe to have occurred. The evidence I have is, to my mind, indisputable that some reader of the paper did distribute it to British troops in the Bombay Presidency.

East Africa [Indian Subjects.]

Mr. Bennet asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he has received from or on behalf of His Majesty's Indian subjects in East Africa any request for the franchise upon the basis of the franchise created by the Government of India Act, 1919, or an indiscriminate and uniform franchise?

Lieutenant Colonel Amery : The Secretary of State has received representations in favour of the grant of elective representation to the Indian community in East Africa; it is understood that the franchise desired is the same as that already granted to Europeans, including woman suffrage.

Colonel Wedgwood asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Secretary of State for the Colonies received, on or about 19th April, a deputation on the subject of the grievances of Indians in His Majesty's Protectorates and Territories in East Africa; whether the Colonial Office proposes to make inquiry into those grievances; and, in case no inquiry is to be undertaken, if he will indicate the nature of action that his office proposes to take to insure equality of treatment to His Majesty's Indian subjects in these Protectorates and Territories?

Lieut. Colonel Amery : The Secretary of State for the Colonies received a deputation on the 19th of April. He has since had an

opportunity for full discussion of matters affecting the Indian community in East Africa with the Governors of the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates; and he does not consider that further inquiry will be necessary. The decisions on the matters discussed will be announced in due course.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—12th May 1920.

British Officer's Wife [Peshawar]

Sir W. Joynson Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has yet received details regarding the case of the British Officer's wife who was carried away from Peshawar by Afridi tribesmen and what steps the Government of India proposes to take to bring them to justice?

Mr. Montagu : If the House will allow me, I will read out a statement which the Government of India have published concerning this case.

"As there have been exaggerated rumours regarding the abduction of an English lady from Peshawar Cantonment, we are authorised to state that the following are the actual facts. A gang of Afridi ruffians entered outskirts of Peshawar Cantonment of Sadar Bazar late on the night of 23rd, 24th March, probably with the object of theft. It happened that, contrary to usual practice, an English lady and her family were occupying the house in this exposed quarter. The gang broke into this house and carried off the lady, dragging her in a most brutal manner with them across the border. The alarm was raised as soon as it was found what had happened and troops, militia, constabulary police and villagers started in pursuit in all directions with the result that the gang was all but intercepted and one of them was actually arrested. Meanwhile, Khyber authorities got into touch with the Afridis along the border, and an Afridi rescue party of over 1,000 men started within a few hours. Members of this party pushed forward and blocked passes, and came into conflict with the gang more than once, and eventually rescued the lady after some sharp fighting. The lady was at once brought into Jamrud within 36 hours of abduction—a very prompt performance, considering the nature of the country. The next day a large Afridi jirga of all sections waited spontaneously on the Political Agent at Khyber to express their abhorrence of this outrage, their sincere regrets that members of their tribe should have been guilty of such conduct, and their assurance that such acts would not be permitted in future. Measures are in progress to ascertain the identity of the offenders and to take further action. No ransom was paid and no reward given to the rescue party who were told that they had merely done their duty."

The Government of India assure me that every effort is being made to secure the arrest of the offenders, and to exact reparation from the section to which they belong.

Sir J. D. Rees : Was this English woman fairly treated during the time she was in the hands of the tribesmen?

Mr. Montagu : I must refer my Hon. Friend to the passage in the answer, which says : "Carried off the lady, dragging her in a most brutal manner with them across the border." I do not think it would be in the interests of the lady to give a detailed description of her treatment.

Indian Medical Service

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India if he can state the number of officers of the Indian Medical Service, native and European, in 1914 and 1919 ; how many of each race were gazetted in 1919 ; and what steps he is taking to make the Service attractive to English doctors?

Mr. Montagu : In 1914 the number of officers in the Indian Medical Service was 706 Europeans and 63 Indians. In December 1919, excluding officers holding temporary commissions, there were 650 Europeans and 80 Indians. During 1919, 25 Europeans and 21 Indians were appointed to permanent commissions.

In amplification of improvements already sanctioned, I hope to announce at an early date increased rates of pay and pension for the Indian Medical Service. I also recognise that it is essential to improve the facilities for leave and study, but no decision on these points can be effective until recruitment has brought the Service nearer to its normal strength.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : If I put a question in a month's time will the right hon. Gentleman say if he hopes to be able to give the increases and the other arrangements for improving the Service?

Mr. Montagu : Yes, I hope so, and if my hon. Friend will permit me, as soon as a decision has been reached, which, I hope, will be only a matter of a few weeks, then I will let him know.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—12th May 1920.

Crown Colonies and Protectorates [Indian Communities]

Mr. Bennett asked the Secretary of State for India if his attention has been called to the declaration made by the Viceroy on the 30th of January last that the position of the Government of India is, and always has been, that there is no justification in a Crown Colony or Protectorate assigning to British Indians a status in any way inferior to that of any other class of His Majesty's subjects; and whether he can assure the House that the principle thus asserted will be adhered to by the Imperial Government in the arrangements

for the political and administrative settlement of East Africa that are now under consideration?

Mr. Montagu : The Viceroy declared that the position of the Government of India is, and always will be, as stated by my hon. Friend. I am assured by the Colonial Office that full consideration is being given to the claims of the Indian communities in the East African Protectorates as well as to those of the other section of the population.

Mr. Bennett asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies whether and upon what conditions His Majesty's Indian Subjects exercise the franchise in any province of the Union of South Africa, in Rhodesia, in British Guiana, in Fiji, in Trinidad, and in Ceylon; whether it is proposed in any of these territories or in any other of His Majesty's territories to extend the franchise to His Majesty's Indian subjects, and, if so, upon what conditions; whether, in any of the British Colonies an Indian sits in the local Legislature by election as distinguished from nomination; and whether the statement that, for the present, it was not proposed to extend the franchise to His Majesty's Indian subjects in the East African Protectorate is to be taken as the considered reply of the Secretary of State for the Colonies on this point to the representations made to him thereon by the deputation under the auspices of the Indian Overseas Association that waited upon him on 19th April last?

Lieut.-Colonel Amery : As regards the first part of the question the electoral law of the Cape Province of the South African Union and of Southern Rhodesia draws no distinction as to race or colour in respect of voters qualified for registration. In British Guiana there is an elected Legislature, and there is no racial distinction as regards the franchise. In Fiji, Indians do not exercise the franchise at present. In Trinidad, the Legislative Council is nominated. In Ceylon, a person of Indian origin, born in Ceylon and otherwise qualified, is able to vote for the Ceylonese member of the Council.

As regards the second part of the question, in Fiji it is proposed that Indians should be added to the Legislative Council as the elected representatives of the Indian inhabitants of the Colony, but the condition upon which they shall be elected have not yet been settled. In Ceylon, proposals are under consideration which would qualify as a voter any male British subject who possesses the requisite qualifications. No proposals with regard to the extension of the franchise are under consideration in any other Colonies or Protectorates.

As regards the third part of the question, in British Guiana there is an elected member of the Legislature who is of East Indian race, and in Ceylon a person of Indian origin but born in Ceylon

sits on the local Legislature by election as the Ceylonese members of the Legislatures of other Colonies or Protectorates.

As regards the fourth part of the question, the Secretary of State has given careful consideration to the representations made to him by the deputation to which my hon. Friend refers, but I am not yet in a position to announce his final decision on this point.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—13th May 1920.

Defence of India Act [Punjab]

Mr. Cape asked the Secretary of State for India if he will give a list of the persons against whom the Defence of India Act was used during Sir Michael O'Dwyer's administration of the Punjab; how many persons were prohibited from entering the Punjab; and how many local men were interned during his administration?

Mr. Montagu: There were 145 persons whose movements were restricted under the Defence of India Act in the Punjab at various times, of whom only 24 remained under such restriction on the 1st April, 1919. Four persons were prohibited from entering the Punjab. Besides the number restricted under the Defence of India Act, about 400 were interned at different times in gaol, and 1,625 restricted to their own villages, under the Ingress into India Ordinance. In April, 1919, seven of these still remained in gaol, and 124 under restriction in their villages. These were men who had returned to India from America and the Far East at the beginning of the War, with the object of causing revolutionary outbreaks.

Punjab Newspapers

Mr. Cape asked the Secretary of State for India what newspapers edited outside the Punjab were prevented from being circulated in the Punjab during Sir Michael O'Dwyer's administration; from how many newspapers security was demanded; and in how many cases security already deposited was forfeited during that period?

Mr. Montagu: From 1914 to 1918 eight newspapers including "Sadaqat" "Jamhur" and "Naqqash" of Calcutta, and "New India" of Madras, were kept outside the Punjab. In 1919 twelve such Orders were passed, namely, against the "Congress" "Vijaya," "Inqilab" of Moradabad, the "Al Khalil" and "Yathrib" of Bijnor, the "Independent" of Allahabad, the "Hamdam" and "Akhuwat" of Lucknow, the "Swadesi" of Gorakhpur, and the "Amrita Bazar Patrika" of Calcutta. To the best of my information, security was demanded during Sir Michael O'Dwyer's administration from four newspapers and twenty-four presses. Forfeiture was ordered in the case of one newspaper and four presses. But I am not quite sure that these figures are complete.

Martial Law

Mr. Lunn asked the Secretary of State for India (1) whether the Hunter Committee, or any of its members personally, visited any of the places affected by Martial Law ; if so, which ; and whether the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress or some of its members, personally visited, during their enquiry, almost all the principal places affected by Martial Law and

(2) the names of witnesses examined by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress regarding illtreatment of women during the administration of Martial Law, with a brief statement of the allegations made by it?

Mr. Montagu : The answer of the first part is in the affirmative ; to the second, Amritsar, Gujranwala, Kasur, Lahore, and Ahmedabad. As regards the last part of this question I would refer the hon. Member to the Report of the Congress Sub-Committee.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—13th May 1920.**Amritsar Hunter Report**

Captain W. Benn asked the Prime Minister when the Hunter Report will be published ?

Mr. Clynes asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he will give an early day after the recess to discuss the Report of the Hunter Commission regarding the Amritsar incident ; and whether if a definite Motion is placed on the Paper, he will allow the discussion to take place on that Motion and not on a Motion for the Adjournment?

Mr. Bonar Law : I am informed that these papers will be published before Parliament re-assembles. The subject can be raised on a Supply day on the salary of the Secretary of State.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—19th May 1920.**Legislative Council [Committees]**

Mr. Swan asked the Secretary of State for India whether he is aware that during the last sessions of the Imperial Legislative Council, the Honourable Mr. Patel and the Honourable Mr. Chanda were not included on any Select Committee on Government Bills or any other Committee appointed by Government during the Sessions ; that during the whole session the Honourable Pt. Madan Mohan Malaviya and the Honourable Mr. Khaparde were taken only on one Committee ; and whether the Government of India have of late adopted a policy of excluding as far as possible prominent Congress men from all Committees ?

Mr. Montagu : I do not know whether the statements are

correct; I would deprecate discussion in this House as to the personnel of the Committees of the Legislative Council in India.

Amnesty of Political Prisoners.

Mr. Swan asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Government of India have given, or propose to give, to Savarkar brothers of the Bombay Presidency the benefit of the Royal amnesty; whether one of the brothers had submitted two petitions, one in 1914 and another in 1917, offering his services to the Government during the War, and praying that a general amnesty be granted to all political prisoners.

Mr. Montagu: The answer to the first part is in the negative; to the second, in the affirmative.

General Dyer.

Mr. Swan asked the Secretary of State for India whether he will state the different posts and places to which General Dyer was appointed after the Jallianwalla Bagh firing; what was his remuneration before the firing; and what was his remuneration at the date of his resignation?

Mr. Montagu: Brigadier-General Dyer was in command of 45th (Jullundur) Brigade prior to the disturbances at Amritsar, and this was his substantive appointment up to the time when he returned to this country. He served with this brigade during the Afghan operations, and on its return from field service he was posted to officiate in command of the 5th Infantry Brigade in the Khyber Pass, and this was his actual command when he left India. His pay throughout has been that of a brigade-commander.

Gold Importation [Restrictions.]

Mr. Lunn asked the Secretary of State for India whether the restrictions on the import of gold into India by the public still continue and what are the reasons for the continuance of the same; whether Indian industrial and commercial opinion has protested against the continuance of such restrictions; whether, as a creditor country with a favourable balance of trade in her favour, India is entitled to receive in gold the balance due to her by other countries; and what is the total amount of profit made by the Government of India on their gold transactions?

Mr. Montagu: There is undoubtedly a considerable feeling in India in favour of a removal of the restrictions which it has been thought necessary to continue in respect of the import of gold, or the reasons given in the announcement of which I am sending a copy to my hon. Friend. The announcement recognises the removal of present control as an objective of currency policy in India. The

of profit on the gold transactions of the Government of India is complicated by exchange considerations; taking these transactions as a whole, the Government of India estimated that for the year 1920-21 a net loss would accrue. I am also sending to my hon. Friend a copy of the reference to the subject in the Government of India's budget.

Fiscal Policy [Commission.]

Mr. R. Richardson asked the Secretary of State for India whether he will lay upon the Table the correspondence which may have taken place between the Government of India and himself on the question of Imperial Preference?

Mr. Montagu: The communications which have passed between the Government of India and myself on this subject were of a confidential character and I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by their publication, especially as I understand that the Government of India are now considering the advisability of appointing a Commission to consider the whole question of the future fiscal policy of India.

Currency.

Mr. Lunn asked the Secretary of State for India whether he is aware of the great dissatisfaction prevailing in India on the action taken by the Government of India on the recommendations of the Majority Report of the Indian Currency Committee; whether the recommendations were published in the Government of India Gazette, or in any other way, in order to enable the Indian public to consider the effect of such recommendations; and whether the policy was undertaken with the entire concurrence of the Government of India?

Mr. Montagu: I am aware that the action taken on the Report has been criticised in certain quarters in India. The nature of the subject was such as to require action immediately on publication of the Report, and as was done in the case of the closing of the mints in 1893, the decisions arrived at were put into effect without previous notice. The Government of India concurred in the main recommendations in the Majority Report which forms the basis of the present policy.

Franchise Rules [Wage-Earning Classes]

Mr. R. Richardson asked the Secretary of State for India whether, in the opinion of the Government of India, the practical application of the recommendation of Lord Selborne's Committee to secure better representation of the wage-earning classes in India is attended with difficulties; whether they propose to restrict

such representation to two cities only in the whole of India and on the Provincial Councils ; whether he is aware that the problem is no less urgent in many cities, such as Madras and Ahmedabad, than in the cities of Calcutta and Bombay, and that the Government of India has even refused to call for the Report of the Bombay Government on the question of providing representation of the wage-earning class of the city of Ahmedabad ; whether the Bombay Government, in their original franchise proposals submitted to the Franchise Committee, included all persons earning Rs. 250 annually ; and if so what difficulties do the Government of India anticipate if those proposals were accepted ?

Mr. Montagu : With regard to parts 1, 2, and 3 of the question, I have not yet received the Government of India's final proposals for franchise rules under the Act of 1919, which will embody their views on this question, but from informal communications I understand that they do anticipate difficulties. I hope to receive these draft rules very shortly and submit them in due course to the Joint Select Committee and to Parliament.

With regard to parts 4 and 5 of the question, I understand that this is not a correct statement of the case, and that what happened was that in endeavouring to work out a basis for decision as to the number of members to represent each district on the Bombay Provincial Council, the Bombay Government adopted as one of their experimental tests an income of Rs. 250 in order to gain some rough idea of the number of voters each district might be expected to contain. I do not understand that this test was even put forward as a definite proposal for a voting qualification.

Rate of Exchange [Sterling Transfers]

Mr. Charles Edwards asked the Secretary of State for India what is the total amount of Reverse Council Bills sold by the Government of India since the new policy of fixing the rate of exchange on the basis of the London New York rate was introduced, such amount to include remittances made to this country through the Post Office ; out of what funds is payment being made here against such bills ; what was the rupee equivalent at which these funds were accumulated and stood in the books ; what is the rupee amount now realised by such sales ; what is the total loss incurred so far by the Government of India by these sales ; and against what is it to be debited ?

Mr. Montagu : The total amount of " Reverse Council Bills " or sterling transfers, sold since 5th February, 1920, is about £30,000,000. Remittance through the Post Office during February,

March and April, amounted to about £2,000,000. Payment against these transfers is being made from the Paper Currency Reserve and from Treasury. The funds held in the Paper Currency Reserve stand in the books at a rupee equivalent of Rs. 15 equal to £1. These funds, as also the Treasury holdings, were laid down in London at rates of exchange varying from 1s. 4d. to 2s. four and half pence. The rupee amount realised by the sales of reverse mentioned above is approximately Rs. 23 crores. The precise loss cannot be calculated, as the funds held in England cannot be earmarked against particular remittances from India, these having been effected, as just mentioned at varying rates. Moreover, it will in any case be necessary, as recognised by the Currency Committee, to revalue the sterling holdings of the Government on the basis of a 2s. rupee. On this basis the net loss on the sales as measured in sterling is approximately £7,000,000, representing the difference between remittances at 2s and the rates actually realised by the sales. The net loss incurred by reason of the high rate at which these remittances were effected will ultimately be debited to revenue which will per contra profit by the fact that under the new policy the Government of India will be able to make the remittances necessary for the purpose of meeting their sterling expenditure in this country at a far more favourable rate than was formerly the case. In this connection it may be mentioned that the rise in exchange above the rate of 1s. 4d. on which the Government accounts have hitherto been based, led, in the years 1917-19, to an exchange gain on the Government's total remittances of about £ 8,000,000.

Amnesty

Mr. R. Richardson asked the Secretary of State for India whether he will lay upon the Table, a statement giving the number of all the political offenders, including the detainees, internees, State prisoners, and persons convicted under the Indian Penal Code or otherwise confined in gaols or kept under restrictions in each province in India and in the Andamans on the 23rd December, 1919, their original sentences or periods of restriction ordered by the executive; the period undergone by each; the number of those who were released under the Amnesty Clause of the Royal Proclamation; and the number and names of those to whom benefit of the royal amnesty has been refused, with the reasons for such refusal in each case?

Mr. Montagu: The following figures are taken from the statement made by the Secretary to the Government of India in the Imperial Legislative Council on the 24th February;

Total number released under the amnesty	...	1,235
Of these there were :		
(a) State prisoners under Regulation III 3 1818	...	24
(b) Restricted under the Defence of India Rules	...	309
(c) Restriction under the ingress into India Ordinance.	—	
(d) Persons who had been convicted of offences against the State.	52
(e) Persons convicted in the disturbances of March and April 1919.	727

By comparison of these figures with an earlier return, I gather that the numbers in each of the above classes not released was on that date as follows : (a) 40 ; (b) 9 ; (c)— ; (d) 55 ; (e) 115. I have not inquired the names of these persons. His Majesty's Proclamation directed the Viceroy to exercise clemency in the fullest measure which in his judgment was compatible with the public safety.

Army and Public Services (Increased Pay)

Mr. Lunn asked the Secretary of State for India whether he will state the financial effects of the recent increases in the remuneration for the Indian Medical Service, the Indian Police Service, the Indian Educational Service, the Indian Civil Service, and the Indian Army, and lay upon the Table the correspondence on the subject between him and the Government of India on the subject?

Mr. Montagu: The approximate cost per annum of the increases of pay which have been sanctioned is estimated to be:

	£
Indian Civil Service	360,000
Indian Police Service	130,000
Indian Educational Service	100,000
British officers of Indian	
Army and of British troops in India	1700,000
Indian Medical Service	250,000

The correspondence is very voluminous, and I do not propose to lay it before the House. The usual course is for the Government of India to announce the decisions arrived at in the form of Resolutions promulgated in India. This is, I think, the most convenient procedure.

Mr. B. G. Horniman.

Mr. J. Adamson asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has received from Mr. B. G. Horniman a letter controverting the charges made against him by the right hon. Gentleman in this House on 23rd May, 1919; whether he promised to send Mr. Horniman a considered reply to this letter, but afterwards wrote to him saying that he preferred to deal with the matter in Parliament; whether, in

these circumstances, he will agree to Mr. Horniman's request for an investigation of these charges by a Parliamentary Committee ; and if so, whether he will make a Motion before the House rises for the appointment of a Committee for that purpose ?

Mr. Montagu : I received a letter from Mr. B. G. Horniman, and my considered reply was that any controversy which might arise about the statements I have made in this House should be conducted in the House itself. I am prepared to explain or justify here these statements if they are called in question. But there is, in my opinion, no need of inquiry.

Government of India Act [Draft Rules] Ordered :

"That a Select Committee of Seven Members be appointed, to join with a Committee to be appointed by the Lords, to revise the Draft rules made under the the Government of India Act, 1919."—*[Colonel Gibbs.]*

Motion made and question proposed, that Mr. Ackland, Mr. Bennett, Sir Henry Craik, Mr. Montagu, Mr. Ormsby Gore, Sir J. D. Rees, and Mr. Spoor be Members of the Committee.—*[Colonel Gibbs.]*

Colonel Yate: I object to this for the reasons which I gave the other day. In my opinion the Secretary of State should give evidence before this Committee and not be a Member of the Committee. He should not be both counsel, judge and jury. I lodge my protest against the appointment of this Committee and the appointment of the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State as Members of it, and I beg to move: "That the Secretary of State be not appointed."

The Secretary of State for India (*Mr. Montagu*): I would remind the hon. and gallant Gentleman that his protest was more appropriate when it was first made, when the original Committee was appointed to consider the Bill. He then made his protest and House decided against him. The rules which are to be revised by this Committee are part of the Bill. They arise out of the Bill, and it would be most unfortunate, having regard to the great importance of time, to delay matters by a change in the personnel of the Committee of Gentlemen who have devoted their attention to the rules, who are familiar with all the process which relate to the rules being framed and incorporated in the Bill itself. I am afraid that I can never convince my hon. and gallant Friend, and therefore I will not go on trying.

Question put, and agreed to.

Ordered, "That the Committee have power to send for persons papers, and records."

Ordered that "Five be the quorum,"—*[Colonel Gibbs]*

Hunter Report [Evidence].

Mr. Inskip asked the Prime Minister whether the Hunter Report will be issued with the evidence ; and whether, in view of the desirability of giving ample time for the perusal and study of the evidence, there is any objection to the immediate issue of the Report with the evidence, in order that it may be available before the Whitsuntide Recess?

Mr. Bonar Law : The evidence will be made available to Members who wish to study it as soon as the Report is presented. No effort is being spared to minimise delay, but I fear it will not be possible to present the Report before the early part of next week.

University Franchise—Women.

Mr. Lunn asked the Secretary of State for India whether it is proposed to include women graduates of seven years' standing in the electoral rolls for university seats in the local Legislative Councils ; and whether Lord Selborne's Committee has recommended the giving of the vote in the University constituencies to all graduates of seven years standing irrespective of sex.

Mr. Montagu : I give the hon. Member the reply which was given on behalf of the Government of India to this same question when it was put in the Indian Legislative Council during the last session :

"(a) No. As recommended by the Joint Committee, provision will be made in the rules under Section 7 (4) (b) of the Government of India Act, 1919, for their inclusion in any province in which the Legislative Council may by Resolution so recommend.

"(c) The Joint Committee recommended that the franchise for the University seats should be extended to all graduates of over seven years' standing, but the Government of India understand that this recommendation, which does not include the last three words in the hon. Member's question, is subject to the general proposal of the Committee in regard to the admission of women to the franchise."

HOUSE OF COMMONS—8th June 1920.

General Dyer.

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of War whether the question of Dyer's conduct whilst in command in India has been referred to the Army Council ; if so, when and with what result.

Mr. Churchill : Yes Sir ; as is stated in the published despatch of the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy on this subject, the circumstances of the case of General Dyer have been brought to the notice of the Army Council by the Secretary of State for

India. Secondly, the Commander-in-Chief in India has recommended that General Dyer should be retired from the Army. Thirdly, General Dyer himself has written to the War Office requesting to be allowed to make a further statement. A preliminary discussion has taken place in the Army Council, and it has been decided to allow General Dyer to submit in writing the further statement which he wishes to make.

Colonel Burn: Is the opinion of the Army Council in unison with the opinion expressed in Lord Hunter's Report?

Mr. Churchill: It would be improper for the hon. and gallant Gentleman to ask questions in regard to confidential business of the Council of this character, and it would certainly be very improper for me to offer him any enlightenment.

The Punjab—Arms Act

Mr. Swan asked the Secretary of State for India whether, after the Royal Proclamation, the District Magistrate, Jullunder, in the Punjab, has refused to renew licenses under the Arms Act to several applicants on the ground that they had attended the Indian National Congress, which he said had passed seditious resolutions; whether he refused to forward to the Government of the Punjab a representation on the subject made by the Jullunder District Congress Committee, on the ground that that body was irresponsible and self-constituted; whether a series of questions on this subject, of which notices were given by several members of the Indian Legislative Council, were disallowed by His Excellency the President during the last session; and whether he proposes to take any action in the matter?

Mr. Montagu: I have no information beyond some complaints made in the Press. I will make inquiries.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, 9th June 1920.

General Dyer

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India whether General Dyer resigned his command in India voluntarily; if not, who asked him to resign; and was any reason given?

The Secretary of State for India (*Mr. Montagu*): The Commander-in-chief informed General Dyer that he accepted the conclusions of the Hunter Commission in regard to the occurrences at Amritsar, and directed him to resign his appointment as Brigade Commander.

Commander Bellairs: Was General Dyer supplied with legal assistance at this inquiry?

Mr. Montagu: I do not think so.

Commander Bellairs: Is that accepted by the India Office as a fair trial for this distinguished General?

Mr. Montagu: The hon. and gallant Gentleman must know it is not a question of a trial. The Commander-in Chief in India has a perfect right to dispense with the services of any officer.

Commander Bellairs: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is not in accordance with the rules of any military court that General Dyer should have no legal assistance and that he should not be able to cross-examine witnesses?

Mr. Montagu: I quite agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but the Hunter Commission was not a military court and cannot be regarded as a substitute for a military court.

Sir H. Craik: Is it not the case, as was stated yesterday, that the Army Council has had the case of General Dyer before it, and has given time to General Dyer to give a further statement of his case before they come to judgment?

Mr. Montagu: Yes, that was the policy announced yesterday by the Secretary of State for War.

Sir H. Craik: It is not proper—

Mr. Speaker: We are going to discuss the matter to-morrow.

Acting Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwalla.

Colonel Yate asked the Secretary of State for India what action has been taken by the Government of India in the case of the Acting Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwalla, who is reported in the Majority Report of the Hunter Commission to have committed an error of judgment in refusing to give the police liberty to fire upon and disperse the mob engaged in burning the post-office there?

Mr. Montagu: The Government of India, in paragraph 25 of their despatch, accept the opinion of the majority of the Committee. As stated in paragraph 44 of the despatch, they are asking the Local Government to take such action as may be necessary to mark their disapprobation.

Hon. Pandit Jagat Narayan—10th June

Lieut. Colonel Sir F. Hall asked the Prime Minister if Pandit Jagat Narayan, who in 1917 accused Sir Michael O'Dwyer of having imprisoned thousands of people without trial, and who subsequently undertook to make a public withdrawal of this false charge, has yet done so: if this person is identical with the Mr. Narayan who has signed the Minority Report of Lord Hunter's Commission on the Punjab disturbances; and, if so, will he state who was responsible for placing on the Commission, a person who had already, by his own confession, been guilty of false and seditious statements of a glaring character?

The Prime Minister : I should be much obliged if my hon. and gallant Friend would address this question to the Secretary of State for India.

Sir F. Hall : Perhaps the Secretary for India could answer the question now ?

The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Montagu) : I do not like to do so without preparing a carefully written answer, and if the hon. Gentleman will be good enough to put it down for Monday I will answer him.

Hunter Commission—14th June

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether one of the Indian members of the Hunter Commission had been, shortly before his appointment to investigate the actions of the Punjab Government, forbidden by that Government to enter the Punjab ?

Mr. Montagu : One of the Indian members applied in May, 1919, for permission to enter the Martial Law area to defend one of the accused before the Martial Law Commission. His application was refused by the Administrator of Martial Law.

On 16th June Sir F. Hall repeated the same question and Mr. Montagu replied :—

“ Pandit Jagat Narayan Singh, who signed the Minority Report of Lord Hunter’s Committee, made a speech in which he brought this charge in 1917. On being informed of its inaccuracy in 1918 he offered to withdraw it publicly, but in view of the lapse of time the Provincial Governments concerned thought it unnecessary to ask him to do so. He was appointed to the Committee in 1919 by the Government of India, acting in close consultation with myself and with the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces. The habit of bringing unfounded charges against the Government is not confined to India, although we could all wish that the willingness to withdraw them when disproved were less exceptional. If the hon. and gallant Member really takes the view that he appears to take of the matter, he will, of course, discount the Pandit’s recorded opinion accordingly. If he wishes to know my views on that opinion, he will gather them from the Papers which have been presented.”

Sir F. Hall : May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he does not think it would have been more advisable to put somebody on this Commission who had not got a debit balance standing against his name ; and is he aware that perhaps not everybody right through the country has the same opinion with regard to

whether or not it is right for the right hon. Gentleman to put such people on the Commission.

Mr. Montagu : I can assure my hon. and gallant friend that every effort was made to get Indian representatives put on this Commission who were impartial. The fact that a very highly distinguished and esteemed member of the United Provinces Legislative Council made a mistake once, which he offered to withdraw, does not, in my opinion, show he was a partial inquirer.

Sir F. Hall : As that offer of withdrawal had been suggested, does not my right hon. Friend think it would have been advisable that the Government should have accepted it and not have put this gentleman on the Commission ?

Mr. Montagu : As a matter of fact, although it would not have affected my judgment on the subject, neither the Government of India nor I knew of this case when he was appointed, but I am not going to censure the Local Governments concerned when they advised this gentleman a year afterwards that it was not necessary to make a public withdrawal and that it was sufficient that he had offered to do so.

Commander Bellairs : Were the Government of the Punjab asked their opinion as to the qualifications of this gentleman to serve on the Commission ?

Mr. Montagu : That I do not know. I do know that this question of the unfortunate speech of this distinguished Gentleman was brought to the notice of the Government of India, after his appointment, by the Government of the Punjab, who at the time stated that they did not wish on that ground to object to his appointment.

Brigadier-General Dyer—21st June

Colonel Ashley (*by Private Notice*) asked the Secretary of State for War whether the Army Council have decided to restore Brigadier General Dyer to the Army ?

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Churchill) : No, there is no truth in that statement, which has been published in a great number of newspapers. The Army Council are still awaiting a statement which Brigadier-General Dyer is being allowed to submit. He expressed an opinion that he would be able to make his statement by Wednesday last, the 16th, but he asked for a few more days' delay to enable him to complete his statement. That is how the matter stands. All statements to the contrary are without any kind of foundation.

Colonel Ashley : When the statement is investigated, will the Army Council be able to come to a decision on that statement, or will there have to be a further Court of Investigation ?

Mr. Churchill : That would be prejudging the discussion which is going to take place.

Sir D. Maclean ; In view of what the right hon. Gentleman knows of the progress of the proceedings before the Army Council, is there any likelihood that the debate on this subject will not take place next Monday ?

Mr. Churchill : Yes, I think that there is a considerable chance that we should not be able to have the debate next Monday. We certainly ought not to take any course which appears to deny reasonable facilities for the preparation of the statement, nor do I suppose for one moment that there would be any intentional delay in making the statement ; and after that there should be a certain period for consideration and discussion by the Army Council. I think it quite possible that I shall have to ask my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House to make representations to those concerned to postpone the discussion for a little longer in both Houses of Parliament.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—23rd June 1920

Punjab Disturbances

Brigadier-General Surtees asked the Secretary for India whether the Government of India propose to recognise the services of those officers, both civil and military, who in its opinion, contributed to the quelling of the disturbances in the Punjab and elsewhere in India, by any other method than the general expression of satisfaction mentioned in paragraph 43 of the Government of India's letter on the Hunter Committee's Report ?

Mr. Montagu : I have not received from the Government of India any proposal for further recognition. I will draw the attention of the Government of India to the hon. and gallant Member's suggestion.

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India whether Sir Michael O'Dwyer communicated day by day with the Government of India concerning the various outbreaks in the Punjab and the measures taken by General Dyer to deal with them ; whether this information was submitted forthwith to the India Office ; and if not, for what reason ?

Mr. Montagu : I received daily telegrams from the Government of India from the beginning of the disturbances up to the middle of May. These telegrams embodied the reports of the Punjab Government and, as I have already stated, were all, except two important messages, communicated to the Press here. General Dyer was in charge in only one area, and there was no mention of him by name

in those telegrams, and only one mention of him as General Officer Commanding, Amritsar. Some movements of troops that were under his command are also reported in those telegrams.

Mr. Gwynne: If the right hon Gentleman was receiving the communications daily from the Government of India, will he say why he stated in December that he knew no details except what he read in the newspapers?

Mr. Montagu: There has been a great deal of misunderstanding on the point. I can assure my hon. Friend that what I said then was true. I was referring to a question put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) on the publication of General Dyer's evidence in the newspapers. I then stated that I had published reports on the occurrences as I received them. If my hon. Friend will look at it, he will see that the matters dealt with in the published newspaper evidence of General Dyer were not covered in this report.

Lieut. Colonel Sir F. Hall: Does the right hon. Gentleman think that the manner by which this gallant officer has been treated is likely to assist officers in general in dealing with outbreaks?

Mr. Speaker: That does not arise out of the question.

Mr. Palmer: Is it not a fact that the right hon. Gentleman actually told the House that he knew nothing of these occurrences, and that he would wire for information with regard to them, and left the impression on us that he was entirely ignorant of the whole business?

Mr. Montagu: Perhaps the hon. Member will be good enough to look at the official Report on the question and supplementary question I answered. Perhaps he will look also at the speech I made immediately after the occurrence, and the telegrams which resulted. I think then he will be in a position to take part in the Debate.

Mr. Gwynne: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he stated on 16th December: 'I thought I said I knew no details until I saw the account in the newspapers.'

Mr. Montagu: Every report I had received from the Government of India, with the exception of these two telegrams, was published. That is true. The occurrence to which my right hon. Friend drew attention was the details of the shooting by General Dyer at Amritsar. I had no information on that subject.

Lieut. Commander Kenworthy: Did the Government of India keep the right hon. Gentleman fully informed of events or did the telegrams hush up the most important part of the account?

Mr. Montagu: A great deal of this unfortunate controversy has arisen because there is an impression that I was accusing the Government of the Punjab or the Government of India of concealing

facts. I never made such an accusation, and I am prepared to defend their conduct in awaiting the Committee's report.

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India on what date he first interviewed Sir Michael O'Dwyer in regard to the outbreaks at Amritsar and discussed General Dyer's action; and whether at any time he interviewed Miss Sherwood, who was assaulted during the riots, and, if so, when?

Mr. Montagu: The answer to the first part is, I think, on the 30th June, 1916; to the second, yes, on the 7th October, 1919.

Mr. Gwynne: Will the right hon. Gentleman explain how it was that he was able positively to state in December, if he knew from detailed information, both from Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Miss Sherwood in June, "I said I knew no details until I saw the report in the papers." If he sent the report to the papers he must have known it before he saw it in the papers. Is that a correct way of giving information to the House?

Mr. Montagu: I suggest that the hon. Member's question shows the wrong headedness of the whole thing. Miss Sherwood could not possibly have given me any information of what General Dyer did because this gallant lady had been attacked long before all these incidents occurred. If the hon. Member wishes to accuse me of giving false information or making a statement which is not true perhaps he will raise the point in Debate, when I shall have an opportunity of answering him.

Mr. Gwynne: I shall have great pleasure in asking the right hon. Gentleman to explain how it is he is able to say he knew nothing at all of any details when he had seen Sir Michael O'Dwyer and had all the details from him six months before.

Mr. Palmer: Does the right hon. Gentleman suggest that he knew nothing of the Amritsar shooting until he read it in the *Daily Express*?

Mr. Montagu: No, I never said so. The fact that there had been shooting at Amritsar was known to me and was published to the world when it occurred in the telegrams I received from the Government of India. What I said in December and what I say now, is that I had no information as to the details, shooting without warning, and shooting to the exhaustion of ammunition, and the principles upon which General Dyer acted, and so forth. Those things came to me as a shock when I read them in the newspaper.

Sir W. Joynson Hicks: When the right hon. Gentleman saw the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, why did he not, in June and at that interview and other interviews, ask him for full details?

Mr. Montagu: I can answer that much better in Debate, and I should prefer to do so. I have many most important private

interviews at the India Office, and it is very difficult to keep in one's head a year after exactly what occurred, but I think I can satisfy the House, if not the hon. Member, that everything I have said is absolutely true.

Mr. Remer: Will the right hon. Gentleman publish the account which Miss Sherwood gave him before the debate takes place?

Mr. Montagu: How can I do that six months after I had the private interview with Miss Sherwood of which no record was kept? The step I took about Miss Sherwood, if the hon. Member wishes to know, was to tell, I think, two important London newspapers that Miss Sherwood was in London, and that it would be a good thing in the public interest if she were interviewed. I do not know what other steps I could have taken.

On June 25, 1920 Brig-General Surtees asked Mr. Montagu if, before the House discussed the affairs of the Punjab, he would lay upon the table copies of all memorials, and declarations sent by Anglo-Indians to the Viceroy and himself regarding General Dyer.

Mr. Montagu replied that the only message of the kind he could trace was as follows:—

Cablegram from the European Association of India, received in London, 9th June 1920—

"The Council of the European Association expresses indignation at the despatches of the Secretary of State and the Government of India on the Hunter Committee's Report. The Council considers the situation in India from 1918 onwards to be much more dangerous than is indicated by that Report, and consider that the Government of India and the Secretary of State have subordinated justice to political expediency. They consider that General Dyer was absolutely justified at Amritsar in considering the whole situation in India, and that, therefore, the doctrine of minimum force does not apply; that General Dyer's action stopped a revolution; that the refusal of Government to support its officers is destructive of sound government and will place all officers in an impossible position in any emergency in which responsibility has to be undertaken. The Council asks, therefore, that General Dyer should be exonerated from all blame, and should suffer no loss of rank or emoluments, and that Government's proposal to punish the officers who suppressed the rebellion shall be abandoned."

On June 28th Sir Frederick Hall asked the Prime Minister if, in view of the conflicting statements that had been made as to the extent and nature of the information furnished to the Secretary of State for India by Sir Michael O'Dwyer and others with regard to the occurrence at Amritsar in the spring of 1919 and

the dates at which such information was given, the Government would appoint a Select Committee of the House to inquire into the matter and to report after taking all available evidence.

Mr. Lloyd George replied that he saw no reason for the appointment of such a Committee. The matter could be brought up in debate.

On June 30th Mr. Rupert Gwynne renewed the attack on Mr. Montagu by asking him whether the Punjab disturbances in general, and General Dyer's action at Amritsar in particular, were debated at length in the Legislative Council at Simla during September 1919; whether reports of these debates were received by him, and if so, on what dates.

Mr. Montagu: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Many allegations were made by non-official members to which the reply of Government representatives was generally that these were matters on which judgment should be suspended till the Committee had reported. The debates were received in two parts on the 5th and 12th November.

Mr. Gwynne: Will the right hon. member say how, if that is the case, he could still state in December that he had no information on the subject of Amritsar except what he read in the papers.

Mr. Montagu: The hon. member still persists in misquoting. What I said on the 15th December was that I had no details of these occurrences, not that I had no knowledge whatever. I have given accounts to the House. If the hon. member suggests that on reading the allegations of hon. members of the Legislative Council of India, I should have communicated those as authentic to the House whilst there was at that moment a Committee of Inquiry sitting, I venture to differ from him.

Sir Richard Cooper: Will the right hon. Gentleman say how he was able to state positively that he had no information of the details when he had read the full account and that the discussion in the Legislative Council was a false discussion?

Mr. Montagu: I cannot carry on a debate at Question Time but what I said was that I had no knowledge of the details of the occurrences.

Lieut.-Colonel Croft: Was not the right hon. Gentleman shocked?

Mr. Montagu: Certainly; I think the words I used were that the evidence as reported in the newspapers was profoundly disturbing. I think those were the words.

Mr. Plamer: You said "shocking".

Mr. Montagu: Well, I accept "shocking." I had no knowledge whatever that General Dyer had made those statements that he was reported to have made until I saw the account in the papers.

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India whether Sir Michael O'Dwyer informed him at his interview on 30th June 1919, that General Dyer had ordered his troops to shoot on the prohibited meeting at Jalianwala Bagh without further warning than that already given by him by Proclamation causing death casualties to the then estimated extent of 200 persons?

Mr. Montagu : So far as I can state with certainty the details of a conversation which took place a year ago, I am confident that nothing was said about warning. The casualties as ascertained at the time had already been published.

Mr. Gwynne : Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Sir Michael O'Dwyer stated positively that he told the right hon. gentleman all the details, and he found he was then so well informed, and knew them as well as he did, of the shooting, and the casualties and the firing, and the crawling order ; and is he also aware that Sir Michael O'Dwyer wrote to him on 13th December of last year directly he saw the accounts in the papers that the right hon. Gentleman said he knew nothing about it and of the details ?

Mr. Speaker : The hon. Member has put a fresh series of statements and I think he ought to give notice of them.

Dr. Murray asked Mr. Montagu : Do all these questions not show that the time has come when the Debate on Amritsar should take place to settle all these things, and can he not say when it will take place ?

Mr. Montagu : The sooner it comes on the better I shall be pleased. I understand that General Dyer's statement to the Army Council is expected in the War Office to-day, and therefore I confidently hope it will be possible to hold the Debate next week.

On July 1st, 1920 Mr. Bonar Law announced that Thursday week, i. e., July 8th had been set apart for the Debate on the Vote for the Secretary of State for India. Members wanted two days, one, a Supply Day to discuss the Administration of India on the Vote for the Sec. of State for India, and another specially for the Amritsar Debate This the Leader of the House could not promise.

On July 5th Mr. Palmer (*by Private Notice*) asked the Secretary of State for India whether, in view of the forthcoming debate on the shooting at Amritsar, he would be willing to include in a White Paper the letter of Sir Michael O'Dwyer dated Delhi, December 30th, 1919, and his letter marked "private and confidential," which was sent in reply.

The Secretary of State for India replied : I do not think it is necessary to issue a White Paper. I propose, however, to circulate with the letter of the 30th December, 1919, and the reply which

I caused to be sent by telegram through the Viceroy on the 2nd February, 1920. As the name of Sir T. Holderness has also been mentioned in this controversy, I propose to add with his permission a letter which he addressed to me on the 30th June last.

Mr. Palmer: Will the document include the letter marked "private and confidential"?

Mr. Montagu: I think that the Hon. Member is under a misapprehension. There was no letter. It was a telegram addressed to the Viceroy marked "private and personal."

Sir W. Joynson Hicks: Will the right hon. Gentleman add to these papers the report of the Brigade-Major which has been referred to all through the Hunter Commission, but has not been published in the papers so far as I can gather?

Mr. Montagu: I do not think that I can promise to publish any special papers in answer to a question asked without notice, but if a question is put down to-morrow I will answer it.

The following are the documents referred to:

Sir M. O'Dwyer's Letter to Mr. Montagu

Army in India Committee,

Delhi, 30-31 December, 1919.

DEAR MR. MONTAGU,

Since I wrote last week Reuter has been cabling summaries of the discussions in Parliament of the Punjab disturbances. I enclose one of these dated London, 16th December, which report the Secretary of State as saying *inter alia*, "he did not know the details (of the Amritsar occurrences) until he saw (the) reports in the newspapers." That telegram has led many people here to ask me if, when I reached England at the end of June, I took any action to inform the India Office of the position at Amritsar and elsewhere. The Press here, too, has been asking whether Meston and I, when we got home, did anything to explain the situation in India.

At the time I got home I probably knew as much about the Punjab situation as any one in India or England, and I would not like you or any one else to think that I kept anything back. You will remember that you were good enough to give me two long interviews on 30th June (two days after I arrived), and on 24th July (those dates I get from my diary), a few days before I left town. On one or both of those occasions we went over all the main facts of Dyer's action at Amritsar, and the impression I then formed was that the India Office knew as much about all the material facts as I did.

I have a distinct recollection (though my diary is silent on this point) that at our conversation of 30th June I brought out the fact

that Dyer, on 13th April, having already formally warned people that he would disperse any gathering by force, did not think it necessary to give any further warning to the gatherings which assembled an hour or two later in defiance of his proclamation. I certainly explained then that two British police officers were with him when he fired and that the District Magistrate thinking a gathering in defiance of the proclamation impossible, had gone off to look after the 80 panic-stricken women and children who had been collected in the Fort for safety after the murder of Europeans on the 10th. I also said that Dyer's rough estimate of the death casualties was 200 ; but my memory was not clear as to whether he had fired 1400 or 1600 rounds.

The question of Dyer's so-called 'crawling' order was not discussed. I said it was quite indefensible, that I had asked for its cancellation directly I saw it, and so had the Commander-in-Chief, and my recollection is that you told me you had gathered this from copies of my letters to the Viceroy which he had sent on to you. After leaving you on the 30th June I went on to see Sir T. Holderness, and a few days later I saw Lord Sinha. I endeavoured to explain to them, as clearly as I could, the whole situation in the Punjab, and especially in Amritsar. I gathered from them also that India Office was already in possession of all the main facts though in some respects I was able to offer further explanation, e. g., as to the necessity of sending aeroplanes to Gujranwala, the exclusion of legal practitioners, and the treatment in gaol of the Editor of the *Tribune* regarding which Lord Sinha had received many letters and telegrams. Possibly Reuter's summary, as quoted above, may be giving to us here an incorrect impression. But, in any case, you will, I am sure, forgive me for trying—perhaps needlessly—to make it clear that I endeavoured to put the Secretary of State of the India Office in possession of such knowledge as I had. You may remember too, that I stated to you on the 30th June, a fact which was not perhaps mentioned in the telegrams from India and may not have been reported at the time, that the aviator at Gujranwala, on the 14th April, seeing the English Church in flames, had, very wrongly, dropped a bomb close to a mosque in the town, but fortunately, it did not explode. In writing all this I am less concerned with my own responsibility in the matter than with how others may be affected by any misunderstanding or obscurity.

Dyer, at the first interview I had with him (on the 16th April), told me everything about the Amritsar events on 13th April as frankly and as fully as the limited time I could spare him—when there was rebellion(!) all round—allowed. I did my best to report his version with my own comments to you and others of the India

Office on the very first opportunity. If I did not do so fully or clearly enough then the fault is certainly not his, but rests either with me or with those who were questioning me. But, as I have said above, there was even as far back as 30th June, little room for doubt as to the substantial facts, namely, the circumstances in which he opened and maintained fire on the prohibited assembly on the 13th April, covering death casualties which, at the time, he estimated roughly at 200 but which up to date inquiries put at 379.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) M. F. O'DWYER.

Telegram from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 2nd February, 1920.

Private and personal,—Following for O'Dwyer. I have received your letter of the 31st. December. Of course, I need hardly say that in the House of Commons I was not referring to conversations of which no record is kept and which cannot be a substitute for official information, nor did I make any complaint; indeed, I explained, and have explained frequently since, that I thought it was quite natural that I should have received no detailed information. Let me say that I certainly do not hold you in any way responsible. I have no recollection of, and such notes as I took do not contain, any statement about the two British police officers. But in any case the details I was referring to were these: That Dyer is reported to have stated in his evidence that the crowd might have dispersed without his firing on them, that he fired without warning, and that he stopped firing because his ammunition was exhausted. I do not remember that you ever dealt with these things.

Letter of Sir W. T. Holderness

30th June, 1920.

"Dear Mr. Montagu,

As I am mentioned in Sir M. O'Dwyer's letter of 8th June, which appeared in the "Morning Post" of 9th June, (*for this letter see "Punjab Unrest—Before & After," App. P. 251*) as one of the officials of the India Office who were fully informed by him during the summer of 1919 of the disorders which had occurred in the Punjab in April of that year, and in particular of the circumstances of the action taken by General Dyer to disperse the crowd assembled in the Jallianwalla Bagh, I think it right, in justice to myself, to submit to you a few remarks on so much of his letter as concerns myself.

"Sir M. O'Dwyer writes, "I put all my information at the disposal of the Secretary of State, and also of Lord Sinha, Sir T. Holderness and others at the India Office. The impression I then

formed (in June and July last) was that as regards all the main facts the India Office was quite as fully informed as I was ; though I was naturally able to explain certain points, e. g., the reasons for using aeroplanes at Gujranwala, for the exclusion of legal practitioners from other province by the Martial Law authorities, etc."

"Indeed, all that time, my endeavour was to impress upon the authorities at the India Office the gravity of the situation in the Punjab, which to my mind they had not sufficiently realised."

"Lower down he quotes from a letter dated 30th December 1919 which he wrote from India to the Secretary of State, in which the following passage occurs : 'Dyer, at the first interview I had with him on the 16th April, told me everything as frankly and fully as the limited time I could spare him (when there was a rebellion all around, would allow. I did my best to repeat his version, with my own views and comments, to you and to others at the India Office on the very first opportunity. If I did not do so fully enough, then the fault is certainly not his, but rests either with me or with those who were questioning me. But, as I have already said, there was even as far back as 13th June, little room for doubt as to the substantial facts, viz., the circumstances in which he opened and maintained fire on the prohibited assembly on 13th April, causing death casualties which at the time he roughly put at about 200, but which the complete up to date enquiries put at 379.'

I gather that the interview which Sir M. O'Dwyer had with General Dyer was limited to a quarter of an hour, and that when Sir M. O'Dwyer left India in May the Punjab Government was still awaiting General Dyer's Report. (See Hunter Committee Report). General Dyer's Report was not made till August, 1919. It is this Report that contains the passage which gives the key to General Dyer's action and which is the centre of the controversy to which his action has given rise. "It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd, but one of producing a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not only on those who were present, but more especially throughout the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity." (Hunter Committee's Report, page 30). Up to the time I remained in the India Office, General Dyer's Report had not reached it.

"I had the privilege of frequent conversations with Sir M. O'Dwyer during the summer of 1919, and learnt from him many particulars regarding the disorders in the Punjab that bore out his view that the situation had been one of extreme gravity. As regards General Dyer's handling of the Amritsar riots, I have a clear recollection that Sir M. O'Dwyer justified the casualties (then thought

to be about 200 killed) by the necessity for dispersing a hostile and dangerous mob, inflamed by the license and savagery which for several days had prevailed in the city and for regaining control over the populace. But I have no recollection that he considered the force employed to have been in excess of the immediate necessities of the case, and deliberately exercised in excess with the distinct object of producing a moral effect throughout the province. My recollection is fortified by the astonishment which I felt on reading the report of General Dyer's evidence which appeared in the *Times* of 15th December. I was by that time aware that a bitter controversy had arisen in India over circumstances of the Jallianwalla Bagh affair, and that the exact incidents were in dispute between the National Congress party and the Government. But the details given by General Dyer to the Commission came to me as a great surprise and were entirely unexpected.

"In conclusion, I would like to say, that if I had been called upon during the summer or autumn of 1919 to prepare a statement for publication regarding the Jallianwalla Bagh incident, and had framed it on the information verbally received from Sir M. O'Dwyer and on the scanty information transmitted by the Government of India, the narrative would have been of a different complexion from the account of the fact given by General Dyer. It would not and could not have included the critical features on which discussion has since centred. On the publication of General Dyers evidence, the India Office would assuredly have been taken to task if it had forestalled the Committee's inquiries by publishing an imperfectly, and as some persons would have considered, misleading account of what actually had happened. The Government of India in their despatch forwarding the Committee's Report say that in view of the fact that a Committee was about to make a formal investigation, they had deliberately refrained from instituting preliminary inquiries. The India Office took the same view and I venture to think that its reticence has been justified by the event.

"It is perhaps superfluous to say that I kept you fully informed of my conversations with Sir M. O'Dwyer. My recollection is that while recognising the great value of the information placed by him at your disposal, you were as impressed as I was with the inadequacy of our knowledge of what really happened at Amritsar and elsewhere, with the conflicting character of the rumours and assertions appearing in the Indian and Anglo-Indian press, and with the necessity for awaiting a full inquiry on the spot by a strong Committee.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) T. W. HOLDERNESS.

On 7th July 1920, the day before the famous Amritsar Debate in the House of Commons, the Dyerites raised a howl against Mr. Montagu and plied him with questions.

Sir W. Joynson Hicks began the heckling by asking Mr. Montagu whether he would publish the Report of Major Briggs, the Brigade-major to General Dyer which was refused publication by the Hunter Committee owing to the death of the writer. Mr. Montagu said that the document referred to was not admitted as evidence by Lord Hunter's Committee and had never been communicated officially. It was appended to the statement submitted by General Dyer to the Army Council and will be published with that statement.

Then Viscount Curzon and others asked whether all witnesses including General Dyer called before the Hunter Committee was given an open opportunity of correcting the report of their evidence. Mr. Montagu could not give a definite reply, but said that Gen. Dyer's statement has been published.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked by private notice whether Mr. Montagu was in a position to announce the decision of the Army Council in reference to General Dyer and if, and when, he proposed to publish General Dyer's statement.

Mr. Churchill (*War Minister*): I am about to lay a paper on the table of the House in dummy which will, I hope, enable hon. members to be in possession of General Dyer's statement in time for the debate to-morrow. With regard to the decision of the Army Council, they came to the following conclusion :—

The Army Council Decision.

"The Army Council have considered the report of the Hunter Committee, together with the statement which Brigadier-General Dyer has, by their directions, submitted to them. They consider that inspite of the great difficulties of the position in which this officer found himself on April 13th, 1919 at Jallianwalla Bagh, he cannot be acquitted of an error of Judgment. They observe that the Commander-in-Chief in India has removed Brigadier-Genl. Dyer from his employment ; that he has been informed that no further employment will be offered him in India ; that he has, in consequence, reverted to half-pay, and that the Selection Board in India have passed him over from promotion. These decisions the Army Council accept. They do not consider that further employment should be offered to Brigadier-General Dyer outside India.

Mr. Churchill also said that they have also considered whether any further action of a disciplinary nature is required from the Army Council. In view of all the circumstances they do not feel called upon from the military point of view, with which they are alone concerned to take any further action,

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : Is my right hon. friend prepared to endorse the action of the Army Council and is he also prepared to defend it here-to-morrow ?

Mr. Churchill : Yes, certainly.

Lieut-Colonel Croft : Is it not a fact that General Dyer, after these events happened, was employed to take part in the operations in Afghanistan ?

The Speaker : The hon. and gallant gentleman is asking a question which has been answered before.

Commander Bellairs : Will hon. Members be precluded from moving the adjournment of the House with regard to the War Office decision at a later stage, in view of the fact that the discussion to-morrow is on the India Office Vote ?

The Speaker : I can only answer in the well-known Parliamentary phrase : "Wait and see" (Loud laughter in which Mr. Asquith joined).

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked Mr. Montagu how many appeals had been referred to the Privy Council by persons convicted of rebellion, murder, and other serious offences during the Punjab disturbances ; what had been the result of the appeal which had been heard ; and what steps he was taking to defend the remainder.

Mr. Montagu : There have been six appeals of 52 persons. One appeal of 21 persons has been heard and dismissed. The remaining five are pending. If proceeded with counsel of standing will be retained to defend them in accordance with the usual practice. My right hon. Friend the Attorney-General was one of those who acted in these behalf in the appeal which was dismissed.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : May I ask what is the position of the appeals ? Are they going to be proceeded with or not ?

Mr. Montagu : That depends upon the appellants. My legal advisers have, I think, pressed that the appeals should be proceeded with.

Dr. Muhammed Bashir.

Replying to Sir W. Joynson Hicks and Colonel Yate with reference to the case of Dr. Muhammed Bashir, Mr. Montagu said that Muhammed Bashir was sentenced to death by a Martial Law Commission in the Amritsar Leaders' case, which included the charge against him of inciting the mob in the attack on the National Bank. The sentence was reduced by Sir Edward Maclagan, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, to one of six years' rigorous imprisonment. The two High Court Judges appointed to examine cases tried by Martial Law Courts agreed that the part of the case against the doctor relating to the events at the National Bank rested on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver ; one Judge was of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence to justify a convic-

tion for waging war only, but the other Judge would not admit the sufficiency of the evidence to justify a conviction at all. The Punjab Government, in the circumstances, recommended the release of Dr. Muhammed Bashir and the Government of India accepted these recommendations.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what the conditions were, whether they had been fulfilled and whether this gentleman, who was convicted, sentenced to death, and let out, is the leader of an agitation in the Punjab against this country?

Mr. Montagu: The conditions were (1) that during the remaining term of sentence he would not commit or abet the commission of an offence against the State or public tranquility, (2) that during the same period he would not directly or indirectly take part in any movement directed against the State or public tranquility, or likely to lead to the commission of any offence of the nature described above. If any of these conditions be not, in the opinion of the Local Government fulfilled, the Local Government may cancel the suspension of the sentence. The hon. Member will perceive that under the terms of the condition, the Local Government have full discretion to act, and I would prefer to leave it to the Local Government to act.

Colonel Yate: Do the Government of India think it right to go against four judges and is it likely to uphold the judiciary of India when four judges out of five condemn a man and the Government of India order his release?

Mr. Gwynne asked Mr. Montagu if, when he first heard of the Amritsar occurrences, he thought it a matter for immediate inquiry and if so why he did not arrange for the commission to commence proceedings before 29th October.

Mr. Montagu: As I stated in this House on the 22nd May, 1919, the Viceroy had always contemplated an inquiry and in the first week of that month he intimated this fact to me. I said, however, on the same date, "Let us talk of an inquiry when we have put the fire out." Any subsequent delay was due to climatic conditions and to the obvious difficulties in selecting and arranging for such a committee.

Mr. Gwynne: Will the right hon. gentleman say on what date he considered the fire to be put out?

Mr. Montagu: I would not like to say that accurately in answer to a supplementary question, but I would suggest to the hon. Member that it was certainly not before martial law.

Mr. Gwynne: Does the right hon. gentleman suggest it was reasonable, taking into consideration all that he has said, to wait from April until the end of October before proceedings were started?

Mr. Montagu : I understand that that is one of the charges which the hon. Member will make in the debate. You cannot hold an inquiry of this kind in the Punjab during the hot weather, and you cannot ask people to serve on an inquiry the date of which has not yet been fixed.

Mr. Gwynne rose—

Mr. Speaker : The hon. Member had better wait until to-morrow. He is in danger of spoiling his case by this preliminary canter.

Nevertheless Mr. Gwynne continued his cross-examination and next asked Mr. Montagu if it was his intention to publish the evidence of all the witnesses examined by the committee, or expected the House to form an opinion on extracts from evidence of a few witnesses, as set forth in the Blue Book Cmd 681.

Mr. Montagu : The evidence of witnesses examined by the Hunter Committee has been published and is on sale; except that of three witnesses heard "in camera." Members were informed, on a slip attached to the Report, which has been distributed, that copies of evidence would be supplied on application to the India Office.

Mr. Gwynne : Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have applied twice in the Vote Office for a copy of the evidence, and have been unable to get one?

Mr. Montagu : Nobody can regret more than I do the misfortunes of the hon. Member. I will see that he gets a copy of the evidence this afternoon.

Mr. Gwynne : Does not the right hon. gentleman think it is very important that we should all have it? Is it not usual for hon. Members to be able to get evidence of all important Commissions and inquiries in this House?

Colonel Wedgwood : Will the right hon. Gentleman let me have a copy too?

Mr. Montagu : There are, I think, five volumes. If I printed and distributed them to every hon. Member, I should be accused of unnecessary expenditure. If the hon. Member has found any difficulty in getting the evidence, it is rather remarkable that he waits till the day before the debate is to take place.

Mr. Gwynne said : Mr. Montagu must know that it is usual to send round such evidence. Continuing his questions Mr. Gwynne asked Mr. Montagu at what date and through what source he eventually became aware of the details of the occurrences at Amritsar.

Mr. Montagu : Brigadier-general Dyer's own reports were first received at the India Office in January, 1920, and the Committee's Report at the end of March. Earlier official reports had not given

the details in question. It was in the previous December that I read a newspaper cablegram reading what Brigadier-General Dyer had said in evidence.

Mr. Gwynne: Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly answer my question, which was from what source he eventually kept himself informed as to the details of the occurrence?

Mr. Montagu: Perhaps the hon. Member will be good enough to study carefully the printed report of the answer I have just read to the House.

Colonel Yate: Can the right hon. Gentleman explain why the Government of India did not send home General Dyer's Report?

Mr. Speaker: That does not arise out of the question.

Mr. Remer asked Mr. Montagu whether the contents of the leading Indian newspapers containing comments on the Amritsar disturbances and evidences given before the Hunter Commission were cabled to him, and particularly whether a full Report of General Dyer's evidence before the Hunter Commission on 19th November was cabled to him; if they were not cabled, on what date the newspapers published from April to July were received; and whether he made a careful study of them.

Mr. Montagu: I do not think it is a part of the duty of Ministers to explain what newspapers they read and with what attention they read them.

Mr. Remer further asked whether he would state the names of the two London newspapers he asked to interview Miss Sherwood in October last. Mr. Montagu's reply was: No. Sir, I do not think it necessary to give this information.

Mr. Gwynne asked if there was any reason to believe that the tribal rising in April and May 1919 had any connection with the disturbances throughout India and especially Punjab.

Mr. Montagu replied that he was not in a position to add anything to the information given in paragraph 12 of Chapter XI of the Hunter Report.

Brig.-Gen. Surtees asked Mr. Montagu if he had received any reports from Afghanistan and the border tribes, as to the activity of Bolshevik agents in those countries, and if that was resulting in a dangerous effervescence directed against British rule in India; and if he had found Bolshevik agents working in the more disturbed portion of that Empire.

Mr. Montagu: I have received reports on Bolshevik activities in the regions mentioned in the question. I know the Government of India are carefully watching the propaganda, which is, of course, dangerous in any country. I am consulting them as to the publication of a statement on the subject.

The Amritsar Debate

In the House of Commons

Supply Day—8th July 1920

The House went into Committee of supply, Mr. Whitley in the Chair. On the vote of £53, 500 to defray the charges up to March 31, 1921, for the contributions towards the cost of the Department of the Secretary of state for India—

Mr. Montagu said : The motion that you have just read from the Chair is historic. For the first time in the history of this House the Committee have had an opportunity of voting or of paying the salary of the Secretary of State for India and it is signalized by a very large desire for a reduction. (Laughter). I gather that the intention is to confine the debate to the disturbances which took place in India last year. That being so, after more careful consideration in India, I have come to the conclusion that I shall best discharge my Imperial duty by saying very little indeed. The situation in India is very serious owing to the events of last year and owing to the controversy which has arisen upon them. I am in the position of having stated my views and the views of His Majesty's Government, of which I am the spokesman. The despatch which has been published and criticised was drawn up by a Cabinet Committee and approved by the whole Cabinet. I have no desire to withdraw from or to add to that despatch. Every single body, civil and military, which has been charged with the discussion of this lamentable affair has come, generally speaking, to the same conclusion. The question before the Committee this afternoon is whether they will endorse the position of His Majesty's Government of the Hunter Committee, of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and of the Army Council or whether they will desire to censure them. I hope the debate will not take the shape of a personal criticism of the personnel of any of them. It is so easy to quarrel with the judge when you do not agree with his judgment.

Sir E. Carson :—And with an officer too.

Mr. Montagu :—The Hunter Committee was chosen after the most careful consideration with one single desire and motive to get a tribunal impartial to discharge the most thankless duty to the

best of their ability, was, I maintain, such a body. I resent very much the insolent criticisms that have been passed either on the European members, civil and military, or upon the distinguished Indian members, each of whom has a record of loyal and patriotic public service. The real issue can be stated in one sentence, and I will content myself by asking the House one question. If an officer justifies his conduct, no matter how gallant his record is—and everybody knows how gallant General Dyer's record is—by saying that there was no question of undue severity, that if his means had been greater the casualties would have been greater, and that the motive was to teach a moral lesson to the whole of the Punjab, I say without hesitation, and I would ask the Committee to contradict me if I am wrong because the whole matter turns upon this, **that it is a doctrine of terrorism.** (Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy—Prussianism). If you agree to that, you justify everything that General Dyer did. Once you are entitled to have regard neither to the intentions nor to the conduct of a particular gathering, but to shoot and to go on shooting with all the horrors that were involved in order to teach somebody else a lesson, you are embarking on terrorism to which there is no end. (Cheers.)

I say further, that when you pass an order that all Indians must crawl past a particular place, when you pass an order to say that all Indians must forcibly or voluntarily salaam any officer of His Majesty the King, you are enforcing racial humiliation. I say, thirdly, that when you take selected schoolboys from a school, guilty or innocent, and whip them publicly, when you put up a triangle where an outrage, which we all deplore, has taken place and whip people before they have been convicted, when you flog a wedding party, you are indulging in frightfulness, and there is no other adequate word which could describe it.

If the Committee follows me on these three assertions, and I shall be only too glad if there be any answer, this is the choice and this is the question which the Committee has put to it to-day before coming to an answer. Dismiss from your mind, I beg of you, all personal questions. I have been pursued for the last three months by some people and by some journals with personal attack. I do not propose to answer them to-day. **Are you going to keep your hold upon India by terrorism, racial humiliation and subordination, and frightfulness, or are you going to rest it upon the goodwill and the growing goodwill of the people of your Indian Empire?** I believe that to be the whole question at issue. If you decide in favour of the latter course, well, then you have got to enforce it. It is no use one Session passing a great Act of Parliament which, whatever its merits or demerits, proceeded on the principle of

partnership for India in the British Commonwealth, and then allowing your administration to depend upon terrorism. You have got to act in every Department, civil and military, unintermittently upon a desire to recognise India as a partner in your Commonwealth. You have got to safeguard your administration on that Order passed by the British Parliament. You have got to revise any obsolete ordinance or law which infringes the principles of liberty which you have inculcated into the educated classes in India.

That is one choice, to adhere to the decision that you put in your legislation when you are criticising the administration. **There is the other choice, to hold India by the sword, to recognise terrorism as part of your weapon, as part of your armament to guard British honour and British life with callousness about Indian honour and Indian life.** India is on your side in ensuring order. Are you on India's side in ensuring that order is enforced with the canons of modern love of liberty in the British democracy? There has been no criticism of any officer, however drastic his action was, in any province outside the Punjab. There were 37 instances of firing during the terrible, dangerous disturbances of last year. The Government of India and His Majesty's Government have approved 36 cases and only censured one, censured one because, however good the motive, I believe that it infringed the principle which has always animated the British Army and infringed the principles upon which our Indian Empire has been built.

Mr. Palmer—It saved a mutiny.

Mr. Montagu.—Somebody says that it saved a mutiny.

Captain W. Benn.—Do not answer him.

Mr. Montagu—The great objection to the rule of force is that you pursue it without regard to the people who suffer from it and that having once tried it you must go on, and that every time an incident happens you are confronted with the increasing animosity of the people who suffer. There is no end to it until the people in whose name we are governing India, the people of this country, and the national pride and sentiment of the Indian people, rise together in protest and terminate your rule in India as being impossible on modern ideas of what an Empire means.

The Alternative to Terrorism.

There is an alternative policy which when I assumed office I commended to this House and which this House has supported until to day. It is to put the coping stone on the glorious work which England has accomplished in India by leading India to a complete free partnership in the British Commonwealth,—to say to India: "We hold British lives sacred, but we hold Indian lives sacred too. (Cheers). We

want to safeguard British honour by protecting and safeguarding India too, that our institutions shall be gradually perfected whilst protecting you and ourselves against revolutions and anarchy in order that they commend themselves to you." There is a theory abroad on the part of those who have criticised His Majesty's Government upon this issue that an Indian is a person who is tolerable so long as he will obey your orders, (Cries of "No," "Shame" and "withdraw") but if once he joins the educated class, if once he thinks for himself, if once he takes advantage of the educational facilities which you have provided for him, if once he imbibes the ideas of individual liberty which are dear to the British people, why then, you class him as an educated Indian and as an agitator (Cheers). What a terrible and cynical verdict on the whole!

Mr. C. Palmer.—What a terrible speech!

Mr. Montagu.—As you grind your machinery and turn your graduate out of the University you are going to dub him as belonging, at any rate, to the class from which your opponents come. (Hon. Members—"No.")

Colonel Ashley.—On a point of order. May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to say against whom is he making his accusation?

The Chairman.—That is not a point of order. We are here to hear different points of view, and all points of view. (Cheers)

Brigadier-General Cockerill.—On that point of order, Mr. Chairman, are we not here to discuss the case of General Dyer? What is the relevancy of these remarks to that?

The Chairman called on Mr. Montagu to resume his speech.

Mr. Montagu.—If any of my arguments strike anybody as irrelevant—

Mr. Palmer.—You are making an incendiary speech.

Mr. Montagu.—The whole point of my observations is directed to this one question, that there is one theory upon which I think General Dyer acted, the theory of terrorism and the theory of subordination (Cheers). There is another theory, that of partnership, and I am trying to justify the theory endorsed by this House last year. I am suggesting to this House that the Act of Parliament is useless unless you enforce it both in the keeping of order, and in the administration (Cheers). I am trying to avoid any discussion of details which do not to my mind affect that broad issue.

I am going to submit to this House this question, on which I would suggest with all respect they should vote: Is your theory or rule in India the ascendancy of one race over another, of domination and subordination—(Hon. Members,—“No”)—or, is your theory that of partnership? If you are applying domination as your theory then it follows that you must use the sword with increasing

severity—(Hon. Members—"No")—until you are driven out of the country by the united operation of the civilised world. (Cheers and interruption), (An Hon. Member—"Bolshevism"). If your theory is justice and partnership, then you will condemn a soldier, however gallant, (Mr. Palmer—"Without trial.") who says that there is no question of undue severity, and that he is teaching a moral lesson to the whole country. That condemnation, as I said at the beginning, has been meted out by everybody who has considered this question, civil and military. As far as I know, no reputable Indian has suggested any punishment, any vindictiveness, or anything more than the repudiation of the principles upon which these acts were committed. I invite this House to choose and I believe that the choice they make is fundamental to a continuance of the British Empire and vital to the continuation, permanent I believe it can be, of the connexion between this country and India. (Cheers.)

Sir E. Carson.—I think upon reflection, that my right hon. Friend who has just addressed the House will see that the kind of speech he has made is not one that is likely in any sense to settle this unfortunate question. (Cheers.) My right hon. Friend, with great deference to him, cannot settle artificially the issue which we have to try. He has told us that the only issue is as to whether we are in favour of a policy of terrorism and insults towards our Indian fellow subjects, or whether we are in favour of partnership with them in the Empire. What on earth has that to do with it? (Cheers.) (Lieutenant Commanner Kenworthy—"Everything.") I should have thought that the matter we are discussing is no grave both to this country and to our policy in India that we might, at all events, have expected a Minister of the Crown would have approached the matter in a much calmer spirit than he has done (Cheers).

An Hon. Member.—He ought to resign.

An Hon. Member.—So should Ulster. (Interruption.)

The Chairman.—All round the House there seems to be a lack of understanding as to the seriousness of this matter. Let me remind the House that this is the first occasion on which we have had these Indian Estimates—that is to say, the salary of the Secretary of State—by deliberate act of the House, and for public reasons—put on the British Estimates, and we ought, I think, to recognise that occasion. (Cheers.)

Sir E. Carson.—If I thought that the real issue was that which was stated by my right hon. friend, I would not take part in this debate. There would be no dissension from the proposition that

he has laid down in this House (Cheers). But it does not follow because you lay down a general proposition of that kind that you have brought those men, on whom you are relying in extremely grave and difficult circumstances as your officers in India, within the category that you yourself are pleased to lay down. As to whether they do come within those categories is the real question. My right hon. friend begs the question. (Cheers) After, all, let us even in the House of Commons try to be fair, some way or other, to a gallant officer of 34 years' service—(Colonel Wedgwood—Five hundred people were shot)—without a blemish upon his record, and whatever you say, and mind you this will have a great deal of effect on the conduct of officers in the future as to whether or not they will bear the terrible responsibility, which they have not asked for, but which you have put upon them. We may at least try to be fair and to recognise the real position in which this officer is placed. (Cheers) So far as I am concerned, I would like, at the outset, to say that I do not believe for a moment it is possible in this House, nor would it be right, to try this officer. (Cheers.) To try this officer, who puts forward his defence as I saw it for the first time an hour ago, would be a matter which would take many days in this House. Therefore, you cannot do it; but we have a right to ask: Has he ever had a fair trial? and to put this further question before you break him and send him into disgrace: Is he going to have fair trial?

You talk of the great principles of liberty which you have laid down. General Dyer has a right to be brought within those principles of liberty, and he has no right to be broken on the *ipse dixit* of any Commission or Committee, however great, unless he has been fairly tried—and he has not been tried (Cheers). Do look upon the position in which you have put an officer of this kind. You send him to India, to a district seething with rebellion and anarchy. You send him there without any assistance whatever from the Civil Government, because the Commission have found that the condition of affairs was such in this district that the Civil Government was in abeyance, and even the magistrate, as representing the civil power, who might have been there to direct this officer, had gone away on another duty. I cannot put the matter better than it was put before the Legislative Council of India on September 19 last by the Adjutant-General of India;—

"My Lord," he said, "my object in recounting to this Council in some degree the measures taken by the military authority to reconstitute civil order out of chaos produced by a state of rebellion is to show there is another side to the picture, which is perhaps

more apparent to the soldier than to the civilian critic." Now mark this: "No more distasteful or responsible duty falls to the lot of the soldier than that which he is sometimes required to discharge in aid of the civil power. If his measures are too mild he fails in his duty; if they are deemed to be excessive, he is liable to be attacked as a cold blooded murderer. His position is one demanding the highest degree of sympathy from all reasonable and right-minded citizens. He is frequently called upon to act on the spur of the moment in grave situations in which he intervenes, because all the other resources of civilians had failed. His actions are liable to be judged by *ex post facto* standards, and by persons who are in complete ignorance of the realities which he had to face. His good faith is liable to be impugned by the very persons connected with the organisation of the disorders which his action has foiled. There are those who admit that measures of force may have been necessary, but cannot agree with the extent of the force employed. How can they be in a better position to judge of that than the officer on the spot? It must be remembered that when a rebellion has been started against the Government it is a tantamount to a declaration of war, and war cannot be conducted in accordance with standards of humanity to which we are accustomed in peace." (Cheers.) That was a statement of the position of General Dyer. He went to Amritsar on April 10, and found the place and all the great towns in the immediate neighbourhood in a state of rebellion. On April 11 and 12 murders of officials and bank managers were rife. The civil power had to abandon its functions, and he was asked to make up his mind, as best he could, how to deal with the situation. Now he is to be broken because it was said that he made up his mind wrongly. Yes, Sir, the armchair politician in Downing Street

Colonel Wedgwood : What are you?

Sir E. Carson : I am not a Bolshevik anyhow—

The armchair politicians in Downing Street (cheers) had, no doubt, a very difficult task to perform. I do not content that in no case should they overrule what an officer had done in the spot, but they ought to try to put themselves in the position of the man whom they asked to deal with difficult circumstances. That officer had to decide whether the occurrence was a riot, or an insurrection, or a rebellion, or a revolution, or a part of a revolution. There is a great deal to show, even on the face of the report, that it was at all events the precursor to a revolution. Different rules officially laid down were applicable to each of those different matters. What is the error of judgment? It is admitted that he acted in perfect

good faith and in most difficult circumstances with great courage and great decision; but the fault found with him is that, while he thought that the circumstances necessitated that he should teach a lesson to the country all round, the Committee thought that he ought to have dealt with it solely as local matter. That is the difference—and for that you are going to smash and break an officer who has done his best. In reference to the very action which you are going to break him for, or have broken him for, after his 34 years of honourable service, you have to admit it may have been that which saved the most bloody outrage in that country, which might have deluged the place with the loss of thousands of lives and may have saved the country from a mutiny to which the old mutiny in India would have appeared small. Admit, if you like, in your armchair that he did commit an error of judgment, but was it such that alone he ought to bear the consequences? That is the way I prefer to put the matter because I cannot believe you can betray the case here. I am sure I shall have the assent of any man who has had to do with government and thinks the matter out, when I say that if you are going to lay down here to-day this doctrine for your officers who are put into these situation—"before you act, no matter what state of affairs surrounds or confronts you, take care and sit down and ask yourself what will Downing Street think, what will the House of Commons say to us, when they have been stirred up six months afterwards". If that is to be the position of your officers and you make a scapegoat of them because there is an *ex post facto* statement of the events, you will never get an officer to carry out his duties towards his country.

I remember, when I was First Lord of the Admiralty, I recalled a Commander-in-chief because I thought he had, of two courses, taken one which was very harmful to the duty he had in hand. He came and saw me afterwards and asked me for an explanation. I said, "you are perfectly entitled," and I handed him his own report and I said to him, "Let us not talk, I as First Lord, or you as an Admiral, but read your own report and tell me did you do the best thing under the circumstances for the Admiralty and for your country? He said, "No, Sir. The reason I took the course was because I did not know whether I would be supported by the Admiralty." I said to him, "your observation goes to show me that I was right in recalling you because if you would not take the consequences, and act in the way you thought right, you are not fit to be a commander". Yes, sir, but you have to deal with human nature in the men you put into all these difficult places. Do not let them suppose that if they do their best, unless on some very grave consideration of dereliction of duty, they will be

made scapegoats of and be thrown to the wolves to satisfy an agitation such as that which arose after this incident.

You must back your men, and it is not such a distinction as I have already shown, that is the origin of this matter as to this error of judgment, that will ever give confidence to those faithful and patriotic citizens who have won for you and kept your great Empire beyond the seas. The most extraordinary part of this case is as to what happened immediately after this incident occurred, and I beg the house to pay attention to this part of the matter. We all know perfectly well how differently every body views the situation when the whole atmosphere is different and when the whole danger has passed away. What happened immediately afterwards?

My right hon. Friend said that nobody in authority, as I understood him, approved of General Dyer's action. I will tell you who approved it. Brigadier General Dyer, in his statement says:—

"On 14th April, 1919, I reported the firing in the Bagh to Divisional Headquarters in the report B. 21.

"On the next day or the day following, my Divisional Commander Major-general Beynon, conveyed to me his approval.

"The Lieutenant Governor about the same time agreed with the Divisional Commander."

May I state here that I am very proud of him as an Irishman, and I am very glad at all events that it is not an Irish man who has thrown over his subordinate?

What followed?

"On the 21st April with the concurrence of the authorities, I went on a special mission to the Sikhs.

"On 8th May 1919 I was sent on active service in command of my Brigade to the frontier.

"On about the 28th May, 1919, I was detained to organise a force for the relief of Thal, then invested by the Afghan Army. On this occasion I had an interview with General Sir Arthur Barret, commanding at Peshawar. I had by then become aware that the influences which had inspired the rebellion were starting an agitation against those who had suppressed it.

"Sir A Barret told me he wanted me to take command of the relief force. I told him that I wished, if possible, to be free from any anxiety about my action at Amritsar, which so far had been approved. He said 'That's all right, you would have heard about it long before this, if your action had not been approved.' I give the precise words as nearly as I can.

"About the end of July, 1919, I saw the Commander-in-Chief. He congratulated me on the relief of Thal. He said no word to me

of censure about Amritsar, but merely ordered me to write a report on it, which I did. This report is dated the 25th August, 1919.

"On the 25 September Major-General Beynon in his report on the rebellion made to Army Headquarters repeated his previous approval of my action, and added a testimony to my other services in connection with the rebellion.

And so this officer was on, put day after day into more difficult positions. After he had carried out this work at Amritsar, I believe he was promoted to a higher command. He had not only that, but, as I gather from the evidence, he received the thanks of the native community for having saved the situation, the thanks of some of those, at all events who, when the danger was over and everything was peaceful, turned upon him and said he ought to be punished. Yes, when that agitation began, everything took a different turn, and the extraordinary part of it all was—and I am not going into details of what has been going on by way of question and answer in this House for the past three or four weeks—that all through these months my right hon. Friend never even knew the truth of the affair. That is really a most extraordinary matter. He had at the India Office during these months Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Ex-Governor of the Punjab, meeting him day by day and getting his reports day by day from India, and he never took a single step until this agitation broke out in India—an agitation which only broke out after the situation had been practically saved. That is a most unfortunate matter. If there was anything to be investigated, if there was punishment to be meted out, it ought to have been an immediate matter, not only in justice to General Dyer but in justice to the Indian people. What is the good, six or seven months afterwards, of trying to placate these people by going back, after all these months, on everything that was done by the Lieutenant Governor, by the Commander-in-Chief, and by the immediate Divisional Commander, and telling them that they were wrong. What do you get by it? Was there ever a more extraordinary case than that of a man who comes forward and tells you: I won the approval of my Divisional Commander and the Lieutenant Governor of the Province. I was given promotion, I was sent to do more and more difficult jobs, and eight months afterwards, you tell me I shall never again be employed because I have disgraced myself by inhumanity and an error of judgment?" (Cheers)

I suppose he will have to bear his punishment. [Hon. Members "why?"] The Secretary for War and the Army Council have said it. Let me say this: whatever be the realities of the case, however you may approve of the doctrines laid down by my right hon. Friend

—and I do approve of them—however you may approve of the Hunter Commission—and I find it difficult myself, having read the report of the commission, to agree with some of the conclusions that they came to. For instance, I find it difficult to agree with their conclusion that there was no conspiracy to overthrow the British—

Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy : you are an expert in that.

Sir E. Carson :—The hon. member opposite may be sure he is so beneath contempt that—(*Interruption*)—I wonder.....

How many members of the House and of the Government really following out the conspiracy to drive the British out of India and out of Egypt it is all one conspiracy. It is all engineered in the same way and for the same object. I hold in my hand a document which was sent to me by somebody in America few days ago. It goes through the whole of this case in its own peculiar way—this case of the 13th April, in which you are going to punish General Dyer because you were not satisfied that there was a conspiracy to overthrow British power, for that is the finding of the commission although I notice that even on that question on which General Dyer had to make up his mind, they are themselves a little uneasy, because they say :—

“Apart from the existence of any deeply laid scheme to overthrow the British, a movement which had started in rioting and become a rebellion might have rapidly developed into a revolution.”

Because General Dyer thought he ought to prevent it developing into a revolution you have now broken him. I have read the article, and I ask my right hon. Friend to look at the document entitled “Invincible England,” and see what it says :

“There is no idea of putting England out of India, but Asia is waking up! Its participation in the Great War, the grossly immoral tactics used by the great European Powers, and the conquest of Asian Territory, the realisation that the revolutionary elements of India, Ireland, Egypt and other nations have shaken the supposed invulnerability of England, is already morally loosening the hold of Europe on Asia. England still retains her territory. She has also grabbed Turkey, but her expulsion from Asia looms largely on the horizon. Russia has relinquished her sphere of influence in Persia, and has assured India that the present Russia is not like the ambitious nation of the past, and has no expansionist ideas. She has abandoned all the privileges improperly acquired from China by the late Government.”

And then it goes on :—

“Uncertainty, as concerns India, is in the air. Its influence on the situation is unmistakable. Arms are lacking, it is true, but India has the will and determination to expel England.”

If, that is true—and I am not arguing the causes or the policy of the Secretary of State in trying to alleviate the situation there by the Act passed last year—all these matters are outside the domain of the soldier. But for Heaven's sake, when you put a soldier into these difficult positions, do not visit upon him punishment for attempting to deal to the best of his ability with a situation for which he is not in the slightest degree responsible. (Cheers.) If he makes an error of judgment, approach it with the full idea that if he is *bona fide* and you can see it was impossible for him in the circumstances to have calmly made up his mind in the way you would do, then you may censure him, but do not punish him, do not break him. (Cheers.) I should like to ask my right hon. Friend, if men are to be punished for an error of judgment such as occurred in this case, how many of those right hon. Gentlemen would now be punished sitting on the Treasury bench (Loud cheers.) I hope we may not get off on false issues.

I am speaking here with reference to a soldier, whom I believe I saw once, whom I otherwise do not know at all. I am speaking of a man who in his long service has increased the confidence he had gained of those under whom he was serving, who had won the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province, who was acquainted with the whole facts—and who had got the approval of the Divisional Commander and of the Commander-in-Chief. I say to break a man under the circumstances of this case is un-English.

Mr. Churchill (President, Army Council).—I shall certainly endeavour to follow very carefully and strictly the advice my right hon. Friend has given, that we should approach this subject in a calm spirit, avoiding passions and attempts to excite prejudice. Members ought to address themselves to the subject with a desire to do to-day what is most in accordance with the long view of the general interests of the British Empire. There has not been for many years a case of this kind which raised so many grave and wide issues, or in regard to which a right and wise decision is so necessary. There is the intensity of racial feeling which has been aroused on both sides in India and every word we speak ought to have regard to that (Hear, hear). There are the difficulties of military officers, who in these turbulent times have been, or are likely to be, called upon to handle their troops in the suppression of civil disturbances; there are the requirements of justice and fair play towards an individual (cheers); and there are the moral and humanitarian conceptions involved. All these combine to make the task of the Government and of the Committee one exceptional seriousness, delicacy and responsibility.

I will deal first of all with the action of the Army Council, for

which I accept full responsibility. The conduct of a military officer may be dealt with by three perfectly distinct ways. First of all, he may be removed from his employment, relegated to half-pay, and told that he has no prospect of being employed again. This may be done to him by a simple administrative act. It is sufficient for the competent superior authority to decide that the interests of the public service would be better served if some one else were appointed in his stead to justify and complete taking off of such a step. The officer in question has no redress. He has no claim to a court of inquiry or a Court-Martial. He has no protection of any kind against being deprived of his appointment, and being informed that he has no further prospects of getting another. This procedure may seem somewhat harsh, but a little reflection will show that it is inevitable. There is no excuse for superior authority not choosing the most suitable agents for particular duties, and not removing unsuitable agents from particular duties. During the War, as every member of the Committee knows, hundreds, and probably thousands of officers have been so dealt with by their superiors; and since the war, the tremendous contraction of the Army has imposed similar hardships on hundreds, and possibly thousands of officers against whom not one word of reproach could be uttered, and whose careers in many cases have been careers of real distinction and of ~~in~~variable good service. This applies to all appointments in the Army, and I have no doubt, in the Navy, too, and it applies with increasing severity in proportion as the appointments are high ones. From the humble lance-corporal who reverted to a private by the stroke of the pen, if the colonel thought he would prefer some other subaltern, up to the highest general or field-marshal, all officers are amenable to this procedure in regard to the appointments which they held. The procedure is hardly ever challenged, and it is not challenged by General Dyer in his statement. It is accepted with soldierly fortitude, because it is believed, on the whole, that the administration of these great responsibilities is carried out in a fair and honest spirit.

Indeed, when one thinks of the hundreds of officers of high rank who in the last year have had their professional careers brought abruptly and finally to a close, and the patience, good temper and dignity with which this great personal misfortune has been borne, one cannot help feeling a great admiration for the profession of arms to which those officers belong. That is the first method by which military officers may be dealt with. Under this procedure the officer reverts automatically to half-pay, and in a very large proportion of cases, having reverted to half pay, he applies to be placed on retired pay, because, especially in the case of senior

officers retired pay is often appreciably higher than half-pay. The second method is of a more serious character, and affect, not the employment of an officer, but his status and his rank. Here, it is a question of retiring an officer compulsorily from service, or imposing on him some reduction or forfeiture in his pension or retired pay.

In this case the officer is protected under article 527 of the Royal Warrant, by the fact that it is necessary for three members of the Army Council to approve the proceedings, and by certain rights of laying his case before them. All the same the Secretary of State for the time being, by virtue of his office, has the power to make a submission direct to the crown, and advice that an officer be retired compulsorily, or simply that his name be removed from the list, His Majesty having no further use for his services.

Mr. Bottomley : What has all this to do with General Dyer—I mean with the specific case we are dealing with ?

Mr. Churchill : I have great respect for the Committee, and I do not believe it will refuse to allow a minister or a Government to unfold a reasoned and solid argument to its attention ; and I am surprised that my hon. Friend, who himself takes a not undistinguished part in debates, should not appreciate that fact, and should not be willing to facilitate my doing so.

I was saying that is the second method, in which the personal reputation of an officer is undoubtedly affected. The third method is of a definitely penal character. Honour, liberty, life are affected. Cashiering, imprisonment, or the death penalty may be involved, and for this third category, of course, the whole resources and protection which the judicial procedure, lawful tribunals and British justice accord to an accused person are brought into being.

Those are the three different levels of procedure in regard to the treatment of the conduct of officers. Although my hon. Friend has not seen the relevance of it, I think it right at the outset, to unfold these distinctions very carefully to the committee, and to ask the committee to bear them attentively in mind.

Coming to the case of General Dyer it will be seen that General Dyer was removed from his appointment by the Commander-in-Chief in India, that he was informed, as hundreds of officers had been informed, that there was no prospect of further employment for him under the Government of India, and that in consequence, he reverted automatically to half-pay. These proceedings were brought formally to the notice of the Army Council by a letter from the India Office, which recommended further that he should be retired from the Army, and by a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief in India, which similarly recommended that he should be ordered to retire, That was about a month ago.

At a latter stage it was brought publicly to the notice of the Army Council by the published despatch of the Secretary of State for India, which stated that the circumstances of the case had been referred to the Army Council. The first step taken by the Council was to direct General Dyer—we had an application from him that he desired to take this course—to submit a statement of his case for their consideration.

The statement is, I think, in the possession of the Committee at the present time. We asked him to make that statement, and we accepted his request that he should be allowed to make it, because we felt that if any action was to be taken against him, apart from removing him from his appointment and employment in India, it was essential that he should furnish a statement in his own behalf and should be judged upon that and not upon evidence which he had given as a witness in any inquiry before which he had been summoned without having any reason to believe that he was cited as an incriminated party.

The conclusion of the Hunter Committee might furnish the fullest justification for removing him from his appointment.

Commander Bellairs : No, no !

Mr. Churchill : I am expressing my opinion. When my hon. and gallant Friend is called, he will express his opinion. That is process which we call Debate. But if any question of retiring General Dyer from the Army was to be examined, direct statement from him in his own defence was indispensable. The conclusion reached by the Army Council, which have been communicated to the House, was reached unanimously and speaks for itself. It must be remembered, however, that the Army Council must deal with these matters, mainly, from a military point of view. They had to consider the rights and interests of officers and also to consider the effects of any decision which they may come to upon the confidence with which officers will do their duty in the kind of extremely difficult and tragical circumstances in which General Dyer and a good many other officers of the Army had in recent times been placed.

The Army Council have to express an opinion of Genral Dyer's conduct from what is primarily a service standpoint. Their function is one of great responsibility, but at the same time it is one of a limited and special responsibility.

Nothing could be more unjust that to represent the Army Council as seeking to raise a constitutional issue, or setting themselves up against the paramount authority of the Govt. of the country. I very much regret to have seen that that suggestion has been made. It is quite unmerited and uncalled for. Asked to express their opinion, they were bound to give it sincerely and plainly

from their special stand-point. Their conclusions in no way affected the *Final freedom of action* of the cabinet. The cabinet has many interests to consider far outside and beyond the scope and authority of a body like the Army Council which is an administrative body, a subordinate body, and which is not at the same time a judicial tribunal. If the Cabinet with their superior authority and mere general outlook, took the view that further action was required against General Dyer beyond the loss of employment, beyond the censure pronounced by the Hunter Commission, by the Government of India, and by the Secretary of State's despatch, which was a cabinet document bearing the considered opinion of the Government; if it was thought further action of a disciplinary character was required, the cabinet were perfectly free to take it without any conflict of powers arising from the subordinate administrative Army Council, and the Supreme Executive Council of State.

I made it perfectly clear to my colleagues on the Army Council, that in assenting to the conclusion to which we came, as an Army Council, I held myself perfectly free if I thought right and if the cabinet so decided, to make a further submission to the Crown for the retirement of General Dyer from the Army.

Lieut. Colonel Croft: And the converse may be true, also. The cabinet upset the whole decision also in the other directions?

Mr. Churchill: Certainly. The cabinet can certainly alter the employment of any officer. I now come to explain and to justify the decision of the Cabinet. This is the question I have been asking myself and which I think the House should consider. Were we right in accepting, as we have done, the conclusion of the Army Council as terminating the matter so far as General Dyer is concerned, or ought to have taken further action of a disciplinary or quasi-disciplinary character against him? Here, for the first time, I shall permit myself to enter, to some extent, upon certain aspects of the merits of the case.

However we may dwell upon the difficulties of General Dyer during the Amritsar riots, upon the anxious and critical situation in the Punjab, upon the danger to Europeans throughout that province, upon the long delays which have taken place in reaching a decision about the officer, upon the procedure that was at this point or at that point adopted, however we may dwell upon all this, one tremendous fact stands out—the slaughter of nearly 400 persons, and the wounding of probably three or four times as many at the Jallianwalla Bagh. That is an episode which appeared to be without precedent or parallel in the modern history of the British Empire. It is an event of an entirely different order

from any of those tragic occurrences which take place when troops are brought into collision with the civil population. It is an extraordinary event, a monstrous event, an event which stands in singular and sinister isolation. Collisions between troops and native populations had been painfully frequent in the melancholy aftermath of the Great War.

My right hon. Friend has reminded the House that in this particular series of disturbances there were 36 or 37 cases of firing upon the crowd in India at this particular time, and there have been numerous cases in Egypt. In all these cases the officer in command is placed in a most painful, difficult and different position.

"I agree absolutely with the opinions quoted from the Adjutant General in India as to the distasteful, painful, embarrassing, torturing situation, mental and moral, in which the British officers in command of troops were placed, when he was called upon to decide whether or not he should open fire, not upon the enemies of his country, but on those who were his countrymen or who were citizens of our common-Empire. But there were certain broad lines by which I think, an officer in such cases could be guided. First of all the officer might ask himself, "Is the crowd attacking any thing or anybody? Are they trying to force their way forward to the attack of some building or troops or police, or are they attempting to attack some band of persons or some individual who has excited their hostility?" The question is, "Is the crowd armed?" By armed I mean armed with lethal weapons.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : How could they be in India?

Mr. Churchill : Men who take up arms against the State must expect at any moment to be fired upon. Men who take up arms unlawfully cannot expect that the troops wait until they are quite ready to begin the conflict.

Mr. Donald : What about Ireland?

Mr. Churchill : I agree, and it is in regard to Ireland that I am specially making this remark or until they have actually began fighting. Armed men are in a category absolutely different from unarmed men. An unarmed crowd stands in a totally different position from an armed crowd. At Amritsar the crowd was neither armed nor attacking (Cries of Oh!). When I use the word "armed", I mean armed with lethal weapons, or with firearms. There is no dispute on that point. "I was confronted," says General Dyer, "by a revolutionary army." What is the chief characteristic of an Army? Surely it is that it is armed. This crowd was unarmed. There is another test which is not quite so simple, but which nevertheless has often served as a good guide to officers in these difficult situations—I mean the doctrine that no more force should be used than is necessary

to secure compliance with the law. The officer should also confine himself to a limited and definite objective—that is to say, to prevent a crowd from doing some thing they ought not to do, or to compel them to do something which they ought to do.

My right hon. Friend (Sir E. Carson) will say it is easy enough to talk like this, and to lay down these principles here in safe and comfortable, and in the calm atmosphere of the House of Commons or in armchair in Downing street or Whitehall. But it is quite a different business on the spot in great emergency, confronted with a howling mob, with a great city or a whole province, quivering round with excitement. (Cheers.) I quite agree. Still these are good guides, and sound simple tests, and it is not too much to ask of our officers to consider and observe them. After all, our officers are accustomed to accomplish more difficult tasks than that. Over and over again we have seen British officers and soldiers storm entrenchments under the heaviest fire with half their number shot down before they entered the position of the enemy, the certainty of a long bloody day before them, and a tremendous bombardment crashing all around; we have seen them taking out their maps and watches, and adjusting their calculations with the most minute detail. They had been seen showing not merely mercy, but kindness to prisoners, observing restraint in the treatment of them, punishing those who deserved to be punished by the hard laws of war, and sparing those who might claim to be admitted to the clemency of the conqueror, and they had been seen exerting themselves to show pity and to help the wounded, even to their own peril. They had done all that thousands of times; and in requiring them in moments of crisis dealing with civil riots, when the danger is incomparably less, to consider these broad, simple guides, I do not think we are taxing them beyond their proved strength.

Commander Bellairs: what about the women and children?

Lieut.-colonel Croft: There are no women and children in the trenches.

Mr. Churchill: I am bound to say I do not see to what part of my argument that remark applies. I say I do not think it is too much to ask a British officer in this painful, agonising position, to pause and consider these broad, simple guides—I do not even call them rules—before he decides upon his course of conduct. Under circumstances, in my opinion infinitely more trying, they have shown themselves capable of arriving at right decisions.

If we offer these broad, positive guides to our officers in anxious, and dangerous times, if there are guides of a positive character there is surely one guide which we can offer them of a

negative character. There is surely one general prohibition which we can make. I mean a prohibition against what is called "frightfulness." By frightfulness I mean inflicting great slaughter or massacre on a particular crowd of people with the intention of terrorizing not merely the rest of crowd, but the whole district or the whole country. We cannot admit this doctrine in any form. Frightfulness is not a remedy known to the British Pharmacopæa.

I yield to no one in my detestation of Bolshevism and of the revolutionary violence which precedes it. I share with my right hon. Friend (Sir E. Carson) many of his sentiments as to the world-wide character of the seditious and revolutionary movement with which we are confronted. But my hatred of Bolshevism and Bolsheviks is not founded on their silly system of economies, or their absurd doctrine of an impossible equality. It arises from the bloody and devastating terrorism which they practice in every land into which they have broken, and by which alone their criminal regime can be maintained. I have heard the hon. member for Hill (Lieut. Commander Kenworthy) speak on this subject. His doctrine and his policy is to support and palliate every form of terrorism as long as it is the terrorism of revolutionaries against the forces of law, loyalty and order. Governments who have seized power by violence and usurpation have often resorted to terrorism to keep what they have stolen, but the British Empire, where lawful authority descends from hand to hand, generation after generation, does not need such aid. All such ideas were absolutely foreign to the British way of doing things.

These observations are mainly of a general character, but their relevance to the case understood, and they lead me to the specific circumstances of the fusillade at the Jallianwallah Bagh. Let me marshal the facts. The crowd was not armed, except with bludgeons, and it was not attacking anybody or anything. When fire had been opened on it, it tried to run away, but it was pinned up in a narrow space, considerably smaller than Trafalgar square with hardly any exits when one bullet would drive through three or four bodies. The people ran madly this way and that and the firing was only stopped when the ammunition was on the point of exhaustion, enough being retained to provide for the safety of the force on its return journey. If more troops had been available, says this officer, the casualties would have been greater in proportion. If the road had not been so narrow, the machine guns and the armoured cars would have joined in. Finally when the ammunition had reached the point that only enough only remained to allow for the safe return of the troops, and after

379 persons had been killed and when most certainly 1,200 or more had been wounded, the troops, at whom not even a stone had been thrown, marched away. I do not think it is in the interests of the British Empire or Army to take a load of that sort for all time upon our back. We have to make it absolutely clear that this is not the British way of doing things (Cheers.)

I shall be told that it "saved India." I do not believe it for a moment. The British power in India does not stand on such foundations. I am going to refer to the material foundations of our power very bluntly. Take the Mutiny as the datum line. In those days there were normally 40,000 British Troops in the country and the ratio of British troops to Native troops was one to five. The Native Indian Army had a powerful Artillery, of which they made tremendous use. There were no Railways, no modern appliances, and yet the mutiny was effectively suppressed by the use of a military power far inferior to that which we now possess in India. Since then the British troops have been raised to 70,000 and upwards, and the ratio of British to Native troops is one to two. There is no native artillery of any kind. The power and the importance of the artillery has increased in the meantime 10 and perhaps 20 fold. Since then a whole series of wonderful and powerful war inventions have come into being, and the whole apparatus of scientific war is at the disposal of the British Government in India—machine-guns, the magazine rifle, cordite ammunition, which cannot be manufactured as gunpowder was manufactured except by a scientific power, and which is all stored in the magazines under the control of the white troops. Then there have been the great developments which have followed the conquest of the air and evolution of the aeroplane. Even, if the railways and telegraphs were cut or rendered useless by a strike, motor lorries and wireless telegraphy would give increasingly the means of concentrating troops and taking them about the country with an extraordinary and almost undreamed of facility. When one contemplates these solid, material facts, there is no need for foolish panic or talk of its being necessary to produce a situation like that at Jallianwalla Bagh in order to save India. On the contrary, as we contemplate the great physical forces and the power at the disposal of the British Government in their relations with the native population of India, we ought to remember the words of Macaulay—

"and then was seen what we believe to be the most frightful of all spectacles, the strength of civilisation without its mercy." Our reign in India or anywhere else had never rested on a basis of physical force alone upon it.

The British way of doing things has always meant close co-operation with the people of the country. In no part of the British Empire have we arrived at such success as in India whose princes spent their treasure in our cause, whose brave soldiers fought side by side with our own men, whose intelligent and gifted people are co-operating at the present moment with us in every sphere of government and of industry. In Egypt there has recently been a breakdown of the relations between the British and the people, and we are trying to rebuild that relationship laboriously and patiently. We have plenty of force, if force were all, but what we are seeking was co-operation and good will. If such a rupture between the Government and the people had taken place throughout the Indian Empire, it would have been one of the most melancholy events in the history of the world. That it has not taken place is, I think, largely due to the constructive policy of His Majesty's Government, to which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India has made so great a personal contribution. I was astonished by my right hon. Friend's sense of detachment when, in the supreme crisis of the war, he calmly journeyed to India and remained for many months absorbed and buried in Indian affairs. It was not until what I saw in Egypt, and, if you like, what is going on in Ireland to-day, that I appreciated the enormous utility of such service, from the point of view of the national interests of the British Empire, in helping to keep alive that spirit of comradeship, that sense of unity and of progress in co-operation, which must ever ally and bind together the British and Indian peoples.

I do not conceal from the House my sincere personal opinion that the conduct of General Dyer at Amritsar deserved not only loss of employment and the measured censure which the Government have pronounced, but also to be marked by a definite disciplinary act namely his being placed compulsorily on the retired list. But we have only to turn to the statement of General Dyer; we have only to cast our mind back to the most powerful passage in the speech of my right hon. Friend (Sir E. Carson) to see that such a course was barred. It is quite true that General Dyer's conduct has been approved by a succession of superiors above him, who pronounced his defence, and that at different stages events have taken place which it may well be argued amounted to virtual condonation so far as a penal or disciplinary action is concerned (Hear, hear). General Dyer may have done wrong, but, at any rate, he has his rights, and do not see how, in face of such virtual condonation, it would have been possible, or could have been considered right, to take disciplinary action against him. For these reasons the Cabinet found themselves in agreement with the

conclusions of the Army Council, and to those moderate and considered conclusions they confidently invite the assent of the House. (Cheers.)

Mr. Asquith: I have heard this afternoon so much sound and excellent doctrine from the Treasury Bench, notwithstanding an occasional deviation in one or two of his intercalary perorations from my right hon. Friend (Mr. Churchill) who has just sat down, that I shall content myself with two or three observations. The issue as far as the Debate has gone, is reduced to a very narrow point. I assume that we have heard, as we always do hear from such a consummate advocate as my right hon. and learned Friend (Sir E. Carson), the full strength of the case that can be made against the Government decision. To what does that case amount? My right hon. and learned Friend has not attempted to justify General Dyer's action on the merits. He made no attempt of any sort or kind to meet the points which have been submitted to the Committee by the Secretary of State for War. He had two suggestions and two only, to support his general allegation of hardship and grievance. The first was an extraordinary one—that General Dyer had not had a trial. General Dyer's case has been considered on his own evidence before the Hunter Committee. [Hon. Members: "No!"] By what I think was an unfortunate decision, many of the witnesses who were available were not called and examined.

His case was considered on his own evidence before the Hunter Committee. Both of the Majority and Minority agree in their condemnation, and their judgment is supported and endorsed by the Government of India. It is confirmed not only by the Secretary of State but by the full Cabinet here. Then he represents his case as he has done in the last few weeks, in an *ex parte* statement of his own, to the Army Council. The Army Council reconsider the case, and come to the same decision which had been arrived at by other authorities. To say, in all the circumstances, that he has not had fair hearing and ought to have another opportunity of saying whatever he can say in his own defence, seems to me to be an abuse of language (Hear, hear). It is undoubtedly the case that he had been commended at the time by his superior officer and by the Lieutenant-Governor. Whether they were then in full possession of the facts, I do not know: whether they were impartial judges in the circumstances, I do not know. There was much of feverish, hectic excitement in the atmosphere. They had very little opportunity of making dispassionate inquiry into the case. I have heard nothing from the right hon. and learned member (Carson) which could in any way impugn the correctness and force of the decision concurrently arrived

at by so many authorities. The case is as simple a case as has ever been presented in the House.

Undoubtedly on the 10th April—I do not go into the larger question whether there was or was not evidence of a conspiracy in the Punjab—very serious riot occurred which involved both arson and murder that was put down. During the three days which elapsed from the 10th to the 13th of April there had been no outbreak. My right hon. Friend spoke of these days a very dark and ripe with murder. I do not know from what evidence he was speaking. I know of no such evidence of any sort. On the contrary, the riots were put down on the 10th. The 11th and 12th passed in perfect tranquility, or, at any rate, there was no further offensive.

Here I must offer a word of criticism on a point which has not so far been referred to at all in the course of the discussion. I feel that it is deeply to be deplored and reprehended that the civil authority abdicated its function and handed over something very much in the nature of a *carte blanche* to the General in command. It is the worst example, and in India particularly, it is a very bad example. The civil authorities were guilty of a gross dereliction of duty in divesting themselves, or trying to divest themselves, of their functions, and handing the whole thing over to the discretion of the military authorities. I cannot help thinking that if the civil officers at Amritsar had, at the beginning of the transaction, taken a proper sense of the duty which the law of their office imposed on them, and had controlled and directed, or at any rate supervised, subsequent military operations, it is quite possible that this terrible incident of the 13th might never have occurred. (Chees). It is only fair and just to General Dyer to say this, in what I conceive to be a most terrible error of judgment, and even worse, he had not, in this very critical and responsible situation, the advantage which he was entitled to have and which the Executive ought to have given him, of the assistance and advice of the civil authority familiar with all the local circumstances, and ultimately responsible for the maintenance of order.

But that criticism having been made, two days passed in tranquility, at any rate without further outrage. The General saw fit to prohibit the holding of a public meeting and he went round the town with an escort and with drums for the purpose of communicating that prohibition to the population. The meeting, nevertheless, was held. As my right hon. Friend has just pointed out, it was a meeting of unarmed persons. I think that I am right in saying that there were women and children there as well as men.

[Hon. Members : No]

Sir W. Joynton-Hicks : There were no women or children :

Mr. Asquith : Be it so. I believe that there were boys, but be it so. It was an unarmed crowd, in a closed space, from which the exit were few and narrow. There is no evidence, nor could there be, that the bulk of the people were aware of the Proclamation which had been issued earlier in the day. General Dyer with his troops, giving no warning of any sort or kind, fires indiscriminately into this mass of people until he has practically exhausted the whole of his available ammunition. There has never been such an accident in the whole annals of Anglo-Indian history nor, I believe, in the history of our Empire (Hear, hear). To ask the House of Commons to reverse the considered decision given after hearing everything that General Dyer had to say or put forward to all these great responsible authorities, to reverse that decision upon no new facts—to take General Dyer's statement and judge him on that—is not only to fly in the face of the presumptions of evidence and the rules of common sense and the practice of all civil and judicial tribunals, but is something much worse than that. It is for the House of Commons to take upon itself on behalf of the British Empire as a whole, the responsibility of condoning and adopting one of the worst outrages in the whole of our history (Cheers). For my part, so far as I can command any authority or confidence among others in this House, it is an occasion on which I ask my hon. Friends to give their hearty support to the Government in the course which they have taken. (Cheers).

Mr. Ben Spoor : I beg to move that Item A (Salaries, £ 6,500) be reduced by £ 100. I hoped that Mr. Montagu would have dealt at greater length with the extremely grave situation in India and the result of the happenings of last year. I would like to say how very much I appreciate, and all the members of the Labour Party appreciate, the very definite declaration of the Secretary of State with regard to the question of the Hunter Report. I will only add this, that if the spirit which infused the right hon. Gentleman's speech infuses and directs the policy of the Government in India in the months ahead, there is some chance of peaceful relations being established between India and England. I am glad the right hon. Gentleman reminded the House how extremely grave the situation is there. I wondered as I heard some of the rather unseemingly interruption of time, whether those who took part in the interruptions realised what was happening in India at this moment, whether the interrupters knew that there was a wave of unrest that was full of dangerous possibilities, whether they realised that the Reforms that were passed through this House and became an Act last year, and which it was hoped would shortly

come into operation in India, were seriously prejudiced by the attitude of the Indian people as a direct result of the policy that led up to Amritsar. In this Debate, I hope that the committee will not lose sight of the attitude of the Indian people themselves. I am quite sure that the sentiment of which we have had abundant evidence this afternoon, the sentiment of sympathy with some officers to whom direct reference has been made, is a sentiment not shared by many people outside this House. I would like to suggest to any Indian who may be present in the Chamber—

Mr. Palmer : Is it in order for an hon. member to address the gallery, and not the Committee ?

The Deputy-Chairman : I am sorry that for the moment I was not paying attention to the hon. Gentleman's remarks. If he will proceed, I will listen carefully.

Mr. Spoor : I am extremely sorry if I have said anything not in accordance with ordinary procedure in our Debates. If what I have said was not in order I withdraw it. I will put the matter this way. I would be extremely sorry if I thought that people outside the Commons, whether British or Indian, believed that the sentiment of which we have had evidence this afternoon represented in any real degree the feeling of the people of this country. A fortnight ago the Labour Party held a great conference and passed a resolution on that subject which some people no doubt thought was of an extreme character. It asked for the recall of the Viceroy, the impeachment of Sir M. O'Dwyer, the trial of officers against whom allegations have been made, and the repeal of repressive Legislation and coercive Legislation which more than any thing else has contributed to the present unhappy state of affairs in India. That resolution expressed the considered opinion of Labour Party outside the House of Commons. It was a resolution framed by men not unfamiliar with the Indian situation, and it commanded the unanimous support of the whole Conference. In all seriousness, I submit that that resolution and the sentiment that was in evidence at the conference much more correctly express what I believe to be the general feeling of the public in this country than the exhibition we have had here this afternoon. Sir E. Carson said : "Let us be fair to a distinguished soldier." I want to be let them be fair to the hundreds of Indians who have lost their lives, and to the children who were bombed from the air by British Officers.

I am quite sure that no reasonable being could attempt for a single moment the defence of many of the horrible acts that took place, and when we ask for justice for our own generals and officers—and I hope justice will be done to them—let us also insist upon equal justice for the people of India themselves. I would

like to refer to the broad fact of the Indian situation as it existed in the time immediately preceding these events. Those of us who took any part in the Indian debates last year had abundant evidence of the extraordinary outburst of political opinion, the extraordinary awakening of political consciousness, to which reference has been made already to-day. During the war promises were made to the Indian people, and in a measure an attempt was made in the Act of last year to give effect to those promises. Yet, at the same time that we were promising the people of India that we would apply the Principle of Self-determination to the country and give them Home Rule, those activities were countered by repressive legislation throughout India and more particularly in the Punjab ; they were countered not only by repressive legislation, but by Acts that have been rightly described here as Acts of unrestrained Prussianism. The inevitable happened. The Secretary of State for India in his despatch has condemned General Dyer severely. He speaks of him as having on one occasion violated every canon of civilised Government. Even the Government of India seems to regret the inhumanity of this British officer.

Sir J. D. Rees : why "Even the Government of India?"

Mr. Spoor : If the hon. Member will wait a moment, I will answer his query. I am going to suggest that the Government of India share a great measure of responsibility for this tragedy. The Government of India were behind the policy that led up to these unfortunate events. But even the Government of India regretted the inhumanity of General Dyer. I want to suggest that Amritsar is not an isolated event any more than General Dyer is an isolated officer. These are not things that can be judged apart, if they resulted from a certain policy that some men have pursued, from a certain mentality that some men seem to possess in India in a most extraordinary degree. Talking about the curious mentality of some Anglo Indians, may I be permitted to quote one short paragraph from the evidence of the Brigadier-General Commanding the Delhi Brigade ? It is taken from volume one page 172 of the evidence.

"Composed as the crowd was of the scum of Delhi, I am of opinion that if they had got a bit more firing given them it would have done them a world of good, and their attitude would be much more amenable and respectful, as force is the only thing that an Asiatic has any respect for."

I put it that if that is a typical example of a British officer in India—

Colonel Wedgwood : It is not.

Mr. Spoor : If it is not a typical example, I would ask, is that British officer still in India ? Is he still in a position of authority

or has he been called upon to resign? I said that the happenings in India resulted from certain policy on the one hand, and a curious mentality on the other. As far as the Punjab was concerned, the policy was obviously that of Sir Michael O'Dwyer. On page 92 of the Hunter Committee Report the Minority point out that his speech in the Legislative Council in September 1917 was regarded as an attack on the educated classes, that he prohibited during his administration certain political leaders from entering the Punjab, and that he put the Press Act more rigorously into operation in the Punjab than elsewhere. In a word his administration was tyrannical. He revealed no qualities of statesmanship.

Sir Charles Oman: That is not the report, but the Minority Report to which you are referring?"

Mr. Spoor: Yes. He revealed no qualities of statesmanship; he showed always a blunt reliance on force. It was Sir Michael O'Dwyer who was primarily responsible for the use of aeroplanes at Gujranwala. In connection with that raid, I believe, bombs were actually dropped into the play-ground of a school. According to the Congress report, all disorder that had occurred in Gujranwala had actually ceased before the aeroplanes arrived and began their bombardment. I submit that Sir M. O'dwyer and those like him typify that kind of Anglo-Indian who is the greatest menace to the security of the Empire and the greatest barrier to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India. Behind Sir M. O'Dwyer we have the Viceroy and he cannot by any manner or means evade his responsibility in this crisis.

Earl Winterton: On a point of order. It is not in order to criticise the action of the Viceroy of Ireland save on a substantive motion. I submit that by the rulings of successive speakers it is equally out of order to criticise the doings of the Viceroy of India in his executive capacity without putting down his substantive motion.

The Deputy-Chairman: The Noble Lord is quite right. It is not in order to discuss the conduct of the Viceroy except upon a motion put down for that purpose.

Colonel Wedgwood: When the Mesopotamia Report was discussed in this House the conduct of the Viceroy was attacked then, and no ruling was made that such an attack was not to be allowed. I think we ought to protest at once against the idea that we are not to be allowed to criticise the actions of the Viceroy and Executive of India in this Debate.

Mr. Spoor: I was speaking of the Viceroy as the president and representative of the Indian Government. The Indian Government as the overruling authority, cannot possibly evade their responsibility

ties in this matter. I am one of those—and I am sure there are many others in the House—who do not like the idea of General Dyer being made a scape-goat of in connection with these matters. The truly responsible persons must be discovered, and, without vindictiveness, they must be punished in justice to the people of India. Therefore, when I use the name of the Viceroy, I refer to him in his capacity as President and Governing Head of the India Government. I do submit respectfully, one is not only entitled, but almost compelled, to make references to the Ruling Head of India in a Debate of this character, if we are to allocate responsibility in the fairest possible way. What I was going to say with regard to Lord Chelmsford I will leave unsaid in deference to your ruling.

The Deputy-Chairman : The hon. Member must not discuss the actions of the Viceroy. He is entitled to refer to the actions of the Government of India.

Mr. Spoor : I think it is quite clear that what one is criticising is the policy for which the Government of India have to be responsible and a policy which has contributed far more than has yet been admitted in this House to the serious situation that at present exists in this country. We, therefore, ask that the Viceroy and Sir Michæl O'Dwyer should be dealt with in a way that would secure justice for the Indian people. I referred just now to the curious mentality of some Anglo-Indians. There may be some climatic explanation—one cannot tell—but the fact is they are of the most extraordinary mentality which seems to possess some of those in positions of authority out in that country. India may be governed by consent; she will never again be governed by force. (Cheers) Any attempt to do so is to act contrary to the often declared principle that has governed the policy of his Majesty's Government, not only in India, but in all parts of the Empire. Every contributory cause to that extraordinary mentality must be removed. There were three courses open to the Government. The first is that which would be advocated by those who believe that General Dyer and his colleagues had saved the country. The first course—a frank approval of the Head of the Indian Government, Sir Michæl O'Dwyer, General Dyer, and the other officers implicated. The second course is the one which has apparently been followed up to now by the Secretary of State for India, that is to say, approval of the Indian Government and approval of Sir Michæl O'Dwyer, but condemnation of General Dyer, who, after all, is the instrument of their will. The third, and the only logical course, is to be found in the pursuance of the liberal spirit which is supposed to inspire the Reforms of last year, and which we were told this afternoon aims at leading the people of India into Liberty. If this last course is followed it

obviously involves the condemnation of all those who have been responsible for this reactionary policy. We, of the Labour Party, and I speak for all my colleagues, stand for the last course as the only one which is consistent with our national honour and obligation. It involves the recall of the Head of Indian Government, the trial of Sir. M. O'Dwyer, General Dyer and others implicated, a trial in His Majesty's Courts of Justice. I may, in passing, submit that they will probably have a more judicial hearing and receive a more impartial trial there than they are likely to secure from the columns of "Morning post" or the columns of the "Times."

Last of all, and to me it is really more important, our Government should take action in this matter and immediately repeal all that repressive and coercive and totally unnecessary legislation which has defaced the Statute Book in India, and which has had no other effect than to promote continual irritation and dissatisfaction. Unless that legislation is immediately repealed and the people of India are made to realise that they are in the Empire on equal terms, so far as their ordinary rights are concerned, with every British citizen, there is not the slightest hope of peace in that country. If the Government do not do this, then it is impossible to say what the consequences will be and the situation in India will not improve. I have referred to the feeling of bitter indignation that swept and is still sweeping over India, and are you not going to remove that feeling by calling on the British General who happened to lose his head to resign? You have got to do a great deal further. You will only do it by showing, unmistakably, that the policy of governing India by a military policy and by getting rid of the prehistoric mental outlook which possess individuals out there, is the foundation of unrest in India. I wonder how familiar members are with the movement that has recently been initiated in India, and which is calling upon the Indian people to refuse to co-operate in the working of the Act that was passed last year. It is a movement which has spread with great rapidity, and it is a movement which has the support, not only of the Extremists, but also of moderate men, and it is a movement which, if it is persisted in and developed, will most certainly make the working of Reforms altogether impossible. I am one of those who want to see the people of India really free. I hope to God they are not going to wade through blood to get that freedom; but if we want to destroy this non-co-operation movement, and to remove the justification for it, we can only do so in so far as we are prepared to do justice to the people of India in regard to the tragedies of last year. Some of us hope much from the Reforms which were passed. Some of us believed we were present at the birth of a new understanding between East

and West. Those hopes will never be realised, unless the Government is prepared to act with courage and decision, and unless the Government is prepared to repudiate in the most emphatic manner possible those men whose policy, if continued, will surely wreck all possibilities of co-operation between an awakened India and ourselves.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hunter Weston, as one who had served with native troops in India, appealed to the Committee to exercise moderation in what they said about the regrettable occurrences in India, and with a due feeling of responsibility and of the harm that might be done by intemperate speeches on either side. There was a great danger of exacerbating feeling between the British section of the population of India and that conglomeration of different races, different religions and, indeed, of different civil nations which they were apt to class as one, as the people of India. There was undoubtedly present a certain strain in the relations between the British population in India and certain sections of the Indian races, and to still further aggravate that feeling would be to do the gravest disservice to their country. General Dyer by his record had shown himself to be a man and an officer well able to deal with threatening situations without the use of force. The evidence contained in the Report of Lord Hunter's Committee could not be used against any man in any Court of Law, either civil or military, and, therefore, it should not be used as the basis of defence or attack in that House or outside. In principle, the use of the military in aid of the civil power was the same in that country and in India. To allow anything in the nature of "frightfulness" was abhorrent to the British Nation, and therefore to the British Army. If both the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Army Council had decided that General Dyer should be relieved of his command, the Committee might be sure that he had been treated fairly, and that no good could be done to him, to the Army, or to the country by attacking a decision made by responsible soldiers, who had the full confidence of the Army and the Nation, and had the facts fully before them and the best legal advice at their disposal.

He appealed to those who desired to defend an eminent soldier not to attack those other eminent soldiers who had to adjudicate on the case, and especially not to say anything which could be quoted in the difficult days ahead as showing that members of Parliament approved anything which could give colour to the assertion that the British Army might be used as an instrument of oppression. Upon those members, whose sympathy with the relatives of those who lost their lives at the Jallianwala Bagh prompted them to condemn General Dyer utterly, and to call upon the Government to

punish him still further, he urged moderation in the expression of their opinion, remembering that harm might be done by their words in embittering feeling in India and adding to the difficulties of those who in the future would have to uphold law and order.

The situation with which General Dyer had to deal had been in existence for some time, and before his arrival, had led to the murder of Europeans, to an assault upon an English woman, to loss of life among the natives, and to much damage to property. The terms of written order given to him by the civil authority on his arrival on April 11, were : "The Troops have orders to restore order in Amritsar and to use all force necessary. No gathering of persons nor procession of any sort will be allowed. All gatherings will be fired on." That notice was given out to several of the citizens on April 11. On the afternoon of April 13 having received notice from the Superintendent of Police that a crowd was assembling in the Jhallianwala Bagh, a park in Amritsar city, General Dyer marched to the spot, and found a huge assembly of many thousands of people, who appeared to him to be in a dangerous mood. A determined rush might easily overwhelm his little force of 50 native soldiers armed with rifles, and 40 armed only with kukris. General Dyer and his little band were entirely isolated in the city. Narrow streets were behind him, his flanks and rear were open to attack, and no reinforcements were within reach. If this little band, who were the sole guardians of law and order, had been overwhelmed, there was nothing to hold in check instigators of crime and insurrection, nothing to prevent the recurrence of the loot and murder and arson which had raged in the city only three days before. (Hear. hear.) Any hesitation on General Dyer's part, any failure to use, and to use at once, the necessary force might have been the spark that would light the conflagration of another mutiny. No one who had not been placed in a similar situation should venture to condemn General Dyer. (Cheers.)

Lieutenant Colonel James said that, as it appeared to him, the question was one affecting not so much the Indian Empire as justice. When General Dyer put in his statement to the Army Council, one should have thought that the natural thing would have been to send for him and ask for oral explanations. He understood that procedure was never followed at the War Office, and he thought that alone vitiated the virtue of appeal. Unless they could have a man face to face with the president of the tribunal they could not form a proper judgment on his case. General Dyer was faced with an unparalleled situation and the only judge of the amount of force which should be used at the moment was he himself. (Cheers) To say that there was no evidence of a general conspiracy in India

was just as absurd as it would be to set up a board of inquiry in Ireland at the present moment, and to say that there was no evidence of constables being killed, for the simple reason that they had not been caught. (Laughter and cheers). He asked hon. Members to stand for the cause of justice, fair play and moderation towards the great mass of the loyal Indian peoples, who would be the first to suffer if they in that House did not stand by their own people. (Cheers.)

Sir W. Joynson Hicks : I came down to the House very fully intentioned to make a very moderate statement, and to deal in my remarks with the wider question of the future of our government in India, rather than to speak on the actual case of General Dyer. I should like to congratulate the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just disappeared so rapidly after making his maiden speech ; the whole House, I should say, will like to hear him again. I should like to refer for one moment to the hon. and gallant Member for Northampton, and the very fine speech in which he put the case of General Dyer admirably. He described the Amritsar events of that awful afternoon of 13th April. Yet I do not know whether every one in the Committee heard the beginning of the speech. He appealed to the hon. Members as Members of this House, to support the decision of the Army Council because the Army Council has come to a decision. Really, the second part of the speech of my right hon. Friend was a complete justification for anyone who votes against the decision of the Army Council. I want to say at once that as a member of this House I am not prepared to abdicate not merely my rights but my duty of taking part in this debate, and of supporting my convictions by my vote, and, if necessary, voting against the decision of the Army Council, which has been put forward for justification on the ground that it is a decision of the Army Council. What is the House of Commons for? What is this Debate for? I am glad to see that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State acknowledges the correctness of what I say as to what is the right and the duty of the House of Commons. We are here to debate questions, and to say what we believe to be right, not merely to confirm the views of some other body.

After all, we are, as I think the right hon. Gentleman the member for Paisely (Mr. Asquith) once described the House of Commons to be : "The great inquest of the Nation." We are the best Court to which General Dyer, or any other person aggrieved by the action of any Government Department, can come. General Dyer has appealed to the Commander-in Chief. He has appealed to the Secretary of State. He has appealed to the Army Council. In the last resources he appeals to us. We have to decide the case. We

have to decide one way or the other. My hon. and gallant Friend made a powerful appeal for moderation in regard to this matter. I do not intend to attack the Secretary of State. But I think I must say that a more disastrous speech—and I say that with a sense of responsibility and the hope that my words may be believed—has never been made on the Amritsar affair. I had just returned from a visit to India and to Amritsar, and the opinions I am expressing as to the events which took place there are held by at least 80 per cent. of the Indian Civil Service throughout India and 90 per cent. of the European people. (Hear hear.) The Secretary of State for India has, for some time past, entirely lost the confidence of the Indian Civil Service. (Cheers.) It is a very serious matter, and the speech of the Secretary of State on this afternoon will have utterly destroyed any little shreds of confidence which was left to him, not merely in the minds of the Indian Civil Service, but in the minds of the British Army in India. (Cheers.) It is difficult in the face of the speech to make a moderate speech, which was merely one long vituperation of General Dyer in his action in India, and one long appeal to racial passions. (Cheers.)

The right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Paisley asked for a defence of General Dyer. He asked whether there was any body in this House prepared to say that General Dyer did right. I am prepared to say so. I am backed up in that opinion, as I say, by 80 per cent. of the Indian Civilians and by 90 per cent. of the European population.

Mr. Mills : Where did you get those figures ?

Sir W. Joynson Hicks : In India. I devoted my time in India to seeing and speaking to every one I could, both agitators as well as the governing classes. I did my best to form an accurate opinion. There is one person whose opinion I think may carry weight with this House. Hon. Members had heard of the lady missionary who had nearly been killed in Amritsar on 10th April. I refer to Miss Sherwood. She has told the whole of the facts of the case, how she has lived for 15 years amongst the Indian population, how she was torn from her bicycle while riding to from her work, how she was battered from head to foot, how she was left for dead, and how subsequently she was carried into a house, and after being there a little while had to be carried to another.

Mr. Mills : By Indians ?

Sir W. Joynson Hicks : By Indians, who were themselves attacked for having so carried her into the house. Miss Sherwood after her return to England, I think I am correct in saying, went to see the Secretary of State for India, and declined to accept any money compensation. She would not take

blood-money from this country. I have seen her. I have seen General Dyer and Sir M. O'Dwyer. Miss Sherwood has asked me to read to the House of Commons a letter which she has written, and I crave the indulgence of the Committee while I read it. It is a letter from an Englishwoman on the spot who, even after her ill-treatment, still hopes and intends to go back to the Punjab. She says :

"I have lived in the Amritsar neighbourhood for nearly 15 years, and my work in connection with the Church of England Zenana Missionary Society has brought me into close contact with the homes of the Punjab, both in Village and City. Moreover, I was superintendent and manager of the City Mission Schools for over 600 girls. Hindu and Muhammadan, at the time of the riots. As is known to you, I was almost killed on the 10th of April and was, in fact, left for dead in the streets of Amritsar. I was picked up and carried into the fort, where I lay for 19 days before I could be removed to England. During that time I heard all about the further riots and the shooting on the 13th from people who were in touch with what was happening. In March people of Amritsar bazars were talking of striking. The prospect of the police even joining it was discussed."

I want the Committee to realise the position of affairs in Amritsar and the whole of the Punjab.

"Never mind if they don't, we ourselves will fight", is a translation of the actual words used. On the day I was wounded, I saw men tearing down poles from shop awnings and seizing hold of anything likely to serve for a weapon, and a rushing out of the city to a given rendezvous."

"To teach the people that a wrong was done them (as sedition-mongers are doing, backed by English people) is a cruel and wicked thing, and far from mending matters will make them infinitely worse. No Indian in writing or conversation with me has referred to the repressive measures as other than meet and right under the circumstances. I should like to say that, loving the people as I do, having worked amongst them for years, and still hoping to go back to India, I am convinced that there was real rebellion in the Punjab, and that General Dyer saved India and us from a repetition of the miseries and cruelties of 1857."

I have letters from five other English missionary ladies who were in Amritsar at the time, and who went through this terrible time. All asked me to implore the House of Commons not to do this great wrong to General Dyer. One account says :

"The children had no milk, but only bully beef, and there were no sanitary conveniences in the fort. We had a terrible time,

recalling the days of Mutiny which was a very, very bad time for Englishwomen and children." Another account :

"I was 16 days in the Amritsar Fort in April, 1919, in consequence of the deplorable riots which took place, and I wish to do my part in strongly protesting against the injustice being done to General Dyer, who, I believe, did his duty and saved us from unspeakable horrors. I have lived in India longer even than Miss Sherwood, and love India's people very dearly, but in such crises only those on the spot can judge as to what action to take, and they, according to British tradition, should be justly treated"

What was the condition of affairs before General Dyer struck his blow—this inevitable and necessary blow on 13th April? One would imagine, from all that is being said, that General Dyer, a blood-thirsty English officer, found this gathering perfectly peaceful on the Jallianwala Bagh, and had said, "We must destroy this crowd, we must fire merely for the love of firing." The whole of Northern India was in what amounted to revolt and rebellion in the early part of April, 1919. From Calcutta to Peshawar and from Lahore to Bombay there were sporadic revolts and riots all over the country.

Colonel Wedgwood : Why? what were the causes?

Sir W. Joynson Hicks : I am not going into the causes. What we have got to face are facts with which General Dyer had to deal, the knowledge that was within General Dyer's brain when he was called upon by the Civil Authorities to take a hand in this disposal. I know there are political causes. I know there are political troubles in India, and there will be far worse political trouble in India in the near future.

Colonel Wedgwood : After they have read your speech!

Sir W. Joynson Hicks : I am trying merely to give to the Committee what I believe to be the facts of the case. I want hon. Members to realise that General Dyer knew that he had charge of this whole district. In Lahore the capital, there had been riots. I want to refer to those, because I notice in *the Times* newspaper this morning a leading article pleading for moderation, and asking why it was not possible to adopt the same methods at Amritsar as had been used in that quelling of the mob at Lahore on April 1910 and '12. If the leader writer in *the Times* had read the evidence given before the Commission, he would have seen that Lieut. Colonel Johnson who was in charge at Lahore, gave evidence before the Commission in which he said that he considered the quieting of Lahore was due 60 per cent. to the action of General Dyer at Amritsar. The action at Amritsar of General Dyer spread all through the Punjab and particularly quieted the town of Lahore. In Amritsar itself when these riots

broke out they were directly anti-British and anti-Christian. The crowd attacked one of the English banks and murdered the English manager, and the English assistant they beat to death. They piled up the furniture and set fire to the whole place. Then they went to the Alliance Bank and murdered the Manager. Afterwards they visited both the Town Hall and the Post Office and set fire to them. I brought back photographs of these places given to me by the Lieut. Governor of the Punjab, and they showed these burned buildings where the bank managers were murdered, and building after building occupied by English residents and Christians were burnt.

The telegram system was attacked and the railways, and wherever they could get hold of an English guard on the railway he was beaten to death. They went to an army hospital to get hold of another lady missionary and she only escaped through the kindness and loyalty of her Indian friends. They went to Indian christian church and burned that. The Religious tract Society's Depot was burned, and they tried to get hold of the Church Missionary Society Girl's School. The state of things there on the 10th and 11th of April did amount to a rebellion. The difference between myself and the Secretary of State for War is, whether there was a rebellion or not? If there was no rebellion but merely a local riot, then General Dyer could be rightly convicted of inhumanity and cruelty, but if there was a rebellion, as I submit there was, then General Dyer's action was justified. It was a rebellion which might have led to almost anything, in fact, it was an open rebellion.

It is not a question in these circumstances as to how far General Dyer should have gone, because he was at a war with a section of the people of India, and a section of the people of India were at war with general Dyer. The right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) said that nothing happened between the 10th, and the 13th of April. At that time the whole city was in the hands of the military, soldiers had to be poured in, and the reason why General Dyer had only a few troops was because the troops were guarding every available place, protecting the European population. The whole city was picketed during the 11th and 12th of April. It was all one continuous operation, and not merely incidental firing on the part of General Dyer's force. The native populace had every possible warning. During the riot the military had to shoot in Amritsar, and some men were killed, and at their funeral on the 10th the following notice was issued.

"The troops have orders to restore order in Amritsar and to use all force necessary. No gatherings nor procession of any sort will be allowed. All gatherings will be fired on. Any persons leaving

the city in groups of more than four will be fired on. Respectable persons should keep indoors." On the night of the 11th of April General Dyer arrived, and on the 12th he marched round the city with as large a show of force as possible. As he marched the inhabitants were insolent and spat on the ground as the troops passed, and amid all this provocation General Dyer did nothing to them, and the most extreme opponent of General Dyer could not find fault with him up to this point. He did his best not to take the extreme measures on the 12th which he was forced to take on the 13th. One or two extracts from the reports of the Committee which investigated the disturbances in the Punjab will show exactly what took place on the 13th when the following proclamation was issued :

"The inhabitants of Amritsar are hereby warned that if they will cause damage to any property or will commit any act of violence in the environs of Amritsar, it will be taken for granted that such acts are due to incitement in Amritsar city, and offenders will be punished according to Military Law. All meetings and gatherings are hereby prohibited, and will be dispersed at once under Military Law."

On the 12th instant my right hon. Friend said that nothing happened, but a force had to be sent out to bring in two ladies, and during the day the telegraph wires were cut between Chbeharta and Amritsar, between Khalsa and Gurushar, and between Khalsa and Chbeharta. In spite of all that happened on the 10th, in spite of all the firing that took place, the rebels were quietly taking means to isolate Amritsar and prepare themselves for anything that might take place on the following day. On the 13th General Dyer went round Amritsar, and at 19 places he called a halt, and by sounding a drum he summoned the people and at those 19 places he read out another proclamation which was drawn up in English and in the vernacular as follows :

"It is hereby proclaimed to all to whom it may concern that no person residing in the city is permitted or allowed to leave the city in his own or hired conveyance or on foot without a pass. No person residing in the Amritsar city is permitted to leave his house after 8. Any persons found in the city after 8 are liable to be shot. No procession of any kind is permitted to parade the streets in the city or any part of the city, or outside of it, at any time. Any such processions or any gathering of four men will be looked upon and treated as unlawful assembly and dispersed by force of arms, if necessary."

It is idle to say that these proclamations were not known to the whole of the population. I have spoken with men on the spot who were on the police force at the time, both Native and English ; and not only these, but the Indian official as well in

Amritsar, supported General Dyer to the utmost in the action he was taking, and none of them will dispute that the inhabitants of that city knew of this proclamation and knew of the danger they would be subject to. In spite of those proclamations word was brought to General Dyer that this crowd was assembling in the Jallianwala Bagh. It is true that it was impossible for more than a few troops to get through the narrow opening into this place at the same time, but the right hon. Gentleman is not correct when he said the crowd could not get out at the other end because they could get out the garden and over the walls. There was only one entrance for the troops, and General Dyer and his troops came in at this narrow entrance. He knew that the telegraph wires had been cut and that Amritsar was isolated. He knew that there was a crowd being addressed by an agitator, the same agitator who was condemned for his connection with the murders on the 10th, but who, I regret to say, was pardoned by the India Government. He was haranguing the mob and doing his best to excite them. General Dyer had only 50 men armed with rifles and about 40 with cutlasses or knives. What would this House have said if he had waited and allowed the crowd to charge him? The mere force of numbers and the mere impact of the crowd would have swept General Dyer and his force absolutely out of existence if they had attacked him. The Europeans were behind General Dyer, and I am sure hon. Members would have condemned him and rightly condemned him if he had allowed himself to be overwhelmed by that mob.

It is not for me to say what some of my hon. Friends would have done, but it is not for hon. Members who do not know the facts to say that they would have acted differently. I do not know any man who would say that with such responsibility upon his shoulders, and with the knowledge that General Dyer had, he would have dared to have abstained from firing in the way he did. It is said that General Dyer's force fired without any cessation, but if you look at the report of the Brigade-Major of his forces who has since died, it will be seen that he says :

"We began to fire upon the crowd, which broke into two bodies. . Things were getting very serious indeed, and looked as if they were going to rush. Fire was ordered first on one lump of crowd which looked the most menacing and then on the other."

Those are the words of this officer who was merely making his formal report, and he says that the crowd looked as if they were going to rush them. What has happened since? Was General Dyer assailed by the people of the Punjab for the action he took? Certainly not. They afterwards came to him in their thousands

and thanked him for what he had done. They thanked him for the action he had taken. He was made a Sikh—one of the highest honours given to men. He was employed by the Government to march round the whole district and pacify it—this blood-thirsty man who is said to have wantonly shot down so many of their fellow country-men, was the man who was selected to do his best in friendly conversation with them. I assert that General Dyer was and is to-day beloved of the Sikh Nation. I should like to say one word with regard to the speech of the Secretary for War. He made great play with the statement that the crowd were not armed with lethal weapons. Any one acquainted with conditions in India would have known it was impossible under the Arms Act for them to be armed with guns. Nevertheless, they imported into Amritsar hundreds of thousands of ironshod bamboo canes which they proposed to use. It was suggested by the right hon. Gentleman that if the object of General Dyer was to disperse the crowd, his action was uncalled for and unnecessary. I say, on the other hand, if it was to stop or to put an end to rebellion, then he was entitled to judge of what was to be done in military fashion.

The hon. Gentleman said that nobody with any reputation in India had suggested the punishment of General Dyer or other officials concerned. Has he seen the report of a meeting which took place in the Kingsway Hall, London, on the 3rd June? It was attended by gentlemen who are supporting my right hon. Friend to-day. It was addressed by an hon. Member of the Legislative Council—the Hon. Mr. Patel. May I here utter a word of warning to the hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle—under-Lyme (Col Wedgwood) in this connection. I happened to be in the Legislative Council at Delhi when the Hon. Mr. Patel was making a speech not quite so bad perhaps, but one in which he quoted a speech of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, and then turned round and said, "These are the noble words of a noble man." After that I went out. This is what Mr. Patel said at the meeting in London the other day.

"When the Indian people are informed that the Government have the fullest confidence in Lord Chelmsford and a high appreciation of Sir M. O'Dwyer's energy, do you suppose they will be impressed by Mr. Montagu's platonic condemnation of some of the excesses under Martial Law? No; they will judge you by your deeds, not by your words, and if you have confidence in Lord Chelmsford, they will have no confidence in you. Lord Chelmsford must go. It is a fresh insult and outrage to Indian sentiment that the Government should express their confidence in such a Viceroy."

There was another speech made by a Mr. Horniman, who was expelled or deported from India, and it was almost equally as bad. I will refer to only one further speech, and that was delivered by an Indian lady, Mrs. Naidu, who gave a description of alleged action of our troops at Amritsar. If hon. Members really believe in the increasing goodwill of certain sections of the people of India, I want them to realise what this woman said and said in the presence of two English Members of Parliament—the hon. Member for Newcastle (Major Barnes) and the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Neil Maclean) on the 3rd June 1920 at the Kingsway Hall. Mrs. Naidu said :

"Women, whose faces had never been touched by the curious sun or the moon, were dragged into the market place. My sisters were stripped naked ; they were flogged ; they were outraged ; and yet you dare talk of the auction of souls."

Neither of the two hon. Members bounded up in his seat as I should have expected any English Member of Parliament would have done. One of them in fact, the hon. Member for Newcastle, said :

"We have just listened to a very, very wonderful speech which had that greatest power a speech can ever have, to get past the head to the heart, and that is where it arrived."

Immediately, I got that report I wrote to General Dyer and Sir M. O'Dwyer, and I am authorised by those two gentlemen to say in this House of Commons that that statement, as far as their knowledge goes, and I think their knowledge is conclusive in the matter, is absolutely and totally untrue. Let English Members realise that that is the kind of incitement to hostility to our rule in India which is indulged in by extreme sections of the Indian Community. This was going on last year, and it is going on to-day. When I was at Peshawar there was a placard posted up in that city, which itself is too liable to disorder and crime, calling upon the Indians to rise and destroy the British forces. It said :

"Your hearts will soon be soothed by the entire annihilation of British Imperialism and the complete destruction of these enemies of humanity."

This placard was posted up in Peshawar in March, 1920, and it goes on :

"Active resistance will crush the viper's head. Burn their offices, mutilate their railways and telegraphs, induce the Police and Army to work with you and slay these dogs of Britain everywhere you find them."

I want to make an appeal to this Committee on behalf of the Englishmen and Englishwomen in the Civil Service, and in the Army, who are upholding our flag there under very great difficulties.

We hear a great deal of the responsibilities of Empire, but what is too often referred to is the responsibility to the native races on the part of the Government. There is, however, a responsibility also to the Europeans. You send these men out, you allow their women and children to go out there to live in scattered areas, spread all over the country—often miles and miles away from any help, and they are only enabled to live and to rule by the knowledge of the fact that there is in India a British Army on which they can rely in the last resort. I appeal to this Committee, not merely on behalf of them, but on behalf also of the soldiers in India, who feel strongly with regard to the action which the Army Council has taken into the case of General Dyer. They feel that when the next riot takes place they may be called upon in similar circumstances to come to a somewhat similar decision. Are you going to tell them that this House of Commons has supported the action of the Army Council in the case of General Dyer, and are you going to tell them also that in the future in any action they may take they will not have the support of Great Britain? We must trust the men on the spot. We send out our best men to India to the Civil Service and to the Army, and we have to trust them not once or twice, but at all times.

Mr. Bennett: A meeting took place in this city not many weeks ago attended mainly by Englishmen whose lives have been spent largely in India. As reported to me, the speech of the Chairman of that meeting may be summarised in these words: "We English have got to live with the natives, and the best we can do is to get on good terms with them, and say as little as we can about these disturbances." With part of that sentiment I cordially agree. We have to pursue a policy of moderation. There are obstacles in the way of that policy and in the way of a good understanding between the two races. Some of them are raised by hon. Members opposite, some by hon. Members around me. So far as hon. Members opposite are concerned, I deprecate the agitation—premature and purely fictitious—on this question which they have carried on. The meetings that have been held have been artificial in character. I have a letter from Mr. Horniman, who has been referred to to-day, a journalist who was expelled, and, in my opinion, properly expelled, from Bombay. In that letter he writes to a newspaper in Bombay to the effect that he is "working the press in this country for all that is worth." He goes on further to say "you may trust me to keep the Press of England up to the mark."

That discounts a great deal of what we read in the English Papers. On the other hand, we have got a mischievous Press in

England poisoning the wells against the Secretary for India. I think we have seen some co-operation in that unworthy purpose in some of the questions which have been put in this House during the last few days. The great obstacles to a friendly understanding, which is profoundly to be deferred therefore, come from two sides. Two eminent Members of the legal profession, one representing the higher and the other the less high branch of the profession, have shown what I may call the forensic astuteness in concentrating the discussion to-day upon the case of General Dyer. That made an appeal to our fair-mindedness; they put before us the case of an honourable officer, who has served his country for 34 years, and who, they think, has not had justice. I have read fully the statement which General Dyer laid before the Army Council, and have given it my best consideration, and I am satisfied that there is every warrant for the decision which has been come to in regard to him. I notice one thing that was not known to me before—namely, that General Dyer was for some years on the staff as instructor in Military Law. That rather disturbs me. I want to know how many officers of the Indian Army have received the benefit of his teaching in military law, and how many of them have imbibed the peculiar principles to which he has given expression. For instance, is it generally believed, amongst the officers of the Indian Army, that, in cases of trouble it matters little whether there is to be excess of shooting or not? He says excess does not concern him. "I was not concerned with excess," I think he says, "because I had in view the effect which it was necessary to produce upon the public feeling in the Punjab."

I am not going further into the question of General Dyer. I want to take the discussion away from General Dyer altogether for the time being, and to call the attention of the committee to the exercise of Martial Law in the Punjab at this time, the conditions under which Martial Law was exercised and the lessons to be derived from it. We shall waste our time if we simply stand here condemning or exonerating particular individuals. We want to find what happened, and to guard in the future against the consequences of the errors that have been made. I will ask hon. Members to study carefully the evidence given by a number of the officers who were appointed as Area Military Officers to carry out Martial Law, after the control had been handed over by the civil authority. The committee recognised, of course, the serious dangers which follow from the institution of Martial Law. The ordinary rules of evidence are suspended, but what is worst of all is that a number of men are put in positions of judicial authority who necessarily have no experience of exercising such authority and are utterly incapable of doing so properly.

Martial Law may be a matter of military necessity. Owing to pressure of circumstances it may be inevitable, but it is a thing to be avoided so far as it possibly can be. I want the committee to endeavour to get some grasp of the conditions under which Martial Law was carried out, and of the kind of men who were occupied in carrying it out. I wish to make no personal attacks on them, and I shall as far as possible avoid naming any of these officers, but the errors of their administration and their want of judgment and, at times, even of common-sense, must be made known. There was a young officer—I fancy he must have been a very young soldier indeed—who invented a number of minor punishments. These punishments have been called “freak punishments” and I think that is a term which sufficiently does justice to them. He invented skipping as a means of minor punishment—very minor, I think we must say. In other case, finding that a culprit before him was given to poetry, he ordered to him to write an ode in his honour. He also ordered that one after another of the persons who came before him should touch the grounds with their foreheads. He justified himself for that by saying that it was a common thing, and he believed it was done all over India. If that is so, I hope the Government of India have had their attention directed to it, and we should like to have an assurance that no longer are men humiliated by being made to touch the ground with their foreheads.

We get more serious things than this. A military officer exercising authority under martial law had to deal with a case in which martial law notices had been stripped from the wall of a school. He had no evidence as to who was guilty of this irregularity, but he thought he could find out, or, at any rate, that he could administer justice, by ordering that some of the bigger in the school should be picked out and whipped. His own admission before the Committee was, “They were not necessarily guilty but it was their misfortune.” Then he was asked, “Were warnings against defacement of notices written or oral? I do not remember,” he said, “but what does it matter?” Questions of life or death may come before these tribunals, and some importance must be attached to the regularity of the procedure and when an officer gives an answer indicating that he does not care whether an order is written or oral, it is a clear indication of the general prevalence of slipshod procedure in these courts. Again, and I think this is still more serious, we read that at Lahore a whipping triangle was set up before the accused persons were tried. That seems to be an anticipation of events scarcely consistent with a judicial attitude of mind. Worse still, also at Lahore, gallows were erected before the court opened. There again, is the sinister anticipation of the issue which, I think, is discreditable to all who are

associated with it. If we want a historic parallel to that, we should find it in the case of the Duc d'Eughien, whom Napoleon had tried at Vincennes, and for whom a grave was dug before the trial began. I put this case of the erection of a gallows before the opening of the court on a par with that sinister episode in the procedure of Napoleon. In another case, a Deputy Commissioner in Gujranwalla caused the leaders, or those who were believed to be the leaders of the popular party, to be handcuffed and chained, marched through the streets to the station, and sent to Lahore in a goods truck. The same official arrested Gover Singh, aged 60, as a hostage, because his three sons were missing. An order was passed confiscating his property, and a warning was issued that any one attempting to reap his crops would be shot.

These are matters to which hon. Members here attach no importance. They concentrate the whole of their thought and care upon vindicating General Dyer, and proving that he has been very badly treated. I think they would spend their time a little more usefully, and would be more fully performing their duties in regard to India, if they would inquire into the methods by which martial law was administered at that time. I think we ought, in following these proceedings, to note the mentality of the men who were engaged in them. What can you say of the mentality of a man who, over and over again, will tell you that the people of the Punjab like martial law? We have heard of eels getting used to be skinned, but when it is said that the people of a province like martial law, it only shows what extraordinary persons were put in charge of the administration of martial law at that time. "People liked my administration." "People liked martial law, especially the masses." Another officer who had not been salaamed by some children—the pupils of a school—gave orders that the whole of the boys in that school should for a week be made to come and salute him at his office, and should, in addition, salute the Union Jack. If that officer had set himself to devise means by which the children of that town could be made as long as they lived to hate the Union Jack and the people who ruled under it, he could not have adopted a more efficacious procedure. Because the pupils in one group of colleges were suspected of tearing down a martial law notice, the whole of the students—a thousand all told—were made for a whole week to march 16 miles a day to the military headquarters. That is the rising generation in India. Those are the students, the class of people who in Italy, for instance, took a prominent part in the *risorgimento*. What *gaucherie*, what stupidity there must be amongst this school of officers in the Punjab, who will take these men and make them hate England

and English officers! We have heard a great deal about General Dyer, and the dangers that would have arisen if he had not been as stern as he was, but no one in this Committee, so far, has seemed to contemplate the danger to British rule that follows proceedings of this kind. I maintain that those who uphold this procedure, or who ignore it, and concentrate their attention in a wrong fashion on the problem, are doing every harm to British rule. The proceedings I am describing do not stand alone. There is a whole group of blunders and oppressions and hardships of this kind which seem to me to provide material for a hymn of hate against England, and nothing short of it. I ask hon. Members to study that aspect of the question, and not to concentrate upon General Dyer. I will give another instance. We have heard—reference was made to it in the speech of Secretary of State—of a particular officer who arrested a wedding party and had them flogged because they were in excess of the number allowed to pass in the streets. The officer said this whipping of the wedding party was the only regrettable incident that occurred in his jurisdiction under martial law. He must have had dense mind and a strange perception; because it was this officer who had been responsible for this marching backwards and forwards of students and for a number of other acts of oppression which were only too characteristic of the reign of martial law in that part of country.

We have had in the Report of the Commission an exoneration of the Government of Sir M. O'Dwyer from the charge that he had exercised undue pressure in recruiting and the loan campaign. As to recruiting, it is fair to Sir M. O'Dwyer to recognise that there was a quota which the various administrations were expected to work up to in their recruiting operations, and it is also fair to say that when these were brought to notice measures were taken to prevent their repetition, and it is also fair to say that one witness before the commission said that those who were guilty of exercising pressure in recruiting were native officials of some standing. As to the loan operations, I do not accept the finding of the Commission in regard to that, because I have here a circular which was issued in the Punjab administration giving instructions as to the way in which encouragement was to be given to the loan, and this passage occurs:

"Deputy Commissioners will find much assistance in estimating the contributions that they ought to get from various places by going to the Income Tax Officer and getting the Income Tax Returns, which will furnish a fairly reliable index to the financial conditions of individuals who are expected to help the loan."

In India, as I understand, Income Tax operations are as confi-

dential as they are in this country, and we can realise the possibilities at all events of a somewhat oppressive officialism if we contemplate the officers of the Government in charge of Loan operations going to the Income Tax Officer, and asked him to give a return of the incomes of this or that individual. I cannot, in view of that circular, join in the acquittal of the Punjab Government of the charge of having exercised undue pressure in some, at all events, of their operations.

We have had a good deal said to-day as to the Punjab having been saved by the operations of General Dyer. What evidence have we of that? What inductive process based upon known facts have we which leads legitimately to the conclusion that a great rising, equal to that of the Mutiny of 1857, was imminent, and that these severe measures had to be taken to prevent it? The Punjab knows something of conspiracy as Bengal knows a good deal of conspiracy. We had a conspiracy seven or eight years ago and another of the same kind occurred a little later. There was organised dacoity carried out with the object of seizing arms and the money with which to buy arms. It was accompanied by attempts to corrupt the native army, by attacks upon the regimental armouries, and attempts to get arms from them, and by the manufacture of bombs, and I believe classes were opened to teach what may be called political chemistry—the manufacture of bombs. But there is absolutely no indication of the existence of any preparations of that kind during the troubles in the Punjab. We have evidence, too, which will not be questioned, as to the condition of the villages and of many towns even after these troubles had taken place. We have the statement of General Benyon that he had gone through all the villages in the neighbourhood and that he found the villagers were quiet and willing to co-operate with him in watching the railway lines. On page after page there is evidence that in the rural districts the people were as a whole quiet, and orderly and well-behaved. Not only so, but I have every reason to believe that the Government of the Punjab, even at the worst time, had confidence in two things. They trusted the Army, and their trust was fully justified. The Army was absolutely loyal during the whole of the proceedings. They also trusted the village populations. On the whole, they were quiet and orderly, and there were no signs, in large areas of the rural part of the Punjab, of any tendency towards insurrection. Therefore, I hold that this purely hypothetical danger, to which General Dyer points as his excuse for an act of gross and excessive severity, did not exist. I have as much reason to say there was no danger as hon. Members opposite have to say that there was, and in any case the findings of the Committee is with me. The Commit-

tee had much fuller opportunities for inquiring into the facts. The Committee came to the conclusion that there was no evidence of a widespread conspiracy. We had confirmation of that in Delhi. Immediately after the Afghan invasion a meeting of 40,000 people was held in Delhi at which the conduct of the Amir was condemned, and the Deputy-Commissioner of Delhi states his opinion that meeting was sincere. That is a fact which discourages belief in anything like a widespread movement towards conspiracy.

We have heard a great deal about General Dyer, but I have not heard one word from those who defended him as to the 300, 000, 000 millions of people who live in India, and what they think. The most remarkable thing to me has been that hon. Members have taken up the interests of one individual, and have concentrated all their thoughts on one individual, but have turned an absolutely blind eye to what the people of India think. That is not a reasonable way of dealing with a great question of this kind. We have to live with these people, and we have to be on close terms with them that we have been before, and they will have some reason to complain if they read this Debate and do not find one word as to what the people of India think of these happenings. It is no sign of real interest in India when a number of hon. Members become excited, as they did this afternoon, over the interests of an individual, and are so absolutely indifferent to the bearings of our discussion upon the people of India. We have been told that India was conquered by the sword and is being held by the sword. That doctrine is absolutely repudiated by every historical authority of any importance. We began as a trading nation. We did not go as a military nation, and we should have accomplished nothing in India but for the co-operation of Indian agents. Why should we vaunt this doctrine of holding by the sword in the face of a people whom we want to make a free people, whose liberties we are enlarging? During the enquiry we had the Commandant of a regiment stating that we can influence the Asiatic only by force. That is a view which is at the back of all these happenings and the operation of Martial Law. There has been an idea that the native of India is an inferior person who has to be held in restraint by coercion. The Secretary of State for India seems to have aroused the anger of certain hon. Members by a speech which I regard as a dignified and noble vindication of the liberal policy which has been pursued in India. What hon. Members have seen to justify them in speaking of it as an appeal to racial prejudice I do not know. The appeal to racial prejudice has come from their side. There is no warrant for the condem-

nation which has been passed upon a speech which is worthy of the subject and worthy of the occasion. Recently, we have had an opportunity of refreshing our memories on some of the achievements and speeches of the Earl of Beaconsfield. I came across a passage in which he reminded the people of this country that we were proud of our Empire, and the chief reason for being proud of it was that it had been based on sympathy as well as on force. Let us never forget that. Unless we get the sympathy and good-will of the people of India our task is ended or will be ended in a short time. We cannot contemplate a future in which the normal condition of things in India is one of antagonism between the people and the Government. If we are to continue the Dyer policy, the result must necessarily be no progress in India and no improvement in the relations between the people of India and the Government. The other day I had a letter from India, in which the writer—an Englishman who had lived the better part of his life there, and in whose judgment I place the most absolute confidence—said ; “Dyer is the greatest asset that the extremists in India have got.” No truer word has been contributed to this discussion. Dyerism will be an enormous help to those who are trying to oust the British Government from its place in India, and hon. Members who have been censuring the Secretary of State for India for the generous and sympathetic words in which he spoke of the people of India ought to realise that we reached a point at which most critical issues have to be decided. We have to ask ourselves whether we are to be on terms of friendship with the people of India or whether we are to go on dealing with them in a way in which so many officers have dealt with them. Those who have looked too lightly and with approval in too many cases upon the action of General Dyer, have a scale of value of their own of human life, in which they place the Indian below the European. This is not a political question, but a question of human values, and until we get rid of that idea and recognise the sacredness of European life, we shall be suspected by the people of India, our actions will be untavourably coloured, and our policy in that country will be a failure.

I appeal to those hon. Members on the other side of the House who have put themselves in antagonism to the policy of the Government to realise that it is they and not those who are supporting the Secretary of State, who will be responsible if in the time to come we should ever lose India. God grant that the connection between this country and India may long continue, that it may never cease, that India being a self-governing country, will at the same time remain an integral part of the British Commonwealth. But at the same time

we have to make it worth the while of the people of India to retain their place in that Commonwealth, and if they are to be treated as serfs, to be treated as too many of them were treated in those troublous times, the day of our rule will come to an end. I hope that hon. Members on that side who concentrate so much on the individual aspect of this case will realise its political importance and will realise that one at all events of the lessons which we have derived from this experience is that we must never again allow the military authorities to get out of touch with the civil authorities. Let hon. Members, if they want to see how things should be done, turn from Amritsar to Ahmedabad in the Bombay Presidency and see the success of an entirely different method. There the civil authority never lost touch with the military authority. The result was that within forty-eight hours the military authority was enabled to withdraw its orders suspending assemblages, and the abnormal condition of things was brought to an end. The real lessons which the Government have to learn is to follow the example of Ahmedabad and never again allow the military authorities to get into such entire detachment from the civil authority as it was allowed to do at Amritsar, with consequences of the most deplorable kind.

Brigadier-General Surtees urged hon. members to remember the effect that speeches and decisions in that House would have upon natives in all parts of the Empire. If British prestige were destroyed the Empire would collapse. In 1865 Governor Eyer saved the European inhabitants of Jamaica by prompt and strong action, for which he was persecuted as General Dyer had been. General Dyer had a similar idea in his mind. Europeans on the spot were the best judges of the situation. "We could not surrender India even if we wished to do so, yet if a plebiscite were taken to-morrow as to who should rule India, the result would be against us. If we did not hold India by moral suasion we must hold it by force, possibly thinly veiled, but undoubtedly by force." He believed that General Dyer, by his action saved the Empire from serious danger. As Mr. Palmer had rightly said they had a most deplorable speech that day from the Secretary of State for India which would go out to our great Dependency as an encouragement to lawlessness and those forces of disorder which every sane and patriotic Englishman was anxious to see laid to rest in India. His attitude would feed the flames of antagonism against him in a manner which, in his more reserved moments, he would sincerely regret.

Mr. Palmer : I think we are to be congratulated that during this dinner hour some one of more sober thoughts has addressed

himself to this tremendous question. Every one will feel that they are face to face with a crisis, as far as India is concerned. I imagine there is not a man in this House who does not realise that we hold in trust a great and mighty population in India, and that it is our duty to treat them with generosity and with justice. This debate has revealed that, while the vast body of the population of India are loyal subjects of the Crown, there is in India, as in other parts of the world, a vast organisation determined to bring down the strength and might of the British Empire. It was this distinguished general who was called upon at a moment of great emergency to settle for himself how he should deal with a crisis. No one who has read the evidence can fail to realise that throughout the Punjab and other parts of India there was a concerted attempt at revolution. General Beynon can be quoted in favour of General Dyer—

"The strong measures taken by General Dyer at Amritsar had a far-reaching effect and prevented any further trouble in the Lower Division Area."

We have had to-day a most deplorable speech from the Secretary of State for India, a speech which, I think, will go out to India as an encouragement to disloyalists and those forces of disorder which every sane and patriotic Englishman is anxious to see laid at rest. We know that during the War India provided some of the most gallant of our troops. It is not fair to suggest there are people here who believe that the great and loyal Indian population only to be kept down and repressed, and that we will not treat them as citizens of the Empire. One thing that has impressed me very much was this—that while General Dyer, able to visualise what was happening, realising the atmosphere in which he was moving, did his duty, severely, yes, but for the sake of the British Empire and for the sake of the people of India, a right hon. Gentleman sitting in oriental aloofness in Whitehall, a year after, and 6000 miles away, is pleased to measure the less or more of the severity applied by that gallant soldier. They actually passed strictures upon other gallant officers who did not exercise sufficient severity in the circumstances in which they were placed. On the one side you have the right hon. Gentleman in this House, far away from the scene, smug and safe here, censuring this gallant officer for the extra severity which, in his particular judgment, he thought it right to display, and we have on the other side actually criticism, if not censure, of other gallant officers, because they were not sufficiently severe in putting down sporadic risings. Let me quote, in one case with regard to Delhi—

"Firing continued no longer than was necessary to achieve the

legitimate object of restoring order and preventing a disastrous outbreak of violence”

That is a commendatory statement. Here is another one in regard to Ahmedabad—“The force used against the rioters was certainly not excessive. If greater force could have been applied at an early stage the commission of an atrocious murder and much destruction of property might have been prevented.”

Here is another in regard to Gujranwala.

“In failing to order the police to fire upon and so disperse the mob surrounding the burning Post Office, the Acting Deputy Commissioner appears to us to have committed an error. If effective measures had then been taken to disperse the mob and restore order, the later incidents of the day might have been avoided.”

It passes ones comprehension to understand the position. If an officer in the exercise of his discretion uses a little more or less severity according to the measure of the Secretary of State for India, he is broken on the wheel—no trial, no possibility of defending himself, and even his statement to the Army Council is carefully put out after we have had an announcement that he is condemned. That announcement went out last night to the world, and I came here at 8 o'clock this morning to get hold of General Dyer's statement. A more manly and splendidly frank and open statement I have never read. Here we have the right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for War, sitting in his oriental aloofness in Whitehall, denouncing General Dyer for what he did, and we have in the Hunter Commission Report criticisms of other officers for failing to take effective measures immediately to put down disturbances. The right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for India, made a deplorable speech. It will go out to India, to the seething masses there, who are ready for trouble and revolution, that there are large masses of opinion in this country who think that the Indian is to be down-trodden. That is not so. The right hon. Gentleman has done a great thing to India in the great measure of freedom and reform that he has brought about. That measure of freedom was passed by the House of Commons and by the very men whose opinions he has denounced to-day. Instead of coming down to this House to-day with a statesman-like and reasonable speech he fed the flames of antagonism in a manner which I feel sure in his more reserved moments he will sincerely regret. An hon. Member said just now that no regard had been given to Indian opinion and yet we know that a vast mass of sober patriotic Indian opinion was with General Dyer and applauded him for the splendid severity of his action before the right hon. Gentleman and the Government gave way to the clamour of revolution, and six months after these events, set up a

committee. I have had some letters from people in India who were concerned in these tremendous and troublesome days. An hon. Gentleman referred in terms of praise to what happened in Ahmedabad. I have a letter here from a lady in which she says :—

"I was in Ahmedabad at the time of the Amritsar riots, when we experienced riots of similar nature, and I have not the least hesitation in saying that the prompt action taken by General Dyer in the Punjab saved our lives. The British police-sergeant who was the very first victim in Ahmedabad, had his hands cut off, and he was then hacked to pieces. At a small station, a loyal native who gave the order to fire on the mob, was tied to a chair with the official records piled around him, and they then poured kerosene oil on him, thus burning him alive. I expect you know that they burned down most of the other Government buildings, but although the guard on the Bombay Bank fired on them the building was left untouched owing to the fact that the securities of the natives were in the bank. We people are powerless to help the man who, by a great decision made in a few minutes, saved us all from a fate too horrible to think of."

That is the testimony of a woman who was in India at the time. I have had many other letters from those who were with General Dyer. One man writes :

"I have had the pleasure of serving under this General, and a better or kind-hearted man you could not wish to meet. I went all through the Amritsar and Lahore riots with the motor transport section, and consequently saw a lot of events that happened ; and only those that were in those riots could realise fully the danger it meant to the empire. This General had only one alternative, and that was to deal with a firm hand. If he did not give the orders he gave, there would not be many of the garrison alive to-day to tell the truth."

There are many other people, I could quote, who says that General Dyer saved India. In my opinion, for what it is worth, there was an incipient revolution which might have grown into immense and mighty proportion and greater proportion even than the great Indian Mutiny. Every evidence shows that that was so. I think it is rather a commentary on the turn of the wheel that it should be the business of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for war, who is responsible for more errors of judgment than any man sitting on the Treasury Bench, and responsible for the loss of more lives than any man sitting in this House, to get up and denounce this gallant man who, in my opinion, saved India from grave trouble and saved the women from grave outrage and saved India for the Empire. Some hon. Gentlemen.

who may have not given a deep study to all the documents including the report of the National Council which was well worth reading, do not, I think, realise what was happening there. Not only was Amritsar the centre of this thing, but throughout the whole of the Punjab there was a deep and concerted movement to overthrow the British Raj. Here is one case which is worth mentioning. In a city of Punjab frightened women had taken refuge in one of the rallying points, as they were called, waiting eagerly for the arrival of the troops, and whilst there, notice were issued by the natives stating that there were 80 women and children waiting to be ravaged. In fact, no girls' school was sacred. Then there was the remarkable letter written by the Archbishop of Simla, who is not a politician, and not a man who is seeking to make dialectical points in this House to break a gallant officer for the sake of saving their own position. He is a Right Reverend prelate of the Church who has the respect and affection of thousands of the natives of India. No man in this House who has only sense of responsibility can fail to appreciate what he wrote. I ask hon. Gentlemen who as a rule associate themselves with the Government to pause before they go into the lobby to support the right hon. Gentleman to-night. This is a matter which cannot easily be settled by mere argument in this House. It goes much deeper—it goes down to the very bed-rock of our great Empire. I appreciate what the right hon. Gentleman said, and with much of his speech I agree, but the whole tone and temper of that speech inflamed the Committee more than I have seen it flamed in 35 years' experience. We are sincere in this matter, and I grant that he is. We feel that General Dyer has been sentenced without trial. Cannot the Government see some way by which justice can be meted out to this honourable and gallant officer by which we can yet have an inquiry where he can put his case and defend it, as he has never yet had a real opportunity of doing? If that suggestion, which I throw out, could be accepted by the Government, many of us who feel very deeply on this matter would have our feelings somewhat alleviated. I ask hon. Members to forget the past and to remember the British Empire, and to realise throughout the vast spaces of the world. We ask our gallant soldiers to uphold the British flag, and if a man goes a little beyond what we consider to be just and fair, do not break him on the wheel without trial, but give him a fair chance of being heard. Reprimand him if you will, and say to him he exceeded the legitimate needs of the case, and that in the circumstances in which he was placed he may have overdone the severity, but let us realise that we shall not hold our Empire together if, whenever we get clamour from revolution arise, a gallant soldier

who has done his duty is to be broken at the dictate of the Treasury Bench.

Lieutenant Commander H. Young unreservedly supported the action of the Government of India and the Secretary of State. They were dealing simply with a question of the exercise of professional discretion by a soldier. He would fain take every point in favour of General Dyer up to the critical moment of the opening of fire at Amritsar and assume that he was right in opening fire. But as to the continuance of the firing, it was common ground that the shooting was more than necessary to disperse the meeting. It was carried on for another purpose—for the sake of intimidation. That was an extension of the simple, definite, well established rule of the use of minimum of force for the immediate circumstances which ought not to be countenanced either in the interests of officers in charge, for it extended their area of judgment from the situation immediately before them to the situation in its widest possible aspect, or in the interest of the civilian population, for whom the rule was the charter for the protection of their lives, liberties, and safety from unduly violent action.

Colonel Wedgwood : I know I am regarded as an anti-patriot in this House of Commons—as one opposed to the interests of his own country, of course. Old Members of this House know that that is not so. If ever there was a time in which it behoved those who love England to speak out, it is to-day. Hon. Members have discussed this question of General Dyer as if it concerned only him ; but General Dyer was only an incident. What we are discussing or ought to be discussing, is whether India is to have a chance to remain part of the British Empire. That is the question that I do beg hon. Members to take into account. Do you desire to see the British Empire preserved ? If we do, we must remember that it can only be preserved by the co-operation of the Indians and not by any other means. Some are carried away by the idea that the safety of English men and women comes first. It does not come first. Every man who went out to France to fight in the War knew perfectly well that his safety and the safety of his relatives and friends was of no importance whatever. They knew that the honour of their country comes first. And there is a profound antagonism between honour and safety. General Dyer no doubt acted as if the safety of English men and women should come first. I think that was the wrong thing to do. It is more important to save the national honour than to save any particular item in the nation. I would rather say, for the interests of our country, that Englishmen and women had been shot down at Jallianwala by Indians than that Indians had been shot down by Englishmen,

The principal charge I make against Dyer is not that he shot down Indians, but that he placed on English history the gravest blot since in days gone-by we burned Joan of Arc at the stake.

I am not speaking from an Indian point of view, but solely from an English point of view. Where a question of National honour is concerned we must look at it with English eyes and I beg hon. Members to realise that by doing this action General Dyer has injured our honour and that is his crime. The safety of life is of no importance, the safety of women and children, even, is of no importance compared with the honour of England, and every member knows that that is so. The complaint is not that General Dyer committed this crime. It is not just a question of punishing General Dyer. I agree with Mr. Gandhi, the great Indian, representing, I think, all that is finest in India, when he said: "We do not want to punish General Dyer; we have no desire for revenge; we want to change the system that produces General Dyer." That is what we must do. It seems to me that it is hopeless now, after this Debate. I could hope in the old days that the Indians would listen to what I said and would take it as coming from a friend. Now they will have faith no longer—because I am an Englishman. But this I would urge upon the Indians—to remember that revenge is the aim of fools. What really matters is to change the system that produces crime. That is why I welcomed the tone and speech of the right hon. Gentlemen opposite. After all, we do not care whether General Dyer is punished or not. What we want to do, what we want to put before the minds of the Indians is that, with the help of Indian co-operation and their control of their own destinies, they will be in charge, in future, of law and order in India and will be able to prevent these things happening. That is the only hope in the present situation. I do not believe that hon. Members understand and what the feeling is in India at the present day. When we were passing the Bill for India, I had the brightest hopes for the future of India as a self-governing dominion within the British Empire, but since that time the situation day by day has gone worse. The worst thing of all is that 80 percent of the Anglo-Indian opinion backed General Dyer, and were against the Secretary of State. That is what perpetually, and day by day is making the Indians enraged, antagonistic, anti-English and Sinn Fein. If they decide that they will take no part in the new constitution, that they will boycott it, then it is all up with the British Empire in India. I will read this telegraph which I have received among other messages. It is from a mass meeting in Bombay.—

"Hunter Report and Despatches rudely shaken deepest faith in British justice, unless Parliament vindicates character British rule by condemnation and repudiation Punjab official miscreants."

I know that is strong language—

"Britains moral prestige, of greater consequence than military strength, will be irretrievably lost and peoples' hearts alienated from British rule."

That message was sent by Jamnadas Dwarkadas who is a "moderate." That is the feeling of the moderates there about the course adopted by the extremists in England. It is an illustration of what I have said, that hon. Members do not understand what is the feeling in India. They do not understand how near we are to Sinn Fein in India, and that it will become more and more difficult to secure a settlement. The hon. Member for Twickenham (Sir W. Joynson Hicks) put the finishing touch upon the whole affair. He spoke with a certain authority, for though the voice was the voice of the hon. Member, the words were the words of Sir Michael O'Dwyer. He spoke as though the future relationship of the Indian and the English was worth nothing, as though what was important alone was our caste rule in India. Rule by force, by a class, must now come to an end all over the world. No one need fear military uprising in India. A military uprising is absolutely impossible in these days of aeroplanes, armoured cars, roads and railways, and wireless telegraphy. Such an uprising would be absolutely impracticable. What we are face to face with there is not a military uprising, but simply passive resistance. Once you get people refusing to take part in Government, you may carry on for a few years, but in the end you will find yourselves where the Irish Government is to-day—and without an Ulster!

You have got this situation before you in India. What are you going to do? Is the only message that the English Parliament has to send to India this, that the only day on which we discussed Indian affairs was taken up with discussing the right and wrong of a British General? That is no message for India. It may be good enough for thoughtless people who want simply to create a little sensation for the moment. The speeches that have been made will attract attention. Every word that is said here to-day will be read in India. We cannot help it even if we would. To my mind every speech ought to be delivered to appeal to Indians, to show them that the people in England condemn this affair at Amritsar, condemn the horrors of the Military law. I speak here to-day for thousands of Liberals as well as Labour Members, in saying that we are against the Jallianwala Bagh murder,

against the way in which the martial law was carried on in the Punjab, against Sir M. O'Dwyer, and against the whole administration of the Punjab. We send that as a word to help those men, like Mr. Lagau, who is now trying to bring the Punjab back to sanity, and Sir George Lloyd, who managed to carry Bombay through these stirring times without any martial law. Cannot we send to them a message of help, try to assist them in the work they are doing, instead of perpetually making their work of reconciliation more impossible by the insane speeches made from these benches.

Will not hon. Members understand that unless we now take broad view of the future of the British Empire, unless we now turn down for ever the idea that the British Empire is a replica of the Roman Empire, it will be an evil day for us? Hon. Members will remember how Macaulay's "Lays" end—

Shall be great fear

On all who hear

The mighty name of Rome.

That was most attractive when we were younger. It may have been so in the British Empire in the old days. It will not work now. Where we are now we must decide to throw over the Roman Empire idea of fear and force! Here we are at the end of a great Victorious War. We are for the strongest Power in the world. The old great Powers have come to an end. We dominate the old world as the United States dominates the new. There are no other great Powers. How are we to deal with the future? The other nations are looking to us, the small nations the Magyars, the Austrians, the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks—all look towards England as being the greatest Power in the world; the people that can help them, of whom they are afraid. How are you going to use this great Power influence? If you are going to utilise that power in the way suggested by some, you may go on for some years, but in the end you smash.

Sir C. Oman: How are you going to carry on—with Provincial Councils?

Colonel Wedgwood: I would like to refer the hon. Member in this matter to a greater historian even than the hon. Gentleman—to Mr. H. G. Wells and his "Outline of History."

Sir C. Oman: If that is where the hon. and gallant Gentleman gets his history, then I do not wonder at his views about India.

Colonel Wedgwood: Perhaps the hon. Member would prefer in this connection Gibbon's "Decline and fall." But the real point is this: Are we to try to carry on the great position we have to-day by the terrorism of subject races? (Hon. Members: "No!") The only alternative that I can see is to invite them to come into the

British Empire on equal terms so that Indians should be British citizens, and have the same rights as Englishmen or Australians. If you give those rights, you offer a certain attraction to people to belong to the British Empire. If you persist in treating Indians, not only in India, but be it observed, in our colonies, East Africa, South Africa, and elsewhere, as though they were an inferior people, not equal to you and me, so long as there is this social feeling against them, so long as they are legally inferior, you are ruining the British Empire and the future cause of country. I want to see England embracing all these people, not only Indians, but as they come along in the scale of civilisation, the black men of Africa, as well as the Jews of Palestine and the Egyptians of Egypt. I want to see them all as proud of being British citizens as the men in the Roman days were proud of being Roman citizens. There is nothing finer in the records of Lord Palmerston than the way he stood up for that Gibraltar Jew, Don Pacifico. Lord Palmerston made it a *Casus belli* because that man had lost some of his property. If that is the way you are going to make people proud of being British citizens, well and good. But so long as you go on treating Indians as though they were a subject race, as if those who had the wit, intelligence, and energy to educate themselves were all wicked agitators and people to be condemned, as they were condemned by Sir Michael O'Dwyer in his speech, so long as the only decent Indian is the Indian who is tamed and who is content to be your servant, so long as that is the feeling of Englishmen, you are injuring the prospects and the true development of the British Empire.

If we get a division to-night in which a large number of Members go into the Lobby against the Secretary of State, that will be an indication to India that, bad as is the Secretary of State whom they condemn, there are people worse than the Secretary of State, worse than General Dyer, the people who support Prussian Terrorism as the essence of British rule. If that is going to be the message to India it can have nothing but a disastrous result. The Secretary of State will prove to the full that what he has done is all that England would let him. He has not done enough. I believe that in the blessing he has given in his despatch to Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Lord Chelmsford, he has done more to undermine his reforms than anything he has ever done before. We, on these benches are not prepared to say that he is correct in blessing Sir M. O'Dwyer and Lord Chelmsford. We know that the right hon. Gentleman has undone some of his best work. We wish that he had put such words on paper.

My last message to the right hon. Gentleman is this, that unless something is done, and done quickly, to put into the hand of

Indians not only the legislative power but the administrative power to deal with these questions of law and order, questions which have been so mishandled by the military, unless you give the people power to repeal the Seditious Meetings Act and restore to them that Magna Carta and freedom which we enjoy in this country, unless this is done, all the right hon. Gentleman's great reforms, from which we all hoped so much, fall into fire of racial hate which will destroy not only India's chances of freedom but the whole future of the British race.

Mr. Rupert Gwynne: The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has suggested that this is really a controversy between Indians and Europeans, but I venture to say that it is nothing of the kind. There are in India a great majority of citizens who are loyal and patriotic, but there are also a minority who are disloyal and unpatriotic, which is the same as in this country. It is, I think, unfortunate to suggest that because some of us feel that General Dyer has not received justice that we should be stamped as taking the part of the Anglo-Indians against the Indians. There are a great many Anglo-Indians and Indians who are fully alive to the fact that although General Dyer had to perform a very unpleasant duty, he really did save an appalling situation, and I think everyone whether Indian or European, must on reflection, feel that General Dyer has not had, even after this discussion to-day, justice in any sense of the word as we know it here.

The right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith) says that General Dyer had full justice, but how can he say that when he knows that he has never been definitely accused, and that he has been judged and condemned on evidence which he gave before a commission which was not enquiring into his case in particular, coupled with statement which he was allowed to send to the Army Council? May I say here that I think it is extremely unfortunate that that communication, which most of us feel carries great weight, was not issued to the House until this morning and the vast majority of hon. Members have not had an opportunity of informing themselves properly in regard to General Dyer's case. The Secretary of State for India, in his despatch, stated that General Dyer's evidence was afterwards available for public as an authorised version, but it was admitted that it was not an authorised version as the evidence had not been submitted to him.

The right hon. Gentleman said it was unfortunate that General Dyer had to return to the front and therefore inaccessible. Let me inform the Secretary of State for India that General Dyer, after having given his evidence before the commission, returned to his duties some 200 or 300 miles away, while other members who were

examined before the Commission went a thousand miles away, but they were sent after their evidence while General Dyer was not. It may be a coincidence but it is an unfortunate coincidence, and it was a lack of justice which it was the Secretary of State's duty to see should be meted out to this officer. The right hon. Gentleman devoted the greater part of his speech to condemning in a wholesale manner General Dyer, and he was followed by the Secretary of State for War. I am bound to say that when I heard the Secretary of State for War condemning in wholesale language General Dyer's action which after all the Hunter Committee found was an error of judgment, I felt reminded of the man in the parable who, having been excused the payment of hundred talents by his master, went and cast his fellow servants into the prison because he would not pay him a hundred pence.

The right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary of State for War committed an error of judgment when he was in a high office before, and risked the lives not of hundreds but of thousands of men in Gallipoli, as he thought, with the object of saving a great number of lives. His error of judgment ended in disaster and was unsuccessful. He gave up one great post, but he is now at another. General Dyer committed an error of judgment, according to the Hunter Report. He was, at any rate, successful, but there is no pity for him on the part of the right hon. Gentleman who condemns him wholesale for having taken the lives of two or three hundred people, as he thought, to save the lives of thousands of others. As regards the Secretary of State for India, I think, at the present time, that whatever effect he may think General Dyer's conduct had in India, the right hon. Gentleman's administration of affairs in India is a very much greater danger to that country. During the last few weeks I have tried to elicit certain informations from the right hon. Gentleman in this House, and I regret to say that he has mis-informed this House. He has said and repeated on more than one occasion things which I think I can prove are not true, and if that is so, anyone occupying the great position which the right hon. Gentleman does is not fit to be Secretary of State for India if he misleads, and continues to mislead, this House on matters of importance.

There are other reasons why I think the right hon. Gentleman is not a suitable person to fill that high office. I think it is conclusive that his sympathies have been with those who are opposed to law and order in India, whilst he has been prejudiced against those who have been trying to maintain it. There has not been any word said in the Debate about the people who are responsible for these riots, and the whole condemnation has been in regard to those

who have tried to put them down. I hope to show that the right hon. Gentleman, by his action throughout last year, has proved that he is really the friend of that small disloyal minority, that he has encouraged them and discouraged the officials and those whom he ought to be the first to protect who are working under his administration. As regards my first charge, that the right hon. Gentleman has misled this House, I may say that on the 16th December last the right hon. Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) asked the Secretary of State when he had become acquainted with the details of the occurrence at Amritsar, and the right hon. Gentleman replied that he had not received any detailed account, nor did he expect to do so. Then he was asked by the right hon. Member for Peebles when did he become aware of the occurrences, and what reason had he for not informing the House of Commons, and he replied :

I thought I said I knew no details of the circumstances until I saw a report in the newspapers. It is not an official communication yet" (Official Report, 16th December, 1919 ; col. 241 ; vol. 123).

On the 23rd June I asked the right hon. Gentleman questions arising out of that. I asked him why it was that he did not know in December the details of the occurrence at Amritsar, and he replied :—

"What I said in December and what I say now is that I had no information as to the details, shooting without warning and shooting to the exhaustion of ammunition, and the principles on which General Dyer acted, and so forth. These things came to me as a shock when I read them in the newspapers"—(Official Report, 23rd June 1920 ; cols. 2153-4 ; vol 130).

If the right hon. Gentleman in December had felt it was not in the public interest to state in this House various matters connected with the Amritsar affair and had said so, I do not suppose we should have pressed him. But he did not say so. He said he had no information, and he led the House to believe he was in perfect ignorance. Time went on. During the last two or three weeks I have pressed him in this matter and he has continued to insist that he knew nothing of the details in regard to the shooting by General Dyer at Jallianwala Bagh. I say it is perfectly clear that the right hon. Gentleman did know and he was deliberately misleading the House when he said that he did not. Let me substantiate that case. It is very difficult to suggest reasons which may be apparent in the minds of some one else, but it is a fair inference to say, looking back on events, that the right hon. Gentleman was anxious to keep back from this House and from the

country the real state of affairs in India during that time, until he had got his Government of India Bill through.

Let me run through the dates and see what was the course of events. The Amritsar affair took place on the 13th April, and after that there were communiques sent to the Press. These went on during April: four or five of them were issued about the riots in India, and then the matter dropped. On the 12th May the right hon. Gentleman was asked by the hon. Member for Melton if it was true, that first class priority tickets on the steamers were given to certain representatives of the agitators in India to let them come over here and give evidence, while officers and women and children anxious to get home could not obtain berths. The Secretary of State replied that what he had in mind was that the passage of the Indian Constitutional Reforms through this House was urgently vital. On 22nd May, the right hon. Gentleman during the discussion on the Indian Budget, made certain statements in regard to the riots, and then again the matter was dropped. On 29th May, the first reading of the Government of India Bill took place in this House. On 5th June the second reading took place, and no mention was made of the disturbances in India. On 30th June the right hon. Gentleman saw for the first time Sir Michael O'Dwyer who had come home from India. He is then informed, presumably, of what is going on in India. In August, General Dyer was required to send in a Report of what took place at Jallianwala Bagh. That is received by the Government of India. Why did not the right hon. Gentleman inform himself then when he saw the full Report—the Report on which he now condemns General Dyer?

Mr. Montagu—Does the hon. Gentleman suggest that I saw the report in August? If he does, I say it is not true.

Mr. Gwynne—I ask the right hon. Gentleman why he did not inform himself.

Mr. Montagu—I did not deal with the subject. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does not want to misrepresent me. I thought I had already informed him that I had called for no report from the Government of India because in May immediately after the occurrence had happened we decided to appoint a committee. I thought then that the best thing to do was to await the findings of that committee.

Mr. Gwynne: Sir M. O'Dwyer states positively that he told the right hon. Gentleman. He says he is willing to go into a Court of Law and swear on oath that he told the right hon. Gentleman details of the affairs at Amritsar. I would ask him this. He told me the other day, in answer to a question, that he received in November the Report of the Legislative Council meeting at Simla. I suppose I am right in assuming that the right hon. Gentleman

informed himself of what the Indian Government were doing out there. If he received that Report, he must have received full details of what had taken place at Amritsar. In that Report full details were given, but the right hon. Gentleman told me the other day they were merely statements made by certain aggrieved persons. I say, at that discussion at Simla, certain statements were made by aggrieved persons, but the answer to them was given by Government of India officials. Let me ask the right hon. Gentleman, how did he know that of the aggrieved persons, if he had not taken the trouble to read the Report? When this discussion took place at Simla, one Government member after another was put up to answer it, and this Report was issued, which the right hon. Gentleman admits he got in November. Here we find speeches from Sir William Vincent, Sir George Lowndes, Mr. Hailey, General Hudson and others, all representing the Government of India. What was the attitude of the Government of India at that time? They took the attitude, every one of them, that General Dyer was justified in what he had done, and that he would have been guilty of negligence if he had not done what he did do. Here is the Government of India's own Report, from the soldiers point of view, which the right hon. Gentleman had in November. Sir Havelock Hudson representing the Government of India and, I take it, equivalent to the Secretary of State for War here, says :

"My Lord, my only reason for intervening in this Debate is to clear up one or two remarks which have been made by my hon. Friend as regards the action of certain officers connected with the suppression of rebellion at Amritsar.....

The first event to which I shall refer is the Jallianwala Bagh."

He goes on to give the whole details of that. I am not going to read the whole of it, but apparently the right hon. Gentleman was not aware of it. I want, however, not to repeat what has been already said to-day as to the details in regard to Amritsar, but to show that the Government of India had then considered the case of General Dyer and come to a decision, and that decision was strongly to support General Dyer in the action he had taken. This is what the official spokesman of the Government of India said at Simla :—

"It was clearly the duty of the Officer in Command to disperse this unlawful assembly, realising the danger to his small force, unless he took immediate action, and being well aware of the inadequacy of the measures taken to restore order on the 10th April, he ordered fire to be opened."

The right hon. Gentleman said he was shocked when he heard that there was firing.—

"The crowd was dispersed and the force was withdrawn. I

have given the Council this narrative to show how the situation would be viewed by the soldier, and will content myself with saying that from a military point of view the sequence of events justified the exercise of military force and that the object of its exercise was fully attained. Also, from a purely military point of view, the officer in command would have been gravely at fault"—mark those words—"had he permitted the elements of disorder to continue unchecked for one moment longer."

The right hon. Gentleman turns round now and is shocked to learn of the shooting without further warning. If there was time I would read the whole Report, which goes into every detail. The right hon. Gentleman was also shocked when he heard of the principles on which General Dyer acted. What does Sir Havelock Hudson say? He says:

"Something was required to strike the imagination and impress on all the determination of the Military Authorities to protect European women. ... There are those who will admit that a measure of force may have been necessary, but who cannot agree with the extent of the force employed. How can they be in a better position to judge of that than the officer on the spot? It must be remembered that when a rebellion has been started against the Government it is tantamount to a declaration of war. War cannot be conducted in accordance with standards of humanity to which we are accustomed in peace. Should not officers and who, through no choice of their own, are called upon to discharge these distasteful duties, be in all fairness accorded that support which has been promised to them?"

That was the soldier's point of view. What did the civilian representatives of the Government of India say? He took this line:

"How can any member of this Council expect military officers of Government to do their duty unless they receive reasonable support? A military officer is in a position of peculiar difficulty. If he does not suppress disorders he is liable to censure, blame and punishment at the hands of his superior officers. If he does not take adequate measures, he may be removed from his office. . . . Let each Member visualise to himself what his position would be, faced with these difficulties, often with insufficient forces at his disposal to cope with disorders, doing what he thinks to be his duty, ... and then being penalised and held liable to prosecution and persecution for no reason whatsoever."

This is what was said by Sir William Vincent, who is the Home Secretary. Does the hon. Gentleman repudiate him? He said:—

"If officers acting on that assumption, and acting *bona fide* and perfectly reasonably, are not to be protected by Government, then the future prospects of Government officers are very serious. How can any member of this Council expect an officer to act confidently, firmly and decisively, if he knows that this Legislative Council and the Government will repudiate his action at the first opportunity? ... In a resolution published by this Government some time ago, I think during the period of the disturbances, we solemnly promised all those charged with this onerous duty of restoring order our full countenance and support, and it is in fulfilment of that promise that I now come to this Council and ask hon. Members to ratify what we then promised."

Did the right hon. Gentleman know that that meant support for General Dyer? If so, he is certainly not in a position now to say that he is justified in continuing his office. He does not even know what his own Government in India were doing. He has placed the Legislative Council and the Government of India in a hopeless position, saying one thing one day, and then, when he is pressed, presumably by his agitator friends, reversing the whole position.

Mr. Montagu.—Does the hon. Member suggest I put pressure on the Government of India?

Mr. Gwynne.—It is most amazing if you did not. Why did they suddenly turn round? (Loud cheers.)

Mr. Montagu.—The charge has been made in my absence that I put any pressure upon the Government of India. They waited to receive the Hunter Report, then made their decision and communicated it to me. The hon. Gentleman is making many foul charges against me which are not supported by the facts. (Cheers.)

Mr. Gwynne.—Charges are foul when they are made against civilians, but they are not foul when made against soldiers (Loud cheers). General Dyer is disgraced after 34 years' service without trial (Cheers). When the right hon. Gentleman is criticised in this House, he says the charges are foul. At any rate he is not losing his office. I only wish he were. I say the right hon. Gentleman must have known in December these details, because he admits having received that Report in November. If he says that that Report does not contain evidence that General Dyer shot without further warning, and that he had certain motives in shooting, then, I say, I leave the committee to judge whether he is telling the truth. I said a short time ago that the right hon. Gentleman, to my mind, had shown during his last year of office that his sympathies were with those who were in favour of disorder in India, rather than with those who were trying to keep the Government of India going. Look at the right hon. Gentleman's speech in this House on the

22nd May, 1919, that is to say, just after the disturbances at Amritsar. No one knew or ought to have known better than the right hon. Gentleman that the man who was more responsible for these disturbances than any one else in India was Mr. Gandhi. We, in this House, had been kept in ignorance of the fact—details had not been given us—but the right hon. Gentleman must have known the feeling in India. He knew, and it has been proved by the Hunter Commissions Report, that Mr. Gandhi had started on foot this passive resistance movement which led to the riots and disturbances. Let me read what was said about Mr. Gandhi at the Legislative Assembly at Simla by one of the representatives of the Government.

"I maintain that no one with any feeling for the security of the Province could have safely allowed Mr. Gandhi to have arrived in the Punjab at this juncture."

What does Mrs. Besant say?

"People who committed arson and assaulted woman did so with the name of Mr. Gandhi upon their lips."

What does one of the posters say which was issued by these seditious people?

"Conquer the English monkeys with bravery. God will grant victory. Leave off dealings with the Englishmen. Close offices and workshops. Fight on. This is the command of Mahatma Gandhi. Get ready soon for the war and God will grant victory to India very soon. Fight with enthusiasm and enlist yourselves in the Danda Army."

While that was going on, what does the right hon. Gentleman say in this House?

"I cannot do better in describing this body of men than quote the words of a very great and distinguished Indian, Mr. Gandhi. There is no man who offers such perplexity to a Government as Mr. Gandhi, a man of the highest motives and of the finest character, a man whom his worst enemy, if he has any enemies, would agree, is of the most disinterested ambitions that it is possible to conceive, a man who has deserved well of his country by the services he has rendered, both in India and outside it, and yet a man who has friends, and I will count myself as one of them, who would wish to exercise his great powers with a greater sense of responsibility and would realise in time that there are forces beyond his control and outside his influence who use the opportunities afforded by his name and reputation."

Viscount Wolmer: That explains his speech to-day.

Mr. Gwynne: It is without significance that the present time Mr. Gandhi is at large, free to go about India still further

trying to spread pernicious doctrines, and the right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that at the very time he was making his speech it was telegraphed to India, and what effect can it have had? That was in May, when, as he told me yesterday, the fire had not yet been put out. The right hon. Gentleman gave that amazing character to the man who, rightly or wrongly, started these insurrections, which proved a danger to this country, and if he is Mr. Gandhi's friend, he has no right to be Secretary of State for India. What is Mr. Gandhi doing now? He started another organisation. He is now at large in this country, and has even passed resolutions saying that his Excellency the Viceroy shall be approached and given notice of one month to see that the Turkish Peace Terms are revised in accordance with Moslem sentiment and, in case it is not done, to start the movement of non-co-operation. The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Wedgwood) said this movement of non-co-operation was hopeless in India, and that it meant trouble. Here Mr. Gandhi is spreading it. He is at the head of the movement to bring about non-co-operation, a fresh system of passive resistance, and that is the man whom the right hon. Gentleman is supporting. Let us turn round and see who is supporting those who are trying to carry out the law. If the right hon. Gentleman continues, we are going on the right road to lose India. The most graceful thing he could do now would be to resign. I would even prefer that the usual method of the Government should be proceeded with and that he be given, if necessary, a more important appointment rather than should be allowed to ruin India (An hon. Member: "Are you out for the job?") No Sir, I want no job at present in this Coalition Government, if we are to be classed with colleagues of that kind. I would much rather remain an unimportant, unofficial Member with freedom to criticise if I like. I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend who is to reply will suggest some very good reasons for refuting the accusations I have made. It is not pleasant for me to have to get up and attack the party which I have come here to support, but I do so because I feel strongly that those men who are under the right hon. Gentleman, and who are depending upon him for justice and for representing in this house, have not been looked after as they have a right to be. I would remind him that when he was asked last year whether he would have representatives from the various Governors and Lieut-Governors to come over and give evidence as to the reforms in India, he said that the only representative in this country of Governors and Lieut-Governors and others in India was himself, as Secretary of State. If that is the case, if the Governors and Lieut-Governors and those who are

carrying out the laws in India are solely dependent upon him, then their position is indeed an unhappy one, because not only are they flouted, but the enemies of this country are encouraged, and I think I have proved that to be the case in my speech.

Mr. Clynes (Labour Leader) said that while he thought the Government had gone the right way, so far as they had gone, the Labour members wished to express their appreciation of the tenor of the speech of the Secretary of State for India that day. They felt the minimum of reparation which the people of India were entitled to demand, had not been made, and therefore they would go into the lobby, not for the purpose of reducing the Secretary of State's salary, but to protest against the action of the Government in taking no step to remove those conditions of repression which provoked those incidents of disorder and commotion such as led up to the unhappy Amritsar affair. If the issue to be decided in the lobby was the murder of these hundreds of Indians and injury to thousands of them under conditions which sent them to their doom like cattle, he felt that they ought to carry with them a very large number of members who did not belong to the Labour Party at all.

Major-General Sir J. Davidson :—Considerable play has been made in this Debate with the report of the Army Council, but I think that there is nothing in it. There are two main points : First, General Dyer was guilty of an error of judgment. Perhaps he was, but who of us in a similar position would not be guilty of an error of judgment. It was a difficult and a most objectionable position to be in. One has some idea when one has been on strike duty, as I have been in connection with the railway strike, which is a most detestable duty for a soldier. There was liability to error of judgment during the whole operation in India, and he would be more than human if he were not guilty of an error of judgment during the whole of that period. The second point is the statement that he would not be employed at home. I do not know General Dyer, but I think he did not expect to be employed at home. An officer of 56 would not expect to be employed at home. What is important is the action of the Government of India. For ten months after the 13th of April, when the Amritsar incident occurred, General Dyer was given one appointment after another. He was praised up to the skies and congratulated and then he was turned down as a scapegoat. This is most reprehensible and reflects very badly on the Secretary of State for India. I would ask the Mover of the Amendment what good it is going to a division ? I am not frightened going to a division, and I shall vote in the Lobby against the Government on the ground of the abominable action of the Government of India in

the matter, including that of the Secretary of State for India. But what is the use of going to a division? I see no objection in the least, and I appeal to the hon. Baronet not to press his Amendment.

Mr. Bonar Law (Leader of the House) :—I was sorry to listen to what was said by my hon. Friend, the Member for East Bourne (Mr. Gwynne). I think my right hon. Friend (Mr. Montagu) is in a false position, (Cheers) for this reason that, as he said, the subject was too large to make it right for him to answer personal charges, and it is not possible for him to answer now except at the expense of my taking no part in the debate. I am quite willing to give place to him (Montagu), but he says it would not be wise (Cheers and laughter). I think the House of Commons is always fair. But I doubt whether it has been fair to my right hon. Friend. It is entirely wrong to suppose that my right hon. Friend is especially responsible without the conjunction of the Cabinet for the policy in India. The first step of the new policy in India was taken before he became Secretary of State.

Apart from this incident the debate has been a painful one to me. I confess that this is one of the most difficult subjects which either the House of Commons or individuals can ever attempt to deal. It raises issues of precisely the same kind as were raised in regard to Governor Eyre very long ago.

It happened when I was a very small boy, and apart from having read about it, I have still a vague recollection of the extent to which the whole empire was divided from top to bottom on the issue then raised. Then, as now, it was not, I think, a question of argument so much as of temperament, and criticisms arose according to the different points of view from which these things are regarded.

As I listened to the Debate to-day, I felt that nothing could be easier than to make an effective advocate's speech from either point of view. If on the one hand you look simply at what happened at Jallianwala Bagh, without a proper regard to the circumstances under which it happened, it would be perfectly easy, on the ground of humanity, to raise an amount of passion which, in my opinion, would not represent the actual facts of the case. On the other hand, if you disregard altogether what happened, and look at it simply from the point of view of supporting our officers who were doing their duty in difficult circumstances, it would be equally easy to make a case which would carry conviction almost to any one who was not determined to get to the bottom of it for himself. My duty is more difficult. It is more difficult to make a speech when you are not on one side or the other, and when you are trying to judge fairly all the circumstances of the case.

But apart altogether from speeches, which after all are very unimportant, what the Government did was to look at the case, not as an advocate on one side or the other, but to judge it as fairly as they could and to come to a decision which they thought and in the best interests of the empire as a whole. This is what they have done. When I first heard of the occurrences at Jallianwala Bagh I had that feeling of indignation which has been expressed by many hon. Members who take one view of the subject. As it became necessary for the Government here to take a decision, I had to examine the evidence available, and while on the main issue my opinion is not changed, the result of that examination has been to make me more sympathetic, because I understand much better the difficulties of the position in which General Dyer was placed. Consider what that position was. Disturbances had taken place in Amritsar. They were not ordinary riots. It is not very important whether or not there was a conspiracy, as General Dyer thought, of which all this was a part, but the Hunter Committee itself declared that what was taking place there was not a riot but a rebellion. That was a very serious thing. General Dyer was called to Amritsar after the atrocity of the 10th April.

I listened to the speech of my right hon. friend, the Member for Paisley (Mr. Asquith), and agreed with his conclusion, but I do not think he at all did justice to the difficulties of General Dyer. It was not as if, as he seemed to think, after the occurrences of the 10th April, everything has quieted down, and that there was no further danger. Quite the reverse. It is quite true that the riots and murders had ceased, but it is true also that the party which had been guilty of those crimes were in command, and it is true that every appearance justified General Dyer, in my opinion, in thinking that the same outrages which occurred before might occur at any moment. That makes a very great difference. In addition, there is this point. My right hon. Friend spoke of it as if this meeting at Jallianwala Bagh was merely a seditious meeting. It was not that General Dyer had made his proclamation throughout Amritsar and what I thought in reading the evidence, one of the most striking thing was that almost simultaneously with this proclamation, the rebels were following him with a proclamation urging the people to go to this place in spite of the proclamation. That makes a great difference. It makes this difference, that when General Dyer came to that place, and found the meeting there, he had a right not to consider that every one there was guilty of open rebellion but he had the right to consider that a large number of them had come there for the express purpose of flouting the Government, and showing that the Government could not maintain its power in that city.

All that has got to be taken into account. We have discussed it over and over again in the Cabinet, and the views which I am expressing are, I am sure, the views of my right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for India and my colleagues. What further followed? General Dyer knew that the British in that city were very few; he knew that his military force was very small; he knew that there was great danger. Every one admits that, and he had to take all that into account. He came to this place; the shooting began; it continued. I have spoken, I hope, fairly of my view of General Dyer's action, but it has not in the least altered the opinion with which I began—not in the least that that action was wrong, entirely wrong, and that the Government responsible for the Government of this country and of India is bound to declare that, in its opinion, it was wrong. The Hunter Report has, I am sure, been read by all Members of this House who are interested in this question. I think it is a very fair Report. I think it does justice to General Dyer's difficulties, and I would remind the Committee of this also, that in the despatch sent by the Secretary of State for India, those difficulties are pointed out and are emphasised.

The Majority of the Hunter Committee came to this decision, that, in their view, General Dyer was open to serious criticism on two grounds. The first was, that he had not given notice before he began to fire. I see that my right hon. Friend and, no doubt, many others think there is no justification for that criticism. I do not agree. General Dyer himself admitted that though he felt sure the bulk of the people there did know what they were doing, and were there to flout the Government, there might have been some—indeed, I think he said there might have been many—who were not aware of what they were doing. Surely, seeing it was the universal custom in India, as it is here, to give notice before beginning to fire, it would have been right to give warning first!

Mr. A. Parkinson: Did not General Dyer give six hours' notice for them to disperse out of the square before he fired?

Mr. Bonar Law: The Hunter Committee express the opinion that the firing without notice would have been justified had General Dyer thought he was in danger of being attacked by the people. (Hon. Members: "He was!") Oh, no. In his evidence General Dyer says that was not so, but that he was determined before he came there to shoot right away. He himself said it. Now let us consider what General Dyer says on that in the report sent to the Army Council, which is a very able defence although it does not, I think, give any new facts. What he said, was this. "If I had been thinking of myself, of my own protection, then I would have given notice." That, I think,

itself is a proof that notice ought to have been given. When a soldier is in the position representing the Government, as, of course, a soldier exercising martial law is, if it would have been right for him, from the point of view of his own protection, to have given notice first, it was his duty also to think of the moral position of the Government. (Hon. Members: "Oh"; and "Hear, hear!") Surely, if you are looking at the thing in a broad way, as General Dyer said he was—if we are looking at it, not merely from the point of view of the effect on the crowd itself but the wider issue, then we have to look at all the wider issues, and surely it is right to think, not only of the merely military effect but the effect on India as a whole, of the action, and make sure that there is no ground for saying that notice was not given before the firing began.

The next ground on which the Hunter Committee criticised General Dyer was that he continued firing long after he ought to have stopped. With every desire to put myself, as far as I can, in General Dyer's place, I agree with that criticism, and I think there is no possible justification that I can see for the continued shooting. Just consider what it means. Here were these people almost like sheep in a pen. It is quite true that probably the mass of them were there in rebellion. I agree with my hon. Friend, the Member for Twickenham (Sir W. Joynson Hicks) in that respect, that if they had had the courage, in spite of being only armed with iron sticks, they might have rushed a small force; but again General Dyer said distinctly that that was not an element which weighed with him. His defence was quite different, and it is really that defence—and I am going to put this solemnly to the Committee—which above every thing else makes it necessary for this Government, or any Government—that this country, if it is to retain the reputation it always has had, must repudiate the action. I am not going at this moment to read the exact words he said, but I will look at his defence. He admits it in an elementary rule that, in the exercise of Martial Law, you should not use more force than is necessary for the purpose. Then, when it was pointed out by the Hunter Committee, as also by the Secretary of State in his despatch, that there was far more force than was necessary for the purpose, General Dyer gives a defence which is quite right. He said he must take, to some extent, the circumstances into account. No body questions that, that is to say, as General Dyer puts it. If you are dealing with a riot in a city which is other-wise tranquil, you ought to be less severe than you are bound to be if you are dealing with a riot where a whole city is endangered, and something else may happen. I admit it is very difficult to draw the line, but I should myself think that, probably,

the right line to draw in a case of that kind is to use whatever force is necessary to prevent the body with which you are dealing from giving trouble. I think that is as good a distinction as I can make, but consider what General Dyer's own view was. He said :—

"I fired, and continued to fire, until the crowd dispersed..... If more troops had been at hand, the casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd, but one of producing sufficient moral effect from a military point of view not only on those who were present, but more specially throughout the Punjab."

Consider what that means. If you once accept the principle that in inflicting punishment on any set of men, you are to consider not merely that of which they are guilty, and that which they should receive, but also the effect of their punishment upon other people, then there is no end to it. I say for myself—and on this I feel as strongly as any Member of the House—that is a principle which ought to be repudiated, not only by the "arm-chair politician" of whom my right hon. Friend (Sir E. Carson) spoke, and of whose peaceful and tranquil life he has had some experience—

Sir E. Carson : I never make a scape-goat of any body.

Mr. Bonar Law : Quite right, and I hope that I never do. It is a principle opposed to the whole of the British Empire and, in my opinion, can never be justified. General Dyer's whole record was a good one, and no one accused him—at least I do not—of anything except a grave misconception as to what was his duty. The very fact that that view as expressed by a man of that kind makes it all the more necessary that it should be repudiated by the Government of this country.

Mr. Gwynne : Would the right hon. Gentleman say why the Legislative Council have changed their minds?

Mr. Bonar Law : I cannot answer that question, but I should hope that the answer of the Government of India would be that they changed their minds on the evidence before the Hunter Committee. Let us consider the position further. My right hon. Friend, the Member for the Duncairn Division said that General Dyer had not had a fair trial. I do not see how that statement can be justified. We all know that throughout the war scores of Generals were subjected to the same penalty as General Dyer, on no other authority than that of their superior officers. I am dealing now with the position after the Hunter Report. This General was liable to nothing more than to which every General or any one in the same circumstances would be liable. He had no right whatever to a court martial. It has never been accorded to any one else. The Government of India took the view that his action must be repudiated. The Comman-

der-in-Chief who, I should have thought would not be unmindful of the difficulties of the soldier, took the same view. It was submitted to the Army Council here. I have seen suggestions that the Army Council in coming to their decision were cowardly. No charge could be more unjust. In my view, theirs is the proper position for the soldier. The same view was expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for one of the Divisions of Ayrshire (Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter Weston), who has served in the Army, and understands the Army point of view. I myself have discussed this with a good many soldiers. Nearly all of them share the view that no action ought to have been taken against General Dyer. But there is not one to whom I have spoken who has not taken the view that General Dyer was wrong. That is a fact.

Suppose the Army Council took the view that General Dyer was wrong, and at the same time felt all these difficulties, felt the necessity, as far as possible, of supporting the officers who were placed in that kind of position, but thought that no action should have been taken. I can imagine nothing which would be worse, not only for the country, but for the Army. Are you really going to take the view—for that is what it amounts to—that if a soldier make a mistake in any portion of his life or activities—on the battle-field for instance—he has to pay for it, but if he make a mistake when dealing with the civilians, whatever that mistake may be, then the Army must back him up? (Hon. Members: “No, no!”) That is what I think it comes to! Take, in conclusion, the case presented by my right hon. and learned Friend (Sir E. Carson). I do not see in what respect the Government were to blame! He said in his speech: “By all means censure him, but do not punish him.” What is punishment? My hon. Friend who spoke last (Mr. Gwynne) explained. But it is not more punishment than happened to many Generals in the War.

Sir E. Carson: The right hon. Gentleman says it is nothing more than happened to many Generals in the war. Does he then admit that the state of India and the Punjab at that time was to be compared to War?

Mr. Bonar Law: I think I have dealt with that. My right hon. and learned Friend says: “You are right in censuring him!” Does he mean that if we have the right to censure General Dyer, we have the right to continue him in employment! (Mr. Charles Palmer: “You re-employed Churchill?”) My right hon. Friend went a step further. He said you must back those who are doing their best in support of your authority. I agree, but how far? I can conceive of nothing worse than that the Government should make a scape-goat of a man of that kind. I am sure my right hon.

Friend will not say that we have got to support them, however wrong they are ; but he would say perhaps that if an officer is doing his best, then we have to support him whatever he does. I cannot accept that doctrine. Personally, I am very sorry that this question has been treated with so much heat. I can say honestly that the Government have tried to deal with it fairly and justly.

Lieut.-colonel Croft : What about the Secretary of State for India's speech ?

Mr. Bonar Law : We have tried to deal with the question fairly and justly, and I think what we have done is fair and just. We have, however, to consider something more. We have to think not only of public opinion here, but in India as well. We have to think not only of the opinion of Anglo-Indians, but of the opinion of Indians themselves ; and when my hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Sir W. Joynson Hicks) tells us of the outrageous speeches of those who are against British rule, we know that there are deadly enemies to British rule in India. I am not afraid when they make charges such as those which the hon. Member referred to—which every honest man in this country and in India knows are false—but I am afraid if we do anything that gives them the right to say that we are treating Indians less fairly than we treat other British subjects.

Question put, "That Item A be reduced by £100." (Labour move)

The Committee divided : Ayes, 37 ; Noes, 247.

Original Question again proposed by Sir Edward Carson : I beg to move, that the vote be reduced by £100. The Committee divided : Ayes, 129 ; Noes, 230.

Question put, "That a sum not exceeding £53,600 be granted for the said Service."

The Dyer Debate

In the House of Lords

July 19th, 1920

The case of General Dyer was taken up in the House of Lords on the 19th July, 1920, when Viscount Finlay rose to move :—

That this House deplores the conduct of the case of General Dyer as unjust to that officer, and as establishing a precedent dangerous to the preservation of order in face of rebellion.

The Noble and learned Viscount said : My Lords, I can assure your Lordships that it is with a feeling of very great responsibility that I have undertaken this motion. I have felt impelled to do so by my strong feeling that an injustice has been done to a very distinguished and very deserving officer, and that the case is one of a nature which, in its effects in the future, may be deleterious to the efficiency of our public services. I trust that not one word will escape me in the course of this debate which could in any way aggravate our difficulties in India ; but, I desire as shortly as I may—and I trust that your Lordships will think I have been justified in raising the matter in this House—to bring into the clearest light that I can, the facts with regard to General Dyer, and the considerations which are probably applicable to his case.

Now, I shall not say a word to imply any doubt as to the absolute prerogative of the Crown to dispense at any time with the services of any officer. That is unquestioned and unquestionable ; but General Dyer has been relieved of all employment in the Army, under circumstances which affixes stigma on him, a stigma which I believe, is entirely undeserved ; and what I propose to bring before your Lordships is the question whether the Government have been justified in allowing General Dyer to be treated in that way, when his case has not really been tried at all. Further, a very severe censure has been passed upon General Dyer by the Secretary of State for India, and whether that censure was justifiable is a matter on which I am going to invite your Lordship's opinion. The effect of this case upon the future of our public services in India, and indeed in all parts of our Empire, opens up a very large field. On that it is not necessary for me to say more than a very few words. One of the main-stays of our Empire has been the

feeling that every officer whose duty it was to take action in times of difficulty, might rely, so long as he acted honestly, and in the discharge of his duty, upon his superiors standing by him. If once the suspicion was created that for any reason, political or otherwise, an officer who had done what he believed to be his duty was to be thrown over, no one can exaggerate the mischievous effect such a feeling might have upon our public services.

The ground, and the main ground, on which General Dyer has been condemned, is that in dealing with the mob at Amritsar he had regard to the effect of his action over the rest of the Punjab, and in very emphatic terms it has been laid down by the Secretary of State that, in doing so he committed a grievous error, and that he ought to have had regard only to putting down the disturbances at Amritsar. I am going to submit to your Lordships that it is the Secretary of State who falls into error upon this matter. In dealing with a disturbance the question how it is to be dealt with must depend entirely upon the circumstances. If it is merely a local riot, then the one object to be kept in view is the putting down of that disturbance and the restoration of order in the locality affected; but if the local disturbance is but a feature in a widespread insurrectionary movement, it assumes a different complexion altogether, and the officer in command is not only entitled but bound to look at the effect of his action upon the rest of the district which is affected by that insurrectionary movement.

Now, the question of what force should be used in putting down a disturbance is, of course, often a very difficult one indeed, but I think every one will agree that no more force should be used than is necessary for the purpose in view. Any excessive force is entirely out of place and reprehensible, but then, in the case of a mere local disturbance, the only object in view is the restoration of order in the locality. If you are dealing with a disturbance which is a feature of a widespread insurrection, any capable officer is bound to have regard to the effect of the action which he takes in putting down that movement upon the rest of the district which is affected by the insurrection. As I understand it, General Dyer has been condemned because in measuring the amount of force to be used, he had regard to the state of things in the rest of the Punjab, and he has been told that he had no business to take such a consideration into account in dealing with the circumstances before him, and that he ought to have confined himself simply to restoring order in Amritsar. Surely, it is one thing when you have merely to quell a local disturbance, and another when you have to determine in what manner an insurrectionary movement should be put down in the place with which the officer has more immediately to deal.

On page 12 of the statement which General Dyer has put in and which is printed as a White Paper, your Lordships will find this sentence used by General Dyer—

“What the Hunter Commission have done is to apply the principles applicable to unlawful assembly in times of otherwise general peace and quiet to a vital incident of a rebellion.”

The Government, as I understand their action, have identified themselves with that doctrine promulgated by the Hunter Commission. I am going to submit to the House that that is an erroneous canon, and that it is unjust to an officer, in such circumstances as those in which General Dyer was placed, to apply any such canon in judging his conduct. Let me not be misunderstood. No man is more averse from what is called frightfulness than I am. The essence of frightfulness, of which we have had of late years some conspicuous examples on the continent of Europe, is that innocent people are treated severely and harshly with a view to producing an effect elsewhere. In defence of such conduct I never should utter a word, but the question here is a totally different one.

If you are dealing with a formidable mob, assembled in defiance of the express order of the Government, and at a time when an insurrectionary movement is in progress throughout the whole district, are you not justified, when you choose your way of putting down that insurrectionary movement, in doing it in a way which will have a beneficial effect on the restoration of order throughout the whole district? Where you have a state of things such as unfortunately existed in the Punjab (which really approximated a state of war), strength is sometimes the best moral. If your Lordships would look at the map which is at the end of the Report of the Hunter Commission, your Lordships will find that it represents by a series of red marks what was the state of things in the Central and Northern Punjab in April of last year. There are a number of red marks which indicate the districts where the cutting of telegraph wires, arson and murder had prevailed, and a most formidable appearance have these red marks upon that map. They extend from the Sutlej on the east, through the districts of five rivers, through the Punjab itself, and they go on to the Indus. When you have that state of things there, it is impossible, by the light of evidence, to come to any conclusion other than that the action taken throughout the Punjab was concerted action as it was a conspiracy.

Lord Hunter's Commission said that no evidence had been brought before them sufficient to establish a conspiracy to overthrow the British Government in the region. A conspiracy is always inferred from the acts of people who are obviously acting in concert.

It is very seldom that you can get any evidence of a conspiracy except from such action, and any one who looks at the evidence regarding the state of things in the Punjab must, I submit, come to a very different conclusion on this matter from that to which Lord Hunter's Commission came. The City of Amritsar was the centre of the disturbances, and the state of things there was indeed formidable. It is a city of about 150,000 inhabitants, and the men of the city and of the district are of a hardy and formidable race. There you had a state of things that I will endeavour to describe in the words of the documents which contain what the Government themselves thought of it. They show how formidable it was. Let me only add that Amritsar is the sacred city of the Sikhs, famous for its Golden Temple, and that it is a vital link in our chain of railway communications. There was a cloud on the Afghan frontier which very shortly afterwards—in May last year, I think—resulted in an Afghan invasion, and if the railway system had been cut at Amritsar it might have had a most disastrous effect upon our power of dealing with that Afghan trouble.

General Dyer is an officer who had served for thirty-four years. He is generally recognised, I think, as an officer of very great ability. What is more, he has shown that he eminently possesses the qualities of fact and humanity. He can strike hard, when it is necessary to do so, but no man has more thoroughly evinced that he is averse from the unnecessary use of force. He was at Jullundur, a little to the east of Sutlej, when the state of things at Amritsar was such that he was sent to Amritsar. He arrived there on April 11. What was the state of things that he found there? May I answer that question by referring your Lordships to the despatch of the Secretary of State of May 26 of this year? I will quote only two sentences from that despatch—

“In Amritsar itself violence, murder and arson of the most savage description had occurred three days previously, and the city was still practically in possession of the mob. From the surrounding countryside reports were hourly being received for similar violent outbreaks and attacks upon communications, and the deficiencies in this report (due to the success of attacks on communications) were supplemented by rumours which there was little means of verifying and as little ground for disbelieving.”

It is impossible to picture a more serious state of things! General Dyer himself, in vivid terms, in that statement of his—the White Paper—describes what he found when he arrived on the evening of April 11.

He found a crisis of the gravest kind. He says—

“On the 10th the mob had risen, killed every one of European

nationality in the city upon whom it could lay its hands, burnt banks and Government buildings, and had been held off the European settlements outside the city only with the greatest difficulty. The situation had already been handed over to the local commander by the civil authorities as being a military one and beyond their control. I found a clear conviction upon the part of the local officials and abundant signs that a determined and organised movement was in progress to submerge and destroy all the Europeans on the spot and the district, and to carry the movement throughout the Punjab, and that the mob in the city and the excitable population of the villages were organised for this purpose."

The forces that General Dyer had at his disposal were very slender—some 500 British troops and some 700 native troops. He took every step to avert bloodshed in the way of warning the population and endeavouring to secure that the law should be obeyed without recourse to arms.

He marched a column through the city, showing those who were disposed to make mischief that he had some force with which they would have to reckon. He prepared the Proclamation—referred to as Proclamation No. 1—which prohibited all meetings, and announced that they would be dispersed by force of arms. On the next day a second Proclamation was issued which prohibited all processions and any gatherings of four men. That second Proclamation was issued in circumstances of the greatest possible publicity—circumstances such as to make it absolutely incredible that it was not known to every one in Amritsar. He marched through the city with a guard, spending some two or three hours in the process. By beat of drum the people were assembled to hear the Proclamation read, and it was read to them in their own language.

This was done, and General Dyer hoped that no recourse to force would be necessary. A Counter-proclamation was actually issued by those who were engaged in fomenting disorder, announcing that a meeting would be held, and the threats of that meeting were freely circulated. At first General Dyer could not believe them, but later in the afternoon he found that the matter was serious, and that the leaders of the forces of disorder were in earnest.

He proceeded in the afternoon to a place called the Jallianwalla Bagh, which is a great open space in the city. Your Lordships will see it on the map of Amritsar which is annexed to the Report; it is not very far from that Golden Temple which is so celebrated in India.

In the Jallianwalla Bagh he found an enormous gathering of men. It is absolutely untrue that, as has been said, any women or children were present. Women in India do not attend meetings of

that kind; and there were no children. The meeting consisted entirely of men. It is difficult to get an estimate, but there is no doubt that it was an enormous meeting. General Dyer's own estimate is from 15,000 to 20,000. Any how the people were there in multitudes. It was an assembly of men, many of them criminals of the worst type, who had been engaged in the excesses to which I have already referred.

In the other House the Secretary of State, I think, in speaking of that crowd as "an unarmed crowd" was careful to explain that when he said "unarmed" he meant that they were not in possession of what he called "lethal weapons or fire arms." I presume from this statement that the Secretary of State for War considers that the fauj, a bludgeon of stout bamboo shod with iron, is not a lethal weapon. As I understand, it is a formidable weapon, and your Lordships will find the name of it on page 23 of the despatch of the Secretary of State. You will also find a statement that the name the disaffected gave to themselves was "Bludgeon Army." The bludgeon, of course, are not as formidable as fire-arms or bayonets, but they are very formidable weapons indeed in the hands of determined men. The meeting was assembled in open defiance of the Proclamations that had been made that day and if General Dyer had hesitated, all would have been lost. He opened fire at once and the meeting was dispersed.

Two charges have been made against General Dyer in connection with this meeting. The first is that he did not give another warning before he opened fire. The Committee censure this omission to give another warning in addition to the Proclamations, but in very mild terms; and indeed, the mildness of the censure is not wonderful considering what they go on to say. On page 30 of the Report the Hunter Committee states—

"We think it distinctly improbable.....that the crowd..... would have dispersed upon notice being made.....and much more likely that recourse to firing would have been necessary to secure obedience to the Proclamation. The majority, at all events, of the people who assembled had done so in direct defiance of a Proclamation issued in the interests of peace and order, many thinking that the reference to firing was bluff."

Having found that, nevertheless the Committee go on to pronounce their mild censure—

"In spite of this circumstance, notice to disperse would have afforded those assembled in ignorance of the Proclamation, and other people also, an opportunity to leaving the Bagh. If the notice had been disregarded, General Dyer would have been justified in firing on the crowd to compel it to disperse.

How many people were there in that crowd who were ignorant of the Proclamation? They were there because they were determined to defy it.

But the censure pronounced by the Hunter Committee is not enough for the Secretary of State for India who says, in that despatch to which I have referred, "The omission to give warning before firing was opened was inexcusable." I submit to your Lordships that this is a most extraordinary statement.

Will your Lordships picture the scene? There is the narrow lane through which General Dyer with his handful of men,—fifty with rifles and forty armed only with kukris, had to enter. This handful of men, with General Dyer at their head, debouching from that narrow lane, came upon this enormous assembly. What would have been the effect of beginning to parley with that crowd in such circumstances? The mere rush of the crowd would have swept that slender force of its feet; and your Lordships can picture to yourselves what the result would have been in Amritsar and throughout the Punjab if General Dyer and his men had been massacred and the city left in possession of the triumphant mob.

Parleying in those circumstances would have been useless and fatal. Indeed, I think I am entitled to put it higher than that, and to say he was the man on the spot. In his judgment it would not only have been useless but also absolutely mischievous, and the judgment of the man on the spot is that which, in such circumstances, ought to be accepted. If he had hesitated, the rebellion would have acquired irresistible momentum. Your Lordships will recollect that there were many women and children who had taken refuge in the so called fort who, if the mob has triumphed, would have been at their mercy. I shall not picture what their fate would have been. If life is to be taken—and it is a hateful necessity—I would rather wish that the lives taken were those of the members of a criminal mob than of law-abiding citizens who have been loyal to the Crown and to the Empire. The first charge about not giving a second warning is, I submit, a frivolous charge, and the fact that it is made in the Report of the Hunter Committee goes rather to diminish any importance that might be attached to other parts of the finding.

The second charge made was that General Dyer continued firing too long, and had regard to the effect that would be produced throughout the Punjab elsewhere than in Amritsar. In the Hunter Report at page 30 your Lordships will find this passage—

"In continuing firing as long as he did it is evident that General Dyer had in view not merely the dispersal of the crowd that had assembled contrary to his orders, but the desire to produce a moral effect in the Punjab In our view this

was unfortunately a misconception of his duty. If necessary, a crowd assembled contrary to a proclamation issued to prevent or determine disorder may have to be fired upon ; but continued firing upon that crowd cannot be justified because of the effect such firing may have upon people in other places."

I believe that to be a profound misconception. It is confusing the case of a mere riot with the case of a local disturbance which is really part of the battle that is going on throughout the district between the Government and the forces of insurrection. In the way in which you deal with the opposing troops on a part of the battlefield you must have regard to the effect that will be produced elsewhere throughout the whole extent of the field. It is otherwise in the case of a mere riot, but, where you are dealing with what is really an insurrectionary movement, merely to make the mob move on is to do far more harm than good.

It might only aggravate the situation, and the ineffective firing which had taken place, on April 10, has been referred to by the Adjutant-General, speaking in the Legislative Council in India, as an example of the inefficiency of the half measures in matters of that kind. This was no mere riot, when the military are called in aid of the civil power. The civil authorities had handed over to the military the whole control of the situation, and I should be very much surprised to be told that they had not done that with the entire concurrence of the Central Government of India. In these circumstances, with the country in insurrection, would General Dyer have been fit for his post if he had hesitated to treat such a mob as that in a manner which might affect and tend to break the rebellion throughout the whole district ?

I abhor frightfulness. This was not a case of frightfulness exercised upon innocent people. It was a guilty force which had to be dealt with, and in measuring the amount of force that it was proper to use, General Dyer was bound to take into consideration the whole situation. A wider outlook was necessary than in the case of a mere local riot. Indeed, this is admitted in one passage of his despatch by the Secretary of State himself. On page 24 your Lordships will find this sentence,—

"In discharging this responsibility with the small force at his disposal, Brigadier-General Dyer naturally could not dismiss from his mind the condition in the Punjab generally, and he was entitled to lay his plans with reference to those conditions."

I quite agree to that. No one, I think, could really question that in that sentence the Secretary of State was right, but unfortunately he goes on, in an immediately following sentence, to say—

"But he was not entitled to select for condign punishment an unarmed crowd which, when he inflicted that punishment, had committed no act of violence, had made no attempt to oppose him by force, and many members of which must have been unaware that they were disobeying his commands."

I have dealt with the question of the unarmed crowd and with the knowledge among them, and I am going to submit to your Lordships that this was not a case really of condign punishment, as the Secretary of State asserts.

It was a case of repressing a mob which was out for mischief, which consisted very largely of criminal elements, and which, unless it were checked, and effectively checked, had taken a course which might have been the beginning not merely of hideous disorders in Amritsar itself, but of a general rising throughout the Punjab. This was no innocent gathering. It was the same mob, in effect, General Dyer says, which had committed the crime of April 10. They knew of the proclamation. They were there in spite of the proclamation. They were there because of the proclamation in order to show that they were stronger than the Government, and to defy the order of the Government. In these circumstances, I submit that the closely reasoned statement which will be found in the White Paper prepared by General Dyer, to which I have already referred (pages 12 and 13) was thoroughly justified, and I invite the attention of every one of your Lordships to that document.

What was the opinion of those who were there, who were in positions of trust and confidence and who were best able to judge whether General Dyer's action had been right or not. I will cite a few of them. Sir Michael O'Dwyer was the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. He was a witness before Lord Hunter's Committee. He says this—

"Speaking with perhaps a more intimate knowledge of the then situation than any other else, I have no hesitation in saying that General Dyer's action that day was the decisive factor in crushing rebellion, the seriousness of which is only now being generally realised."

Mr. Miles Irving, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, says this, in his evidence—

"The result of the firing on the mob was that the whole rebellion collapsed. There was an idea that the Government would do nothing, and this came as a disillusion."

Colonel Jhonson was called before Lord Hunter's Committee. He was in command in the Lahore area from April 15 to May 29. He was asked that how it was that peace was maintained and blood-

shed avoided in the Lahore area, and he said it was mainly by reason of General Dyer's action at Amritsar.

Mr. Kitchin, the Commissioner in the Lahore District, was called as a witness and your Lordships will find his evidence at page 222 of Volume III of the evidence. He uses this remarkable expression—

"All independent opinion is united that the blow struck on the 13th April in Amritsar saved the Central Punjab from anarchy, loot, and murder."

Major General Beynon is an officer whose evidence will be found in volume IV of the Evidence given before Lord Hunter's Committee, and what I am going to read will be found on page 322. He wrote to the Adjutant General in India—

"The wisdom of General Dyer's action has been fully proved by the fact that there has been no further trouble of any sort in Amritsar. The news had a decidedly sobering effect on the surrounding villages when it spread to them."

Then, to wind up these testimonies, the Government of India itself, in a letter written as late as May 3, 1920, after expressing opinion that General Dyer exceeded the reasonable requirements of the case, nevertheless goes on to say this—

"We are convinced that General Dyer acted honestly in the belief that he was doing what was right, and we think that, in the result, his action at the time checked the spread of the disturbance to an extent which is difficult now to estimate."

Surely that is a very remarkable testimony, and surely the man who achieve that result is not to be lightly condemned on some theory, framed when the danger is over, that less force might possibly have answered the purpose.

I am not going to read your Lordships the very remarkable speech which was made by the Adjutant-General for India to the Legislative Council, on September 19, 1919. It is a speech that is worth reading, for it deals, from a broad point of view, with the difficulties which confront a soldier when he is put to deal with such a situation as that which existed at Amritsar. He concludes a speech to which I think every one would listen with some emotion by saying that, in the discharge of a distasteful duty of that kind, any soldier who honestly tried to do his duty deserves sympathy and support.

Thanks were showered upon General Dyer from all quarters. I am informed that he received very many letters—hundreds of them, I am told—from natives of the country thanking him for what he had done. The Government promoted him. They not only raised his rank, but they gave him charge of the expedition for the relief

of Thal which was invested by the Afghans, and he discharged that duty in a manner to enhance even his military reputation. He was universally regarded as the man who had saved the Punjab. It is a curious incident that the Sikhs felt so strongly what General Dyer had done, that they conferred upon him what, I believe, is a very rare honour, the honour of making him Sikh. The investiture consists in putting a slender armlet upon the wrist of the recipient of the honour. It is an honour that, I am told, has never been conferred on any British subject before ; and that was the action of the Sikh population of the district.

Everything promised well. But in October, 1919, the Hunter Committee were appointed. They reported on March 8, 1920, and on March 22 General Dyer was told that he must resign. I think General Dyer has very good ground for complaining of the manner in which he had been treated with reference to that Committee. He was called as a witness before it. He was never really told that he was on his own trial when that investigation was proceeding. No warning was given him. He had no legal assistance. He was cross-examined with great ability by three members of the Commission who were vakils, or pleaders, I understand, of very great ability of the Indian Courts. I must very respectfully enter my protest against the practice which is getting so common, of appointing strong partisans upon Committees or Commissions of Inquiry. To my mind it is a gross abuse. The duties of such a Committee or Commission are judicial, and such a cross-examination, as your Lordships will find in the record of these proceedings, was unseemly. Forensic ability is out of place in one who occupies, for a time, a judicial position. If you are to have partisans on a Commission you ought to have them not on one side only, but on both, in the hope that by the friction, by the collision of the opposing forces, truth may be evolved. But no partisans of General Dyer were appointed. In some Commissions lately we have seen partisans appointed on both sides, and we have seen the Commissioners giving evidence in the course of the proceedings.

Here General Dyer was put at every disadvantage, and submit to your Lordships that this constitutes grievous flaw in the proceedings of Lord Hunter's Committee. As a result General Dyer has been ruined. His punishment is very severe one. Surely it was not necessary to brand him as has been done. If it was not expedient to employ him in that part of India, he might have been sent elsewhere, or if necessary, he might have been employed in another part of the Empire. Surely it was a very cruel thing to say, not only that he was relieved of his command in India and would never be employed there again, but that the same thing was to

apply to a command elsewhere. I am not disputing the right of the Crown to do it. What I am disputing is the wisdom of those who advised that such action should be taken in such a case. He was condemned without trial, and, as I believe, on a misconception as to the considerations which should govern a soldier in dealing with a local disturbance which is part of a general insurrection. Whether, judged by that standard—the only true standard—his action was excessive, was a matter which, before he was condemned, should have been tried by a qualified Court of Inquiry; and I am certain of this, that any competent Court, in such circumstances, attach very great weight to the opinion of the man who was on the spot and who had to decide.

But then your Lordships may be told that the Army Council here have approved of the Report of Hunter Committee and of the action taken by the Secretary of State and others. Before I know what importance should be attached to the decision of the Army Council, I should like to know upon what view of the law they proceeded. Did they accept the view, laid down in the Hunter Report, that the force to be used must be judged simply by the necessity for putting down the local disturbance, or were they told that the wider view shall be taken and that, so long as General Dyer did not use excessive force with regard to the effect produced in the Punjab, he was not doing anything that was wrong? Until I know that, I confess that I should not be disposed to allow my judgment to be very much swayed by the conclusion which was arrived at in the Army Council presided over by the Secretary for War. Now that the danger is past we are all apt to forget it. I believe there is a Spanish proverb referring to the way in which people are ready to forget assistance which they were eager to have at the time—“The river passed, the saint forgotten.” I believe there is a Italian version of the same proverb, of which the action of the Government in this case, I confess, reminds me; it is: “The river passed, the saint mocked.”

I cannot sit down without referring to one very cruel charge that has been made against General Dyer by the Secretary of State. He says in the Despatch to which I have so often referred already—on page 24 of the correspondence—

“Further, that Brig.-General Dyer should have taken no steps to see that some attempt was made to give medical assistance to the dying and wounded was an omission from his obvious duty.”

It is very odd that the Secretary of State should have thought it necessary to say that. The Committee had considered the criticism which had been passed in that respect, and what they say

is tantamount to an acquittal of General Dyer. In effect they discard the charge ; they refer to the fact that the hospitals were open, that the medical officers were there, and they add—

“It has not been proved to us that any wounded people were, in fact, exposed to unnecessary suffering from want of medical treatment.”

General Dyer himself, in his statement on page 18, as to sending medical officers into the city, says—

“No medical officer could have lived in the city without a strong escort, and in my judgment none could be spared.”

Surely it is not in accordance with the traditions of our public life that a charge of that kind, which must have been read by tens of thousands who would never read the paragraph in the Committee's Report from which I have quoted, exonerating General Dyer in this matter of the wounded, should be circulated broadcast. There is nothing to which the people of this country are more sensitive than a charge of inhumanity, and I think that the Secretary of State should have weighed his words more carefully before he put such a stigma as this upon a gallant officer whose humanity is beyond question.

I have only a very few words to add on the more general aspects of the case. The matter may not rest here. In this case you have a man selected for a most arduous and unpleasant duty ; he discharges it in a manner such as to achieve results that could not have been surpassed ; he is praised and promoted, and employed on active service. A year afterwards, on the Report of the Committee, he is sent as a scape-goat into the wilderness. I am told that soldiers rather distrust politicians, but hitherto the Government has supported its servants who have tried to do their duty. Nothing could be imagined more demoralising than the suspicion that they may not be backed, for political or other reasons.

It may be said that our soldiers are made of sterner stuff, and that they will do their duty whatever course the politicians may take. I believe that to be generally true. But all soldiers are not equally strong, and when you have the less strong man faced with a situation of difficulty and danger, where his conscience and his military instincts tell him that he ought to take a strong line if he is to save the situation, if such a man has a feeling that the support to which he is entitled may not be accorded to him, and that the result of his doing his duty may be the ruin of himself and all those that are dear to him, can you wonder if, for a moment, he might hesitate ? Can you wonder if, in some cases, the results of such hesitation might be disastrous ?

Moved, to resolve, "That this House deplores the conduct of the case of General Dyer as unjust to that officer, and as establishing a precedent dangerous to the preservation of order in face of rebellion"—(Viscount Finlay)

The Under Secretary of State for India (Lord Sinha): My Lords, it is with great hesitation, indeed with reluctance, that I rise to address your Lordships this evening. I am not so presumptuous as to think that I can deal effectively with the case which has been presented with such skill and eloquence by the Noble and learned Viscount who has just finished. That I must leave to abler hands than mine. Indeed, I fear that I cannot hope to throw fresh light on a matter which has been discussed threadbare for the last few months. I cannot hope that anything that I can urge will change the opinion or alter the convictions of those who have arrayed themselves on opposite sides in this unfortunate controversy. I might, however unintentionally, fan the flames of bitter racial animosity which is now raging. The only reasons which compel me to trespass on your Lordships' indulgence are, that I hope I shall be able to clear away certain misunderstandings and remove certain wrong impressions which have been caused by incidental issues, false and irrelevant issues which have been raised, and have tended to obscure the main issues underlying the Punjab disturbances. I ask your indulgence, because I fear that my silence might be misconstrued, both in this country and in India.

I desire at the outset, on behalf of my fellow-countrymen in India to express the deep horror and regret that we all feel at the abominable outrages committed at Amritsar, Ahmedabad and elsewhere, in April last year—a regret and horror to which public expression was given by the Secretary of State for India as soon as the news arrived. I must also ask your Lordships' leave to express, on behalf of my countrymen the deep resentment and indignation, which is felt in India over the humiliation inflicted, and the indignities heaped, on some of my countrymen in the Punjab in the course of the administration of martial law in that province. I ask your Lordships' House to endorse the judgment of His Majesty's Government that those acts flout the standards of propriety and humanity which the inhabitants not only of India but of the civilised world have a right to demand from those set in authority over them. I desire to make it clear that what my fellow countrymen in India desire is the vindication of principles, and not the punishment of individuals. That is of secondary importance. Indeed, it is of importance only in so far as it tends to give effect, adequate or otherwise, to your vindication.

The unhappy incidents which occurred in various parts of India

and particularly in the Punjab, in April last year, will form, in any case, a deplorable chapter in the history of British rule in India. They have given rise to a controversy prolonged beyond the limits of safety. The more responsible sections of the Press in this country and in India have counselled all parties to the controversy to accept the decision of the Cabinet as final and to refrain from further strife. I regret that the advice seems to have fallen upon deaf ears, and that the publication of papers has been the signal for a revival of bitter racial animosity. I am afraid there is little hope of an end to this dangerous feud unless both parties determine to drop the question, to efface the bitter memories of last year, and set themselves to accomplish the great task of peace and reconciliation so ably begun by Sir Edward Maclagan, the present Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab.

The Noble Viscount has referred to the Report of the Hunter Committee. I am not quite sure whether he accepts or rejects the findings of the Committee, or even of the Majority section of the Committee. I am in doubt after having listened to him, whether he does or does not. It is unfortunate that the Report is not unanimous. It is still more unfortunate that, at first sight, the divergence seems to proceed on racial lines. I hope, however, to satisfy your Lordships that there is no real, substantial, and fundamental divergence, and that a divergence on matters of opinion, as distinct from questions of fact, is consistent with a conscientious integrity on the part of the dissentients. I claim both for the British portion of the Committee and for the Indian portion that they have conscientiously endeavoured to discharge their duties to the best of their abilities.

I regret that Lord Finlay has considered it fit to cast aspersions on the Indian Members of the Committee. I hope to satisfy your Lordships that those aspersions are unmerited. As I have said, the difference of opinion with regard to the necessity for martial law and its duration is one that is natural and almost inevitable. Some would be chiefly impressed with the dangers of the situation, by the heavy responsibilities thrown on the authorities, and by a feeling that the safety of a large population, including the small European portion, might possibly depend upon firm and energetic action. Others, firm in their conviction (happily well-founded) that India is as steadfast in loyalty to-day, as during the war, would as certainly take a less serious view of the possibilities of the situation, however menacing it might appear on the surface, and would concentrate their attention upon the sudden outbursts of disorder, the measures taken to ensure their quick cessation, and the abuse of powers conferred solely for the purpose of repressing disorders.

I submit that two points of view are possible with regard to the introduction and the continuance of martial law, but one view, and one view alone, is possible with regard to the incident which has loomed so large in this controversy—the shooting at Jallianwala Bagh—and also with regard to some of the orders issued in the course of the administration of martial law; and it is precisely this that we find in the Report of the Hunter Commission.

I have said that it will be my principal endeavour to clear the atmosphere by getting rid, so to speak, of the side issues which have been raised, some of them of a personal nature, and all of them, I submit, introduced for the purpose of prejudice.

The first and foremost of these is one to which I regret Lord Finlay has to-day, to some extent at any rate, lent the great authority of his name—namely that the Government of India was at any time of opinion that General Dyer's action at Jallianwala Bagh was justified, and thereby to some extent at any rate endorsed—I do not say fully, I hope not—but to some extent endorsed—the mischievous, I may almost say the dangerous, suggestion that the Government of India has, in deference to the wishes of the Secretary of State, or of his Majesty's Government, altered its original view with regard to General Dyer's action. I can assure your Lordships that that is not so; that any such suggestion is absolutely unfounded; that the Government of India has at no time changed its view with regard to the action of General Dyer at Jallianwala Bagh, and that the Noble Viscount was incorrect in stating to your Lordships to-day that they had given General Dyer promotion after the incident of Jallianwala Bagh.

Upon what grounds is this suggestion made? It is said that after April 13 General Dyer was sent to the front, in connection with the Afghan War which supervened soon afterwards, and that he was given promotion. I have already said that it is not the fact that he was given promotion, but he certainly was sent, in the position and *status* which he occupied before, to the front, where his services would be best employed, and where, I am glad to say, he gave such a good account of himself. But at that time—this was early in May—there had been no inquiry and there was nothing before the Government of India, except the meagre report made by General Dyer himself on April 14, the day after the occurrence. None of the details which have since appeared were before the Government of India, and I submit that it would have been not only unfair to General Dyer, but contrary to public interests, if the services of that gallant soldier had not been utilised and employed wherever the public service required that they should be employed.

Then it is said that, at the time when a debate took place in the Legislative Council of India, the Government of India, through its member, expressed approval of, or justified or condoned, the action of General Dyer at Jallianwalla Bagh. That is an equally unfounded statement. I can only presume that those who make that suggestion have not read the report of the proceedings of the Legislative Council in September of last year. With your Lordships' leave I will tell you, as shortly as I can, what happened, and give you one extract from the speech of the Member of the Government of India who was in charge of the Bill then before the Legislative Council to show that, so far from approving or justifying or condoning the action of General Dyer, the Government of India, in specific terms, refused to express any opinion, and stated that no opinion would be formed until the enquiry by the Hunter Committee had been completed, and that no action would be taken, and that it was wrong for private members who had made allegations to make *ex parte* statements in the absence of General Dyer himself, and at a time when the Committee is going to hold its enquiry.

There are three dates in September on which this Bill came before the Legislative Council. The Bill was what? A Bill of Indemnity, to indemnify officers employed in the administration of Martial Law for any act of theirs committed reasonably and in good faith in the course of such administration—that is to say, to protect them from legal proceedings in the Courts. Sir William Vincent, the Home Member, was in charge of the Bill. He introduced it on September 18, and in doing so he expressly said that there was no intention to justify any particular action, or to indemnify any officer concerned in the firing at Jallianwalla Bagh, and that necessary action would be taken, and could only be taken, on the findings of the Hunter Committee. On September 19 he repeated that statement, and on September 25 he made a statement which explains what the Noble and learned Viscount Lord Finlay read, the speech of Sir Havelock Hudson which is supposed to have expressed approval of General Dyer's action.

May I read that extract from the last speech of Sir William Vincent, because it makes clear of what I have advanced—namely that the Government of India did not, and could not, justify and asked for a suspension of judgment. He said this in his closing speech in moving that the Bill be passed—

"You have one member saying one thing ; another saying something quite different ; on many occasions neither of them speaking from first hand knowledge ; and on their statement this Council is asked to condemn or justify the conduct of individual officers. I use the word 'condemn' deliberately I put it

emphatically to the Council that such a statement is neither fair nor reasonable. These are matters for Committee. I will take one incident which has been repeatedly referred to—this unfortunate Jallianwala Bagh affair.

“My Lord, no one deplores the loss of life on that day more than the Government. It has been, and must be to all of us, a source of great distress, and it does not really make so very much difference from this point of view whether the number killed was 300 or 400. In either case the loss of life is serious enough in all conscience and greatly to be regretted. But we have no right in this Council either to justify or condemn that action. It is no part of our duty ; it does not come within the scope of the Bill. General Hudson has, it is true, put before the Council certain considerations relating to this occurrence, but as I understood him—he was merely attempting to put the matter as it might have appeared to a military officer at the time and was not in any way putting his personal views before the Council. This is the way I understood his remarks. I mention this because his statements have been made the ground for attacks on him : and it was suggested he sought to justify what was done. I do not think that the Council, when they have considered the position, will for one moment accept that as a fair presentment of his intentions. What I ask this Council to do now is, not to prejudge this matter in any way, neither to condemn nor to justify any action, neither to say a man is innocent nor to say he is guilty until the proper time for such a decision shall arrive.”

I submit, therefore, that it is incorrect to say that the Government of India, by any speech of any member of that Government in the debates of September last year in any manner approved of or justified or condoned the action of General Dyer at Jallianwala Bagh.

There is even a more dangerous suggestion made in this connection—namely, that the original Despatch of the Government of India has been altered in deference to the wishes either of the Cabinet or of the Secretary of State with reference to the case of General Dyer. I assure your Lordships that there is not one word of truth in any suggestion of the kind. There were consultations, of course, in the Cabinet over the Hunter Report and, in the course of those consultations, communications passed by cable with the Government of India, and changes were made not only in the Despatch of the Government of India but in the draft of the Despatch from the Government here.

In no single respect, however, did the Government of India, in any matter of substance, modify their original views, and not in

any respect did they modify their views (which throughout has been the same) with regard to the conduct of General Dyer. It is founded on the unanimous finding of the Hunter Committee, which they have accepted and endorsed, and which have similarly been accepted by His Majesty's Government in this country. I venture to hope, therefore, that what I have said to your Lordships to-day will dispel any suggestion about the Government of India having yielded, with regard to their views upon the conduct of General Dyer, in deference either to the Secretary of State or to His Majesty's Government as a whole.

I must ask your Lordships' forgiveness if I refer to another matter which is of a somewhat personal nature. I am sure that if your Lordships hear the circumstances you will extend your indulgence to me. Most of your Lordships, if not all of you, are aware that it has been suggested by Sir Michael O'Dwyer that, amongst others, he communicated to me in the India Office, details of the firing at Jallianwala Bagh when he saw me in June last year. He said that he had communicated these details not only to the Secretary of State, but to Sir Thomas Holderness (the distinguished permanent Under Secretary in the India Office who retired in January last after long service) and also to me. So far as the Secretary of State is concerned he has given his denial from his place in Parliament, and so far as Sir Thomas Holderness is concerned your Lordships will have seen his denial in a letter placed before Parliament and appearing in the Official Report of the House of Commons on Monday, July 5.

I ask your Lordships to remember that Sir Thomas Holderness saw Sir Michael O'Dwyer frequently, and that my interview was only for half an hour on one particular day. This is what Sir Thomas Holderness said—

"The details given by General Dyer to the Commission came to me as a great surprise and were entirely unexpected. In conclusion I would like to say, that if I had been called upon during the summer or autumn of 1919 to prepare a statement for publication regarding the Jallianwala Bagh incident, and had framed it on the information verbally received from Sir M. O'Dwyer and on the scanty information transmitted by the Government of India, the narrative would have been a different complexion from the account of the facts given by General Dyer. It would not and could not have included the critical features on which discussion has since centred."

Personally, I was more concerned then with the present than with the past. Our conversation was confined to such details as the treatment of the editors and lawyers then in goal, the necessity for

their prosecution, and the necessity for excluding counsel from outside appearing before the tribunal for the defence of these prisoners, and things of that nature.

I did not put one single question to Sir M. O'Dwyer about Amritsar, or the firing at Amritsar, nor did he tell me one single thing with regard to the incidents of the 13th. The reason why the matter did not occur to me was that I had only seen the official communication stating that on April 13 there had been a collision between troops and a mob, with the result that there had been heavy casualties to the extent of 200. I inferred that it was a mob of the same kind as had committed the outrages on the 10th, when they looted, burned, and murdered, and that the heavy casualties were due to the determined resistance which they must have made when fired upon. But the details which have since appeared, and appeared only when General Dyer was examined before the Hunter Committee—I will mention the details presently—were absolutely unknown to me.

These details are—I shall not have to repeat them when I am dealing with the Jallianwala Bagh incident—(1) That the crowd was within an enclosed space almost like “sheep in a pen”—to use the words of Mr. Bonar Law—with the main entrance guarded by troops, and the entrance to the passage leading to the square guarded by two armoured cars with an aeroplane reporting now and then, though not under General Dyer's command; (2) that this crowd included boys and thousands of villagers from outside Amritsar who were there, as stated in the case of the Punjab Government themselves, as mere spectators—that this crowd was unarmed. My Noble Friend is in error in saying that the evidence was that they were armed with bludgeons or anything else. That crowd was not merely unarmed with lethal weapons or firearms, but unarmed. They were attacking nothing and no one; they were seated on the ground squatting, and listening to a speech when they were fired upon. The firing began without any notice; it was continued and directed in the manner now admitted, and the wounded—whose number is still unascertained—were left unattended either by the military or by the civil authorities. These details were then, and for months afterwards unknown to me. I have every reason to believe that they were unknown to the Viceroy and his then colleagues—I speak in the presence of one of them, the noble Lord, Lord Meston—until the examination of General Dyer before the Hunter Committee.

What possible motive could there be for the India Office not to inform Parliament or the public of these details if they had been communicated? On the contrary, it seems to me that it has been urged, with some show of reason on the Indian side, that, whereas

full and elaborate details of the foul deeds committed by the rioters were published by means of official *communiqués* and by the Anglo-Indian Press, much of the details of the action taken by officials, civil and military, in suppressing the so-called rebellion, were left to be discovered by unofficial inquiries which became possible only some time afterwards, when the strict censorship over the Press and private correspondence was removed and free ingress into the Punjab was once more permitted to public-spirited outsiders.

One other matter has been introduced which I am afraid will cause serious misunderstanding in India—namely, with regard to the *personnel* of the Hunter Committee. I regret most heartily that anything should have fallen from Lord Finlay to-day to lend colour to the suggestion that the Indian members of the Committee were imbued with a spirit of partisanship. I had understood before that the objection was not merely to the Indian members, but also to the English members of the Committee: and Sir Michæl O'Dwyer's objection at any rate so far as the English members were concerned, was on the ground of their lack of administrative experience. So far as that is concerned, I should have thought that, in as much as the Committee had to decide upon evidence placed before them in the knowledge and administrative experience of officials was made available by means of evidence before them, this would not be in any way a drawback with regard to their qualifications. But the monstrous charge was made that these Gentlemen belonged to the same class which was largely responsible for creating the situation that led to these disorders, and which, in several cases, actively participated in the rebellion.

I desire to submit to your Lordships with all the emphasis I can that this is a most monstrous and most undeserved charge. Remember who these three gentlemen, the Indian Members of the Committee were. One was Sir Chimanlal Harilal Sitalvad, who was a distinguished advocate of the Bombay High Court for many years, and Vice-Chancellor of the University there, and is at the present moment—after the Report of the Hunter Committee—a judge of the Bombay High Court; a man who has been famous throughout his public life for moderation of thought and speech. Another Indian member of the Committee was Mr. Sultan Ahmed, a Minister to the State of Gwalior, a graduate of Cambridge, a Barrister of England, who has never taken any part in British-Indian politics, whose services and the services of whose family, have been acknowledged, amongst others, by Sir Michæl O'Dwyer himself, and against whom not a breath of suspicion has ever arisen as regard his taking part in political agitation, much less in fomenting disorder. The third Indian member was the Hon. Pundit Jagat Narain, advocate of the

Judicial Commissioner's Court of Oudh, who has devoted the best part of his public life to local self-Government in that province, and who as a member of the Legislative Council, has earned the confidence and the esteem both of the Government and the people of that province.

It was said that he had made an incorrect statement as regards the number of persons interned by Sir Michael O'Dwyer. This was in 1917. The moment his attention was drawn to it he withdrew that charge. He wrote at once to the papers stating that he had been incorrect, and explaining how the inaccuracy had risen, and Sir Harcourt Butler obtained Sir Michael O'Dwyer's thanks for having drawn the attention of Pundit Jagat Narayan to this matter and obtained this withdrawal. It seems to me that there is nothing in that distinguished gentleman's career to disqualify him from sitting on the Hunter Committee. Speaking for myself, I claim that all aspersions on the honesty, the impartiality and the competence of the members of the Committee, whether English or Indian, are absolutely without foundation.

I cannot pass from this without referring to what Lord Finlay was pleased to call the astute cross-examination of these three native lawyers, which is supposed to have placed General Dyer at a disadvantage. Will your Lordships be surprised to hear that the judgment of the Hunter Committee, of the Government of India, and of His Majesty's Government is based, not upon any single word in cross-examination, but upon a statement made in a carefully prepared document—prepared long before the Committees sat, namely, on August 25, and signed by General Dyer—for the military authorities as, I suppose, a part of his report. So far as the cross-examination is concerned, those of your Lordships who care to take the trouble to read it will, I have no hesitation in saying, find that the most damaging statements are made, not under cross-examination by any of those Indian members of the Committee, but under cross-examination by Lord Hunter and Mr. Justice Rankin.

Therefore, this again is introduced as a matter of prejudice, and, so far as the cross-examination by three Indian lawyers is concerned, eliminate it if you like; it has not been relied on by the Committee, or by the Government here, nor has even the cross-examination of Lord Hunter and Mr. Justice Rankin, but the judgment both of the Hunter Committee, and of the Government of India and of His Majesty's Government is founded upon General Dyer's own statement, and his own statement alone. I am afraid I have taken up a great deal of time already with reference to matters which I have, perhaps, treated as of more importance than they deserve. But it seemed to me that some, at any rate, of these

matters have created an atmosphere of prejudice, which was detrimental to a right judgment being formed upon the main issues.

Now I come to the main issues arising upon the Hunter Report. Apart from the question of the necessity of martial law and its continuance, there are only two others—namely, the acts done, the orders passed in the course of the administration of martial law, and that incident of Jallianwala Bagh. I have already said with regard to the introduction and continuance of martial law, that the difference of opinion between the two sections is more superficial than fundamental. After all, they both agreed that it was necessary to call in the military for the purpose of repressing the disturbances that had taken place. I am perfectly certain that if the majority had expressed themselves with the same degree of condemnation of those acts, done in the course of administration of martial law, as His Majesty's Government here has, there probably would not have been even such difference of opinion as exists. It turns on the construction of the words of "open rebellion" in the regulation of 1804, with regard to which it is possible to hold two different opinions; but, as I say, it has become now a more or less theoretical, abstract, academical question, considering that both sections were agreed that it was necessary to call in the military for the purpose of repressing the disturbances.

For myself, I will not even read to you the list of acts done in the course of administration—flogging, crawling orders and so forth—because the mere mention of them raises a storm of passion which I desire to avoid. But I am confident that your Lordships have all seen the allegations, as well as the unanimous findings of the Committee upon those acts, and the judgment pronounced both by the Government of India and by the Committee. It seems to me that hardly any importance has been attached to those acts in the debate which have taken place so far, and attention has been concentrated only upon this one question of whether General Dyer has been properly or improperly dealt with. That again is, I venture to think, a matter which will cause misunderstanding and create a wrong impression in India. However, that may be, I, for my part, am not willing to go into those acts, because I fear to add to the bitter fellings now prevailing.

I will, therefore, content myself with a very few words only as to the Jallianwala Bagh incident and the decision of the Government thereupon. I have, incidentally, referred to the details of the firing. I have told your Lordships that the crowd was unarmed; that it was listening to a lecture; and that there must have been, according to the case of the Punjab Government themselves, a very large number of outsiders from the Punjab who were not there for

any political purposes ; who were not aware even of the proclamation that had been made that morning ; and who were there merely as spectators ; and there is reason to believe that many of them had been misled into coming to that assembly by false representations as to what was going to be done there. That being so, I submit there was no justification for firing upon the crowd at once. It was not attacking anything or anybody ; it was not doing any act of violence, it was sitting on the ground, and, as General Dyer himself said, there was no question of its trying to attack or rush him, or anything of that kind.

Assume, even on the basis of the reasoning that Lord Finlay has urged, that it was necessary, or desirable, or justifiable to fire without previous notice, was it necessary to continue the firing, to the extent and in the manner that was done ? Assume, it was an army of rebels. Supposing they wanted to surrender, would a military commander on the field on a battle give them quarter or not in those circumstances ? The circumstances in this case were such that General Dyer himself said, "If I had more troops, and if my armoured car would come through the lane—which they could not because it was too narrow—I would have done every one of these men to death until the whole assembly had dispersed." Therefore, admittedly, we are on common ground that more force was used than it was necessary to disperse the crowd, and if more force was used, it was used for what purpose ? For the purpose of creating a moral effect ; that is to say, of intimidation, terrorism, frightfulness, or whatever else you choose to call it. And that, My Lords, is the doctrine which I am profoundly thankful to think His Majesty's Government has emphatically repudiated. I hope when your Lordships have heard, from abler advocates than I am, all the arguments in favour of the position which has been adopted by the Government of India, your Lordships will emphatically endorse that judgment.

The Secretary of State for War the other day described this incident as a monstrous event, standing in singular and sinister isolation in the history of the British Empire. A former Prime Minister of England described it as a monstrous outrage. Do your Lordships, then, wonder that this has created, throughout the length and breadth of India, the deepest anger and the deepest resentment ? It is said that the action of General Dyer saved the Punjab. I hope, my Lords, even if that were so, there will be no one in this House who will endorse the doctrine that the end justifies the means. But is it certain, my Lords, that it did save the Punjab ? The Hunter Committee, after a patient and protracted inquiry, have held that it is impossible to come to that conclusion

notwithstanding the statements of Sir M. O'Dwyer and of those officials whose evidence Lord Finlay quotes. Are we to reject that finding?—a finding by a body of competent and experienced persons who heard the evidence on the spot, and against whose competence, I submit, there is no reason whatsoever that can fairly be urged. But even if it could be said, contrary to that finding, that General Dyer's action did save the Punjab and did prevent another Mutiny, are you certain—can any body ask your Lordships to hold—that nothing but this frightful massacre would have accomplished that end? Is there any evidence, is there any justification, for asking your Lordships to hold that this massacre of the 5000, or the 10,000 or the 20,000 persons who were there was the only thing that could have saved the Punjab from rebellion or mutiny?

I submit that it would be in the highest degree dangerous to assent to any doctrine of that kind. And I know that whatever may be the decision that is come to in this House or in the other House of Parliament, there is not a single Indian who believes that the situation was in any way similar to that existing in 1857, or that General Dyer's action saved British rule in India. The Secretary of State for War said that he did not believe it. The Hunter Committee did not believe it. Nor is there, so far as I know, any person in authority in India at that time who will advance that proposition.

I have taken up your Lordships time at greater length than I intended, but I can not conclude those remarks without dwelling for one moment on the lessons to be learnt from these bitter experiences which would otherwise be thrown away. To my mind there are lessons to be learnt both by rulers and ruled. Both section of the Hunter Committee have unanimously said that the movement of *Satyagraha*, passive resistance, civil disobedience, or by whatever name it has been called, has been to some extent at any rate, if not to a great extent, responsible for the spirit of lawlessness which resulted in these disorders. I ask my fellow-countrymen to lay well that lesson to their hearts. I ask them to dissociate themselves from a similar pernicious movement started by Mr. Gandhi—a movement which he calls by another name, that of non-co-operation. It can only lead to the same disastrous results as the *Satyagraha*, or the civil disobedience movement, produced in April of last year. The more reasonable sections of my countrymen—and they are by far the majority—have already dissociated themselves from this movement, and if the Government of India is only allowed to pursue the wise course it is now pursuing, I have no doubt that soon there

will not be a single Indian, either Hindu or Mussulman, who will subscribe to or act upon that doctrine.

But if there is that lesson to be learned by my countrymen there is also another to be learned by the Government, and that is the policy which was persued so successfully in the United Provinces by Sir Harcourt Butler, in Bombay by Sir George Lloyd, and in Bengal by Lord Ronaldshay. Do not interfere too hastily or too violently with an agitation of this nature. Let it kill itself ; as in time it will. Idleness cannot last ; shops cannot be closed for ever. It is against the interests of the people themselves to allow that. Ruthless methods of repression and coercion result in disorder as much as passive resistance, and direct action, or civil disobedience. I ask my fellow countrymen to co-operate as much as they can with all section of the community, both European and Indian, in order that the large and benevolent scheme of Reform, which has just been launched, might result in the progressive realisation of self-government in India which has been declared to be the object of His Majesty's Government. I apologise to your Lordships for the time I have taken.

In the course of the second day's debate on the Dyer case in the House of Lords, on July 20, 1920, Lord Curzon on behalf of the Government said that he hoped the House would not dissociate itself from the unanimous verdict of the high authority who had hitherto dealt with the matter and would not thereby send a message to India which he was firmly convinced would be a source of the greatest apprehension, if not worse, there. He dwelt on the importance and respect due to the views expressed by Lord Meston who strongly supported the steps taken by Government. He was glad that the debate had enabled some of the existing misapprehensions to be disputed, such as General Dyer's alleged promotion after Amritsar. Dyer was Brigadiar-General in the Afghan war and subsequently. Lord Curzon also referred to the dissipation of the suggestion that pressure was brought to bear on the Commander-in-Chief in India and on the Indian Government or that the latter modified its views. He defended the Government of India from irresponsible criticism. He admitted that General Dyer was possibly at a disadvantage before the Hunter Committee at the hands of a skilful Indian counsel, but said that the Government's case rested with General Dyer's answers to question by the Chairman of the Committee, Lord Hunter, and on statements in his own declarations, particularly on the published statement he drew up a few weeks ago. The two aspects which chiefly struck his Lordship were the crawling order and the happenings at Jallianwallah Bagh when the case came up

before him as a member of the Cabinet, because he was convinced that those incidents had impressed themselves indelibly and produced much of the troubles to which Lord Meston had referred. In the course of his long experience in India he had been more than once involved in troubles and crisis of racial aspect. That experience was burnt into his soul, but he had emerged from it all with the unshakable conviction that only upon certain principles could any administrator of India, civil or military, honourably take his stand.

Lord Curzon said that he had noted that most of the previous speakers had only lightly touched upon the crawling order. He declared that if General Dyer's explanation of it before the Hunter Committee was to be accepted then it was a very vicarious form of punishment because most of the people who submitted to it were ordinary inhabitants of the street by means of which they were able to gain only exit from their houses. Also this punishment was inflicted on April 19th for crime perpetrated on April 10th, and moreover, people arrested on minor charges in the different parts of the town had been subjected to this humiliation. Regarding the crawling order, the explanation in General Dyer's recent statement, namely, that his order meant that the street should be regarded as the holy ground which was as well understood by Indians, was an afterthought, if not an absurdity. Lord Curzon described the manner in which an Indian pays penance in order to mark the difference from crawling action. General Dyer's action in this connection was impossible to excuse despite the extreme and intense provocation. The subsequent explanation was inconsistent with the facts. He then proceeded to examine the Jallianwala Bagh affair and refuted at length Lord Finlay's presentation of minor facts and submitted the version based on the evidence of General Dyer himself and the Deputy Inspector of Police and his Brigade Major. He had only discovered one reference in the whole of the evidence on which the theory that the crowd was armed with lethal weapons appeared to rest. He described as a very dangerous doctrine General Dyer's explanation of his action that he wished to produce sufficient moral effect throughout the Punjab. That meant that any officer would be entitled to apply the maximum rather than the minimum degree of force in a similar situation, if he only cast his eyes away from the arena in which he was acting and looked over a sufficiently wide field beyond. If that doctrine was applied to the quelling of any civil riot in England and if such action were taken and condoned, would any British Government stand for forty-eight hours in office? Lord Curzon then proceeded to develop his arguments against the contention that General Dyer saved the Punjab by his action, expressing the opinion that

General Dyer no more saved India by the massacre at Amritsar than you could defeat the Bolsheviks or save Russia by a massacre at Odessa or Warsaw. He profoundly mistrusted the theory that General Dyer saved the Punjab by his exertions. He altogether denied that he had saved India by his example, and the Government could not possibly accept Lord Finlay's theory that so long as an officer acted honestly in difficult circumstances he could rely on his superiors standing by him. To General Dyer sympathy could be given without stint but not necessarily support. He, however, paid a tribute to General Dyer's high personal and professional qualities and recognised that the respect felt for him had been manifested by the Sikhs. Lord Curzon did not desire to minimize the gravity of the situation which had existed and he quite understood how the temper of any man might be aroused by a series of shocking outrages ; but what he condemned was General Dyer's conception of his duty which was altogether a wrong conception. He appealed to the House not to condone General Dyer's error and lower British standards of justice and humanity.

Lord Milner deplored the debate as likely to harm national interest. He declared that the suggestion that injustice had been done to General Dyer from political motive was unfair and gratuitous. He was one of the Cabinet Committee which had investigated the report of the Hunter Committee and he had approached the subject with bias all in favour of the soldier, of firm and even stern repression of sedition and maintenance of Imperial power ; but he was forced regretfully to conclude that in the suppression of disorders, acts were committed for maintenance of authority which were ultimately likely not to strengthen but to undermine it. General Dyer's continued firing, in order to create a moral impression in the Punjab, was a frightful error of judgment involving fearful consequences, but the Government would have committed a more terrible mistake if, for fear of unpopularity, they had hesitated to condemn General Dyer's action. As regards employment of General Dyer, His Lordship declared that it would be unjustifiable and impossible to employ General Dyer when many other British officers of equal rank and distinction were awaiting employment. The Government were not inflicting any penalty or stigma on General Dyer by not employing him, because they could not employ him without extreme injustice to others. The Government took full responsibility for the repudiation of General Dyer's action. No lighter terms of censure would have adequately met the case. The suggestion that any hurt had resulted to General Dyer beyond the inevitable result of censure which the Government felt bound to pronounce was quite contrary to fact. As far as was consistent with their duty in asser-

ting principles they were bound to assist Government, and they had dealt with General Dyer considerably and leniently. Far graver consequences to individuals might have to be faced, if necessary, in order to assert principles which the Government considered vitally important to sound administration and the fair name of the Government of India for capacity of maintaining order by strong but temperate and not ruthless or cruel methods.

Lord Canterbury regretted the discussion on the ground that it might be construed as a approbation of General Dyer's policy.

Lord Buckmaster opposed the motion.

Lord Meston said that the motion was really a vote of censure on the Government of India. He denied that there was any avoidable delay in bringing the case of General Dyer to investigation. General Dyer's continuing to fire after the crowd had dispersed was unjustifiable. It was untrue that the security of the Punjab depended on General Dyer. It was the steadfast front of the Government of India in the Punjab and elsewhere and the courage of Sir Michael O'Dwyer that had kept the Punjab together. No other officer had acted in a similar way to General Dyer in suppressing disorders. They did what was necessary and no more.

Lord Sumner who strongly supported Lord Finlay and declared that General Dyer had been unjustly convicted without trial said that nobody supporting the motion desired one standard of justice for Europeans and another for Indians. They desired the law to be administered fairly and equally to all citizens of the Empire. They claimed that General Dyer's action should be viewed in the light of two prominent considerations. Firstly, that General Dyer alone saw things as they were when action had to be taken, and secondly, that General Dyer was one of a long file of officers who now and hereafter would be called on to meet similar situations and upon whose firmness and judgment great and fateful events must depend. General Dyer was faced with incipient planned rebellion. General Dyer had apparently been punished because he had the candour to say that he thought in time to attack the moral of the rebels and try to suppress them at the outset by showing vigour and not faltering to their disloyal endeavours. Lord Sumner suggested that the campaign against General Dyer was opened not because he evolved in his own mind a theory from which the rulers thought it wiser and necessary to dissent. He expressed the opinion that some members of the Hunter Committee came to the enquiry with information derived from evidence laid before it. In view of the vast new responsibilities we were assuming, it was increasingly the duty of the military authorities to deal with sudden rebellion. They were weakening

the hands of these officers if they let it be understood that fair consideration would not afterwards be given to their difficulties and dangers. He urged their Lordships to pause long before, by voting against the motion, they laid down as a safe rule the policy that the less force a military officer used, if he had to use it at all, the better, and if he used more than the minimum he could keep to, he did so at his peril.

Lord Salisbury, another pro-Dyerite, deplored the violence of Lord Curzon's language. He pointed out that General Dyer was in a position of greatest difficulty and reasserted the authority of the Crown. He expressed the opinion that thanks were due to such an honourable and gallant gentleman. He could not find a trace of General Dyer having acted with vengeance. He did not approve of all General Dyer had done and said, but the House ought to concentrate their attention on the broader issue, namely, whether officers doing their best in positions of great difficulty in which if they did not do their duty, the most formidable consequences would follow, were to be supported by Government or not. If such officers were not supported, the confidence of those responsible for maintaining law and order would be undermined and it would have a most demoralising effect on them and on the people of India who were entering on a great experiment and who ought to understand that there was nothing in self-government which authorised disorder.

Lord Harris expressed the opinion that General Dyer was not justified in continuing firing on the crowd.

Lord Ampthill considered that General Dyer was absolutely right and saved India from anarchy.

Lord Carmichael thought that General Dyer was guilty of a grave error of judgment.

Lord Lamington criticised the delay in taking action and pointed out that the adoption of the resolution did not mean the endorsement of everything that General Dyer had done.

On the Motion made by Lord Finlay, the House divided with the result that 129 voted for and 86 against it—indirectly a Note of confidence on General Dyer and a vote of censure on Government.

House of Commons—July 1920

Mr. Gandhi.

Mr. E. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India whether he took any steps to try Mr. Gandhi for his responsibility in regard to the disturbances in India during the spring of 1919; and, if not, will he state the reason?

Mr. Montagu: The Governments of India and Bombay did not see fit to prosecute Mr. Gandhi who, in a public speech at Ahmedabad, expressed his deep sorrow at the form the agitation had taken, and who disclaimed any intention of encouraging violence.

Mr. Gwynne: After the Hunter Committee reported, did the Right Hon. Gentleman then take any steps to see that steps were taken against Mr. Gandhi?

Mr. Montagu: I preferred to leave the whole matter to the Government of India and the local Government. I recollect what the Hunter Committee said on the subject, but, of course, there is a great difference between moral and legal responsibility.

Colonel Wedgwood. Is the Right Hon. Gentleman not aware that any attempt to prosecute Mr. Gandhi would be worse for our hold upon India even than the Amritsar affair? [Hon. Members: "No."]]

Mr. Montagu: Mr. Gandhi inaugurated a Satyagraha movement and regretted afterwards the consequences that resulted. If he now inaugurates a new movement of the same kind, it cannot be said that he is in ignorance of the consequences that may follow.

Mr. Gwynne: Is the House to understand that the Right Hon. Gentleman thinks that if anyone publicly expresses regret afterwards for having caused riots and bloodshed, it is quite sufficient?

Mr. Montagu: That is not what I said. I leave and I always have left any question as to the necessary steps for maintaining order in India to the local Governments and the Government of India.

Mr. Gwynne: Is the right Hon. Gentleman aware that the local Governments prohibited Mr. Gandhi coming into their districts, and that at the same time the Right Hon. Gentleman made a speech in this House saying that Mr. Gandhi was one of the saviours of India?

Mr. Montagu: There can be no doubt—many other people have said it—that Mr. Gandhi's services to India, particularly in South Africa, were very great indeed, and there can be no doubt as to the high character of Mr. Gandhi. Many people who have high characters are politically mischievous. The local Governments were perfectly right, in my opinion, in prohibiting the entry of Mr. Gandhi into their provinces, and I think the

utterances of His Majesty's Government on the subject show that they supported them.

Sir H. Craik : May I ask the Right Hon. Gentleman if it is proof of this Mr. Gandhi's high character and his sincerity that he has now joined, as Secretary of the Khilafat Committee, a Committee which is pressing points totally against all those that he has hitherto pressed and entirely opposed to his own former principles?

Mr. Montagu : I agree with the Right Hon. Gentleman that if Mr. Gandhi, after what happened last year, persists in a form of agitation such as that which he is now conducting, it would be absolutely impossible to take the same view of his action as was taken last year.

Sir H. Craik : That is not the question I asked. I asked if it were a proof of his consistency and sincerity that he has joined, and acts as a Secretary of a Committee which is propagating notions entirely opposed to those he held previously?

Mr. Montagu : I am afraid it is very difficult to answer a charge of that kind without satisfying myself as to the exact nature of it. What I am concerned in is that the Government of India and the local Governments in their determination to maintain order, will take adequate steps against anybody.

Mr. MacCallum Scott : Is the Right Hon. Gentleman aware that many Members of this House are to-day advocating views contrary to those they advocated years ago?

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India whether Mr. Gandhi is still free to go undisturbed throughout India; whether he is now at the head of the All India Khilafat Committee; whether four of his colleagues on that Committee were interned during the War for hostility to the British Government; one convicted in the Amritsar conspiracy, and one sentenced to transportation for life; whether this Committee has passed a resolution protesting against the Turkish Peace terms and recorded its unequivocal refusal to accept them; and what steps he is taking to see that Mr. Gandhi and his colleagues do not create further trouble and disorders?

Mr. Montagu : I have never received any complete list of the members of the Central Khilafat Committee, of which Mr. Chotani appears to be the President and with which Mr. Gandhi is closely associated; and the notice given me was too short to ascertain which of the individuals who were interned or convicted are members of it. Some, certainly, are closely associated with the movement. It passed a resolution in the sense described by the hon. Member. The Government of India and the local Governments are watching the situation closely and taking precautions. For instance, the seditious Meetings Act has been applied to Delhi, and there have been certain

prosecutions elsewhere. I am satisfied that they will take all steps necessary to maintain order.

Mr. Gwynne : Will the right hon. Gentleman say how it is that he has not informed himself of what is going on there ?

Mr. Montagu : I have taken steps to inform myself of what is going on. I must leave the provisions necessary for maintaining order to the Government of India and the local Governments, and I do submit to this House that it would be extremely dangerous for us here to try to dictate, suggest, or interfere with measures taken by them.

Mr. Gwynne : Are we to understand that the right hon. Gentleman does not keep himself fully informed of the particulars, even if he does not choose to interfere ? Are we to be told presently that the right hon. Gentleman has had no details of this Committee which has been formed, or is he now fully informing himself ?

Commander Viscount Curzon ; May I ask whether Mr. Gandhi is not now endeavouring to organise a boycott of the Prince of Wales' visit to India ?

Mr. Montagu : I think Mr. Gandhi's efforts thoroughly mischievous, but I would prefer to leave their proper treatment to those in whom his Majesty's Government and, I hope, this House have complete confidence, namely, those who have charge of the maintenance of law and order in India.

Mr. Bottomley : Is the right hon. Gentleman still proud to describe himself as one of Mr. Gandhi's intimate friends ?

Sir H. Craik : Is it not the case that in the communication of the Government of India a severe censure was passed upon Mr. Gandhi, and that, in the right hon. Gentleman's own letter to the Government of India, no such phrase of condemnation occurs ?

Mr. Montagu : I endorsed in my letter to the Government of India the general findings of the Government of India, and therefore I endorsed that passage to which I have referred, and I am prepared to support any steps the Government of India think necessary in the very difficult situation which now arises, but I will not dictate to the Government of India any steps. I prefer to leave it to them.

Mr. C. Palmer asked the Secretary of State for India what is the present attitude of the Government of India towards Mr. Gandhi ; and whether that gentleman is now permitted full liberty of action in the presentation of his views on India ?

Mr. Montagu : I am not aware of any restrictions.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—14, July 1920

General Dyer

Mr. C. Palmer asked the Secretary of State for India at what date the Commander-in-Chief in India revised his decision concern-

ing the action of General Dyer in dealing with the revolutionaries in Amritsar; and whether that revised decision of the Commander-in-Chief was in any way influenced by His Majesty's Government?

Mr. Montagu: The decision of the Commander-in-Chief in India to remove Brigadier-General Dyer from his command was made when the Report of the Hunter Committee had been seen by him. It was communicated to General Dyer on 22nd March last. I am not aware that this was a revised decision. The answer to the last part of the question is, of course, in the negative.

Mr. Palmer: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the Commander-in-Chief approved the action of General Dyer, and therefore this must have been a revised decision?

Mr. Montagu: I am not aware of that and I do not think it is so.

Mr. Gwynne: Is the right hon. Gentleman yet aware that at the Legislative Assembly at Simla, General Dyer's conduct was approved by all the official representatives of the Government?

Mr. Montagu: I am not aware of that, and I have carefully read the Debate over again, and I do not draw the deduction which the hon. Gentleman does. I would refer him specially to the utterances of Sir William Vincent.

Colonel Yate: Did the right hon. Gentleman read the speech of the Adjutant-General before the Legislative Council which entirely approved of General Dyer's action?

Mr. Montagu: I did not read it in that way but I will also refer the hon. and gallant Gentleman to the remarks of Sir William Vincent on the attitude of the Adjutant-General. I say again, I am satisfied that the Commander in-Chief in India did not reach any conclusion on General Dyer's attitude and acts until the report of the Hunter Committee had been received.

Colonel Yate: Was not the Adjutant-General speaking on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief when he spoke before the Committee?

Mr. Montagu: The spokesman on behalf of the Government in that Debate was Sir William Vincent. He explained the views of the Government on General Hudson's speech. I will send my hon. Friend a marked copy, which, I think, will completely dispose of the case.

Mr. C. Palmer asked the Secretary of State for India whether all the documentary evidence on which he came to a decision concerning the action of General Dyer has been presented to Parliament; and if not, whether he can see his way to making a complete disclosure of the evidence submitted to him as Secretary of State for India?

Mr. Montagu: If the hon. Member is referring to the evidence heard *in camera*, I am not prepared to publish it. All the other evidence has been published.

Mr. Palmer: Were there communications between the right hon. Gentleman and the Government of India which have not been published relating to the Dyer case?

Mr. Montagu: There have been heaps of communications between the Government of India and myself.

Mr. Palmer: I said relating to the Dyer case.

Mr. Montagu: Including the Dyer case. If the hon. Member infers from that, that anything I wrote to the Government of India altered or was intended to alter, was concerned with their judgment on General Dyer, he is under an erroneous impression.

Mr. Palmer: I am asking whether the Right Hon. Gentleman will publish these documents so that we can judge for ourselves, as we cannot trust him in this matter.

Mr. Montagu: Surely the Hon. Gentleman is aware that in the discharge of my duty as Secretary of State, innumerable communications on all sorts of subjects pass between me and the Government of India. If the Hon. Gentleman suggests that these should be made public, I am afraid I cannot agree with him. I must ask the House to accept my assurance on the subject that I exerted no sort of influence, and made no suggestion which could possibly lead to the insinuation that the Government of India formed their views on any suggestion of mine.

Mr. Gwyne: Are we to understand that the Right Hon. Gentleman still wishes to inform this House that he knew of none of the details at the end of December?

Colonel Yate asked the Secretary of State for War whether the Army Council as a body met to consider the question of General Dyer; and, if so, was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff present?

Mr. Churchill: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff was not present at the meeting, being in attendance on the Prime Minister at the Spa Conference.

Colonel Yate: Are we to understand that the decision in General Dyer's case was given by a majority of the civilians, and not by a majority of military men?

Mr. Churchill: The decision was unanimous. In any case, the military element outnumbered the civilian.

Colonel Yate: Are there not five civilians on the Army Council as against, at the most, four military men?

Mr. Churchill: There were four military officers and myself and two Parliamentary Secretaries. The Secretary was not a

member of the Army Council at that time. I carefully postponed the addition of the Secretary and of the Financial Member until that matter had been decided in order to guard myself against the very kind of suggestion the hon. and gallant Gentleman makes.

Colonel Ashley: Was there not a sharp division of opinion, and then subsequently in order to make a better case, did they not come to an unanimous decision?

Mr. Churchill: That is quite untrue. There was a difference of opinion on the question whether General Dyer should be retired and definite disciplinary action taken against him. The conclusion to which we came—that which I read to the House—was accepted and agreed to unanimously and spontaneously by all present.

Dr. Murray: Were there any reporters present?

Indian Administration (Debate)

Mr. Howard Gritten asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the fact that the only day assigned to the Indian Estimates was entirely devoted to the discussion of the Amritsar episode, he will arrange for another day to be given, as soon as possible, for the purpose of discussing Indian administration in general and the policy of the Secretary of State for India in particular?

Mr. Bonar Law: I would refer the Hon. Member to the reply which I gave yesterday to a question by my Right Hon. Friend, the Member for the Scottish Universities.

Mr. Gritten: Does the Right Hon. Gentleman really say that this House will be afforded no proper opportunity for criticising the administration of one of the most extensive portions of the British Empire—a course absolutely without precedent?

Mr. Bonar Law: I did not mean to convey more than was expressed in my answer.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—15, July 1920

Amritsar Disturbances.

Lieut. Colonel Croft asked the Prime Minister whether, having regard to the fact that the Secretary of State for India was not informed of the details of the occurrences in April 1919, until December of last year, he proposes to take any steps to censure the Government of India for this failure to keep the Imperial Government informed of the events referred to; and whether, he will cause all written messages and telegrams on the subject to be published?

Mr. Bonar Law: The reasons why full details of occurrences connected with the suppression of the disturbances were not elicited, until the Committee appointed to investigate them commenced its inquiry, have been repeatedly explained by question and answer in this House. No question of censure arises. The position is clearly

stated in paragraph 20 of the Government of India's despatch on the Hunter Report, and their conclusions on this point, amongst others, were accepted by His Majesty's Government. Answer to the last part of the question is in the negative.

Lieut.-Colonel Croft : Is it not the fact that the Secretary of State was not fully informed, and if this is so, is it not imperative that the Indian Government should keep the Secretary of State informed on all details of these serious matters in India?

Mr. Bonar Law : That is a matter which has been discussed, not only in question and answer, but in debate, and I have nothing to add to what has been said.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—16, July 1920

Act of Indemnity (India).

Brigadier-General Surtees asked the Secretary of State for India whether an Act of Indemnity was passed by the Government of India in September last which absolved those responsible for any acts committed in good faith under Martial Law but which might be *ultra vires* from the ordinary code?

Mr. Montagu : An Act was passed by the Indian Legislature in September last which, *inter alia*, protected officers of Government or any person acting under their orders from legal proceedings unless instituted by or on behalf of Government in respect of acts done for the purpose of maintaining or restoring order between the 30th March and the 26th August, 1919, if such acts were done in good faith and in a reasonable belief that they were necessary for that purpose. I shall be happy to send the hon. and gallant Member a copy of the Act.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—21, July 1920

Fiji.

Mr. Bennett asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies if he can confirm the information lately received from Fiji that a number of Indians arrested in connection with the strikes in that Colony are still untired ; whether an inquiry has been held in reference to the strikes ; if so, whether he will communicate the result of the inquiry to the House ; whether, as stated, in a recent representation to the Government of India by the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association of Bombay, a number of Indians in Fiji are awaiting return to their native country, but are deterred from returning by the absence of shipping accommodation : and whether steps have been taken to provide such accommodation without undue delay?

Lieut.-Colonel Amery : I am expecting a further report on the subject from the Governor, but it has not yet reached the Colonial

Office. The final report of the Commission on the Cost of Living and Rates of Wages is on its way, and when received, the question of its publication will be considered.

Non-co-operation

Sir. W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has any information as to the threats of Non-Co-operation made to the Viceroy by Mr. Gandhi and his friends leading the Khalifate agitation ; and what steps the Indian Government is taking in regard to this disloyal action ?

Mr. Montagu: The reply to the first part of the question is in the affirmative ; notices of Mr. Gandhi's letter to the Viceroy have appeared in the public Press. Non-Co-operation was announced to start from the 1st August. There is reason to hope that good sense will prevail and the movement will be a failure. I would ask the House to leave it to the authorities in India to take such steps as they may think necessary. The prolongation of the application of the Seditious Meetings Act to Delhi for another three months has just been sanctioned. The Government of India are watching the situation very closely.

Afghanistan

Commander Viscount Curzon asked the Secretary of State for India whether the State of affairs on the Afghan border is now satisfactory ; whether any Bolshevik organisations are now preparing an attack on the North-Western Frontier ; whether there is any reason to suspect that the Afghan Government is not carrying out the terms of the armistice or peace treaty ; whether an exodus of Mahommadans is now taking place from India to Afghanistan ; and to what is this due ?

Mr. Montagu : I think the situation on the Afghan border may be regarded as satisfactory. India is notoriously the object of Bolshevik propaganda, but I know of no reason to anticipate an armed Bolshevik attack on the North West Frontier of India. The answer to the third part of the question now is, I have no reason to suspect the intentions of the Afghan Government. With regard to the fourth part of the question, my information is that between 500 and 600 persons have recently emigrated from India to Afghanistan, and 750 more are said to be on their way. The emigration may be ascribed to the Khilafat agitation. I am asking the Government of India for further information.

Lieut-Colonel Yate : May I ask if the right hon. Gentleman will accelerate the movement of members of the Khilafat agitation across the frontier into Afghanistan ?

Mr. Montagu : That certainly might have a desirable result, but I would prefer to leave that to the Government of India.

Mr. Palmer : Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the emigrants have been well received in Afghanistan?

Mr. Montagu : I understand that some members of this emigrating party, having been convinced of the advantages of the British connection, have returned from Afghanistan.

H. R. H. The Prince of Wales (Visit).

Viscount Curzon asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has any information to the effect that Mr. Gandhi is now endeavouring to organise a boycott of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales's visit to India?

Mr. Montagu : I understand that Mr. Gandhi has proposed a boycott of His Royal Highness's visit. I understand, that as the House would expect, this disloyal project has found little favour, and I am confident that His Royal Highness will receive a welcome in India which will equal if not excel in enthusiasm the reception he has received in other parts of the Empire.

Mr. Gwynne : Will the right hon. Gentleman make it publicly known whether he still regards Mr. Gandhi as his friend?

Mr. Montagu : Nobody who suggests disloyalty or discourtesy to the Crown can be a friend of any Member of this House, let alone a Minister.

Mr. Gwynne : Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether or not Mr. Gandhi had expressed disloyalty last May when the right hon. Gentleman said he was his friend?

Mr. Montagu : At the time I said he was a friend of mine, I hoped, but found reluctantly that it was not so, that Mr. Gandhi's regret that his action had led to disturbances would have had permanent results.

Captain Loseby : Is the right hon. Gentlemen aware that Mr. Gandhi is the same person who stirred up sedition in South Africa until he was expelled from there?

New Councils (convicted persons)

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India whether persons convicted of waging war and other crimes during last year's rebellion, and since pardoned by the Executive, are eligible for election to the new Councils; and whether the presence of such persons on these Councils, the basis of which is co-operation with Government, is likely to produce good results?

Mr. Montagu : The hon. Member is no doubt referring to the clause 2 of Rule 5 of the rules for elections to the new Councils. That rule accepts only persons who have received a pardon, and does not apply

to those whose sentences have been remitted by the Indian executive in pursuance of His Majesty's directions for the exercise of clemency.

Mr. Gwynne : Are we to understand that as many as 1,700 persons out of 1,778 have been pardoned or let out and will the right hon. Gentleman say how many of these will be eligible for election ?

Mr. Montagu : Individuals who have been let out have not been pardoned under the amnesty, and they will not be eligible until five years after the expiration of their sentence.

Mr. Gwynne : How many have been pardoned ?

Mr. Montagu : I do not think any of them have been pardoned but I will ascertain.

Political agitators (Removal of Restrictions)

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India, (1) whether in order to secure a tranquil atmosphere during his visit to India, he suggested to the Viceroy that the restrictions placed upon Mrs. Besant and her co-workers, ordered by the Government of Madras, should be cancelled ; whether as a result of that suggestion, the Government of India did recommend the Madras Government to remove the restrictions forthwith ; and whether this is exerting influence over local Governments ?

(2) In view of the fact that immediately after his appointment in 1917 he telegraphed to the Viceroy to suggest to the Government of India the desirability of removing the restrictions imposed upon persons who, solely on account of their violent or improper methods of political agitation, had been dealt with under the Defence of India Act, he will explain his statement that he leaves, and always has left, any question as to the necessary steps for maintaining order in India to the local Governments and Government of India ?

Mr. Montagu : I hope the Hon. Member will not wish to discuss again these events of three year ago. They were fully discussed in the House on 16th October, 1917. In so far as they have any bearing on the answers I gave last week, I do not regard any action I took then as being inconsistent with the general policy I have always pursued of leaving to the authorities in India decisions which have to be taken for the maintenance of order.

Mr. Gwynne : Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly answer my question, which is quite clear, that is, whether it is true that he suggested to the Viceroy that restrictions placed on Mrs. Besant should be removed, and whether he does not think that suggestion is exercising influence on the local government which he stated last week he had never done ?

Sir J. D. Rees : Before the right hon. Gentleman answers that question, may I ask whether it is not the case that at present

Mrs. Besant is assisting the moderate elements in India against the seditious, and whether, therefore, it is not exceedingly undesirable to raise this question again ?

Mr. Montagu : I think I have answered the hon. Member.

Mr. Gwynne : I asked the right hon. Gentleman a definite question, not about Mrs. Besant, but about the right hon. Gentleman's own statement made last week that he never had influenced any local Government in any way ; namely, whether he now thinks this is correct, bearing in mind that the evidence shows that he did send a telegram to the Viceroy ?

Mr. Montagu : What I asked the Viceroy to do on that occasion was to consider whether the time had not come for the liberation of certain individuals who were interned. The result of deportation or internment without trial is always a question of consideration, whether that deportation or internment ought at a particular moment to end. There is no cancellation of the local Government's order. There was a consideration as to whether those orders ought not to be changed, but in my opinion that has nothing to do with the measures taken for the maintenance and preservation of order.

Mr. Pemberton Billing : Is there any distinction between the wish of the Minister for India and the order of the Minister for India ?

Mr. Montagu : The hon. Member knows well that occasionally suggestions are made to the Government of India for their consideration and on other occasions orders are issued.

Mr. Gwynne : Having considered the matter, is the right hon. Gentleman still justified in saying that he has never in any way exercised influence over the local Government.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—4, August 1920

Punjab Disturbances

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India if he will state what was the total number of persons convicted of waging war and other crimes during last year's rebellion ; how many were pardoned ; and in how many cases were the sentences remitted or reduced ?

Mr. Montagu : I will circulate the telegram received from the Government of India in answer to my inquiries based on this question and a similar one by the hon. Member for the Wrekin.

The following is the Telegram referred to:

Copy of Telegram from Viceroy, Home Department, Dated 2nd August.

Your telegram of 22nd July regarding statement for House of Commons. Following figures have been reported to us by Local

Government as the correct figures for convictions for waging war or murder in connection with the disorders in Punjab :

Sentence by Court :

Death sentences, 108.

Transportation for life, 25.

Sentences as Determined by Government :

Death sentences, 20.

Transportation for life, 25.

Common imprisonment for a term of two years or more, 271.

Imprisonment for less than two years, 40.

Released, 8.

Released under proclamation, 254.

Released on recommendation of reviewing judges, 3.

Remaining in gaol, 78.

20 death sentences were executed.

The figures asked for in your telegram of 28th July are as follows :

Punjab :

Total number convicted (including two persons convicted twice), 1781.

Number of persons convicted for waging war, 364.

For other offences, 1,418.

Number released, including 111 released conditionally, 980.

714 have served their sentences.

Number of persons still in gaol, 86.

This includes one person convicted in two cases who for the purpose of total number convicted has been counted as two.

Bombay :

Total number of persons convicted, 123,

36 persons sentenced for waging war.

87 for other crimes.

Sentences of 18 reduced.

None pardoned.

Delhi :

Total number of persons convicted, 21.

None sentenced for waging war.

None pardoned, but nine released, and sentences reduced in two cases.

Mr. Gwynne : Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us how many people out of the 1,700 affected have been pardoned ?

Mr. Montagu : The hon. Member asks me for a series of figures. The two questions together required a very careful telegram to India. He will find the full information circulated. It is impossible for me to read the long series of figures, and for that reason I will circulate it.

If he wants any further information on reading it I shall be only too glad to telegraph to India again.

Mr. Gwynne : Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether or not he is aware that many of these people who were pardoned are now joining Mr. Gandhi in starting a fresh seditious movement at the present time?

Mr. Montagu : The hon. member will see that none were pardoned when he sees the figures. Many were released—a very large number were released—under the terms of His Majesty's amnesty.

Mr. Gwynne : Are we to understand they were released on such terms that they are able to come out and straightway start a fresh movement?

Mr. Gwynne asked the Secretary of State for India if he will state what were the difficulties which prevented the setting up of a committee during the months of May, June, and July to inquire into the disturbances in the Panjab?

Mr. Montagu : During the months of May, June and July Martial Law was still in force.

Mr. Gwynne : Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question? What prevented the setting up of the Committee?

Mr. Montagu : During the course of questions and answers and debate in both Houses an explanation of the delay was given by various members of His Majesty's Government. The hon. Member asked another question in order to supplement the information which has already been given. I pointed out one of the most obvious reason—that the inquiry was promised when the fire was put out, to use my own words. I informed him before that the fire could not be considered to be put out whilst Martial Law was still in existence.

Mr. Gwynne : Does the right hon. Gentlemen remember that the reason he gave before was that this Enquiry could not be set up because of climatic conditions, and that when I pointed out to him that the High Court was sitting and that therefore climatic conditions could not affect it, he gave some other reason.

Mr. Montagu : If I may summarise the various answers, there was the fact that order had not been restored ; therefore, Martial Law was continued, and therefore it was impossible, in our judgment, to hold the Enquiry. There was also the war with Afghanistan, there were also the climatic conditions, and the necessity for choosing and electing the Committee. All these considerations together accounted, in our judgment, for the delay.

Mr. Gwynne : That did not prevent—

Mr. Speaker : This is becoming a debate.

Punjab Disturbances (Indemnities and Grants)

Mr. Allen Parkinson asked the Secretary of State for India in how many cases indemnities have been imposed on towns or villages concerned in the Punjab disturbances last year, the amount of such indemnity in each case, and the manner in which such indemnity has been levied?

Mr. Montagu : Indemnities were imposed in 12 or 14 cases. The principal amounts were imposed as follows : Amritsar city, Rs. 9 lakhs ; Gujranwala town, Rs. two and half lakhs ; Kasur town, Rs. one and one-fourth lakhs ; Wazirabad Rs. 66,000 ; Sheikhpura sub-division, Rs. 27,000 ; the remainder, Rs. 3,000 and under. In the case of Amritsar, special measures are being taken to effect recovery through advances to the Municipality by the Local Government. In the other cases recovery is being made under section 15A of the police Act.

Mr. Allen Parkinson asked the Secretary of State for India the total amount of compensation awarded by the Government to the Europeans wounded and the relatives of the Europeans killed during the Amritsar disturbances in April 1919, and the highest and lowest amounts awarded in each case ; and the total amount of the grants made to the sufferers and the relatives of the killed during the shooting on the crowd at the Jallianwala Bagh on 13th April 1919, and the highest and lowest amounts awarded in each case ?

Mr. Montagu : The information has been telegraphed for, and I will inform the Hon. Member when it is received.

Madras Legislative Council (Presidency)

Mr. Ramsden asked the Secretary of State for India whether he is aware that the appointment of Sir Rajagopala Chari as President of the Madras Legislative Council is being criticised very strongly on the ground that he has no Parliamentary experience ; and whether, in the interests of the smooth working of the reforms, he can select some appointee with the desired qualification ?

Mr. Montagu : I have received a telegram from a non-Brahmana Conference in India criticising this appointment (of which I have had no official intimation) on the grounds stated. With reference to the last part of the question, I would refer the Hon. Member to paragraph 6 of the Joint Select Committee's Second Report on the draft rules.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—10 November 1920

Dyer Fund

Colonel Yate asked the Secretary of State for India for what reasons instructions were issued by the Government of India for-

bidding civil and military officers and officials in India to subscribe to the Dyer fund ; under what law was this Order issued ; and was it issued with his approval ?

The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Montagu) : The Government of India reported to me in July that they had issued instructions to the effect stated under Rule 22 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, of which I will publish a copy in the Official Report. The instructions were not referred to me before issue. Rule No. 3 appears to be also relevant, and I am circulating it with the other.

Sedition Sentences (Remission)

Colonel Yate asked the Secretary of State for India whether Pir Mahbub Shah was recently convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment in Sind for advocating the expulsion of the British by force ; whether the sentence was remitted and whether this was part of a general policy of clemency approved by the Secretary of State ; whether Safar Ali Khan was convicted in the Punjab last month for seditious writing and sentenced to five years transportation ; and whether the same clemency will be shown in his case ?

Mr. Montagu : Pir Mahbub Shah was convicted and sentenced as stated for sedition, in respect of a violent speech advocating Jihad. His sentence was remitted on his signing a declaration of his repentance with a promise to make no more speeches of the kind and to remain obedient and loyal to the Government. The answer to the third part is, the remission of his sentence was not initiated from here ; to the fourth part, yes ; to the last part, I have received no intimation that it is intended to release Zafar Ali Khan.

Sir H. Craik : May I ask whether in regard to the release in question, the administration of Sind was not overruled by the Government of Bombay ?

Mr. Montagu : I do not propose to concern myself with these allegations. The responsibility is that of the Governor of Bombay, and I propose to approve and accept responsibility for the action taken by him.

Sir H. Craik : Is it not the case that the Administrator of Sind has since been removed from office ?

Mr. Montagu : Perhaps the Right Hon. Gentleman will put down a question. I do not propose to intervene between the Governor of Bombay and the officers.

Colonel Burn : Is there any guarantee that Pir Mahbub Shah will abide by his promise ?

Major Glyn : Is it not the fact that the whole of these

circumstances were gone into very carefully by Sir George Lloyd, and that as a result of his action there has been no further outbreak of sedition ?

Mr. Montagu : I am given to understand that the position in Sind has improved materially. I would ask the house to realise how difficult it is to answer questions of this kind. If I refuse to answer them, suspicious-minded people think that the action has been promoted from India. If I answer them there might be an impression that I am throwing over those who acted on their own responsibility. In this case I have answered that the action was not initiated by the India Office and I accept full responsibility for, and if necessary give my approval to, the action that has been taken.

Colonel Yate : Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise the truth of what was said in the *Times* yesterday, that it is to ignorance and fanaticism that the appeals of Gandhi are being made, and how dangerous it is in a country like India to allow those appeals to go unchecked ?

Mr. Montagu : I think that ignorance and fanaticism are very dangerous things whether in India or on the benches in this House.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Government of India has yet done anything, in accordance with the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Indian Reforms, to give members of the Indian Civil Service an option of retirement on proportionate pensions ; and whether he is aware that there is an increasing number of Civil Servants who wish to take advantage of this recommendation ?

Mr. Montagu : The Government of India will shortly receive a despatch from me in answer to one in which they forwarded Memorials. The answer to the second part of the question is in the negative.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether he is aware that there is grave discontent amongst the senior ranks of the Indian Civil Service in regard to pensions ; and whether he will publish the accounts of the pensions' fund at the date of its termination ?

Mr. Montagu : Memorials on the subject have been addressed to the Government of India, and I expect to receive very shortly their considered views regarding them. As to the latter part of the question, I am not sure if the hon. Member realises that no fund has existed since 1874, when the assets and liabilities of the old Civil Annuity Funds were transferred to the Secretary of State, who undertook that subscribers to those funds should be entitled on retirement to annuities at certain rates subject to certain conditions.

Major Glyn asked the Secretary of State for India, whether he has considered the advisability of issuing the necessary order to ensure that all members of the Indian Civil Service shall be compelled to take leave home at least once in every six years ; whether he will cause inquiries to be made as to how many Indian Civil Servants continue at duty without having had leave for the last 10 years ; and what are the causes of this state of affairs ?

Mr. Montagu : I do not think that the issue of any compulsory orders to the effect suggested would be altogether practicable or likely to commend itself to members of the Indian Civil Service. During the war a number of officers of that and other Civil Services were absent from India on military service and of those who remained many could not be granted leave. It is now being granted more freely, a special concession in respect of privilege leave has been sanctioned in the case of those detained in India during the War, and the leave rules in general have recently been made more liberal and flexible. I would not propose to circularise the several Governments to obtain the information asked for, but will send to the Government of India copy of the question and this reply.

Army Reorganisation.

Major Glyn asked the Secretary of State for India, whether the Army in India Committee has already caused to be put into operation an immense new scheme without public discussion, without counting the cost, without any reference to Parliament, or even without the publication of the views of the Government of India ?

Mr. Montagu : The scheme referred to appears to be that for four commands instead of two in India and for the redistribution of subordinate commands in districts. The facts are that the complete scheme was placed before the Army in India Committee by the Government of India while the Committee was at Delhi, with a request that they would express an opinion upon it. The scheme has since been approved by the Government of India and by myself in Council after consultation with Lord Rawlinson and will shortly come into force. I understand that as a whole it does not involve extra expenditure.

Major Glyn : Will the Right Hon. Gentleman consider whether it is not advisable to put Part 5 of the Committee's Report into operation as soon as possible ?

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : Will the Right Hon. Gentleman give an undertaking that the debatable parts of this Report, other than those already carried out, will not be carried out until the Report has been discussed in this House ?

Mr. Montagu : The Report of the Army in India Committee is now under consideration by Committee of the Council of India. After that Committee of the Council has concluded such a consideration, the Report will come before the Cabinet. After that I am sanguine enough to hope that the objects pursued by the Esher Committee, the improvement of the conditions of service in, and the organisation of the India Army will be no longer debatable.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : My right Hon. Friend knows what I mean by "debatable." The debatable point I mean is in relation to the General Staff. Will he give an undertaking that that shall not be carried out until it is debated ? It is a vital alteration of the relations of the Indian Army.

Mr. Montagu : That question should be addressed to the Leader of the House. I will undertake that the deliberations of His Majesty's Government arising out of these reports will be published before any action is officially taken, and in sufficient time for this House to make an appeal to the Leader of the House for an opportunity to discuss the matter.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : Thank you.

Colonel Yate : Is not Part 5 of this Report within the competence of the Government of India ? Cannot that be carried out at once without waiting for Parliamentary sanction ?

Mr. Montagu : As far as my recollection goes, Part 5 involves considerable expenditure of money and the various projects involved must be considered in the order of their importance as funds are available. I can answer my Hon. and Gallant Friend that I am determined to carry out as quickly as possible any recommendations that will improve the conditions of service in the Indian Army.

Major Glyn asked the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been directed to the statement in the Report of the Army in India Committee to the effect that the centre of gravity of probable military operations has now shifted from the West to the East, and that in future we must contemplate the possibilities of our Armies operating in the Middle East, based partially on India and partially on Home ; and whether the Government concur in that opinion ?

Mr. Montagu : The statement referred to was not (as has been erroneously stated) the opinion of the Committee, but that of a minority of its members, and it has no direct bearing on the recommendation of the Committee as a whole. The Report is now under consideration by a Committee of the Council of India.

Extra Territorial Army Service,

Lieut.-Colonel A. Murray asked the Secretary of State for India under what conditions the Indian military forces of His

Majesty are liable to serve outside the territorial limits of India during periods of war and peace, respectively ; and whether in either or both cases the sanction of Parliament to such service is necessary ?

Mr. Montagu : The Indian Military Forces of his Majesty are enlisted for general service, and are liable to serve beyond Indian limits during peace or war. The sanction of Parliament is not required for such forces serving outside the territorial limits of India. But, except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of His Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the revenues of India may not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applied to defraying the expenses of any military operations carried on beyond the external frontiers of those possessions by His Majesty's forces charged upon those revenues.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—16 November, 1920

Viceroyalty

Sir J. D. Rees asked the Prime Minister when an announcement may be expected regarding the successor to Lord Chelmsford as Viceroy and Governor-General of India ?

Mr. Bonar Law : I hope to be in a position to announce this appointment shortly ?

Captain Terrell : How many Cabinet Ministers have been offered the post ?

Mr. Bonar Law : It is not usual to put such a question as that, and when put it is never answered.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—17, November 1920

Inquiry Bureau [London]

Major Glyn asked the Secretary of State for India whether he will consider the advisability of at once establishing at the India Office an inquiry bureau where Indians arriving in this country for various educational and technical courses can readily be supplied with the necessary information and help to assist them as to the best steps they should take to attain their objects ; and whether the lack of this official help leads many Indians to consult undesirable authorities, who often give bad advice, consequently causing considerable misgiving and discontent ?

The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Montagu) : A bureau of information for Indian students, such as the hon. and gallant Member suggests, had been established in London for the last 11 years. It is in close touch with the universities and technical institutions, and every effort has been made to make its existence known in India.

But, of course, no Indian student is under any obligation to seek its advice. The bureau, which is at 21, Cromwell Road, has recently been transferred to the control of the High Commissioner for India.

Major Glyn : The point of my question is whether a branch of this office should not be at the India office, in order that those Indians, who naturally go to the India Office, may get the necessary information.

Mr. Montagu : I do not think it would be a wise course to identify this bureau too closely with India Office. Perhaps my hon. and gallant Friend will visit the bureau at 21, Cromwell Road, and also discuss the question with the High Commissioner.

Sir J. D. Rees : Does the right hon. Gentleman know that these Indians particularly object to being officially grandmothered ?

Government Stores [Couchman Committee's Report]

Mr. Bennett asked the Secretary of State for India if, in view of the satisfaction which have been caused in commercial circles by the Report of the Couchman Committee on the purchase of stores for the Government in India, he can give an assurance that this Report in its main outlines will be acted upon by the Government of India ?

Mr. Montagu : I regret that I cannot announce any decision on the Committee's opportunity of examining them in the light of the Government of India's views which have not yet reached me.

Mr. Lajpat Rai

Colonel Yate asked the Secretary of State for India whether Lajpat Rai, who was deported from India in 1907 for sedition, and to whom a special passport from America to India was granted by the Secretary of State for India in October, 1919, is the same Lajpat Rai, the author of the book *Young India*, which was seized in November 1917, under Regulation 51 ; whether criminal proceedings can be taken against him now that he has returned to British territory ; whether he can now state whether there is any evidence that Lajpat Rai was subsidised by German agents in America ; and, if so, what action he proposes to take in the matter ?

Mr. Montagu ; Mr. Lajpat Rai was given an ordinary passport back to India last year. The question of taking criminal proceedings against him is entirely for the Government of India, with whose discretion I shall not interfere.

Troops in North-West Persia

Sir J. D. Rees asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Government of India requisitions or retains British forces in North West Persia ; and, if so, whether Indian funds are devoted to any and, if to any, to what extent to defraying the resulting charges ?

Mr. Montagu : The answer to both parts of the question is in the negative.

Army Reorganisation

Sir J. D. Rees asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Esher Report recommends that the Indian army should come under the control of the War Office ; whether the present Chief of the General Staff in India supported the recommendation that a civil member of Council for supplies should be appointed ; and whether, under the recommendations of the Esher Committee, the Imperial Staff can authorise the expenditure of any money from the Indian Exchequer ?

Mr. Montagu : I would leave my hon. Friend to study the recommendations of the Esher Committee and form his own conclusions. The answer to the second part is in the affirmative, and to the third in the negative.

Sir J. D. Rees : Do not these answers in themselves answer most of the adverse criticisms against the Esher Report ?

Deportation

Mr. Kenyon asked the Secretary of State for India whether any Acts or Regulation are in force in India, or any part thereof, providing for deportation ; if so, what are these Acts and Regulations ; and what is their nature ?

Mr. Montagu : Bengal Regulation III of 1818 and corresponding Madras and Bombay Regulations give certain powers of restraint within India without Judicial trial for the protection and security of the British Dominions. The Foreigner's Act of 1864 gives certain powers to deport aliens, and the European Vagrancy Act of 1874 contains powers of deporting destitute vagrants back to Europe. Apart from these there is no provision for deportation from India except a temporary Regulation under the Defence of India Act, 1915.

Indians, British Colonies and Protectorates

Mr. Bennett asked the Secretary of State for India if he has received a despatch from the Government of India reviewing the positions of Indians in British Colonies and Protectorates and making suggestions thereon ; and if he will be able at an early date to place before the House the substance of the recommendations contained in the despatch ?

Mr. Montagu : I am in constant communication with the Government of India on these subjects, but have not received from them recently any general recommendations, though general considerations of course, arise in the discussion of the position in particular colonies.

Mr. Bennett asked the Secretary of State for India whether Sir Benjamin Robertson has recently visited the Kenya Colony and the Uganda Protectorate in order to inquire into the position of Indians in those territories; whether any Report of the result of this inquiries has reached the Government of India; and if he is yet in possession of the view of that Government thereon?

Mr. Montagu: Yes, Sir. The questions discussed are receiving the urgent attention of my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies and myself.

Sir W. Jonyson-Hicks: Does my right hon. Friend agree that self-determination is to be permitted to the Colonies in this matter?

Mr. Montagu: I understand that the question refers to the Crown Colonies which are under the control of the Colonial Office; if the hon. Gentleman applies the meaning of self-determination to them, I hope he will recollect that there are Indians as well as British native inhabitants in those Colonies.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks: I want to know from the right hon. Gentleman whether he intends the modern doctrine of self-determination shall be accorded to these Crown Colonies in respect to the influx of Indians where they are not wanted?

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: Before the right Hon. Gentleman answers that question, may I enquire whether self-determination will take into account that in Kenya Colony there are over 2,000,000 African negroes as well as 5,000 whites; and will their views be taken into consideration?

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks. Do you think they want Indians?

Mr. Montagu: There are many things perpetrated in the name of self-determination.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—18, November 1920

Army Reorganisation.

Major Glynn asked the Prime Minister which Government Department has the authority to consider the Report of the Army in India Committee and make recommendations to the Cabinet; whether Part V. of that Report is altogether the concern of the Government of India; and that, if Cabinet sanction is given, these reforms can be carried out by the 1st January, 1921?

The Prime Minister: The Committee was appointed by the Secretary of State for India and has reported to him. I understand that its Report is now under the consideration of the Secretary of State for India in Council and the Government of India. The proposals in Part V., the greater part of which relate solely to the internal economy of the Indian Army, entail expenditure which, with one reservation, would fall wholly on Indian revenues. Control

of those revenues is vested by Statute, not in the Cabinet, but in the Secretary of State for India in Council, and a majority vote of the Council of India is required for expenditure from them. The reservation is that any improvements in pay, etc., granted to the Indian Army would apply in the case of officers of that Army serving out of India in areas where the War Office is responsible for their maintenance.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—22, November 1920

Lajpat Rai [Passport]

Colonel Yate asked the Secretary of State for India whether, considering that in March 1919 he refused to reconsider his offer in the matter of granting Lajpat Rai a passport to return from America on the signature of peace, and a passport was accordingly granted to him last year, he will state whether this passport was granted at the request of the Government of India; and if not, at whose request it was granted?

Mr. Montagu: The passport was granted not by the India Office but by the British Consul-General in New York at Lajpat Rai's request. I was consulted before it was given.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—24, November 1920

Incitement to Disaffection.

Colonel Yate asked the Secretary of State for India whether, considering that the Government of India in the official exposition of their policy of tolerance of agitation in India, published in the Press of the 6th instant, state that the appeal to the illiterate has already resulted in one deplorable crime, and that the reckless activity of the leaders of agitation who wander from city to city stirring up excitement among the masses by inflammatory speeches and by the reiteration of false statements, despite constant contradiction, may at any time result in serious outbreaks of disorder, he will now suggest to the Government of India the advisability of putting an immediate stop to the policy of non-intervention pursued by them towards the appeals to ignorance and fanaticism hitherto made by Mr. Gandhi and his confederates without restraint; and if he can state what steps are now to be taken to protect the Indian community at large from incitement to disaffection and rebellion?

The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Montagu): I have nothing to add to the replies which I gave in the House last Wednesday on the same matter.

Colonel Yate: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the last

part of my question—What steps have been taken to protect the Indian community from incitement to disaffection and rebellion?

Mr. Montagu: If the hon. and Gallant Gentleman will refer to the answer I gave last week. I recited a list of steps which have been taken. I believe the number of prosecutions now is 16.

Mr. Gwynne: Is the right Hon. Gentleman aware that last week he did not make any statement as to what has been done to restrain Mr. Gandhi?

Mr. Montagu: I did last week state that, as far as I was aware, the only restraint of Mr. Gandhi was the Seditious Meetings Act.

Mr. Gwynne: Does the right Hon. Gentleman consider that sufficient to restrain him, and, in view of the continued sedition which Mr. Gandhi is preaching, will he ask for a special report on the subject?

Mr. Montagu: As I stated last week, I do not propose to interfere with the discretion of the Government of India. We are all agreed as to the danger and the mischief of Mr. Gandhi's campaign, but the matter of enforcing order in India is a matter for the Local Governments and the Government of India. I really must decline to dictate from here what steps are to be taken.

Mr. Gwynne: Will the Right Hon. Gentleman ask for a special Report on the subject? He has asked for special Reports on other subjects.

Mr. Montagu: I have already asked for a Report, and I have given the House the information I have received, namely, the resolution of the Government of India and an account of the number of prosecutions.

Mr. Gwynne: Is the Right Hon. Gentleman satisfied with those steps?

Outrages

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether he can give any information as to the attempt of the Zakka Khel recently to carry off two officers of the British Army; and whether any of them have been captured or punished?

Mr. Montagu: Two British soldiers were kidnapped last month from Peshawar by a gang of Zakka Khel. They were detained in the Bazar Valley and were reported to be receiving good treatment. I have not received news of the release of these men, but I am making further inquiry.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks: Will the Right Hon. Gentleman add further inquiries as to whether the culprits have been found?

Mr. Montagu: The Hon. Member knows—I think he has been there—that we are dealing with tribal territory, and punishment is difficult, but I have made inquiries into that.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has any further information in reference to the recent murder of an English officer at Kohat, and the attempt of the tribes men to carry away his wife?

Mr. Montagu: The only information that I have received beyond that already published in the Press is that the tribes men implicated were a gang of about thirty men belonging probably to the Zakka Khel and Kambel Khel Afridis. The condition of the lady who was wounded is satisfactory.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks: I must ask the same supplementary question, whether any information has been obtained in regard to the Zaka Khel themselves and what steps are being taken with regard to these two outrages by the same tribe, one in capturing British soldiers and the other in murdering a British officer?

Mr. Montagu: I have anticipated the Hon. Member by making inquiry on that very point.

Punjab Disturbances (Amnesty)

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India if any communications passed between himself and the Viceroy after the date of the amnesty and the release of the prisoners regarding the pardoning of the 27 men who were convicted in connection with the Punjab rebellion of 1919, and subsequently released under the amnesty; and, if so, whether he will state what these communications were, who it was that desired that those men should be specially pardoned to permit them to stand for election to the new Councils, and what reason was adduced to warrant the Government of India Act by which Parliament imposed this disability on convicted persons, being set at naught at the first opportunity?

Mr. Montagu: No, Sir, I find that I sent no communications on this subject to the Viceroy except that I communicated to him a question and answer asked in this House. As regards the second part of the question, the Government of India announced in a communique to the Press on the 18th September that they had always contemplated, in the case of persons not found guilty of personal participation in serious deeds of violence, action which would remove the electoral disability. They have informed me their action was taken after consultation with the Local Government. As regards the last part I would refer the Hon. Member to Rule V (2), as approved by Parliament.

Mr. R. Gwynne: Did not the Right hon. Gentleman state, in answer to a question from me, that these men were not being pardoned in order to enable them to take part in the elections?

Mr. Montagu: No, I do not think so. I think I stated that they were not pardoned, but I will refresh my memory.

Rupee Exchange

Mr. Clough asked the Secretary of State for India whether he is aware of the serious effect on British trade of the wholesale cancellation of Indian contracts due to the fall in the rupee; whether the Government of India undertook to stabilise the rupee at 2s.; whether he is now investigating the commercial crisis which has arisen; and what steps he proposes to take to remedy the situation?

Mr. Montagu: I am aware of the serious effect on the United Kingdom export trade on the recent fall in the rupee exchange. As regards the second part of the question no such undertaking has been given, but as stated in the announcement issued on 2nd Feb. last, the objective of Indian currency policy is the stabilisation of the rupee exchange at 2s. gold, the rate recommended by the Majority Report of the Indian Currency Committee of 1910. With a view of the support of exchange, drafts on London have been sold by the Government of India to the extent of £50,000,000 since this policy was announced, but the effect of these sales has been obscured for various reasons, in particular on account of the stagnation of the export and unusual strength of the import trade of India in recent months.

Compulsory Military Service

Captain R. Terrell asked the Secretary of State for India whether, in view of the situation in that country, the India Office will, in reconsidering its attitude, permit the introduction of compulsory military service for all Europeans in India, as desired by Europeans themselves?

Mr. Montagu: An auxiliary force for India has recently been constituted on a voluntary basis. I do not propose to take any steps towards the introduction of compulsory military service until it has been seen what success attends the voluntary organisation. I have asked for a report on the progress of the force.

Colonel Yate: When does the Right Hon. Gentleman expect to get that Report?

Mr. Montagu: I have asked for it by telegram. I hope in the course of a few days.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—1, December, 1920

North-West Frontier [Raids].

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks asked the Secretary of State for India whether, having regard to the constant raids into the North-West Frontier Provinces of India extending to the murder and cap-

ture of British Officers, the Government of India has formulated any definite and permanent policy for dealing with the frontier ; and, if so, when it may be hoped that these raids will cease ?

Mr. Montagu : As a result of the Afghan War, and of the part played in it by some of the tribes, military operations have been undertaken against the Mahsuds and Wazirs with complete success. The Mahsuds have taken contracts of road-making, and considerable numbers of them are now engaged in that peaceful occupation. The Wazirs have accepted the terms imposed by the Government of India. A railway is being constructed in the Kyber. The frontier militias have been re-organised and the distribution of regular troops rearranged. And other measures have been, and are being, taken with the object of securing more stable conditions on the frontier. It may be hoped that the combined effect of these measures will eventually be to reduce, if not to prevent entirely, the number of raids, but I can, of course, name no date.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks : Has the railway actually been commenced through the Khyber, and is the policy of railways and roads to be extended to other parts of the frontier as opportunity offers ?

Mr. Montagu : Road-making is the best security, I think, against raids. I am not quite sure whether the railway has actually been commenced, but I think it has. I am informed that it was to be commenced last month. Perhaps the Hon. Member will put down another question.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—2, December 1920

Dr. S. Bose [Passport],

Mr. Clynes asked the Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been drawn to the case of Dr. Sudhindra Bose, M.A., Ph. D., who made application for a passport to proceed to India for the purpose of seeing his mother, who is very ill and not expected to recover, which was refused ; whether he is aware that Dr. Sudhindra Bose is not a member of any political organisation and has offered to give an undertaking not to take part in politics, and whether, in view of these facts, he will have inquiries made into the case and grant the necessary facilities to enable Dr. Bose to proceed to India ?

Mr. Montagu : Yes, Sir, I have had thorough inquiry made into this case. This Indian Gentleman is now a citizen of the United States, having applied to renounce his British-Indian nationality a few weeks after the outbreak of war. Doctor Bose's original application for a *Visa* to travel made no mention of his mother's health, and I am not prepared to facilitate his return to India.

Civil Service Pensions.

Mr. Kidd asked the Secretary of State for India if he is aware that the pensions for retired Indian uncovenanted civil servants has not been raised for very many years ; that, in view of the increased cost of living, they had become inadequate before the War and have become more so since ; that the Public Services Commission, appointed by the Secretary of State for India in 1915, recommended certain increases, and that no increases have been made ; and whether he can say when it is intended to increase these pensions ?

Mr. Montagu : My hon. Friend is evidently not aware of the measures taken by me in August, 1919, as a result of the recommendations of the Public Services Commission to which he refers. The measures are given in detail in a Resolution of the Government of India of 15th November, 1919, of which I will send the Hon. member a copy.

*HOUSE OF COMMONS—6, December 1920***Mission of His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught to India.**

Motion made, and question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £8,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1921, as a grant in aid of the Mission of His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught to India."

Sir D. Maclean : I am certain the Committee very much appreciates the action of His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught in undertaking this Mission to India. It is entirely typical of his unfailing devotion to public duty. We much regret that His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales is unable, owing to the strenuous nature of his very valuable and prolonged services in other parts of the Empire, to fulfil his contemplated mission to India ; but we are quite confident that in so far as his place can be taken, it is amply and most efficiently taken by the Duke of Connaught. There is a foot-note to the Vote which says that certain expenses in connection with the Vote will be defrayed from the Navy Vote. What is the total expense ? If that can be communicated, I shall be glad.

Mr : Baldwin : I may tell my right hon. Friend and the Committee that it does not mean that any further money will have to be asked of the Admiralty, but I am afraid that, until the journey is completed, it will be impossible to say what the expenses are. The only expenses that I can tell my right hon. Friend for certain are, whatever the extra cost may be of the steamer which takes His Royal Highness to India over and above what she would have consumed had she been employed all the time . I understand that the Suez Canal dues will amount to £3,000, and there are being

incurred certain expenses in providing suitable accommodation for the party, which numbers 13. That expenditure will probably be a matter of about £4,000. That is the whole of the information at present in my possession, but at a later date. I am sure, the total information will be obtainable from the Admiralty, when they know what the expenses of the journey are.

Question put, and agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—8, December 1920

Government Servants' conduct Rules.

Colonel Yate asked the Secretary of State for India whether, considering that Rule 22 of Government Servants' Conduct Rules lays down that no Government servant shall subscribe in aid of any political move in India, instructions were issued by the Government of India forbidding Government servants to contribute to the Tilak fund, the Paisa fund, and other funds of an obviously political character, and if such instructions were not issued in these cases, why the Dyer fund was selected by the Government of India as an occasion calling for special prohibition?

The Secretary of State for India (Mr. Montagu): My hon. and gallant Friend shows by his question that he is aware of the general prohibition contained in the Rule. As regards its application to the Dyer fund, I presume that the Government of India issued their instructions in response to a request for orders. I do not know whether similar action was thought necessary in the case of the other funds mentioned, as to which I have had no particulars.

Colonel Yate: Has the right hon. Gentleman any information as to whether the Government of India have issued instructions forbidding Government servants to contribute to the Jalianwala Bagh memorial fund?

Mr. Montagu: I have no information.

Election Rules (Burma.)

Mr. Grundy asked the Secretary of State for India whether, in view of the fact that the rules for the election of Burma's representatives to the Council of State and the Indian Legislative Assembly are unsatisfactory and temporary arrangements, he will now revise the rules and order a fresh election under the revised rules?

Mr. Montagu: It will necessarily take time to revise the electoral arrangements in Burma. Meanwhile, I think it is preferable that the present arrangements, which should be completed by the 14th of this month, should be carried out than that Burma should have no representative on the Indian Legislature at the outset.

Mr. J. Davidson asked the Secretary of State for India whether

he is aware that men recruited to work on the railways in Mesopotamia were promised 300 rupees per month; that at the commencement they were advanced a month's pay which came to £ 39. 7s. 6d.; that 300 rupees now only equals £23, 12s.; that the men have asked the Civil Commissioner to stabilise the 300 rupees at £30, under which arrangement the men would lose £9. 7s. 6d., and the Government £5. 8s; and whether, in view of the present hardship imposed upon the men who have to maintain their families at Home, he will represent to the Civil Commissioner the advisability of acceding to the men's request?

Mr. Montagu: Men have been recruited for the Mesopotamian railways at varying rates of pay, and have received advances of one or two months' pay according to their requirements. The minimum rate was originally 200 rupees a month, but this was subsequently raised to 275 rupees. The fall in exchange has, of course, reduced the sterling equivalent of pay expressed in rupees. I am not aware that the men have made any representation to the High Commissioner on the subject, but I will make inquiries.

Burma Rice Crop (control)

Mr. Hirst asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has received the Report of the Government in India regarding the control of the rice crop in Burma during the coming year; and, if so, what decision has been arrived at?

Mr. Montagu: I will circulate with the Official Report a copy of a communique issued by the Government of India from which it will be seen that the present system of control will cease at the end of the year. From the 1st January the export trade will be left to private enterprise subject to a limitation of the quantity exported by means of licences.

The following is the communique referred to:

"It has already been announced that all control will be removed over the export trade in rice from Burma to India from the 1st January 1921, but that no re-exports of Burma rice from India will be allowed. In view of the recent heavy fall in the world price of rice, it has been decided to now modify considerably the system of control over exports of Burma rice to foreign countries during next year. Tenders will be allowed as from the 1st January 1921, to make their own arrangements for sale and export to any foreign destination, subject only to the condition that such exports will be permitted only under licence granted by the Rice Commissioner within the limits of the total quantity sanctioned for export. Applicants for licence will be required to submit particulars of all transactions to the Rice Commissioner. Should the price in Burma rise above the equivalent of the present control maximum rate of Rs. 180 per

hundred baskets of paddy, the Government of India reserve to themselves full power to re-impose a system of strict control similar to that in force in the present year. It is estimated at present that the total surplus rice available for export from Burma next year will amount approximately to 2,100,000 tons of white rice. The average amount of Burma rice taken by India previous to the introduction of control was some 850,000 tons, and taking into account these figures the Government of India consider that it will be sufficient at present to estimate the exports of rice to India at a maximum of 1,100,000 tons. The balance of 1,000,000 tons will therefore be allotted for export to foreign countries, but this amount may be increased later if circumstances permit. The existing prohibition on the exports of rice from India proper to foreign countries will be retained. These measures will, the Government of India believe, suffice to conserve adequate supplies for the consumer both in India and in Burma, while ensuring that these supplies shall be available at reasonably cheap prices."

HOUSE OF COMMONS—16, December 1920

Delhi (New Works)

Major Glyn asked the Secretary of State for India whether it is intended to permit any new works, such as triumphal arches, to be built at New Delhi until all the work begun has been completed and better transit facilities provided to enable Government officials and others to reach New Delhi and, once established in houses and offices at the new capital, to enable them to reach the main centres of population in the vicinity to obtain food, clothing, etc., at cheap rates?

Mr. Montagu : It rests with the Government of India to decide in what order works in connection with the establishment of the new capital at Delhi shall be proceeded with, and I doubt whether it would be wise to attempt to determine in London the order of priority to be followed. I will communicate my hon. Friend's question to the Government of India.

Public Works Officers (Technical Allowance)

Mr. Bennett asked the Secretary of State for India whether he has received numerous memorials from members of the Public Works Department recruited in India complaining of the invidious distinction which is placed upon them by an allowance, officially known as the technical allowance, restricted to members of their service who are recruited in England, this allowance being given on the declared assumption that engineers recruited in England have superior professional qualifications to those engineers trained and recruited in India; whether expert witnesses before the Public

Services Commission stated that the professional education given in the engineering colleges of Roorkee, Sibpur, Poona, and Madras was of the highest standard ; whether the commission found that Public Works officers recruited in India were engaged on work of the same importance and responsibility as officers of the same standing recruited in England ; whether they declared that they were satisfied that the training given in the four engineering colleges in India was adequate to the needs of the higher branches of the public service, and condemned the offering of higher rewards to men educated abroad than are offered to those who have passed through the educational institutions of their own country; and whether, seeing that the assumption on which their preferential allowance has been shown to be unwarranted, he will recommend that the terms of the Government of India resolution of 6th May, 1920, be so modified as to do away with a distinction held to be invidious by those who are unfavourably affected by it ?

Mr. Montagu : I have seen copies of such memorials of which the originals are, I understand, being submitted to me through the Government of India in accordance with the memorial rules. I must reserve my decision on the point raised in them until I receive them from the Government of India, their comments and opinions. I have asked the Government of India to expedite their communication.

Seditious Speeches and Article [Prosecutions]

Colonel Yate asked the Secretary of State for India whether Sufi Ikbal and Maulvi Laki Ullah, of Panipat, who were under trial for seditious language, have been convicted or not ; how many other men have been tried and convicted of the same offence ; and whether he can give any information as to what steps have been taken by the Government of India to put a stop to the present campaign of violence and intimidation in India ?

Mr. Montagu : The two persons named were convicted. Within the past three and half months, there have been ten other persons prosecuted for seditious utterances in speeches or newspapers. I have no information as to the result of two cases. In all the others the accused were convicted. I gave particulars in this House on the 17th November of the steps so far taken by the Government of India. Since that date the Seditious Meetings Act has again been extended to Delhi, and its extension to some additional Punjab districts is being considered. Warnings have been given to newspapers that contained seditious articles, and in connection with the violence used at elections in the Punjab the Government of India have impressed on the Local Government the necessity of prompt prosecution of those guilty of unlawful assembly and intimidation.

The hon. and gallant Member referred on Friday last to the policy of "do nothing" pursued by the Government of India in these matters. I was unable to reply to him as his speech was out of order but, I trust that with his information and with an assurance that the Government of India are conducting a vigorous propaganda to counteract mischievous calumnies, he will not repeat an allegation which is wholly inaccurate.

HOUSE OF COMMONS—21, December 1920

Burma Bill

Sir J. D. Rees asked the Secretary of State for India whether evidence will be taken before the Committee which will consider the Burma Bill ; and whether the Burma deputation should remain, or is free to return to, Burma ?

Mr. Montagu : My hon. Friend will remember that in speaking of the Committee on Monday week I said that I do not propose that any Member of the Government shall serve on it. It will be for Parliament to decide whether the Committee should be appointed and the Burma Bill referred to it, and for the Committee, if appointed, to decide whether to take evidence and, if so, from what persons or bodies. I am afraid, therefore, that I cannot undertake the responsibility of advising on the last part of the question, so far as the Committee is concerned. If the Burma Deputation should consider it advisable to prepare and place in my hands a written statement of their case, I will take an opportunity, if one presents itself, of communicating it to the Committee when appointed.